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“Don’t Blame Me”  
 
George McGovern’s capturing of only the electoral votes of Massachusetts in the 
1972 presidential election seemed to cement the reputation of the Bay State as the 
unrivaled bastion of American liberalism. The outbreak of the infamous busing crisis just 
a few years later, however, earned the state’s capital Boston the dubious and opposite 
status as “Little Rock of the North” and “the most racist city in America.”1 The state 
earned national notoriety once again in 1988 with the resounding defeat of Democratic 
presidential candidate and Bay State Governor Michael Dukakis, which seemed to signal 
that the Northeast and its “limousine liberals” were out of touch with the rest of the 
country. The 1972 electoral map, the violence of the Boston busing crisis, and the failure 
of the Dukakis presidential bid have become signposts to symbolize the exceptionalism 
of the Bay State, the failure of New Deal/Great Society liberalism and the decline of 
Democratic Party. Through an examination of the political culture and grassroots 
activism in the liberal suburbs of metropolitan Boston between 1960 and 1990, this 
dissertation challenges those conventional explanations and recasts the narratives of 
modern liberalism, civil rights, suburban politics and electoral realignment.  
                                                
1 Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 1; Pam Belluck, “Boston Rises Above Unflattering 
Stereotypes,” New York Times, July 25, 2004.  
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“Don’t Blame Us” interweaves the stories of postwar suburban growth and 
inequality, grassroots social movements, and the transformation of both Massachusetts 
politics and the Democratic Party at the national level during the second half of the 
twentieth century. Many studies of twentieth century urban and political history have 
routinely demonstrated how postwar liberal policies both fueled the construction of 
suburbia and sowed the seeds for the creation of the Republican coalition.  By inverting 
that paradigm, “Don’t Blame Us” investigates how the processes and politics of 
suburbanization also reshaped the ideology and policies of postwar liberalism and the 
Democratic Party.  This examination of the suburbanization of liberalism revises existing 
scholarly assessments to demonstrate that the rise of the New Right and the  Reagan 
Revolution in the 1970s and 1980s did not mark the demise of liberalism or the 
Democratic Party. Instead, it illuminates the increasing centrality of suburban voters 
outside of Boston and throughout the nation in remaking modern liberalism and the 
Democratic Party by reorienting both away from their roots in the labor union halls of 
Northern cities and the ideals of the New Deal State and toward white-collar 
communities in the post-industrial metropolitan periphery.  
 Massachusetts, one of the smallest and most suburbanized states in the nation, 
has long played a disproportionately large role in national politics and basked in its 
reputation as the stronghold of American liberalism. Yet metropolitan Boston provides 
perhaps the most notable example of a political and social development that has 
percolated in other knowledge-based metropolitan regions around the country since the 
late 1950s, ranging from Fairfax County, Virginia, the North Carolina Research Triangle, 
Boulder, Colorado to Silicon Valley, California. In 2002 political scientists John B. Judis 
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and Ruy Teixeira deemed these areas and their population the vanguard of an “Emerging 
Democratic Majority.” The realignment of white suburban professionals first became 
visible at the national level in the 1972 presidential race and steadily continued so that by 
1988 a majority of the nation’s professionals supported Dukakis over Republican 
candidate George H.W. Bush. Voters in counties in which white collar professionals now 
disproportionately reside, such as Route 128 outside of Boston as well as New Jersey's 
Bergen County, Philadelphia’s Montgomery County, and California's Santa Clara 
County, have all shifted their political affiliation from Republican to Democrat during the 
last forty years as the white-collar post-industrial workforce has increasingly come to 
support Democratic candidates in national elections.2 In 2008, Barack Obama 
overwhelmingly carried this voting bloc and won 50 percent of suburban voters across 
the nation, proving once again the importance of this constituency in ensuring the 
Democratic Party’s persistence at the national level.3 Far from being exceptional, 
                                                
2 John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira, The Emerging Democratic Majority (New York: Scribner, 2002); John 
B. Judis and Ruy Teixiera, “Majority Rules: The coming Democratic Dominance” New Republic, (August 
5, 2002), 18-23.Judis and Teixeira define professionals as “highly skilled, white-collar workers, typically 
with a college education, who produce ideas and services. They include academics, architects, engineers, 
scientists, computer analysts, lawyers, physicians, registered nurses, teachers, social workers, therapists, 
fashion designers, interior decorators, graphic artists, writers, editors, and actors.” As the United States has 
moved away from a blue-collar, industrial economy toward a postindustrial one that produces ideas and 
services, the professional class has expanded from 7 percent of the workforce in 1950 to more than 15 
percent by 2002.” Judis and Teixara state that, “As the professional class has grown, its politics have 
shifted. Typically self-employed or working for small firms, professionals once saw themselves as proof of 
the virtues of laissez-faire capitalism. They disdained unions and opposed the New Deal and "big 
government." In the 1960 presidential election, professionals supported Nixon over Kennedy 61 percent to 
38 percent. Since then, however, their views have changed dramatically. In the last four presidential 
elections, professionals have supported the Democratic candidate by an average of 52 percent to 40 percent.  
3 See John B. Judis, “America the Liberal, The Democratic majority: It emerged!” The New Republic, 
November 18, 2008 (http://www.tnr.com/article/america-the-liberal, last accessed April 28, 2010). Judis 
notes that while it is not clear exactly what percentage of professionals voted for Obama because the exit 
polls did not include professionals as a category. Using an approximation of people with advanced degrees 
who Obama by 58 to 40 percent. Moreover, Judis suggests that increase of the post-industrial knowledge 
based workforce has not just occurred in “traditionally liberal areas like Boston, Chicago, and San 
Francisco” but has also taken shape in parts of the South and West such as Charlotte, Raleigh-Durham-
Chapel Hill Research Triangle, the northern Virginia suburbs, Orlando and South Florida, and the Denver-
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therefore, the developments that took place in Massachusetts, especially its suburbs, 
embody both the progressive and problematic transformations of liberalism and the 
Democratic Party in the second half of the twentieth century.  
 The rise of Cold War military spending and corresponding demographic 
upheaval in the postwar period established the conditions for liberal political activity in 
the Massachusetts suburbs. During the two decades after World War II, the Route 128 
highway encircling Boston evolved into a major node in the nation’s growing high-tech 
economy.  The construction of the highway and its related businesses drew a new 
generation of executives, engineers, professors with ties to the area’s renowned academic 
institutions and post-industrial corporations to move to the suburban communities along 
its periphery. Many of these newcomers defied the conventional image of the apolitical or 
conservative suburbanite. These affluent, largely white residents aimed not to reject, but, 
rather, to deploy their identities as homeowners toward progressive causes. In the 
process, these residents helped to remake Bay State communities such as Brookline, 
Concord, Lexington Lincoln and Newton into some of the most socioeconomically 
exclusive and politically liberal suburbs in the state and the nation. By 1970, in an article 
entitled “Liberalism in the Suburbs,” Newsweek characterized Newton and its neighbors 
as the “seedbed for liberal causes” such as civil rights, antiwar activism, 
environmentalism, and feminism.4 The political activities of grassroots liberals, however, 
also made this set of affluent communities the sites for the major battles that established 
lasting constraints upon the ability to create racial, spatial, and economic equality.  
                                                                                                                                            
Boulder region, helps explain how the Democratic Party recaptured North Carolina, Virginia, Florida, and 
Colorado in 2008 election.  
4  “Liberalism in the Suburbs,” Newsweek (July 6, 1970).  
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The rise of suburban liberal activism first emerged in the late 1950s and early 
1960s around the issues of fair housing and civil rights. Under the umbrella organization 
of the Massachusetts Federation of Fair Housing and Equal Rights, a web of groups 
spread rapidly through Boston’s affluent suburbs as a response to both localized problems 
of residential segregation and a growing national concern over the issue of racial 
discrimination. This movement transformed the notion that African-Americans should 
have the right and opportunity to live anywhere from a fringe into a mainstream belief in 
American policy and society. Its individualist tactics ensured, however, that only a 
handful of middle-class black families ever moved into the elite suburbs of Boston and 
thereby actually did little to alter the structures of racial and economic segregation. In 
1966, this coalition of white liberals spearheaded the formation of a voluntary one-way 
integration program called the Metropolitan Council of Educational Opportunity 
(METCO) that transported black students from Boston into predominately white 
suburban school systems.  The program, which offered a symbolic solution to the 
systemic problem of educational inequality, would become one of the first and largest of 
its kind in the nation. In order to build support for the project, METCO’s suburban 
advocates formulated an individualist argument that emphasized the particular 
educational benefits for white middle-class children by preparing them to operate in a 
multiracial world. This persuasive reasoning anticipated and contributed to the 
intellectual infrastructure leading to the adoption of Affirmative Action policies at the 
national level, creating both opportunities and constraints on the ongoing effort to create 
meaningful racial and economic equality.  
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The white middle-class residents of liberal suburbs like Brookline, Newton and 
Lexington also stood at the vanguard of peace and antiwar activism throughout the 1960s. 
Through activities such as the 1969 Vietnam Moratorium, the largest civil demonstration 
in the history of the United States, this movement successfully pushed opposition to the 
Cold War and Vietnam War from a fringe to a dominant belief within both the 
Democratic Party and the liberal-leaning suburbs.  In the aftermath of this pivotal event, 
the suburban-based liberal leadership opted to focus its energy working more directly 
within the political system. In just a few years, liberal activists led successful campaigns 
for cutting-edge state legislation and in support of antiwar politicians that rested heavily 
on the mobilization of white middle-class voters in the suburbs. The state’s lonely 
support for George McGovern in 1972 punctuated a decade of this mode of grassroots 
activism. The unbalanced results of the election expose the strength, not weakness, of the 
peace movement and the ways it helped to make the Democratic Party locally and 
nationally more attuned to suburban-centered issues and voters since 1972.5  The 
Massachusetts antiwar movement’s suburban-centered strategies and base, however, both 
expanded and limited its possibilities. By focusing primarily on mobilizing white middle-
class suburbanites, these activists often excluded from its frame of focus lower-income 
and racial minorities and the issues that concerned them, which placed lasting constraints 
on peace and liberal politics at both the local and national levels.  
The limitations of this grassroots liberal vision of individualist solutions and 
middle-class privileges became most pronounced when the nation’s economic climate 
                                                
5 For more on how the 1972 presidential election played a central role in making the base and ideology of 
the Democratic Party see Bruce Miroff, The Liberals’ Moment: The McGovern Insurgency and the Identity 




shifted following the 1973 recession. During this period, grassroots activists in several 
Route 128 suburbs fought hard to force their neighbors to accept responsibility for the 
problems of racial and spatial inequality by proposing the construction of small 
affordable housing developments in their respective communities. These residents, 
nevertheless, confronted another brand of local activists who relied on the delay measures 
built into new environmental laws to permanently thwart or significantly downscale the 
affordable housing projects. Likewise, bitter battles erupted over proposals to expand the 
METCO program and to impose a cap on property taxes in these same suburban 
communities. This reaction revealed the unwillingness of affluent white suburbanites 
from across the political spectrum to accept responsibility for the causes and 
consequences of racial segregation and metropolitan fragmentation. This resistance, 
however, did not so much mark the decline of suburban liberalism, but actually directly 
shaped the politics and policies of the national Democratic Party and its increasing 
articulation of market-based individualism and rejection of systemic solutions to the 
problems of structural inequality.  
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Democratic Leadership Council aimed to 
reinvent the party and appeal to moderate suburbanites by depicting “the New 
Democrats” as centrist populists from the South and distancing them from the affiliation 
with the Northeast.6  However, the political subjectivity of white suburbanites from 
Massachusetts and the policy decisions of technocratic politicians such as Michael 
                                                
6 For more on the Democratic Leadership Council’s strategy, see Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: 
Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
320-322; Judis and Teixiera, Emerging Democratic Majority, 29-30, 126-130; Kenneth S. Baer, 
Reinventing the Democrats: The Politics of Liberalism from Reagan to Clinton (Lawrence, KS: University 
of Kansas Press, 2000);  Jeff Faux, “The Myth of the New Democrats,” American Prospect (September 21, 
1993), 20-29.  
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Dukakis fundamentally influenced the Democratic Party’s embrace of a platform of fiscal 
conservatism, post-industrial corporate development, and quality-of-life issues. The 
worldview of these Massachusetts residents embodies the formation of a political 
sensibility that has emerged in the affluent communities in metropolitan regions across 
the country from the suburbs of New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Cleveland, 
Chicago, the college towns of Ann Arbor and Madison to the subdivisions of the Bay 
Area, Boulder, Seattle, and even Orange County outside of Los Angeles. The activities 
and voting patterns of suburban residents together have contributed in important ways to 
transformations of liberalism, the political realignment of the nation and the persistence 
of structural inequality over the last half-century.7 
  The suburban-centered ideology of middle-class entitlements and market-based 
individualism inserted a sliding scale of concerns into the center of the political agenda 
and worldview of liberalism. Residents in the liberal suburbs of Boston overwhelmingly 
supported peace politics, the antiwar movement, the national civil rights cause and 
mainstream environmentalism, each of which posed little potential threat to local 
property values.  These residents demonstrated support for legislation and programs 
                                                
7 For a discussion of the national geography of suburban Democrats and liberals see Judis and Teixeira, 
The Emerging Democratic Majority, 69-116. For examples of works that have addressed various forms of 
suburban liberal activism in these places, see Reginald J. Damerell, Triumph in A White Suburb: The 
Dramatic Story of Teaneck, NJ, The First Town in the Nation to Vote for Integrated Schools (New York: 
William Morrow & Company, 1968); Louise Nelson Dyble, “Revolt Against Sprawl: Transportation and 
the Origins of the Marin County Growth-Control Regime,” Journal of Urban History, Vol. 34, No. 1 
(November 2007), 38-66; Samuel Freedman, The Inheritance: How Three Families and the American 
Political Majority Moved From Left to Right (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Matthew Klingle, 
Emerald City: An Environmental History of Seattle (New Haven: Yale University Press,  2007); Marian J. 
Morton “The Suburban Ideal and Suburban Realities” Journal of Urban History, Vol. 28 No. 6 (September 
2002,) 671-698; William J. Rorabaugh, Berkeley At War: The Sixties (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989); Amy L. Scott, “Remaking Urban in the American West: Urban Environmentalism, Lifestyle 
Politics, and Hip Capitalism in Boulder, Colorado,” in Political Culture of the New West, Jeff Roche, ed. 
(Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2008), 251-280; Peter Siskind, “Growth and Its Discontents: 
Localism, Protest and the Politics of Development on the Northeast Corridor” (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania, 2002); Thomas J. Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for 
Civil Rights in the North (New York: Random House, 2008).  
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promoting individualist solutions to rights-related issues such as fair housing, voluntary 
integration and the Equal Rights Amendment that also required limited financial 
sacrifice. Suburbanites across the political spectrum, nevertheless, exhibited the greatest 
resistance to issues such as affordable housing, two-way metropolitan integration, and 
progressive tax reforms that aimed to challenge structural inequalities and threatened 
their property values and entitlements of homeownership. 8    
By looking both at this cohort of grassroots liberal activists and the political 
culture of the suburban places they inhabited, this dissertation reveals how these two 
forces shaped each other and in the process the political landscape of Massachusetts and 
the nation. The friction between committed activists and their more moderate neighbors 
placed important limits on suburban liberal activism. Many of these more moderate 
suburban residents did not object to symbolic and limited solutions such as fair housing 
policies or METCO, but then fiercely protested against policies and programs like 
affordable housing or tax reform that asked them to assume financial responsibility for 
the costs of structural inequality. These conflicts also illuminate the political dynamics 
and tensions of the Boston suburbs and Massachusetts as a whole.  
The physical and social geography of metropolitan Boston also informed the 
dynamics of liberal activism. In all of these campaigns, the symbolism of suburban 
residency mattered as activists used their homeowner-centered identities to provide 
various issues with a sense of white middle-class respectability. In some campaigns, 
                                                
8 Political scientist Frank Levy’s “Simple Theory of a Civil Rights Law” posits that “the probability of 
securing majority approval for a civil rights bill increases as the proportion of unaffected districts rises.” 
(Northern Schools and Civil Rights: The Racial Imbalance Act of Massachusetts. Chicago: Markham 
Publishing Co., 1971, 12.)   Likewise J Anthony Lukas observed that key to the success of any civil rights 
wrested on the maxim that “the probability of support for such legislation is inversely related to the 
proximity of its potential application.” (Common Ground: A Turbulent Decade in the Lives of Three 
American Families New York: Knopf, 1986, 131). I borrow this basic concept, but expand its  beyond 
application national civil rights legislation to a variety of the other liberal issues.  
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however, actual residency in the suburbs was more important than others. A few enclaves 
of middle and upper-middle class residents within the cities of Boston and Cambridge, 
such as Beacon Hill, Back Bay, the South End and the Brattle Street area outside of 
Harvard Square, shared the socioeconomic characteristics and political leanings of their 
liberal suburban counterparts. Many of the residents in these neighborhoods became 
integral parts of the campaigns for peace, feminism and liberal politicians also using their 
middle-class identities to advance these causes.  White middle-class urban-based 
grassroots activists remained virtually absent, however, from the efforts more directly 
linked to property and taxation, such as affordable housing and metropolitan educational 
integration, which usually constituted fights among factions within various suburban 
communities. 
The consistent ability of suburban liberal activists in Massachusetts to work 
effectively within the formal channels of the political system, especially at the state level, 
helps explains how this group’s hierarchical worldview has become so influential in 
policy and politics. These grassroots activists mobilized their suburban social networks, 
identities as parents and taxpayers, and professional expertise as lawyers, professors, 
engineers, corporate executives and social workers in a series of landmark campaigns for 
the election of liberal politicians and the passage of pioneering state legislation. In 
addition, the federal government and national organizations have embraced many of the 
policies and initiatives first launched by suburban liberal activists in Massachusetts, 
including fair housing, Affirmative Action, inclusionary zoning, open space and growth 
controls laws, the Vietnam Moratorium, and single issue advocacy for abortion rights.  
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The strategies of suburban liberal activists had particularly profound ideological 
and policy consequences at the local, state and national levels.  The architects of these 
grassroots liberal campaigns consistently adopted a pragmatic approach emphasizing 
moderate or token policy solutions to ensure the passage of pathbreaking laws and 
programs to reduce residential discrimination and to increase school integration and 
affordable housing opportunities. These programs often had sweeping symbolism, but in 
actuality represented just the first steps toward achieving more substantive reform.  In 
order to receive support for these potentially controversial ideas, grassroots liberal 
activists also formulated a discourse that underplayed these policies as a remedy for 
historical racial and economic injustice. Instead, liberal activists focused more on the 
benefits of these policies for white middle-class suburban residents and their children. 
However, as state and national leaders enthusiastically embraced these individualist 
arguments and programs, the approach actually foreclosed the possibility for subsequent 
reform. The efforts of suburban liberal activists, therefore, did produce some small cracks 
in the structures of segregation, but ultimately fortified larger patterns of racial, spatial, 
and economic inequality in both Massachusetts and the nation.  
In the aftermath of the 1972 election, a bumper sticker began appearing on cars 
throughout metropolitan Boston declaring “Don’t Blame Me, I’m From Massachusetts.” 
While the slogan clearly referenced the state’s sole support of George McGovern, its 
underlying meaning is equally important to understanding postwar politics and the place 
of suburban liberals. By unraveling the individualist, exceptionalist, and progressive 
meanings embedded in that seemingly unapologetic slogan, this dissertation explores 
both the constraints and possibilities of suburban liberalism.  In doing so, it aims to prove 
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that both suburban liberals and Massachusetts need to be understood less for the reasons 
that they stood against the national tide and more for what they represent about American 
politics and society over the last fifty years. 
 
The “Problem” of Liberalism  
 For a generation historians in the subfield of twentieth century political history have 
engaged in an almost obsessive quest to understand Ronald Reagan’s victory in the 1980 
presidential election. That singular focus has created a teleological view of postwar 
history that overemphasizes the binary relationship between the decline of the New Deal 
Order and the rise of the New Right. These spatially-rooted narratives tend to place the 
decline of the New Deal Order within the industrial centers of the North and Midwest, 
while ascribing conservative ascendance to the suburbs of the Sunbelt South and West. 
These analyses have provided both a distorted cognitive map of political realignment and 
an incomplete explanation of the persistence and contradictions in liberalism. Explaining 
Reagan’s victory either as a story of the decline of the New Deal Order or the ascent of 
the New Right has not supplied historians with an adequate argument to explain 
subsequent political developments. Rather, it draws a straight line between Barry 
Goldwater, Richard Nixon, Reagan and George W. Bush, skating over the two terms of 
Democratic control of the White House, progressive developments at the state and local 
levels. This teleological view of postwar history has not only solidified the assumption of 
the seeming demise of the Democratic Party but has also overlooked or minimized the 




 A declension narrative has long posed a “problem” for the study of twentieth-
century liberalism. The earliest accounts of postwar liberalism argued that the “excesses” 
of 1960s liberalism led to the “unraveling” of the New Deal Coalition. This argument 
placed the ending point of the coalition in the chaotic year 1968, amidst student 
radicalism, the antiwar movement, urban riots, the assassinations of Martin Luther King 
and Robert Kennedy, and the rise of the “silent majority.” A group of leading political 
historians, largely through contributions to the influential edited collection The Rise and 
the Fall of the New Deal Order, have expanded this narrative of liberalism’s triumph and 
tragedy to show the problems of the Democratic Party  did not suddenly emerge in the 
late 1960s,  but had festered since the late 1930s with the Janus-faced agenda of the New 
Deal. 9  This “rise and fall” paradigm tracks the experiences of the white male union 
members in the blue-collar neighborhoods of the Rustbelt who served as the anchor of the 
New Deal Coalition from the 1930s through the 1960s, but by the 1970s had become 
increasingly disillusioned and shifted their political allegiances toward Reagan and the 
Republican Party.10 This framework has wedded the travails of liberalism too closely 
                                                
9 I borrow this summary from Thomas J. Sugrue’s The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in 
Postwar Detroit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), xix, 267-268. For examples of these 
arguments see Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1984); William L. O’Neil, Coming Apart: An Informal History of America in the 
1960's (New York:  Quadrangle-New York Times Book Co., 1974).  
10 Fraser and Gerstle define the “New Deal Order” broadly to encompass economic and social institutions, 
ideologies and electoral coalitions. See Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New 
Order, 1930-1980, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). x-xi. The contributors in the 
collection and others have built directly upon Alan Brinkley’s seminal work The End of Reform: New Deal 
Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995)  in which he argues that New Deal 
policymakers’ embrace of Keynesian economic theory fueled the transition away from a producer to a 
consumer-oriented vision of political economy in the 1930s. This shift in economic policy assured the 
liberal order’s political power throughout much of the postwar period, but also sowed the seeds for its 
eventual demise during the economic recession of the 1970s. The influence of Brinkley becomes 
particularly apparent in Fraser and Gerstle, Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order. For other works that have 
adopted certain key components of Brinkley’s periodization and arguments about consumer-oriented 
politics see Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar 
America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003) and Meg Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship 
in Twentieth-Century America, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). For a recent scholarly 
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with the “Reagan Democrats,” which not only reifies the working class as white male 
union members in the urban North, but also marginalizes other members of the New Deal 
Coalition, including suburban professionals who maintained their allegiance to the 
Democratic Party through this period of realignment.11 By focusing on the Reagan 
election as the ultimate symbol of the decline of New Deal liberalism and the Democratic 
Party, this interpretation, therefore, does not account for the changes within the party and 
ideology after 1960, especially its increasing reorientation toward white-collar 
suburbanites and the priorities of market-based individualism.12 In doing so, this urban 
                                                                                                                                            
debate about the meanings and legacy of the New Deal see Jefferson Cowie and Nick Salvatore, "The Long 
Exception: Rethinking the Place of the New Deal in American History," and responses by Kevin Boyle,  
“Why Is There No Social Democracy in America?”; Michael Kazin, “A Liberal Nation In Spite of Itself”;  
Jennifer Klein, “A New Deal Restoration: Individuals, Communities, and the Long Struggle for the 
Collective Good”; Nancy MacLean, “Getting New Deal History Wrong”; David Montgomery, “The 
Mythical Man”; Jefferson Cowie and Nick Salvatore, “History, Complexity, and Politics: Further 
Thoughts” in International Labor and Working-Class History Volume 74 Issue 1 (Fall 2008), 3-69. 
11 Nancy MacLean provides an excellent discussion of problems associating “working-class” with white 
men in industrial unions in the urban North in  “Getting New Deal History Wrong.” MacLean aptly argues 
that such association fails to show how men and women of color outside of the North have reinvigorated 
the labor movement and the New Deal vision.  A series of works have shown how groups of color have 
tested, extended and reshaped many of the basic tenets of modern liberalism, see Dorothy Sue Cobble, “A 
‘Tiger by the Toenail’: The 1970s Origins of the New Working-Class Majority,” Labor 2 (Fall 2005); 
Nancy MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Workplace (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2006); Ruth, Milkman, L.A. Story: Immigrant Workers and the Future of the U.S. Labor 
Movement (New York: Russell Sage Foundation Books, 2006); Annalise Orleck, Storming Caesar's 
Palace: How Black Mothers Fought Their Own War on Poverty (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006), Matthew 
Countryman, Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Postwar Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of 
Philadelphia Press, 2005); Robert Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland 
(Princeton: University Press, 2003); Vanessa Tait,  Poor Workers' Unions: Rebuilding Labor from Below 
(Boston: South End Press, 2008).  
12 Many of these authors maintain that the future Reagan Democrats did not defect from liberalism, but that 
it left them. See, Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, 
and Taxes on American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992); Formisano, Boston Against Busing; 
Jonathan Rieder, Canarsie: The Jews and Italians of Brooklyn Against Liberalism (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1985) and Jonathan Rieder  “The Rise of the ‘Silent Majority” in The Rise and 
Fall of the New Order. This argument has provided historians with a relatively straightforward and 
seemingly simple means to explain both the demise of liberalism and the rise of conservatism. Yet it is the 
very simplicity of this interpretation that makes it both inadequate for understanding either the failures of 
liberalism or the ascension or conservatism. This type of argument runs the risk of placing too much of the 
burden for the “fall of liberalism” on either a group of urban voters or a small group of politicians. 
Furthermore, it fails to allow room for the overlap of these two political forces and to recognize both the 
volatility of the conservative coalition and the persistence or changes in liberalism. By applying the new 
insights about the political economy of New Deal Order, Thomas Sugrue’s Origins of the Urban Crisis 
helped to significantly thicken this interpretation of social backlash and liberal decline by shifting the focus 
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and labor-centered analysis served to foreclose exploration of  the contradictions and 
persistence of liberalism. Untangling the questions of “how did Reagan get elected?” and 
“what happened to liberalism?” shows both that liberalism did not die, but, rather, 
transformed and further exposes the increasingly important role of white middle-class 
suburbanites in that process.   
The development of a counter-narrative of Reagan’s victory that emphasizes 
conservative coalescence at the grassroots level rather than the fracturing of the New 
Deal Order within the urban North has further marginalized inquiry into both the 
possibilities and limits in postwar liberalism and its reorientation towards the suburbs. 13  
Grassroots-based studies of the rise of the Right by Lisa McGirr and others kindled a 
resurgence of the subfield and moved conservatism from the “orphan in historical 
scholarship” to its increasingly favored child.14 Several of these studies locate the success 
of Reagan in the mobilization of New Right activists in Sunbelt suburban strongholds 
                                                                                                                                            
away from an emphasis on the race-specific policies of the Great Society and toward the consumer-oriented 
legacy of the New Deal. This revised interpretation suggests that government-sanctioned entitlements 
coupled with the economic insecurity of the 1970s propelled many working and middle class whites to shift 
their political allegiance to the Republican Party.  
13 See for example, Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right. (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and The Making of Modern of 
Conservatism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). Jonathan Schoenwald A Time for Choosing: 
The Rise of Modern American Conservatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Darren Dochuk, 
“From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Southernization of Southern 
California, 1939—1969” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2005); Michelle M. Nickerson 
“Domestic Threats: Women, Gender and Conservatism in Cold War Los Angeles, 1945-1966” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Yale University, 2003). For two good overviews of this literature see Darren Dochuk, 
“Revival on the Right: Making Sense of the Conservative Moment in Post-World War II American 
History,” History Compass 4 (2006) and Kimberly Phillips-Fein, “Right On,” The Nation,  (September 28, 
2009).  
14 Alan Brinkley “The Problem of American Conservatism,” American Historical Review vol. 99, no. 2 
(1994), 409. Several more recent works have helped to significantly enhance understandings of modern 
conservatism by shifting attention from the  grassroots focus and demonstrate the importance of 
corporations, think tanks and economists in modern the Republican ascendance. See for example, Jennifer 
Burns, Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the American Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009); Shane Hamilton, Trucking Country: The Road to America's Wal-Mart Economy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008); Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of 
Christian Free Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Kimberly Phillips-Fein, 
Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co, 2009). 
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like Orange County, California, and Cobb County, Georgia.15 This conceptualization 
treats the growth of the New Right and suburbanization as interchangeable processes, 
taking elements of suburban culture more broadly---such as the rise of the military-
industrial complex, massive migration, federally-subsidized entitlements, exclusionary 
zoning, and racial homogeneity---and attributes them solely to Sunbelt conservatism. In 
doing so, this analysis has obfuscated not only the alternative political constituencies that 
exist in suburban settings but also the ways in which a similar set of factors created the 
context for liberal activism.  
In his seminal 1994 essay, “The Problem of American Conservatism,” Alan 
Brinkley accused historians of a political prejudice by overlooking conservatives, but a 
similar allegation can now be leveled at the same scholars for a lack of attention to 
suburban liberals.16 While earlier observers perhaps overstated the importance of liberals 
at the national level, the pendulum has increasingly swung the other way and most recent 
studies of the period after 1968 have largely neglected this constituency in its grassroots 
forms. Uncovering the story of grassroots liberalism demonstrates that the towns and 
residents in the Route 128 corridor outside of Boston, and their counterparts in other 
post-industrial metropolitan communities, are equally important to understanding 
national political realignment and postwar suburban politics as New Right strongholds in 
the South and West. This approach also reveals that the persistence and problems of both 
liberalism and the Democratic Party have increasingly come to lie largely in the suburbs. 
 
                                                
15 McGirr, Suburban Warriors, 10-11.  
16 Brinkley “The Problem of American Conservatism.”  
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The Ideology and Geography of Suburban Liberalism and Massachusetts 
Exceptionalism 
“Don’t Blame Us” approaches liberalism as a category of political and social 
identity formation. It focuses on a of geographically, racially and class-specific set of 
suburbanites who largely self-identified and embraced the label of liberalism. Historians 
have struggled to find a coherent definition for twentieth century-liberalism. Gary Gerstle 
has characterized the “protean character” of liberalism defining it as both ever evolving 
and capacious.17 Likewise Robert Self deems liberalism a “plastic” concept. Depending 
on who is deploying the term and what or whom is being described it can alternatively 
mean stimulation or regulation of the capitalist economy, racial equality or white 
privilege.18 Many scholars find it easier to define liberalism through historical actors 
leading to a long list of people ranging from Robert Moses and the members of Kennedy 
and Johnson Administrations to Martin Luther King, Jr and Tom Hayden who would 
likely have been surprised to find themselves clustered together.  
While white middle class liberal suburbanites did not demonstrate complete 
consistency, their political worldview did reveal some key commonalities.   The ideology 
of this set of actors remained rooted directly in the complex legacy of the New Deal and 
its often contradictory advancement of the relationship between the role of the 
government and the rights of the individual.  The suburban liberals at the center of this 
case study shared a belief in the power of the federal government to stimulate and 
regulate the market economy and to protect individual rights. Many of these suburban 
                                                
17 Gary Gerstle, “The Protean Character of American Liberalism,” American Historical Review Vol. 99, 
No. 4 (Oct., 1994), 1043-1073. 
18 Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), 13-14.  
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liberals had backgrounds in academia and other highly skilled and technocratic 
professions and therefore strongly believed in the power of experts and expertise to solve 
the problems of social, economic and racial inequality. This faith in expertise paralleled 
the tenets of the Progressive movement of the early twentieth century. In addition, like 
their Progressive predecessors, these suburban liberals articulated a firm commitment to 
government reform and a strong resentment of systems of patronage and corruption that 
defined traditional party politics. 19 
This set of principles led suburban liberals to advocate for policies and types of 
reforms that advanced individual rights, setting them against the class politics that had 
historically dominated the Democratic Party. While notions of individualism had long 
been at the center of liberal thought and philosophy, the increasing popularity of 
psychology in the 1940s and 1950s magnified their importance in the postwar period.  
Freudian psychology in particular injected a new emphasis of the self into the politics of 
liberalism.20 Psychoanalytic theories became especially important to liberal ideas about 
race and racism during the postwar period. Gunnar Myrdal’s work both represented and 
influenced this mode of thought. In 1944 The American Dilemma, Myrdal presented 
racism as the product of personal prejudice and moral deficiencies rather than state-
sponsored policy. This branch of thought, which scholars have deemed “racial 
liberalism,” became a crucial component of the suburban liberal worldview, leading its 
followers to advocate for government policies that created “equal opportunity” and 
                                                
19 For discussions of the faith in expertise during the Progressive Era see Alice O’Connor, Poverty 
Knowledge:  Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002); Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive 
Age  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1998); Robert Wiebe. The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1966); Michael Willrich, City of Courts: Socializing Justice in Progressive Era 
Chicago (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
20 See Stephen Frosh, The Politics of Psychoanalysis: An Introduction to Freudian and Post-Freudian 
Theory, (New York:  Macmillan, 1987). 
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“individual rights” rather that those that might eradicate the structural underpinnings of 
racial segregation and economic inequity.21  
The consumer-oriented politics of the New Deal state further fortified this 
emboldened sense of individualism and resistance to structural reform among self-
identified liberals in the Boston suburbs.22 A series of works have forcefully proven how 
the deliberately discriminatory policies of state-sponsored suburbanization helped to 
make “homeownership” into, in the words of Thomas Sugrue,  “an identity as much as a 
financial investment” for a generation of whites in the postwar period. 23 This newly 
emboldened identity led many white middle-class suburbanites to embrace the racially-
specific benefits of homeownership as a fundamental right. These subsidies offered them 
both a defense against charges of racial discrimination and a way to remain exempt from 
accepting individual or collective responsibility for the problems of structural 
segregation. 24 Among liberal and moderate suburbanites in Massachusetts this abiding 
                                                
21 For a discussion of the American Dilemma and its influence on liberalism see Sugrue, Sweet Land of 
Liberty; Walter Jackson, Gunnar Myrdal and America’s Conscience: Social Engineering and Racial 
Liberalism, 1938-1987 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987); Daryl Michael Scott, 
Contempt and Pity: Social Policy and the Image of the Damaged Black Psyche, 1880-1996 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 93-160.  
22 There is a rich history documenting the forms of discrimination embedded in the federal government’s 
housing policy throughout the twentieth century. See for example, Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass 
Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Sugrue, 
Origins; David M.P. Freund, Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban 
America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Arnold R. Hirsch, “Containment on the Home 
Front: Race and Federal Housing Policy from the New Deal to the Cold War,” Journal of Urban History, 
26 (2000), 158-189; Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the 
Making of the Underclass (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).  
23 Sugrue, Origins, 213.  
24 Freund Colored Property. See also George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White 
People Profit from Identity Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998). Likewise, this project 
builds upon the insights of historians like Matthew Lassiter and Robert Self who have argued that the 
investment of middle-class white suburbanites in their identity as homeowners, taxpayers and schoolparents 
evolved into a political worldview based more in the individualistic privileges of suburban residency than a 
clear affiliation to either the Republican or Democratic Party (Lassiter, Silent Majority, 7-8; Self, American 
Babylon, 16). For more about suburban populism see Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in 
Los Angeles (New York: Vintage Books, 1992) which argues that this brand of populism committed to the 
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faith in individualism came to encompass contradictory commitments to ending racial 
and social inequality while benefiting from government-subsidized entitlements provided 
by homeownership. This dualistic interpretation of individualism illuminates why 
campaigns and programs that advocated for symbolic solutions and minimal financial 
sacrifice, such as fair housing law and the METCO program, experienced large-scale 
success and pride in metropolitan Boston’s most liberal communities while efforts to 
create structural and metropolitan-based remedies, such as affordable housing and two-
way busing, engendered enormous resistance within the very same towns.  
 Most scholars of postwar political metropolitan history have adopted a version of 
Massachusetts exceptionalism and have largely ignored the ways in which the Boston 
area has served as a  “bellwether” of postwar suburban growth, urban retrenchment and 
“one of the key places where the military-industrial complex was born.” 25 The sprawling 
new interstate highway system, generous Cold War military-industrial spending and 
corporate relocation that reshaped the geography of the nation particularly in the South 
and West, transformed the Bay State’s Route 128 into one of the most prominent 
corridors in the post-industrial economy. 26 Studies that do acknowledge the rise of the 
                                                                                                                                            
“defense of home values and neighborhood exclusivity” represents a formidable social movement and 
political force based around a class identity more than an alliance with either political party (Davis, 159).  
25 Massachusetts Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination, Route 128: Boston’s Road to Segregation, (Washington: U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, 1975), 3; Ann Markenson, Peter Hall, Scott Campbell, Sabina Detrick, The 
Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 118.  Metropolitan Boston has received a great deal of scholarly attention in studies of the period 
before World War II especially in the late nineteenth century as the national model of urban development. 
See Sam Bass Warner, Jr., Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston (1870-1900) Second 
Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978) and Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier.  
26 For more about the Sunbelt see, Bruce Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, 
Economic Development & The Transformation of the South, 1938-1980 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991); Lassiter, Silent Majority; McGirr, Suburban Warriors; Carl Abbott, The New Urban America: 
Growth and Politics in Sunbelt Cities (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Richard M. 
Bernard and Bradley R. Rice, eds., Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth since World War II (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1983).   
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high-tech economy within the suburbs of Boston treat it as “an exceptional case” and 
focus their inquiries elsewhere.27 Massachusetts, nevertheless, did not stand apart from 
national patterns of suburbanization and Cold War defense spending, but in fact served as 
a representative and microcosmic case study of these processes.28 The pro-growth 
policies of New Deal Liberalism and the Cold War military-industrial complex conspired 
with the rise of the research university to subsidize homeownership for white middle-
class homeowners and expand defense-driven capital growth, making the suburbs along 
the highway into some of the most economically affluent and racially segregated 
communities not only in the state, but in the nation as a whole.  
 The combination of corporate and residential migration simultaneously transformed 
the city of Boston into a national model of urban decline. During the postwar period, 
Boston maintained a shrinking tax base, widespread demolition, large levels of poverty, 
and severe patterns of residential and educational segregation that contributed to the 
systemic discrimination and isolation of African-Americans and other minority groups.29 
                                                
27 See for example, Margaret Pugh O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and the Search for the 
Next Silicon Valley (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 71-72; In explaining why she chose 
Silicon Valley rather than Route 128 as her model of success her study of  “cities of knowledge,” “the 
universities of Boston were so uniquely privileged in the Cold War competition for scientific industry that 
the rule of economic development and economic competition that applied to other cities of knowledge (and 
would-be cities of knowledge) did not apply to them (Cities of Knowledge, 9).”  
28 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Route 128. 3, 36-46. 
29 In its 1982 study Urban Decline and the Future of American Cities, the Brookings Institution placed 
Boston at the bottom of its scientifically calculated list of declining cities below Detroit, Gary, Newark and 
Oakland. See Katherine L. Bradbury, Anthony Downs and Kenneth A. Small, Urban Decline and the 
Future of American Cities (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982). Most studies of postwar 
urban structures focused on the other spaces that comprise the geography of Rustbelt. See, Howard Gillette, 
Jr. Camden After the Fall: Decline and Renewal in a Post-Industrial City (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005), Colin Gordon, Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the Fate of the American City 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), Andrew R. Highsmith, “Demolition Means 
Progress: Race, Class, and the Deconstruction of the American Dream in Flint, Michigan” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2008); Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and 
Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Andrew Hurley, 
Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana, 1945-1980 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Kevin Mumford, Newark: A History of Race, Rights, and 
Riots in America (New York: New York University Press, 2008), Self, American Babylon; Sugrue, Origins.  
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Studies of postwar Boston, however, concentrate almost exclusively on the busing crisis 
and often overlook this complex history of metropolitan development. Many of these 
accounts rest their logic on a set of religiously and ethnically overdetermined and 
reductionist assumptions about Irish Catholics, African-Americans and Jews to explain 
the “urban exodus” and later reaction to court-ordered busing that obscures the role of the 
growth-oriented and deliberately discriminatory policies of the federal government in 
both of those processes.30 
The defense-spending imperatives of the Cold War fundamentally transformed 
the flows of capital and power across the United States, but this infusion of money 
shaped the social and political dynamics of the nation’s regions in different ways. In 
Massachusetts, Cold War contracts and investments primarily filtered initially through 
the area’s heavy concentration of universities such as Harvard and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. In the decade after World War II, the federal government 
significantly increased its funding of scientific-based research projects at universities 
around the nation, but especially in metropolitan Boston. By 1963, MIT and Harvard 
ranked nationally first and third, respectively, in terms of annual federal funding for 
research and development in fields such as radar, missile guidance and navigation 
                                                
30 For studies of about the busing crisis see for example Emmett H. Buell and Richard A. Brisbin, Jr. 
School Desegregation and Defended Neighborhoods: The Boston Controversy (Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books, 1982); Jon Hillson, The Battle of Boston (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1977); Alan Lupo, Liberty’s 
Chosen Home: The Politics of Violence in Boston (Boston: Beacon Press, 1977); J. Michael Ross and 
William M. Berg, “I Respectfully Disagree with The Judge’s Order”:  The Boston School Desegregation 
Controversy  (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981). The best of these works offer nuanced 
explorations of the events and grassroots actors surrounding the school desegregation dilemma. See J. 
Anthony Lukas’s poignant narrative and Ronald Formisano’s scholarly supplement each offer 
compassionate and important portrayals African-Americans and anti-busers caught in a tangled web of 
economic and spatial inequality. Lukas, Common Ground; Formisano, Boston Against Busing. For the 
clearest example of this tendency to focus on religion and ethnicity see Gerald Gamm, Urban Exodus: Why 
the Jews Left Boston and the Catholics Stayed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). See also, John 
McGreevy, Parish Boundaries: The Catholic Encounter with Race in the Twentieth-Century Urban North 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Joshua Zeitz White Ethnic New York: Jews, Catholics, and 
the Shaping of Postwar Politics (Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 2007).   
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systems. 31 These universities also spawned an explosion of electronics companies along 
the Route 128 highway ring that contributed to the reshaping of the social, political, 
culture structures of the area. The majority of these high-technology companies 
maintained close ties to these universities, which helped them both gain defense contracts 
and recruit educated employees and managers who wanted to work and live near  
renowned academic and cultural  institutions.32 In contrast, communities like Orange 
County, Colorado Springs, and Atlanta did not boast the same university presence and 
their allocation of Cold War funding primarily took the form of military bases and large 
aerospace companies. The anchoring of the South and West’s economies in military 
bases and the manufacturing plants of DuPont, Lockheed Martin and Boeing helped to 
make the residents of these areas more amenable to free market ideology and social 
conservatism than those who lived in suburbs along Route 128 in the shadow of major 
research universities.33 
The growth of the Cold War economy in both the Sunbelt and Northeast led to  
major influxes of new residents, but the geographic and social characteristics of these 
new migrants created important political and social distinctions. The people who moved 
with their families to work at the military bases, aerospace companies and related 
                                                
31 National Science Foundation, Federal Support of Research and Development at Universities and 
Colleges and Selected Nonprofit Institutions, Fiscal Year 1963 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1968), cited in O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 3; AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture 
and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 14.  
32 In the Rise of the Gunbelt, the authors state “Universities, indeed, play a central role in the interregional 
redistribution of engineering and scientific talent.” The authors further suggest that the proximity to Boston 
and MIT served as a key factor in recruiting top talent who want to stay in the Boston area, because of the 
“quality of the work “and “the potential to interact with university scientists” and the city’s “cultural 
attributes.” (Markenson et al.  Rise of the Gunbelt, 42, 141.)  
33 McGirr describes how Orange County cities during enticed the U.S. Army and Navy to set up bases in 
the area so that by 1950 the military was “thoroughly entrenched (Suburban Warriors, 25). For another 
point of comparison about the role of the military reshaping the political culture see Kari Frederickson, 
“The Cold War At the Grassroots: Militarization and Modernization in South Carolina” in The Myth of 
Southern Exceptionalism, Matthew D. Lassiter and Joseph Crespino, eds., New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 190-209.  
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industries in the booming metropolises of the Sunbelt primarily traveled from rural towns 
in the Midwest and Deep South, often carrying with them strains of moralism, anti-
communism and a predisposition to evangelical religion.34 Most of the new arrivals to the 
Route 128 suburbs came from other parts of the Northeast or metropolitan Boston and 
many had attended college or graduate school in the area. Moreover, in the Sunbelt 
suburbs, residents moved into sprawling, mass developments of newly-built homogenous 
single-family homes, which Lisa McGirr has argued, “contributed to creating a hospitable 
terrain for the Right by reinforcing a search for alternative forms of community.”35  
Route 128 suburbs like Concord and Lexington had rich histories dating back to 
the colonial era that provided them with well-established architectural patterns and civic, 
social and religious institutions. These existing settlement patterns and institutions helped 
to attract particular kinds of residents and dictated the type of activities in which they 
participated. The postwar migration to places like Southern California led to a flourishing 
of evangelical Protestants, especially Southern Baptists, which many scholars have 
argued established the foundation to the rise of the New Right.36 Evangelical churches 
were virtually absent in the communities outside of Boston. Although the suburbs 
boasted a vibrant religious life, residents in suburbs like Lexington, Concord and Newton 
tended to worship at traditional Catholic, Jewish, mainline Protestant and Unitarian 
                                                
34 While McGirr concentrates her analysis on migrants from the “heartland states” such as Iowa and 
Kansas, Darren Dochuk focuses on the massive out-migration of people from the South between 1940 and 
1960 to California as a major force in fueling the rise of conservative politics in that state and the nation, 
Darren Dochuk, “Evangelicalism Becomes Southern, Politics Becomes Evangelical, From FDR to 
Reagan,” in Mark Noll and Luke Harlow, eds., Religion and Politics in America, Second Edition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 300-301.  
35 McGirr, Suburban Warriors, 39.  
36 Dochuk, “Evangelicalism Becomes Southern, Politics Becomes Evangelical”; See also William C. 
Martin, With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America (New York: Broadway Books, 
1996), especially chapter 4; Daniel K. Williams, “From the Pews to the Polls: The Formation of a Southern 
Christian Right” (Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 2005).  
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churches. These institutions helped to foster a commitment to tolerance and social justice 
among many of their congregants, which proved crucial in the formation of grassroots 
activism related to the civil rights and peace movements.  
The mythology and cognitive geography of Massachusetts exceptionalism has 
further obscured the similarities and differences between metropolitan Boston and other 
parts of the nation. 37  Bay State residents have long adopted the mythology of the 
Puritans’ christening of Boston as “the city on a hill” as a means to distinguish 
themselves above rest of the nation. The American Revolution offered the region the 
reputation as the “birthplace of liberty” as well as the complex legacy and meanings of 
that watershed period. During the Civil War era, the ideology and discourse of 
Massachusetts exceptionalism relied on images of the South as a racist and slaveholding 
backwater to promote the moral superiority and racial progressivism of the state’s 
residents. The forces of the postwar era reinvigorated and recast this set of fraught values. 
Many Massachusetts residents employed claims of historical superiority and progressive 
enlightenment to deflect charges of racism and conservatism onto the South. Although 
not fully disavowing the existence of racial discrimination in the North, this blindered 
conceptualization made clear that discrimination operated in degrees: the Deep South, not 
New England, was the far more pressing concern.38  This self-aggrandizing discourse 
gained increased relevance after the state’s singular support for McGovern in 1972, and 
                                                
37 This discursive frame builds upon what William Chafe has incisively dubbed the “Progressive Mystique” 
to describe race relations in Greensboro, North Carolina. William Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: 
Greensboro, North Carolina and the Black Struggle for Freedom (New York: Oxford University, 1979), 
Chafe suggests that white leaders in the traditionally “progressive” city “engaged in a series of cosmetic 
concessions that altered the appearance of racism, but …left completely intact the structure and foundation 
of racism (Chafe, 240).” 
38 This discussion of Massachusetts Exceptionalism is strongly influenced by the introduction to the edited 
collection The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism. Authors Matthew Lassiter and Joseph Crespino provide 
cogent discussion of the investment in and problems with the narrative of Southern Exceptionalism; see 
“Introduction: The End of Southern History” in The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism, 3-22.  
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then intensified after Nixon resigned amidst the Watergate scandal. The busing crisis 
disrupted this linear narrative and geography of progress and enlightenment with the 
United States Civil Rights Commission ruling that “Boston has become for the 1970’s 
what Mississippi represented in the 1960’s.”39 However, even this comparison relied on 
regional distinctions and Northern Progressivism that normalized Southern racism and 
treated acts of racial violence and politics in places like Boston as aberrations.40   
By inserting the label “Massachusetts Liberal” into the American political 
lexicon, the presidential campaign of Michael Dukakis in 1988 mended these tears in the 
state’s mythology. Many conservative and centrist commentators have adopted the 
moniker, pejoratively conflating the travails of Massachusetts candidates for the 
presidency with the national Democratic Party in order to suggest that both have become 
increasingly “out of touch” with the rest of the country.41 Many liberal residents in 
Massachusetts, nevertheless, have proudly embraced the label and the sense that they 
have stood against the increasingly conservative national tide. The popularity of the red 
state-blue state framework to understand national political polarization has further 
reinforced this sense of liberal distinctiveness. By emphasizing the ways that 
Massachusetts stood outside and above the rest of the nation this discourse also makes 
exceptional how such a progressive place could have pervasive racial and spatial 
                                                
39 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Route 128, xi.  
40 Lassiter and Crespino note that the trope adopted by scholars, journalists and politicians of invoking the 
South in acts of racial backlash outside the region “ treats acts of racism and racial violence to the social 
and political structures of the region while portraying similar events elsewhere as anomalous incidents that 
really should have happened in Mississippi or Alabama (Lassiter and Crespino, Introduction, 9).  
41 For examples of the use of the “Massachusetts Liberal” label see Jon Keller, The Bluest State: How 
Democrats Created the Massachusetts Blueprint for American Political Disaster (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2007); Thomas Oliphant, “Holding Back the Counterpunch Dukakis Ignores Repeated Bush 
Attacks—For Now,” Boston Globe, June 19, 1988; Robert L. Turner, “The State We’re in Massachusetts 
Still Gets Labeled ‘Liberal’, But the Truth is More Complicated, ”Boston Globe, October 18, 1998; Susan 
Page and Jill Lawrence, “Does 'Massachusetts liberal' label still matter?” USA Today, July 26, 2004. 
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segregation, the most restrictive abortion laws in the country in the 1970s, and a tax 
revolt in 1980. Exploring that history, nevertheless, reveals that these events are equally 
important vectors of the state’s liberal past.  
The embrace of Massachusetts’s reputation as “bluest of the blue states” has also 
distorted the relationship between partisan affiliation and political ideology in the 
Commonwealth, especially with respect to the white middle-class suburbs. In 
Massachusetts state politics, suburban liberalism and the Democratic Party have not 
always gone hand-in-hand. From the late nineteenth century through World War II, 
metropolitan Boston exhibited a consistent voting trend that divided neatly along spatial 
lines. The city remained overwhelmingly Democratic while Republican support stayed 
concentrated in the suburbs. Beginning in the 1950s, many suburban voters gradually 
moved away from an affiliation with the GOP in national elections, while at the state 
level still actively supporting Republican candidates who promoted their blend of 
government reform, lower taxes, and increasing social liberalism.  Francis Sargent, a  
Republican who served as governor between 1969 and 1974, opposed the Vietnam War, 
instituted a moratorium on the construction of highways and supported eradicating 
exclusionary zoning laws, owed his success and popularity  to the same base of suburban 
residents that led George McGovern to victory in the Bay State in the 1972 election. Into 
the 21st century the fiscally conservative and socially moderate agenda of a series of 
Republican governors including, William Weld and Mitt Romney, has earned the 
bipartisan endorsement of suburban homeowners in Massachusetts. These same voters, 
nevertheless, have eschewed the seeming “cowboy conservatism” and family values 
agenda of the national Republican Party consistently favoring Democratic candidates for 
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positions in Congress and the White House that support a more social liberal vision. 
Other heavily suburbanized states such as Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and 
California have increasingly demonstrated a similar set of political preferences 
consistently electing candidates at the national level who advocate progressive policies in 
foreign and domestic affairs and politicians for state office that promote fiscal 
conservatism and limited taxation. 
 Further complicating the political geography, Massachusetts also retained strong 
tradition of conservative Democratic politicians at the state level such as Edward King 
the governor between 1979 and 1983. Politicians like King have relied on the steady 
support archetypal blue-collar  “Reagan Democrat,” but in national elections these voters 
have been far less consistent supporting candidates from both political parties.42 In 
addition, many white-collar suburbanites in metropolitan Boston have begun to shy away 
from affiliation with either political party and have increasingly chosen to formally label 
and identity themselves as independents. This label has allowed them greater flexibility 
to vote along an allegiance to their taxpayer interests rather than along formal party lines.  
The red-state-blue-state framework frequently obscures these bifurcated and volatile 
voting patterns which are crucial to gaining a full understanding of the processes of 
political realignment and the persistence of yet more contradictions in modern liberalism.     
 
 
                                                
42 This framework coupled with the use of the backlash also obscures the fact that while Reagan did win 
Massachusetts in the 1980 election as discussed in Chapter 10, his support came from middle-class suburbs, 
while Jimmy Carter actually carried the working and middle-class vote in Boston. The volatility of the so-
called Reagan Democrats is not unique to Massachusetts. Lower middle-class voters in the South, Midwest 
supported the Democratic Party in many of the elections of the last thirty years, see Lassiter, Silent 
Majority, 319-321, Stanley B. Greenberg, Middle Class Dreams: The Politics and Power of the New 
American Majority, Revised and Updated Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); Judis and 
Teixiera, Emerging Democratic Majority, 63-67.   
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Expanding the Boundaries of Political History  
In order to probe these questions about liberalism this project relies on the 
community-study model, which a group of political historians has demonstrated provides 
a useful way to examine the dialectical relationship between federal policymaking and 
grassroots actors, the structural underpinnings of political realignment, and the 
multifaceted dimensions of postwar liberalism. 43 This community study of grassroots 
suburban activism in Massachusetts, nevertheless, reconfigures the framework 
popularized by historians of metropolitan political economy in four important ways. First, 
despite Thomas Sugrue’s astute observation that  “the politics of liberalism was 
ineluctably a politics of place,” few historians of metropolitan politics have sought to 
explore the ways in which postwar liberal politics operated in a single place. 44 Second, 
scholars who have adopted this approach have tended to focus either on activities at the 
national or municipal level and have largely overlooked developments in state 
government. This project provides new ways of understanding the interplay between the 
government and grassroots movements by exploring how suburban liberals worked most 
effectively at the state level to produce policies that aligned with their worldview.  
Third, the so-called “spatial turn” within American political history has provoked 
a reconsideration of the standard timeline of postwar politics by showing that the tensions 
in liberalism began in the 1940s and 1950s. “Don’t Blame Us,” in contrast, begins in 
                                                
43 This model combines grassroots methodology traditionally employed by social historians and the 
structural arguments of urban studies. For examples of works see Countryman, Up South; Freund, Colored 
Property; Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto; Kruse, White Flight; Lassiter, Silent Majority, McGirr, 
Suburban Warriors; Sugrue, Origins. See also Thomas J. Sugrue, “Preface to the Princeton Classic 
Edition” in Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005). 
44 Thomas J. Sugrue, “All Politics is Local: The Persistence of Localism in Twentieth-Century America” in 
The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History, Meg Jacobs, William J. 
Novak, Julian Zelizer, eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003),302.  
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1960 at the very point that many other scholars end their respective analyses and 
concludes in 1990 in order to counter both the declension narrative embedded in studies 
of the New Deal Coalition and the exceptionalist depictions of Massachusetts politics. 
This revised timeline reveals that liberalism and Massachusetts politics during the 1970s 
and 1980s were far more complicated and contradictory than the electoral map of 1972 
suggests and the ways in which they embodied and influenced broader national 
developments. Finally, many metropolitan-based accounts have also concentrated strictly 
on issues of property, education, and taxation, thereby overlooking other facets of 
postwar politics. By drawing on the insights of gender, environmental and foreign policy 
studies, this project expands the focus and demonstrates how the issues and movements 
surrounding housing, education, civil rights, feminism, environmentalism, and antiwar 
activism interacted and shaped one another. Simultaneously, this metropolitan-based 
approach to liberalism revises many of the historiographical assumptions about civil 
rights, feminism, environmentalism and the peace movement. Connecting these 
literatures not only provides a means to revise prevailing understandings of postwar 
liberalism but also redraws the traditional analytic boundaries of both urban and political 
history.   
  *  *  *  *  *  * 
This dissertation is a two-part community study, consisting of ten chronologically 
and thematically arranged chapters. Part I traces the development of various forms of 
grassroots liberal activity among many white suburban residents in metropolitan Boston 
during 1960s. Chapter 1 establishes the geographic, cultural, political and structural 
context and foundations of the overall study, paying particular attention to the importance 
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of the construction of Route 128 as a central axis in the Cold War high-tech and post-
industrial economy, leading its surrounding suburbs to become some of the most 
attractive and exclusive communities in the country. 
 Chapter 2 examines the development of the Massachusetts Federation for Fair 
Housing and Equal Rights, which arose in the suburbs in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Beginning in 1964, many white suburban members of the fair housing movement 
expanded the grassroots structure and strategies they had developed to fight against 
residential discrimination and applied them to the effort to desegregate Boston’s public 
schools, which is the subject of Chapter 3. The chapter focuses on the grassroots liberal 
contributions to the effort to desegregate the Boston Public Schools and on the creation of 
METCO in 1966. This chapter explores how METCO’s suburban advocates formulated 
for the program a persuasive argument about the particular educational benefits for white 
middle-class children that influenced and anticipated a key rationale for the adoption and 
preservation of Affirmative Action. It also analyzes how METCO inadvertently 
embodied and contributed to the development of the bifurcated political outlook of many 
white middle-class liberals. 
 By examining the peace politics movement that emerged in suburbs of Boston in 
the early 1960s, Chapter 4 offers a more ideologically, demographically and 
chronologically expansive vision of the opposition to the Vietnam War. This grassroots 
peace movement emerged during the same historical moment and geographical space as 
fair housing and civil rights activism and relied on similar social networks and tactics. 
This chapter concentrates on these antiwar groups’ efforts to work within the political 
system in order to influence both fellow suburbanites and the Democratic Party’s position 
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on the war. In the process, these antiwar activists helped to make opposition to the Cold 
War and Vietnam War from a fringe to dominant belief within both the Democratic Party 
and the suburbs, culminating in the Moratorium in 1969.   
 Chapter 5 discusses the involvement of suburban liberal environmentalists in the 
broader effort to stop highway construction in metropolitan Boston. First, it examines the 
development of this form of suburban activism committed to preserving open space in the 
decades after World War II. In the late 1960s, these suburban-based environmentalists 
shifted their focus to opposing highway construction, joining a racially, economically, 
and spatially diverse coalition already trying to prevent plans to place a large highway 
through the city. The participation of suburban activists played a crucial role in 
transforming the highway revolt from an urban-based fight about housing displacement 
into a metropolitan-wide movement for environmental protection. In the process, the 
politics of environmentalism and of liberalism changed by solidifying quality-of-life 
issues and class-based exclusivity as central components of both movements.  
Part II begins with an examination in Chapter 6 of the factors leading to 
McGovern’s singular victory in Massachusetts in the 1972 election. The aim is to 
illustrate the ways the election further emboldened the exceptionalist view of both the 
Massachusetts political landscape and the suburban liberal identity. The subsequent 
chapters collectively reveal that both suburban liberalism and Massachusetts politics 
during the 1970s and 1980s were more complicated and contradictory than the election 
results suggested.  
Chapter 7 next examines a series of conflicts over affordable housing that took 
shape during the late 1960s and early 1970s in the same affluent suburban communities 
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most vocally against the Vietnam War and in support of George McGovern. Similarly, 
Chapter 8 explores the tensions in suburban liberals’ commitment to racial and spatial 
equality by looking at their reactions to the Boston busing crisis and the METCO 
program. In response to the violent urban reaction to court-ordered busing, many 
suburban communities sought to get involved in voluntary integration initiatives or to 
increase the number of students transported to their towns. When the state government 
could not afford to finance this increase in demand, fierce battles erupted in many of the 
area’s most liberal suburbs, which tested residents’ commitment to the limited one-way 
integration and racial equality more broadly. Chapter 9 traces the evolution of 
mainstream feminism in Massachusetts as a means to elucidate the continuity and 
changes in both suburban liberalism and state politics during the 1970s.  
Finally, Chapter 10 challenges the periodization of and assumptions about 
political realignment, liberalism and economic restructuring in both Massachusetts and 
the nation in the 1970s and 1980s. The chapter looks at both the career of Michael 
Dukakis, from his victorious election as governor 1974 to his ill-fated run for the 
presidency in 1988, and battles surrounding the passage of the controversial tax limitation 
measure Proposition 2 1/2 in 1980. This dual analysis dispels the images of both the 
demise of the Democratic Party and Massachusetts’s overwhelming liberalism in the 
1970s and 1980s. Ultimately, the chapter, like the dissertation as a whole, reinforces the 
thesis that Massachusetts in fact provides a model for, rather than the exception, to 












Since the late nineteenth century, Boston has basked in its reputation as the “hub 
of universe” for its superior academic and cultural institutions. The results of the 
construction in the 1950s of Route 128, a highway encircling Boston, recast the meaning 
and spatial orientation of the label. Industrial parks filled with the corporate headquarters 
of the nation’s leading technology companies, large defense-related research laboratories 
and burgeoning residential subdivisions housing a generation of white collar technocrats 
along the highway transformed Boston’s suburbs into a major hub in the modern 
universe. Route 128 literally and figuratively embodied the Cold War spending patterns, 
high-tech economy, demographic shifts, and increased racial and structural inequality all 
heavily underwritten and sanctioned by the federal government in the decades after 
World War II.  These factors earned the roadway the labels both as “America’s 
Technology Highway” and “Boston’s Road to Segregation.”1 The subdivisions and office 
parks also created new forms of grassroots liberal activism and structural inequality that 
together reshaped the economy, social order and political culture of Massachusetts and 
influenced the nation as a whole.   
The changes triggered by Route 128 spurred the emergence of new forms of 
suburban politics and grassroots activism in the affluent communities along its periphery. 
                                                
1 Vanessa Parks, “Signs of the Times Gone from Route 128,” Boston Globe, May 9, 2002; U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, Route 128: Boston’s Road to Segregation.  
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In the 1970s, observers on both sides of the political spectrum popularized the broad term 
“New Class” to describe the highly educated professionals who supported a liberal 
political agenda.2 This political movement did not suddenly appear on the national scene 
in the 1970s but had been steadily taking root in the affluent suburbs of Boston in the 
decades after World War II. These white collar professionals with ties to the area’s high-
tech companies and academic institutions helped to fundamentally transform the 
economy, culture and politics of the suburbs surrounding Route 128 and the state as a 
whole. In the early 1960s, political scientist Edgar Litt aimed to revise the traditional 
narrative of Massachusetts’s political culture to take into account the changes engendered 
by Route 128-related industry. Litt asserted, “Massachusetts is part of a post-industrial 
society that emphasizes technical, clerical and professional skills to man the burgeoning 
scientific, defense, educational and administrative institutions.”  He aptly observed the 
“new suburbs of white-collar and professional people have done much to shape the 
political strata within the state” making the state’s political economy and culture “ever 
more wedded to that of the nation.”3 This process reoriented the ideology of liberalism 
and the composition and agenda of the national Democratic Party.   
The structural and social factors that produced a new climate for liberalism 
simultaneously created new and persistent forms of inequality. This chapter explores the 
role of suburbanization in remaking the spatial, racial, social and political dynamics of 
Massachusetts. It demonstrates that the combination of New Deal liberalism and the Cold 
                                                
2 For an excellent discussion of the notion of the “New Class” see Barbara Ehrenreich, Fear of Falling: The 
Inner Life of the Middle Class (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 144-195. Ehrenreich shows how 
Neoconservatives and the New Right increasingly used this label interchangeably with the term “liberal 
elite.”  In one of the earliest uses of the term, Irving Kristol defined the “New Class” as consisting of 
“scientists, teachers and educational administrators, journalists and others in the communications 
industries, psychologists, social workers, those lawyers and doctors who make their career in the expanding 
public sectors.” See Irving Kristol, Three Cheers for Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 27.  
3 Edgar Litt, The Political Cultures of Massachusetts (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1965), 201, 3.  
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War military-industrial complex accelerated both metropolitan growth and the ideology 
of Massachusetts distinctiveness, which together established the conditions for suburban 
liberalism to flourish and structural inequality to harden. Focusing particularly on 
Brookline, Concord, Lexington, Lincoln and Newton, an archipelago of suburban 
communities that stood at the vanguard of this grassroots movement, illustrates the 
historical and demographic factors that helped to create both the favorable conditions for 
suburban liberal activism as well as the impediments that later thwarted efforts to reduce 
structural segregation.  
 
City on a Hill  
 
The physical and cultural landscape of metropolitan Boston and eastern 
Massachusetts directly reflects the state’s rich past and sense of historic distinctiveness. 
The sites of many key events during the American Revolution including Boston 
Common, the Old North Church, Faniuel Hall and Boston Harbor, the site of the Tea 
Party, are contained within the city’s official boundaries. Just across the Charles River in 
Cambridge stands the ivy-lined walls of Harvard University, while 10-15 miles westward 
along the route of Paul Revere’s famous ride sit the towns of Lexington and Concord first 
founded around 1640. Further north lies the city of Lowell whose textile factories served 
as the birthplace of the nation’s Industrial Revolution, and further south lies the famous 
former whaling port of New Bedford.  
During the nineteenth century Boston became an industrial and cosmopolitan 
center that relished in its reputation as the “Athens of America” and the “hub of the 
universe. ”  The topography of Boston, with its hills, marshes, rivers and ocean, had 
initially prevented easy physical expansion. The introduction of the new forms of 
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industry, however, brought with them a significant growth in population.  Between 1850 
and 1900, metropolitan Boston shifted from a small merchant city of 200,000 into a 
metropolis of more than a million people.4 The rise of industrialization in Boston and its 
surrounding communities coupled with its location on the Atlantic Ocean to make the 
city a favorable destination for European immigrants.  In the middle of the century a 
steady influx of Irish, Italian and Jewish immigrants caused spatial changes and the 
increased economic, social and physical division in the city.5 In the first decades of 
nineteenth century, the neighboring villages of Roxbury, West Roxbury and Dorchester 
had served as the site for the summer homes of many wealthy families, but by the Civil 
War, new railway lines helped the expanding numbers of middle-class merchants, 
salespeople, lawyers, school teachers, clerks and contractors commute daily downtown 
from single-family homes in these “streetcar suburbs.”6  During the mid-nineteenth 
century, civic leaders engaged in a discussion about the benefits and drawbacks of 
formally integrating these communities into the city.7 After an extended debate, in the 
decade after the Civil War, Boston doubled its size by engulfing the towns of Roxbury, 
Dorchester, Charlestown, West Roxbury, Allston and Brighton through promises of 
superior municipal services and greater economic opportunity.8 
This trend of consolidation abruptly ended in 1873, when the town of Brookline, 
which sat adjacent to Boston, became the first municipality in the nation to vote against 
annexation and to remain a separate entity. The residents of the self-appointed “richest 
                                                
4 Warner, Streetcar Suburbs, 1.  
5 Warner, Streetcar Suburbs, 80.  
6  Warner Streetcar Suburbs, 116 -117.  
7 For more about the complex debate surrounding metropolitan integration and development in Boston 
during the nineteenth century see Noam Maggor, “Zone of Emergence”: Boston's Lower Middle Class and 
the Politics of Property, 1865-1917” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, forthcoming).  
8 Roxbury, for instance, opted to join Boston as a means to solve a sewer problem, see Jackson, Crabgrass 
Frontier, 146-147.  
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town in the world” were not swayed by the prospect of access to Boston’s services since 
Brookline had already possessed its own waterworks and superior education facilities.  
The vote demonstrated Brookline residents’ determination to have more control over the 
physical and social environment of their community, a reluctance to assume the financial 
burdens of an expanding and heterogeneous urban population, and a fear that a loss of 
local autonomy would threaten the quality of the services the town had begun to offer 
residents. 9 The decision effectively ended the drive for expansion of Boston as most 
other communities on the city’s outer ring soon followed the model of Brookline and 
opted for independent incorporation. The decision for independent incorporation also set 
off a chain reaction in other communities throughout the urban North.10 This trend had 
particularly physical and social effects on Boston in the century to come, because, in 
words one scholar, it “superimposed a fragmented political system on the spatially 
differentiated population of the metropolis.”11 
The rejection of annexation meant that upper-class communities sharing as many 
as two or three borders with Boston remained separate entities. Independent incorporation 
provided a way for Brookline and other affluent communities not only to remain exempt 
from sharing the burdens of urbanization, especially the growing population of low-
income residents, but also to create new mechanisms for excluding lower-income and 
                                                
9 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 147; Warner, Streetcar Suburbs 163-164; Ronald Dale Kerr, “Brookline and 
the Making of an Elite Suburb,” Chicago History (Summer 1984), 36-47.  
10 For example in town of Belmont, just west of Cambridge basis for incorporation rested “upon the desire 
of a group of affluent taxpayers and real estate speculators to create a residential enclave free from the cost 
of services for other classes of citizens.” Matthew Edel, Elliott D. Sclar and Daniel Luria, Shaky Palaces: 
Homeownership and Social Mobility in Boston’s Suburbanization (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1984), 232. 
11 Michael N. Danielson, The Politics of Exclusion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 17. Edel 
et al, Shaky Palaces, 64-67; Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 138-144. By the twentieth century, the land area 
of Boston’s core remained 46 square miles as opposed to Houston, which included 483.5 square miles and 




poor people, which provided real meaning to the imaginary lines separating city and 
suburbs.  These communities used other forms of material and ideological class 
differentiation such as architecture to further define their separation from the city and its 
residents. Politics provided an additional marker of social distinction, throughout the 
period. The residents of suburbs like Brookline and Newton remained overwhelmingly 
loyal to Republican patrician candidates who embodied a similar elite identity and values 
and were distrustful of the Democratic machine-style politics that dominated the city.12 
Thus, by the early twentieth century, the political map of Boston featured a densely 
Democratic city surrounded by a solid ring of Republicanism. The increasing popularity 
of the automobile and the building of new roadways in the first decades of the twentieth 
century quickened the pace of metropolitan development and extended these patterns to 
include previously rural towns including Belmont, Lexington and Wellesley to the West, 
and Ipswich to the North.13 During the interwar period, the automobile caused Belmont to 
expand by 90 percent from 10,749 to 21,748, Needham to grow by 50 percent and 
Wellesley by 80 percent.14 The pervasive practices of formal restrictive covenants in 
residential deeds and informal “gentlemen’s agreements” ensured that these new towns 
remained overwhelmingly Protestant, white, and affluent.15  
                                                
12 For more on the Massachusetts Republican Party in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries see 
Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). 
13 In more established older suburbs like Brookline and Newton, the rise of the automobile enabled 
construction of cheaper homes away from the streetcar lines, which helped to slightly expand these town 
middle-class populations, but only to those who could afford a car (Edel, Shaky Palaces, 60).  
14 Edel et al, Shaky Palaces, 59-60.  
15 Barry Bluestone and Mary Huff Stevenson, The Boston Renaissance: Race, Space, and Economic 
Change in an American Metropolis  (New York: Russell Sage Foundations, 2002), 79. In 1948 the 
Supreme Court officially outlawed the use of such formal restrictions. Prior to that time the practicewas 
condoned by the federal government. The 1938 Federal Housing Authority’s manual encouraged the use of 
such covenants in sale contract and deeds involving mortgage insurance in order to preserve racial 
homogeneity (Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 208; Danielson, Politics of Exclusion, 13).  
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 In order to further preserve their physical characteristics and economic 
exclusivity maintained through resistance to annexation and these exclusionary 
agreements, many of these suburbs in the interwar period embraced newly established 
zoning and municipal planning laws. The push for municipal zoning in Massachusetts 
first emerged at the turn of the twentieth century as part of the broader effort to pursue 
the Progressive era agenda of order, control and public safety. The enabling zoning 
legislation passed in Massachusetts in 1920 channeled this progressive discourse, 
empowering municipalities to establish zoning “for the purpose of promoting the health, 
safety, convenience, morals or welfare of its inhabitants.” 16 This notion of public good 
rested on a set of racialized and class-coded ideals intended to exclude undesirable 
segments of the population. The zoning ordinances of the suburbs extended these ideals 
using one-acre lot size minimums to pursue a land use control agenda that reflected class 
and racialized attitudes about the ideal natural, built and social environments. 17 
Suburban development dramatically intensified following World War II, reorienting the 
social and political landscape of metropolitan Boston even more toward the periphery and 
significantly heightening patterns of racial, spatial and economic inequalities. The 
increasing availability of government loans through the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) and Veteran’s Administration (VA) encouraged homeownership for returning 
                                                
16 Philip Simon v. Town of Needham 311 Mass. 560 (1942), 562. For an excellent discussion of the ways in 
the which these early 20th century zoning advocates inscribed racialized assumptions into land use politics, 
see Freund, Colored Property, 45-98, for an excellent discussion of the ways in the which these early 20th 
century zoning advocates inscribed racialized assumptions into land use politics. 
17 The state court consistently upheld these large-lot zoning ordinances. In 1942 in the case Simon v. Town 
of Needham the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in sanctioned local zoning power and the benefits of 
one-acre plots to prevent “overcrowding of land,” provide  “a better opportunity for rest and relaxation,” 
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veterans and other upwardly mobile white families. While the metropolitan area as a 
whole grew 17.6 percent, adding 282,976 new people between 1940 and 1960, Boston 
lost 100,000 residents, 13 percent of its population, the majority of them white. 
Metropolitan Boston also added 200,000 units of new housing, but only 16 percent were 
in the city itself.18 Relying on the maps outlined by the Home Owners Loan Corporation 
(HOLC), local banks classified as “depressed” and “blighted” many of Boston’s older 
neighborhoods and annexed former “streetcar suburbs” such as South Boston, 
Charlestown, Dorchester and Roxbury and refused to grant mortgages in these 
communities. This policy effectively forced veterans with G.I. Bill loans and other 
individuals with government-underwritten mortgages to seek new housing primarily 
outside the city. 19 The vast majority of loan recipients fulfilled the preferences of the 
FHA, VA and private mortgage companies by purchasing single-family detached homes 
in the suburbs. The Supreme Court’s formal outlawing of restrictive covenants in 1948 
created new opportunities for white ethnics to move into the suburbs. The federally 
sanctioned forces of suburbanization, moreover, operated to expand the definitions of 
middle-class and whiteness, and many Irish Catholics, Italians and Jews who migrated to 
the Boston suburbs after World War II benefited from these recast categories of race and 
class. 20  Many of these new white suburban migrants had roots in the city’s ethnic 
enclaves concentrated in South Boston, Charlestown, North End, Roxbury and 
Dorchester.  
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These discriminatory federal policies excluded African-Americans from suburban 
homeownership and left them largely confined within the boundaries of Boston. The city 
had contained a small black population since the 18th century. While the community had 
established important educational, social, cultural religious institutions, it had never 
reached the scale of other northern urban centers. The lack of manufacturing jobs 
available in the middle decades of the twentieth century made Boston a much less 
desirable destination for participants in the Great Migration. Following World War II, 
however, the city did experience a surge in African-American migrants. Although not the 
near majority of other metropolitan areas like Chicago, Cleveland and Detroit, this new 
influx of population made African-Americans an increasing presence in Boston. Until 
1960, Boston’s black population remained 9 percent of the city’s population with 63,000, 
residents, and then increased to 100,000 between 1960 and 1965. By the late 1960s, 60 
percent of the city’s black population had lived in Boston for less than 16 years, the 
average age of the immigrants was 22 and most came from rural backgrounds.21  
The combination of FHA policy and equally discriminatory Boston Housing 
Authority practices left African-Americans across the economic spectrum with only the 
options of living in deteriorating houses in the former streetcar suburbs of Roxbury and 
Dorchester. 22  Although a half century earlier these neighborhoods housed much of the 
area’s middle-class white population, by the 1950s they remained largely in disrepair. 
The 1960 census reported that almost one half of all African-American residences in 
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Boston were “dilapidated” or “deteriorating” housing compared to 18 percent of white 
residences.23 Landlords took advantage of the fact that African-Americans had few 
options by significantly overcharging for rent.  
Boston’s urban renewal efforts compounded the problems of racial and residential 
African-Americans and the city as a whole. Postwar out-migration coincided with and 
intensified a period of extended downturn for Boston.24 The former financial capital of 
the colonies had the lowest bond rating of any large American city in the 1950s and even 
Boston Common and the Public Gardens, the beautiful and historic green landmarks in 
the center of the city, remained overgrown and untended, reflecting the overall sense of 
decline. 25 In response, the city launched an aggressive urban renewal program based on 
maintaining white-collar industry downtown that raised $1 billion in federal, state and 
private funds for construction of Government Center, the Prudential Center, and several 
other landmark projects.26 The effort sparked a spurt of skyscraper development in the 
downtown area that once again made Boston an international center for of business, law, 
and medicine. These construction projects added over 8 million square feet to the skyline 
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in the 1960s complementing historic sites like the gold dome of the State House and the 
white steeple of the Old North Church.27 Despite the skyline’s seeming unification of 
tradition and progress, the urban renewal program actually compounded the racial 
segregation and physical fragmentation of the city and exacerbated a sense distrust and 
alienation among low-income black and white residents. 28 The combination of formal 
and informal forms of racial segregation further decreased geographic and social mobility 
of African-Americans in Boston. By the early 1960s, 80 percent of the city’s black 
population remained largely confined to 15 contiguous census tracts in the South End, 
Roxbury and North Dorchester.29  A large contingent of white residents sought to outpace 
dilapidation and displacement and joined the broader white middle-class exodus out 
moved out of the city.30 This out-migration toward the suburbs made the Boston white 
neighborhoods demographically poorer and less religiously and ethnically diverse than 
two decades before. In places like Charlestown, South Boston and Hyde Park the changes 
engendered by suburbanization and urban renewal, moreover, increased among residents 
a sense of neighborhood allegiance, resentment of the government, and distrust of 
newcomers.31  
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America’s Technology Highway 
The expanded mortgage market helped finance the migration of white residents 
out of Boston, but state and federal investment in highway construction literally made it 
possible. In 1948, the Massachusetts Department of Transportation released an ambitious 
plan to remake the state’s roadway system by expanding upon the existing radial network 
of roadways and parkways. The funding from the 1956 Federal Highway Act transformed 
these plans into reality. The windfall of government money led directly to the 
construction of several new expressways in the Boston area. These new roadways 
included the eight-lane Massachusetts Turnpike, or Interstate 90, which ran directly from 
the center of Boston through the suburbs of Newton, Weston, Framingham and Natick to 
the state’s western border where it continued across the country. The Central Artery 
consisted of a fusion of tunnels and elevated roadways, which cut the center of Boston off 
from the waterfront and was visually unattractive, but made commuting exponentially 
easier for people who worked downtown to live in the suburbs northeast and south of the 
city. Developers quickly built new subdivisions, industrial parks, and strip malls in the 
forests and meadows by the future roadways. 32 The highways, therefore, helped shift 
homes, businesses, shopping, and people from the city center to its margins. Between 
1955 and 1965, the population increased in the suburbs of Burlington by 272.2 percent, 
Sudbury by 198 percent and Wayland by 137 percent. By the end of the 1950s, suburban 
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residents outnumbered urban dwellers 2 to 1 and 80 percent metropolitan of Boston’s 
white population became dispersed through its outer ring.33  
These varied ingredients of suburbanization collapsed into the singular form of 
Route 128. The combination of corporate decentralization, federal defense spending, and 
metropolitan fragmentation, all embodied by Route 128, served, according to one 
government commission, as a “bellwether for certain national trends in suburban 
growth.” 34 Transportation developers initially intended for the road to ease commuting 
into Boston by connecting a collection of existing roadways and to help vacationers 
travel north to New Hampshire and Maine and south to Cape Cod. Skeptics deemed 
Route 128 “the road to nowhere” because of its semicircular shape. 35 A key intervention 
changed the fate of the highway and offered it several more affirmative nicknames such 
as the “magic semi-circle” and “ideas road. ” 36 In the late 1940s, executives at real estate 
investment and development company Cabot, Cabot and Forbes (CCF) recognized that 
the construction of Route 128 opened up new sites for development that would be ideal 
for the burgeoning technology industry that was growing out of and around the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard in Cambridge and Boston where 
there was little room for physical expansion.37   
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This recognition exposed the increasingly important role of major universities in 
shaping the economy, society and culture of metropolitan Boston in the postwar period. 
The area had served as a college town since the seventeenth century, but following World 
War II the region boasted one of the densest concentration of academic institutions of 
anywhere in the world.38 Metropolitan Boston contained more than 60 colleges and 
universities, including Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Boston 
College, Boston University, Northeastern University, Tufts University, Wellesley College 
and the recently founded Brandeis University. The G.I. Bill increased college enrollment 
significantly in both undergraduate and graduate schools throughout the nation as a whole 
and in Massachusetts in particular.39 The financial largesse led to the construction of new 
buildings and hiring of new faculty in all departments. Further fueling the expansion in 
the decade after World War II, the federal government significantly increased its funding 
of scientific-based research projects at universities throughout the country. Beginning 
with the Morrill Act in 1862, the federal government had provided funding for the 
advancement of science and technology, but the Cold War greatly enlarged the scope of 
endeavors it considered worthy of subsidy. 40 The federal government did not disperse 
this money evenly across the country but instead strongly favored institutions and area 
with established patterns of science research, which made Boston at the receiving end of 
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an enormous windfall of millions of dollars annually in fields such as radar, missile 
guidance and navigation systems. 41  
No institution played a more central role than MIT in the expansion of 
metropolitan Boston’s post-industrial economy and the rise of Route 128. The rapid 
growth of industry connected to the university proved to at least one observer that 
“M.I.T. is Boston’s greatest asset.”42 Since its founding in 1860, MIT had served as a site 
of scientific and technological innovation for the federal government, but that role 
became magnified during World War II when the university became “the nation’s 
unofficial center for wartime research.”43 MIT received the contracts for several of the 
government’s largest defense projects including the development of radar and microwave 
technology, which behind atomic energy served as the second most significant scientific 
breakthrough of the war. As the military aimed to maintain the U.S. technological edge at 
the dawn of the Cold War, the relationship between the university and the Pentagon 
flourished.44 MIT boasted the largest defense research budget of any university in the 
nation throughout the postwar period. In the 1950s the university opened four new 
research centers devoted to life, space, earth and materials sciences as well as Lincoln 
Laboratory in Lexington near the Hanscom Air Force Base.45  The lab, fully underwritten 
by the government, employed close to the 4,000 people who together achieved some of 
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the earliest innovations in computer technology.46 Many of the researchers used the ideas 
first germinated in these laboratories as the launching point for development of successful 
and lucrative private smaller companies.47 An internal report in the 1960s revealed that 
just three MIT academic departments and four laboratories had created 129 companies 
during the postwar decades. “MIT has spawned more spin-off companies than any other 
single institution in the country, ” Susan Rosengrant and David Lampe later speculated.48 
Most of these spin-offs moved to the research parks on Route 128.  
Even before the Route 128 ribbon-cutting, CCF developed plans for this coming 
revolution in real estate and industry. Executives from the company simultaneously 
lobbied several suburban municipalities encouraging them to rezone land by the 
unfinished highway for commercial development and approached Cambridge and 
Boston-based technology firms and labs urging them to relocate to these new sites. The 
company’s first park in Needham called the New England Industrial Center sat on a 200-
acre development and included 16 buildings. In the next few years, CCF and developed 
several other parks primarily in the 30-mile section of the roadway between Dedham in 
the South and Danvers in the North, with the densest concentrations at the interchanges 
of Route 128 and the Massachusetts Turnpike in Waltham and Route 2 in Lexington.  
Aware of its client base in the knowledge industry, CCF designed the parks to resemble 
college campuses with low detached structures and pastoral landscaping surrounded by 
trees.49 Many of the companies that opted to move cited cheaper and more land with the 
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opportunity to relocate to a “good looking industrial park” and to be part of “ a good 
looking industrial community” as key factors in the decision to relocate.50 Many of these 
executives also realized that the location of the “garden-type” industrial centers  “near 
Boston but out of Boston” would provide a means to attract high-quality and well-trained 
technical workers who already lived in the suburbs. 51 The revolutionary construction 
techniques, government incentives, convenient locations and reasonable price of the real 
estate helped make Route 128 the “biggest and fastest growing science-based complex in 
the U.S.” 52 The names of the corporations filling the modernist structures sounded as if 
they came from the plots of science fiction novels, companies such as Digital, Trans-
Sonics, Tracerlab, Dynametrics, Bose, AVCO, High Voltage and Wang Laboratories 
provided the symbols of the beginning post-industrial age and placed Route 128 at the 
vanguard of the emerging electronics and computer industries. 
Many observers placed the rise of high-tech industry in the discourse of 
Massachusetts exceptionalism citing “Yankee ingenuity” as the key ingredient, and 
obscuring the role of Cold War federal investment.53 Indeed, the majority these 
companies served the explicit demands of the Department of Defense.  During the 1950s, 
Massachusetts firms received more than $6 billion in Defense Department contracts and 
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that amount increased annually by $1 billion throughout the 1960s.54 By 1962 the 
Defense Department and federal government accounted for fully half of the sales of 
Route 128 and Massachusetts ranked third in Pentagon contracts nationally.55 Raytheon, 
a defense contractor and missile-maker, became the state’s single largest beneficiary of 
Cold War money. In the 1950s, Raytheon opened twenty-five additional plants that 
employed 36,000 people within a thirty-five mile radius of downtown Boston as well as a 
large new headquarters along Route 128 in Lexington. 56 That Raytheon engineers 
developed missile within just miles of where the Minuteman fired muskets on the 
Lexington Battle Green and the Old North Bridge in Concord reveals the juxtaposition of 
modernity and history at the center of the defense-related industry along Route 128 
simultaneously representing patriotic progress and a betrayal of the ideals of the 
American Revolution.  
Massachusetts aimed to repackage the spectacular rise of the high-tech industry 
and its related business on Route 128 into a form of civic boosterism to lure more people 
and companies to the state. Like other areas across the country, Massachusetts used a 
combination of tax breaks and advertising to draw businesses to Route 128 and the state 
as whole.  A Chamber of Commerce pamphlet from the early 1960s touted Massachusetts 
as the “Nucleus of the Northeast” drawing a map that directly mimicked the arc of the 
highway. 57 In addition, Chamber of Commerce officials emphasized that Greater Boston 
had the largest concentration of skilled professional and technical personnel of “any 
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metropolitan area in the free world” including more than 30,000 engineers and 
scientists.58 The marketing and incentives clearly worked. By  1967, the number of 
companies located on or near the highway rose to 729 and collectively employed 66, 701 
people.59 In addition to several start-ups, established companies like Polaroid decided to 
shift their headquarters to land along the highway in Waltham because the new site 
offered  “good roads and adequate parking for workers cars.”60 National companies such 
as Xerox, Sylvania and General Electric also opted to open branches and plants on or 
near Route 128. A profusion of other science-based companies and government-
underwritten laboratories appeared at sites removed from the actual highway, but the 
name “Route 128” came, according to the New York Times, to “symbolize the 
technological boom in the Greater Boston area.”61 Moreover, the highway revived the 
area’s financial services industry, sparking the creation of several venture capital firms, 
investment funds and consulting firms primarily located in downtown Boston.62  
The Massachusetts government and other observers confidently believed the rise 
of high-tech industry provided the answer to the region and the nation’s economic 
problems.63  Projecting a faith in the growth liberal consensus of the postwar period, the 
Chamber of Commerce and other boosters optimistically predicted that the new 
companies would seamlessly replace the declining manufacturing industry that had long 
served as the mainstay of the Massachusetts economy. This attitude overlooked the fact 
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that much of the new industry appearing along Route 128 demanded highly skilled labor 
and thereby excluded from employment large sectors of the population. Moreover, the 
location of these companies along the highway made automobile ownership virtually a 
prerequisite for employment and precluded many poor people in the city from seeking or 
obtaining employment in the new corporations. These areas along Route 128 
overwhelmingly lacked access to adequate public transportation and likewise most of 
these transit schedules served suburban commuters going into the city rather than the 
reverse.64  
Among companies that relocated from Boston and Cambridge, a large number of 
urban workers did not follow their employers to their new suburban sites. Studies by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in 1958 and 1961 discovered that relocated firms 
reported the highest rates of resignations among unskilled or part-time staff, and female 
clerical and production workers who lived in the city. 65 As one human resources 
executive declared, “You can hardly expect girls on the production line to commute 22 
miles a day for $1.20 an hour.”66  These companies, particularly those which moved to 
affluent suburbs, had an especially difficult time finding employees to fill the clerical and 
production openings traditionally held by women. This statistic offers just one example 
of the way that corporate and residential migration to Route 128 exacerbated the racial 
and economic inequality of the metropolitan region.  
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Route 128: The Road to Segregation  
The construction of Route 128 and attendant business growth rapidly intensified 
the processes of suburban migration and patterns of inequality already underway in the 
adjacent communities. The growing demand by technology companies to settle in 
industrial parks along Route 128 hardened the distinctions not just between Boston and 
its suburbs, but also within suburban communities along its path. This process 
encouraged a sense of localism and lack of cooperation among suburban governments 
and intensified the long New England tradition of home rule.  Lizabeth Cohen observed 
that the post- New Deal expansion of the federal government particularly in the housing 
market provided a moment of opportunity to repudiate localism and provincialism, but in 
these suburbs the opposite occurred and residents “set out not just to replicate the New 
England small town, but to improve upon it.”67 This response of various suburbs to Route 
128 development, therefore, inscribed clear boundaries and socioeconomic distinctions 
into the physical landscape of the area and the cognitive cartography of many citizens. 
Suburbs adjacent to Route 128 including Needham, Burlington and Waltham 
recognized the potential benefits of commercial development as means to enhance local 
property values and tax base and recruited technological companies to their communities. 
68  Needham led the wave. After World War II, the largely white-collar residential 
community experienced an expanding population, especially of school-aged children, 
which had led to a soaring tax rate. Needham thereby agreed to zone a large tract of land 
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for CCF to build its first industrial park. The land proved ideal for this purpose since 
Route 128 itself separated the plot from the rest of the community and it was never prime 
residential property. Other communities soon followed Needham’s model of rezoning 
residents, accepting the assurances of CCF and other developers that the industrial park 
was an “anti-factory” whose design seamlessly fused industry into the suburban 
landscape.69. Several upper middle-class towns like Lexington, Wayland, Winchester, 
and Sudbury allowed for small amounts of industry, but actively limited the construction 
to corporate headquarters rather than large manufacturing plants and relegated these 
offices to the periphery of their municipal boundaries. Towns with a history of 
industrialization were more receptive. For instance, by 1961, Waltham, which sat 
between Newton and Lexington, boasted 64 firms in industrial parks and other locations 
directly along or adjacent to the roadway and further north Burlington added 50 new 
companies during the decade.70 
In several largely residential towns like Concord and Lexington that had roots 
dating back before the American Revolution, the new population and commercial 
pressures created by Route 128 raised concerns about the loss of their physical and 
ideological distinctiveness and increases in local tax rates. These towns therefore decided 
to rigidly restrict residential and commercial development through zoning and forms of 
growth control.71 Many towns had zoning codes in place prior to World War II, yet with 
the outlawing of racial covenants and the rise of suburbanization, these laws took on even 
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more salience as a means to control land development and increase social exclusivity. In 
the decade after the war, several municipalities along the Route 128 established 40,000 
square foot minimums (i.e. one-acre) for more than half the land in their respective 
towns. In 1955, Lincoln went even further in its effort to remain a “country town” by 
setting an 80,000 square foot  (roughly two acres) minimum and establishing a rule that a 
house could only cover 25 percent of the lot.72  Many of its wealthy counterparts like 
Dover and Weston quickly followed suit. 73 These policies constituted a form of nascent 
environmental protection by slowing the pace of growth and maintaining the low density 
of their towns, which they buttressed through conservation zoning and open space 
acquisition. The zoning ordinances in many upper middle-class communities directly 
contributed to a severe housing shortage within metropolitan Boston, especially within 
the low-income and middle-income brackets. In 1958, the Massachusetts Department of 
Commerce discovered that the intensification of zoning restrictions had reduced the 
capacity for residential development in Boston’s suburbs by 39 percent between 1946 and 
1956.74 These ordinances did not just effectively freeze population growth in many 
affluent suburbs, but made the costs of those attractive plots available extremely high.  
Several towns increased their own exclusivity and the housing shortage of the 
state by inscribing into their zoning codes strict limitations on the types of dwellings 
deemed acceptable.   The affluent communities of Concord, Dover, Sherborn, Sudbury 
and Weston prohibited the construction of all multi-family and non-detached dwellings, 
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which purportedly undermined the social values and physical environments of their 
communities.75  Many other suburbs, such as Lexington, Wayland, and Wellesley, 
allowed some non-single-family homes, but relegated them to marginal districts or 
required special permits from local zoning boards for construction. The establishment of 
local historic preservation policies supplemented the priorities of these zoning codes. 
These ordinances gave town officials wide oversight to restrict over-development and 
mass-produced housing that would allegedly violate the historical integrity of the 
community.  76 These laws, therefore, further maintained the historic charm and social 
exclusivity of places like Lexington, Concord, Weston and Wellesley, but at an unspoken 
social cost.  
The reach of these zoning policies extended beyond housing and industry and into 
other areas as well. Weston and Lincoln for instance both prevented all industry and 
restricted commercial enterprises to small grocery stores, plant nurseries, and farm 
stands, forcing residents to do most retail, employment entertainment functions in 
neighboring communities.77 The actions, therefore, placed the burdens on less affluent 
suburbs of not just industrial plants, corporate headquarters, and multifamily housing 
development, but also visually unattractive gas stations, grocery stores and strip malls. A 
report by the Civil Rights Commission in the 1970s, observed, “in those towns which had 
the time and the funds, physical planning succeeded almost too well. Those town are 
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beautiful, although their beauty was paid for, in part, by the ugliness, of others.” The very 
conscious zoning practices also ensured the superior municipal services of these 
exclusive bedroom communities. By allowing only large lot zoning and limited industry, 
towns like Weston, Lincoln, Lexington and Concord had a smaller school population, 
less demand for police, fire and road maintenance and therefore offered excellent services 
at lower rates.78 The reverse result occurred in Boston and the less affluent suburbs that 
allowed for significant commercial development because the rise in population, lower tax 
base and breaks for industry meant less municipal services at higher costs. 
 The decision to embrace or restrict commercial development effectively 
produced different trajectories and class standing even among towns that sat adjacent to 
one another, further enhancing the spatial distinctions between them. For instance, 
Burlington became the fastest growing town in the Boston area with its population raising 
from 2,672 in 1945 to 13,000 in 1960, which placed tremendous burden on its municipal 
services, particularly its school system.79 Adding further pressures, commercial enterprise 
comprised 60.6 percent of the town’s real estate, but due to deals between the companies 
and town officials it only amounted to 25 percent of taxable property. In contrast, the 
nearby town of Winchester remained 93 percent residential and the eight new firms that 
opened in specially zoned areas had little impact on the community, its property values or 
school system. 80  The Civil Rights Commission concluded, therefore, that within the 
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communities around Route 128 “the locations of jobs and housing have become separated 
and the distribution of resources within the suburbs themselves unequal.”81  
The strict zoning policies of this archipelago of affluent suburbs gave 
homeowners and aspiring residents a sense that these physical and economic distinctions 
ran ideologically as well. The rolling fields, architecturally distinctive homes and absence 
of commercial development in places like Concord or Lincoln enabled white middle-
class residents to set themselves apart from the average conformist, homogenous and 
politically disengaged suburbanite who lived in the bland “ cookie cutter” postwar 
subdivisions discussed in the cultural criticism of C. Wright Mills, David Riesman, and 
William Whyte and represented on TV shows like Leave It To Beaver and Father Knows 
Best. Lincoln residents Paul and Susan Brooks proudly described their town as a suburb 
merely “by accident of geography.”82 While this naturalized notion of superiority shaped 
the “happy few” identity of these communities, the process of maintaining that 
mythology was clearly far more deliberate. Mr. and Mrs. Brooks celebrated how their 
local rigid housing code prevented “jerry-built ‘Colonials’ and ‘Capes’ (that no colonist 
or cape would be caught dead in).” The couple overlooked the fact that the combination 
of zoning and building policies did not just restrict mass-produced housing, but also 
excluded the vast majority of lower-income and even middle-income families who could 
not afford to purchase a well-built single-family home on a one-acre plot. Their attitude 
shows how this maze of land control decisions incubated both a sense of liberal 
distinctiveness and entitlement at the same time it hardened structural inequality and 
metropolitan fragmentation.   
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The Social World of the Suburbs  
The combination of Route 128 industry and double-edged zoning policies brought 
to the affluent suburbs along the highway an influx of new upwardly mobile citizens who 
had the means to purchase homes in these physically attractive, socially exclusive 
communities that offered easy access to Boston, Cambridge, and corporate headquarters 
or outposts of businesses along the roadway. These residents could and wanted to expend 
additional money for the advantages that came with living in Lexington or Newton as 
opposed to the more affordable, denser subdivisions in places like Waltham or 
Burlington.   Most of the affluent suburbs along the semi-circle had contained large 
white-collar populations before the construction of Route 128, but who were not 
necessarily tied to the high-tech and defense-related industries. The highway’s arrival, 
therefore, changed the occupational profile of most of the towns along Boston’s outer 
ring. In 1950, one in five employed Lexington residents worked as operative or service 
workers, yet one in three who moved to the suburb in the next six years listed their 
occupation as professional or technological worker.83 A decade later, Lexington planning 
officials announced that 70 percent of the scientists and workers in the high-tech industry 
had decided to live either there or a surrounding community.84 
 Most of new arrivals to the Route 128 suburbs participated in a regional 
reshuffling rather a national diaspora.85 These new engineers, executives and other 
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professionals overwhelmingly came from other parts of the Northeast and often other 
places in metropolitan Boston. In direct contrast to the employee profiles of companies in 
Orange County and Silicon Valley, where the vast majority of workers had moved to 
California from other parts of the country, the majority of Route 128 engineers and 
executives who moved to the Boston suburbs “were from New England, many had 
attended local educational institutions and their identities were already defined by 
familial and ethnic ties.” 86 A survey of people who moved to Newton between 1957 and 
1958 showed that the largest percentage relocated from Brookline or Boston and those 
who migrated from out of state mostly came from New York and Pennsylvania.87 
Synthesizing the typical new migrant, a local reporter in 1958 produced the archetype of 
a “youngish sales-engineer, possessor of one child, one car, seeking the good schools, 
municipal services, suburbia at its best atmosphere.”88 The new population of Concord 
during the same year reflected a similar composite prototype. The majority of new male 
residents were engineers, physicists, professors or sales managers, married to a woman 
who stayed at home, and had moved either from an inner-ring suburb of Boston or an 
eastern seaboard state.89 A large portion of these new professional suburbanites had 
attended college or graduate school in metropolitan Boston and decided to remain, 
enlarging the areas of academia, law, medicine, finance, teaching, social work and 
science-based industry. 90 
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The suburbs along Route 128 also boasted a high number of academics employed 
by area universities. One booster speculated that metropolitan Boston had “more Ph.D.’s 
per acre… than any other place in the country.”91 While there is not statistical evidence to 
confirm that observation, the expansion of universities during the first decades after the 
war increased the demand for professors, many of who opted to live in the suburbs. The 
new highways not only made it easy for white-collar professionals to move in and in out 
of Cambridge and Boston, but also for professors who taught at Harvard, MIT and 
Boston University to live in the suburbs. For instance, Man, Women and Child, Erich 
Segal’s novel about suburban marriage, featured several scenes of Ken Beckworth a 
professor of statistics at MIT, commuting back and forth along Route 2 from his home in 
Lexington to his office along the Charles River in Cambridge.92  Beckworth’s ability to 
move to the suburbs was not just because of the increase in roadway accessibility but the 
rise in faculty salaries at places like Harvard. MIT, Tufts and BU in the 1950s and 1960s. 
In the late 1950s a commission sponsored by President Eisenhower had encouraged 
universities to increase their faculty salaries in order to ensure that these institutions 
remained cutting-edge. Harvard President Nathan Pusey made improving faculty incomes 
a top priority and by 1967 the university had the highest average salaries in the nation. 93  
Moreover, many science, engineering, and economics professors supplemented their 
salaries through consulting income from Route 128-related companies.94 For instance in 
1959, Raytheon kept 30 to 40 academic professors “on tap,” paying them retainers up to 
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$10,000 per year. Through the 1960s these figures increased dramatically. The 
Cambridge-based consultant firm Arthur D. Little, Inc. employed 200 professors as 
consultants with some making as much as $40,000. Prior to the war, most academics 
lived in smaller homes closer to the campuses of Harvard, MIT and Boston University, 
but the increase in funds now made it financially feasible for many professors like the 
fictionalized Beckworths to live in the affluent suburbs. By the early 1960s, the local 
weekly newspapers in Brookline, Lexington and Newton featured articles about local 
residents winning scholarly prizes and gaining tenure side by reports of Little League 
games and Kiwanis Club meetings.  The commuting practices of these academics helped 
to solidify the links between certain suburbs and the area’s universities and to bolster 
these communities’ liberal reputations.  
The professors, engineers and other white-collar professionals who migrated to 
Brookline, Concord, Lexington, Lincoln, and Newton expanded and altered the social 
culture of the suburbs, remolding them into strongholds of liberalism. These 
communities, moreover, already had well-established religious, social, cultural and 
political networks that provided the infrastructure for these forms of grassroots liberal 
activism to emerge. A 1950 booklet distributed to new Lexington homeowner featured a 
long list of church groups, benevolent societies, civic organizations, and sporting clubs.95 
These institutions provided recently relocated married couples in Lexington and 
elsewhere an instant sense of community and belonging in their new homes.96 Annelise 
Siberian described the social world of engineers and executive employed by high-tech 
companies on Route 128 as centered on “church local schools, tennis clubs and other 
                                                
95 Evening Alliance of the First Parish Church, Directory of Organizations in Lexington and Bus Schedules, 
1950, Loeb. 
96 Lisa McGirr makes a similar point about another group of suburbanites, see Suburban Warriors, 48. 
 
 64 
civic and neighborhood institutions” in their local suburbs. 97 During the 1950s and 
1960s, in Concord, Lexington and elsewhere engineers, executives and other white collar 
professionals regularly engaged in forms of socializing such as bridge, tennis, coffee 
klatches, garden clubs, dinner parties and church groups where they forged relationships 
with neighbors and other members of the community who generally shared their 
socioeconomic characteristics and political outlook.98  
In the Route 128 communities that became important incubators of grassroots 
liberal activism, religion served as a particularly important component of residents’ 
identity and social world. The church steeple had anchored the social world and values of 
places like Concord and Lexington since the colonial period, but by the nineteenth 
century, their congregations had abandoned Puritanism for Unitarianism and other less 
rigid denominations which emphasized commitment to democracy, rational thought and 
social justice. The population explosion in the postwar decades spurred construction of 
new churches and renovation of older ones in the cities and towns throughout 
metropolitan Boston. Unlike the Sunbelt metropolises like Los Angeles, where postwar 
migration led to a flourishing of evangelical Protestants especially Southern Baptists, 
outside of Boston the new expansion remained largely in the mainline tradition. While 
fifty-one new Baptist churches launched in Orange County between 1950 and 1960, in 
the mid-1950s in Lexington the sole Baptist church became nondenominational and 
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strictly committed to promoting a spirit of inclusiveness.99 The divergence in church 
construction exposes deeper differences between the new residents who came to the 
suburbs outside of Boston and those who settled in southern California and post-
industrial other nodes. While many of the migrants and existing residents in Orange 
County had a proclivity toward fundamentalist, strict moralist and anti-liberal ideas, 
suburban residents in metropolitan Boston who gravitated from other parts of New 
England were more inclined to the less rigid doctrines of the mainline Protestant tradition 
that preached about tolerance and collective action. 100  
The significant influx in Catholic and Jewish residents during the postwar period, 
moreover, altered significantly the religious composition of the Route 128 suburbs. These 
communities had contained small enclaves of Catholics since the nineteenth century and 
most had at least one Catholic church by the turn of twentieth century. Following World 
War II, the number of Catholic residents and churches grew significantly.  Belying the 
often-repeated suggestion that Catholics either remained in cities to stay by their parishes 
or commuted back into the city on Sunday, the suburbs of Boston experienced a flood of 
new church construction in the decade and a half following World War II. Between 1944 
and 1959, the Archdiocese of Boston approved the building of 75 new churches, the 
majority of which it proudly declared occurred “in small historic communities in the 
midst of which no church steeple bore the cross.”101  
Jews also accounted for a large percentage of the new residents and houses of 
worship in metropolitan Boston after World War II, which was representative of a 
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broader national “exodus” of Jewish people and institutions toward the suburbs.102 Levels 
of observance shaped the suburban settlement patterns of many Jewish families.  Most 
observant families sought to live close to the newly-built synagogues, religious schools 
and kosher grocery stores and therefore opted to live in Brookline, and Newton, both of 
which had large concentrations of Jewish residents. Less observant Jews often opted to 
live in communities that had a tradition of tolerance but not necessarily an established 
Jewish community.103  A study conducted in the suburbs surrounding Route 2 such as 
Lexington, Lincoln, Concord and Belmont found that most of the Jews who lived in these 
communities were third or fourth generation Americans who had recently moved to the 
Boston area, did not have mostly Jewish friends, did not oppose the intermarriage of their 
children and tended to participate socially in non-Jewish activities.104 Sylvia Gold of 
Concord who came to the community during the postwar era later remembered: “My 
husband and I while not really religious have a strong Jewish identity, but some other 
families did not.” Gold observed that she often was not aware of who was Jewish or not 
in Concord and that “common interests rather than religion” dictated social 
interactions.105 
This set of upper middle-class suburbs around Route 128 all demonstrated a great 
deal of interfaith collaboration establishing the connections and infrastructure upon which 
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activism especially related to civil rights, and peace later flourished. During the postwar 
period, communities like Lexington, Newton, and Brookline reported a large amount of 
interfaith activity among both clergy and their congregations. In Lexington, the physical 
proximity of several of the older and newer churches on the periphery of the Battle Green 
encouraged various forms of interfaith collaboration.106 A rabbi from Newton described 
the relations between clergy of different faiths there in 1959 as “excellent.”107 The 
interfaith community in Newton even developed a Social Action Program where the 
officiates from Jewish, Roman Catholic and Protestant churches each selected ten couples 
who met to discuss issues of religion as well other areas of community life including 
“racial and social relationships.”108 The wife of a Brookline minister recalled that 
beginning in the 1950s members of the various local religious congregations would meet 
weekly for informal discussion. By the end of the decade these conversations began to 
take on an increasingly political charge, focusing primarily on civil rights, and led many 
clergy and congregant to become active participants in the local and national movements.  
  The suburbanites in the Route 128 communities demonstrated a range of 
religious commitment from devout to more secular forms of practice. For instance, a 
young engineer in Lexington named Albert Wilson earned national attention when he 
persuaded the minister at the Hancock Congregational Church to support a group of 
couples who would gather for Bible study as an antidote to the primarily secular focus of 
the parish.109 By 1963, the church had ten groups of more dedicated parishioners who met 
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outside of their homes, a practice replicated in several communities throughout the area. 
The levels of religious commitment often took on a spatial dimension dictating which of 
the various houses of worship individuals opted to attend. The divide was particularly 
noticeable in Lexington where more devout and doctrinal Catholics attended Church of 
the Sacred Heart in East Lexington, while those residents more committed to a secular 
and social justice interpretation worshipped at Saint Brigid, which sat just off the Battle 
Green and became a leading force in the civil rights movement.110  One resident reduced 
the distinction between Saint Brigid and Sacred Heart  “to the liberal versus the 
conservatives. 111 This distinction underscores the ways in which churches helped to 
cluster ideologically like-minded people, a prerequisite for grassroots mobilization for 
social and political causes. Thus, while Saint Brigid served as a launching pad for civil 
rights, peace and affordable housing activism, Sacred Heart would later encourage 
residents to join conservative causes such as the pro-life movement. This type of 
dichotomous split became replicated throughout suburban Boston.  
For many residents these churches and synagogues primarily became sites for 
socializing and meeting people in the community. In the postwar period, many of the 
local churches increasingly sponsored secular activities during the week, such as dances 
and card games. The array of different activities, most segmented by age group, became 
so extensive and secular at Hancock Congregational Church in Lexington that residents 
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jokingly renamed the religious institution “The Hancock Country Club.”112 Several 
temples also revised traditions and began hosting more suburban-centered activity such 
as couples clubs, brotherhoods, sisterhoods, and PTAs, which offered increased chances 
for socializing and feeling connected. These activities proved particularly important for 
residents who had recently settled in the area.  For instance, Norma McGavern-Norland 
recalled that growing up in New York City, “I had never been involved even with a 
church before.” But upon moving to Lexington, encouraged by a local Unitarian minister, 
she decided participating in the church would be a good way to meet people, perform 
organized community service and “might be fun.”113 The positive experiences of church 
participation inspired her to get involved in the League of Women Voters and later 
several other liberal causes and groups. Norma McGavern-Norland’s story reflected a 
common pattern among suburban residents who got involved in forms of grassroots 
activism, particularly among female participants.  
In the 1950s, the migration of new residents to the upper middle-class 
communities along Route 128 reflected the broader reaffirmation of domesticity and 
reinscription of distinct gender roles and responsibilities that characterized the national 
postwar patterns of suburbanization.114 The cohort that came to the affluent suburbs were 
predominantly married couples where husbands worked in white-collar professions and 
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wives stayed at home to take care of their children.115 Though they perhaps did not share 
occupational profile of their husbands, many of these women did share their education 
level. A disproportionate number of these women had also attended elite colleges and 
universities, which had often been where they had met their husbands.116 Many of these 
recent college graduates looked for ways to continue their education and intellectual 
engagement while simultaneously performing traditional household duties. Older 
religious and civic institutions as well as newer organizations became crucial spaces to 
meet other women with similar outlooks and experiences.117 “I and a lot of other people 
who became my friends, all had young children around the age of my children,” Norma 
McGavern-Norland later explained. “We were all united by childcare and interest in what 
was going on in the world. I suppose we gravitated to the same organizations because we 
cared for the same things. And we were friends, so it was a very natural thing to do.”118 
These connections established the foundations for many subsequent grassroots liberal 
campaigns.  
Throughout the affluent suburbs of Boston, the League of Women Voters served 
as a major magnet of female activism and the launching pad for later forms of political 
engagement. Most of these towns had existing League chapters by the 1930s.  In Newton, 
a group of women including a professor of Zoology at Wellesley College, two future 
state representatives, the wife of the Director of Admissions at MIT and the wife of a 
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former attorney general, had launched a local League chapter in the mid-1930s to 
“promote political responsibility through informed and active participation of citizens in 
government.”119 In the postwar period, broader demographic shifts led to a flourishing of 
the organization and Massachusetts emerged as the largest state chapter in the country. 
The League’s longstanding focus on studying key local and state issues and presenting 
facts in a dispassionate and objective tone, offered these educated and involved women a 
way to continue their intellectual pursuits, widen their knowledge base, and participate in 
various levels of government. Through such efforts, many suburban women came to learn 
much about the inner-workings of the policy and governmental process, which they 
applied to both related League activity and other grassroots liberal campaigns. At the 
same time, these younger League members also shifted the priorities of the League at the 
local, state and increasingly toward more progressive issues.  
The League provided clear social advantages for the young mothers who made up 
the largest portion of newer members. Louise Haldeman recalled that she answered an 
advertisement from the League in the local newspaper when she moved to Lexington 
because she found herself “a young mother with a baby at home and needed some 
intellectual companionship.” 120 Haldeman stated that the League “opened the door and 
got me out of the house back when we had one car.”  Norma McGavern-Norland later 
explained she got involved in the League and other liberal causes to experience a sense of 
camaraderie. She described the organization as a “support group” that helped her and her 
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friends keep their “sanity” while they “had small children and weren’t working full-time. 
” These social organizations also offered these women a means to reconcile their 
domestic duties and political views.121 Discussing her activist experiences, McGavern-
Norland described that the women usually brought their young children to meetings since 
it offered them a chance to get their children to socialize as well. “They played together,” 
she stated, “while mothers plotted and planned and talked about higher-level issues that 
sometimes included children, too.”122 These forms of social activism represented often an 
extension, not a rejection, of parenting.  
Despite often wanting relief from child-rearing responsibilities, these women 
expressed through their activism a concern for the future of their progeny and became 
involved in issues of education at the local and state levels. Quite a few female volunteers 
had worked as teachers, which gave them a particularly interest in improving the quality 
their children’s education. Carl Koch later explained that in Concord many “mothers had 
gone to Smith and Vassar and places like that joined the PTA, and took the school by a 
storm. Test scores went up.”123 In addition, through the League these women often 
lobbied for educational reform at the state level.  This sense of concern for their children 
also led many of these women (as well as their husbands) to become involved in peace, 
civil rights, environmentalism and the campaigns for various local state and national 
political candidates.  
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A 1960 Time magazine cover article celebrating suburbia described the average 
housewife as an “ aproned activist” whose main role was a “keeper of the suburban 
dream.” 124 The women in the Route 128 suburbs often acted as “aproned activists” 
though perhaps not in the same way as Time intended. The shared experiences of white 
middle-class women in communities like Concord and Newton challenged the image of 
the trapped and apolitical housewife widely popularized with the publication of Betty 
Friedan’s Feminine Mystique, as well as more positive depictions such as the Time 
article. 125 The white-middle class female residents who became active in progressive 
causes were women who helped to remake the boundaries of traditional gender roles and 
suburban political activism. These activities also placed their communities at the 
vanguard of grassroots suburban liberalism.  
 
Bastions of Liberalism  
Brookline, Newton, Lexington, Concord and Lincoln served as the primary 
incubators of Massachusetts suburban liberalism.  Grassroots activism flourished in other 
affluent communities as well, but in this set of suburbs demographic patterns converged 
with a specific history and identity to create favorable circumstances for such activity. All 
of these towns boasted active civil rights and fair housing chapters, constituted the 
founding participants in the Metropolitan Council for Educational Opportunity 
(METCO), engaged in a variety of antiwar and peace activities, stood at the vanguard of 
the environmental movement, and vigorously supported liberal candidates in state and 
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national elections. There were important spatial and social differences even between 
these communities, tied to their respective locations and histories. For instance, 
Lexington’s location meant that it had a higher concentration of engineers than Brookline 
while Lincoln demonstrated a greater commitment to environmentalism than Newton, 
which was denser and closer to the city. Moving from Brookline, the most dense by 
population and socioeconomically diverse community to Lincoln, the most spacious and 
exclusive, brief case studies of each of these five municipalities illustrate how and why 
these particularly suburbs became central sites for liberal activism and tensions in the 
1960s and 1970s.  
Brookline  
The resistance to annexation in 1873 provided Brookline with a unique sense of 
independence and exceptionalism. Since its incorporation, Brookline had embraced the 
religiously-laden idea that it was “a favored town. ”126 In an article entitled “Ideal 
Suburb” published in Harpers Magazine in 1898, James Locke deemed it “the richest 
town in the United States, with an annual income greater than the whole state of New 
Hampshire.”127 Brookline residents proudly embraced these designations promoting it as 
“the wealthiest town in the world” and appropriated the nickname “the wealthy towners” 
for the high school football team, a derisive name provided by opponents. During the 
postwar period, while other suburbs experienced a surge in new populations, Brookline, 
actually witnessed the reverse trend. The population of Brookline decreased from 57,589 
to 54,044 between 1950 and 1960. The well-established patterns of housing and 
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commercial sites made Brookline, which is contiguous to Boston, denser and lacking in 
available land for new development. Many families living in Brookline began to move 
farther away to newly built homes in Wellesley, Weston and Newton where they could 
obtain larger houses on more acres of land.128 Although the community still retained 
many of its large mansions and affluent residents, this demographic shift meant that 
postwar Brookline no longer held claim to the title as the richest suburb in the world or 
even the wealthiest in Boston.   
Brookline did, however, remain an appealing location for many people. In the 
first decades of the twentieth century, Brookline became an increasingly popular 
residential choice among wealthy Catholic and Jewish families. The town had long 
contained a concentration of Irish-born Catholics who worked as day laborers or 
domestic servants but who lived largely separate from their white Protestant 
employers.129 However, that population expanded as affluent Irish Catholic families 
began to move into houses in close proximity to Brookline’s Brahmins.130  In fact, 
Brookline served as the birthplace and childhood home of John F. Kennedy, the first 
Catholic president, which further fueled the town’s sense of historic importance and pride 
in the early 1960s. In the decades before World War II, Brookline also experienced an 
influx of upwardly mobile Jewish families lured from the dense triple-decker enclaves of 
Roxbury and Dorchester by the open space, good schools, and exclusive reputation of the 
community. One resident who moved stated about the reasons her parents sought to move 
there:  “It was where WASPS were. It was a clean beautiful town. Bucolic splendor, 
green grass. The public schools were like private schools. We had French in the sixth 
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grade.”131 In 1930, 8,000 Jews lived in the town, comprising 17 percent of the 
population.132 Several of Boston’s most established and wealthiest synagogues decided to 
follow their congregants and move to Brookline, which made the town an even more 
attractive destination for upwardly mobile middle-class Jews. By 1950 the number of 
Jews had increased to 19,000, a third of the town’s overall population.  
During the postwar period, Brookline’s diverse housing stock of smaller single-
family homes and larger apartments made it a particularly desirable locale for young 
married couples. These families also selected Brookline because of its strong school 
system. Brookline had long boasted nationally recognized schools, but the stagnating 
population in the 1940s and 1950s enabled the town to focus its resources on improving 
on that reputation. It developed an excellent nationally acclaimed college-oriented 
curriculum directed at advanced and gifted students. 133 This set of factors helped attract a 
new type of resident and thereby fortified the progressive reputation of the community. 
Longtime resident Eleanor Kaplan explained that the during the postwar decades middle-
class professionals, business people, and tradesmen “came to raise their families in this 
gracious, well-run, education oriented community and brought with them a liberal point 
of view.”134  Many young professionals and professors were part of this wave of 
settlement. Urban planner Robert Kramer recalled that he and his wife had moved there 
following “ a post-graduate idyll in Cambridge.” Like many young couples, the Kramers 
“ needed affordable housing and good schools” and as “committed ‘urbanites’, they had 
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additional requirement of “easy access to center-city Boston.” These preferences made 
Brookline an ideal choice.135 Psychologist Thomas Cottle and his wife were also 
academic transplants from Cambridge who wanted to find a good community in which to 
raise their children with convenient access to his job as a professor at Harvard and hers at 
Wellesley College. Reluctant to leave Cambridge, Cottle, not a native of the Boston area, 
recalled that many of his college friends had come from Brookline , which led him to 
believe it had superior schools and progressive values. Although himself a Christian, 
Cottle felt that the fact that town had a well-established Jewish community inferred it was 
“welcome” place that would not be “parochial and isolationist.” New residents like 
Kramer and Cottle became active in civil rights and other progressive causes that helped 
Brookline maintain its identity as a favored town and a liberal bastion. Despite the 
renewed progressivism of these new migrants, by 1960, Brookline counted just 15 
African-American families among its 60,0000 residents, which simultaneously caused it 




While other Massachusetts communities drew their distinctiveness from ties to 
various elements of the state and the nation’s past, few historic events or battles occurred 
in Newton and instead the municipality long based its elevated self-image on the fact that 
it was an “ideal” and “exceptional” suburb. Sitting just west of Brookline, the 18 square-
mile city of a dozen separate villages followed in the steps of its neighbor and resisted 
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annexation by Boston. Although the community did contain several pockets of domestic 
laborers and immigrant families, its close proximity to Boston and easy accessibility by 
the railroad made it a favored location for area’s wealthy and upper-middle class families. 
By the late nineteenth century it became designated as the “bedroom of Boston.”137  
Newton also gained a reputation as the “Garden City” for its large Victorian and neo-
classical homes and impeccably manicured yards. In 1935, a local enthusiast promoted 
Newton as  “Suburban Living at Its Best,” stating it was  “distinctly a Boston suburb, a 
place where most of the residences are single houses with ample grounds, where people 
can own their own homes; where the large apartment house is almost unknown.”138 
Following World War II, its location at the interchange of Route 128 and the 
Massachusetts Turnpike only seven miles outside of Boston made Newton an even more 
desirable location. Between 1940 and 1960, the population increased from 69,873 to 
92,384 and younger married couples compromised the majority of these new residents.139 
Developers took advantage of this new need for housing and rapidly started to buy up the 
town’s older estates and farmland turning them into subdivisions of large single-family 
homes.140 Acknowledging the demand for new housing especially among veterans, the 
city of Newton itself entered the construction business building the new village of Oak 
Hill, which consisted of 315 largely uniform ranch houses, an elementary school, a small 
shopping area and recreation space. Despite the building boom, Newton preserved its 
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reputation as the “Garden Suburb” through zoning ordinances that ensured single-family 
homes on sizable lots and a continued scarcity of apartments or rental units.141  
 If the population increase did not change the type of housing built, it did 
significantly alter the ethnic and religious composition of the community.   Like 
Brookline, where Catholic and Jews who had moved in the first decades of the twentieth 
century, Newton became a desirable place for many upwardly mobile white ethnics. By 
1958, 40.4 percent of the households in Newton were Catholic, 36 percent Protestant and 
20.4 percent Jewish. This rise in Jews marked the most notable and rapid change. In 1920 
Newton had only a few hundred Jewish residents, by 1930 that number increased to 
1,400; and by 1950 8,000 and the number expanded steadily over the course of the next 
decade.142  Between July 1, 1954 and December 31, 1955 fully 35 percent of homes 
purchased in Newton were by Jewish buyers who overwhelmingly came from Boston, 
Roxbury or Brookline.143 Collectively, this new diversity of religious backgrounds helped 
to project the image that Newton maintained a commitment to openness and pluralism. 
Yet, while the community contained more socioeconomic heterogeneity than many other 
Boston suburbs, it remained a predominantly upper-middle-class white community.  In 
1960 65.8 percent of Newton residents were employed in white-collar occupations and 
43.8 percent of households earned over $10,000 and Newton’s racial composition, 
nevertheless, remained 98.1 percent white both before and after World War II. 144 
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Many of these white middle-class migrants selected Newton because of its nationally 
recognized school system, which during the postwar period provided the suburb with its 
strongest sense of identity and community pride.  Journalist Peter Schrag described  
Newton as a “loose amalgam of ten postal addresses held together by prestige and an 
outstanding school system. Education is Newton’s central topic of conversation, its basic 
industry, and its most compelling reason for existence.”145 Schrag himself visited the 
town as part of the research for a book project on American education using Newton as 
his case study of an outstanding suburban public school system. The town had a tradition 
of academic excellence dating back to 1848, when Horace Mann moved the nation’s first 
normal school there and the community had an equally long history of sending a 
disproportionately large percentage of graduates down the Charles River to Harvard. 
Following World War II that commitment to excellence and relationship to Harvard and 
the Ivy League increased considerably. In the postwar period, the school system 
underwent rapid growth, which led the city to spend $19 million on improving its 
physical plant, adding a second high school, several elementary schools and renovating 
and expanding existing buildings. 146 However, the school department actively refused to 
“mistake physical growth for educational progress” and during this period also intensified 
its dedication to providing quality instruction. Superintendent Charles Brown recruited 
teachers directly from the area’s many universities and developed a close relationship 
with the Harvard Graduate School of Education, which often used the Newton schools as 
a laboratory for cutting-edge teaching techniques. In developing curriculum, Newton 
teachers often consulted with “university types” from across the country. These steps 
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helped to place Newton at the top of lists ranking it the best school system in the country, 
and in 1964, Time Magazine observed that Newton was “the most creative school system 
in the U.S. today.”147 
 The quality instruction, nevertheless, did not come free and led to a heavy local 
tax rate and high property values. In order to place the financial burden in tangible terms, 
Peter Schrag contended,  “A $30,000 house in neighboring Needham becomes a $36,000 
house in Newton.”148 In fact by the late 1960s, 60 percent of tax revenue went to school 
financing, by far the largest municipal budget item, and the school superintendent earned 
a significantly larger salary than the mayor.149  These financial factors insured that many 
of the newer families who moved to Newton shared a commitment to both excellent and 
experimental education. Schrag concluded that one reason for this heightened investment 
in the public schools was the large influx of Jewish residents, who traditionally placed a 
strong emphasis on quality education.  Taking his religiously deterministic hypothesis a 
step further, he argued that many Jews did not have positions in the managerial hierarchy 
of large national corporations, which often required frequent corporate relocation.150  
Instead, Jews worked in more geographically stable professions like law, medicine, and 
small businesses, which enabled them to develop more of a stake in local institutions, 
especially the schools. While there is no firm evidence to support Schrag’s 
characterization, it was true that Newton attracted Jews and instilled a strong sense of the 
importance of preserving and advancing high quality education in residents from all 
ethnic groups and middle-class professions.  
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The schools also served as a key space for social interaction among members of 
the Newton community. Schrag reported that the education-related events served as one 
place where various religious groups in the community interacted, stating that in the 
suburb “education is religion and almost everyone is a true believer.”151 The schools, 
moreover, served as the launching pad for other forms of collaboration and civic and 
social engagement. Activists like Jerome Grossman cited involvement in the PTA and 
concern about the quality of the Newton public schools as the springboards for action. 
They often used the contacts they made through educational activities to expand the 
membership and volunteer networks for key political and social campaigns. Newton 
liberals frequently invoked the issue of schools and children when trying to impel other 
residents to support a variety of progressive causes, most notably the METCO program. 
 The new population of socially engaged citizens also reshaped the political 
landscape of Newton. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century Newton was 
consistently the most Republican city for its size in all of Massachusetts voting solidly 
against Franklin D. Roosevelt in each of his presidential races.152 However, the new 
postwar migrants spurred by larger changes in local, state, and national politics, helped 
push the pendulum in the other direction. In 1960, the community voted for Kennedy 
over Richard Nixon, initiating a permanent realignment within Newton toward the 
Democratic Party in national elections. Rather than downplay the community’s shift 
away from its “Yankee” identity, the city began to turn the changes into a form of 
affirmative marketing to lure more liberal residents to purchase homes there. In a 
pamphlet entitled the “Brightest Spot on the Golden Circle” from the 1960s, the Newton 
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Chamber of Commerce aimed to fuse the community’s liberal politics, affluence, and 
proximity to Boston into a promotional discourse.153 The Chamber touted Newton as 
“remarkable place,” and “the most affluent and progressive of suburban cities,” 
classifying its residents as “committed to social betterment and change” and bearing “few 
traces of parochial self-centeredness.” The Chamber also boasted that Newton was a 
“Suburban City in Touch with the World” stating “descriptive terms and phrases that 
characterize Newton just don’t apply to other places,” dubbing citizens as socially 
“responsible as they are affluent. ” As we will see in later chapters, this reputation and 
identity both impelled and at other points limited the commitment of Newton residents to 
grassroots liberal activism.  
 
Lexington  
Just seven highway exits northwest of Newton, at the interchange between Route 
128 and Route 2,  stood the town of Lexington.  Since 1775, when members of the 
community famously defended the town and colony against British incursion, a sense of 
historic duty and patriotic sacrifice infused both the physical landscape and attitudes of 
Lexington residents. The Battle Green located in the town’s center served as a constant 
reminder of the community’s revolutionary roots, while the cast-iron statue of James 
Parker with a musket by his side perched at the edge of the Green strengthened this sense 
of historic responsibility.  The site held a deeply symbolic place within the collective 
imaginations of many Americans. Thousands flocked to the town each April to watch a 
reenactment of the first Revolutionary war battle.  
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While park rangers and the town historical society ensured that the Green retained 
its pristine historical authenticity, the town around it did not remain immune from the 
massive changes to the metropolitan landscape in the middle of the twentieth century. In 
the decades before World War II, Lexington retained many of the characteristics from its 
colonial past. Primarily rural with a vibrant agricultural base, the community was also 
predominately white, affluent and staunchly Republican. Lexington residents had 
converged on the Battle Green in 1934 to protest New Deal policies that they perceived 
as both anti-business and infringements on local autonomy. Federally financed programs 
after 1945, nevertheless, radically changed the demographic and political composition of 
the community, transforming it from a quaint New England town into a booming postwar 
suburb. 
Lexington’s convenient location for those working downtown and along the Route 
128 corridor combined with easily available federal loans and the town’s historic charm 
to lure many new residents after World War II.  Between 1940 and 1960 the population 
of Lexington more than doubled, from 13,113 to 27,691. This influx accompanied the 
construction of new subdivisions on former farmlands as real estate developers 
transformed the historic community’s reputation into a commodity for upwardly mobile 
white homebuyers to purchase. Daniel Wheeler, vice president of Cabot, Cabot & Forbes, 
declared that “Lexington’s historical address appeals to companies as well as individuals, 
and is a status for attracting and holding workers.”154 He complained, however, that the 
limited allotment for commercial development had turned the town into “the hardest 
address to move into in the Boston area.” 155 The attractiveness of Lexington, maintained 
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by strict zoning and historic preservation measures, became another reason that residents 
cited for opting to settle there and many companies wanted to as well. Longtime resident 
Nancy Earsy later stated she had moved to Lexington because it was convenient to her 
husband’s job in adjacent Bedford and was “green” and  “pretty.” Bruce Gordon had 
grown up nearby and after leaving the Army he and his wife lived in a basement 
apartment Brookline while he completed Master’s Degrees in English Literature and 
Guidance Counseling. Describing his reason’s for selecting Lexington, Gordon stated 
“when I was a kid in Medford and pedaling through Lexington and looking at the green 
and so on, I said if I ever settle down anywhere its going to be in Lexington.”156  
Similar to those in Brookline and Newton, many of these upwardly mobile residents 
selected Lexington because of the quality of its schools. Marion Colletta and her husband 
selected a house in Lexington in 1950 “because it had a fairly decent school system.”  
Jackie Davisson described that when she and her husband moved in 1954,  “There were a 
lot of young families coming as we did from Boston, wanting to move to a school system 
that was interesting, challenging and would be worth the move to the suburbs, because 
we liked the city. So we moved for the children.”157 The school department sought to take 
advantage of this interest in education as well as the high intellectual caliber of local 
residents. A teacher launched a program to create a directory of residents willing to speak 
to classrooms about their jobs. The curriculum subsequently included presentations by 
bankers, book editors, chemists, geologists, engineers and scientists.158 The project 
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punctuated both the nation’s increased faith in expert knowledge in the postwar periods 
and the ways in which Lexington’s new population of academics and technology 
professionals had helped to reshape and enhance established local institutions. 
Many of these white-collar younger migrants brought with them a more progressive 
outlook, altering the political fabric of the community.159 The increasingly liberal 
reputation itself became a factor that led many new residents to settle in Lexington. 
Bonnie Jones theorized, “Lexington has a lot of university connections to Cambridge and 
Harvard and MIT and professional people who are perhaps a little more on the liberal 
side of things than maybe some of the other communities. And like-minded folks tend to 
move into the same communities.” Attorney Julian Soshnick described that he decided to 
settle in Lexington because of the “wall-to-wall Ph.D’s, and the doctors and the lawyers.” 
160  He stated that he and others believed that these professionals made Lexington “a very 
nice, sensitive, caring community where you could raise a family and deal with 
intelligent people at all levels of the community.” These new and old residents remained 
deeply committed to preserving and extending the ideals of the Revolution and the 
physical charm of the town, but fulfilling those twin goals created possibilities and 
tensions throughout the second half of the twentieth century.  
 
Concord  
A Concord natural resource guide proudly boasted:  “Concord differs from most 
towns in that it is a precious national asset.”161 This statement succinctly captured the 
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town’s exceptionalist understanding of itself and its land. Local residents recognized that 
since Concord represented a “special case” as a “unique piece of national heritage,” they 
had a duty to “sustain both the pride of its residents and the expectations of its 
visitors.”162  With its gracious colonial homes and pastoral scenery, the town’s physical 
terrain in the postwar period looked much as it had during the battle of the Old North 
Bridge of the American Revolution and when Louisa May Alcott and her sisters lived in 
Orchard House in the nineteenth century. Dating back to the era when Ralph Waldo 
Emerson and Henry Thoreau and their fellow Transcendentalists traipsed through its 
meadows, rivers, and ponds, Concord had a long tradition of prideful appreciation of and 
concern for its natural landscape. The community drew both its property and ideological 
values from these past luminaries. Situated 18 miles outside Boston along Route 2, near 
Route 128 and adjacent to Lexington the community experienced the same 
developmental pressures as other postwar suburbs. Following a 1958 survey of the 
community, the town officially aimed to put into practice residents’ desire to preserve the 
physical appearance of the town, to maintain an excellent school system and to restrict 
commercial development through very rigid zoning policies. The effort slowed the rate of 
population growth, reduced the level of socioeconomic diversity, and increased the 
economic affluence of new residents. Throughout first half of the twentieth century, 
though overwhelmingly white, Concord had relative socioeconomic balance. The town 
did contain many wealthy residents, but the median family income was only slightly 
higher than the average of metropolitan Boston ($3,250 compared to $3,042). However, 
by 1960 the mean had increased to $8,538 and in 1970 it was $16, 460, and 38 percent of 
families had an income over $15,000, which made it one of the most affluent 
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communities in metropolitan Boston.163 These new residents were not just more affluent, 
but more politically liberal, which further altered the town’s identity.  
The construction of Concord’s first planned development played a central role in 
changing the social and political dynamics of the town.  In the late 1940s, MIT 
economics professor W. Rupert McClurin grew worried about the potential consequences 
of poorly planned mass suburbanization and decided to develop an “affordable utopia” 
and “antidote to postwar tract developments like Levittown.” He aimed for the project to 
serve as a model for designing better suburbs establishing a plan for a  “clustered 
development” of reasonable-priced homes in a country setting with proximity to Boston, 
which would preserve the rural characteristics through low density and substantial 
common land. McClurin purchased a plot of land along the Sudbury River in Concord 
and decided to name the development Conantum.164 In order to make his plan into a 
reality, McClurin enlisted the help of several fellow MIT faculty members, including 
architect Carl Koch, an innovator of pre-fabricated building. Koch developed a design for 
100 homes on the 200-acre plot experimenting with cost and energy efficient techniques 
and leaving room for a great amount of open and shared space, large pine trees, and 
scenic views of the river.165 McLaurin had sought to create Conantum as a community 
primarily for academics and executives who worked either at universities in Cambridge 
and Boston or at firms along the city’s outer ring. Thus, he promoted the development by 
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sending postcards to Harvard and MIT faculty and placing advertisements on the 
universities’ billboards promising not simply “a house” but “a community” just 22 
minutes from Harvard Square.166 At least half the initial homeowners had an affiliation 
with MIT as either alumni or faculty members and most had a background in science and 
engineering. The community half jokingly awarded a gold star to men living there with 
no connection to Harvard, MIT or Lincoln Laboratory. Only fifteen out of a hundred men 
were eligible.167  
The deeds on the chalet-like structures included a non-restrictive clause 
specifying no limit on purchasing a home in the development on the basis or race, 
national origin, creed or color, which was a novel concept in the early 1950s, especially 
in Concord which was almost exclusively white and Protestant. Roughly eight Jewish 
families moved in which increased the Jewish population of Concord more than 
eightfold.168 This heavy concentration of academics and handful of Jewish residents were 
younger and more Democratic than the average Concord citizens, giving Conantum a 
reputation and identity as a liberal oasis in the traditionally Republican town. “Within the 
town we were sometimes seen as the radicals, the intruders,” Pat Sterling, the wife of a 
Raytheon engineer and an early Conantum resident, later declared. “Our community of 
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new PhDs definitely were not the country club set.”169 Over the course of the postwar 
period that outsider label began to fade.   Many of the Conantum residents became 
actively involved in local affairs, helping to transform both the ideological bent and 
political balance of Concord as a whole. The members of the neighborhood were at the 
forefront of the community’s civil rights efforts, affordable housing drive, and antiwar 
movement. Indeed, one resident served as the chairman of Eugene McCarthy’s 
Massachusetts campaign in 1968.  Increasingly, Concord came to attract other liberally 
minded citizens who settled beyond the boundaries of Conantum. While the shift in 
political identification became a more gradual process in Concord as a whole, by the 
early 1960s the town had an active civil rights, peace, environmental movements and had 




On June 13, 1971, the New York Times featured a paean to the upper-middle-class 
suburb of Lincoln. Written by Paul and Susan Brooks, the praise-laden article entitled “A 
Town With Room for Living” explained how their community had maintained its “rural 
charm in the face of urban pressure,…preserved its open space, and successfully resisted 
the type of ruthless exploitation that treats land merely as a commodity in the market.”170 
Situated between the more nationally known communities of Lexington and Concord, the 
5,000-resident town had preserved most of the meadows, pastures, ponds and old-growth 
forests that had dominated its landscape since the American Revolution. Dating back to 
the late nineteenth century when Lincoln had served as the summer retreat for wealthy 
Bostonians, the community had articulated a celebration of the beauty and distinctiveness 
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of its physical landscape. “The unique character of our town is dependent upon one factor 
above all others: Open Space,” a 1958 town planning document asserted.171 The fact that 
Lincoln’s eastern corner sat at the interchange of Route 128 and Route 2 made its 
resistance to suburban overdevelopment even more impressive. During the two decades 
following World War II, Lincoln’s white, upper middle-class citizens adopted a 
combination of tactics, including large-lot zoning and building codes as well as an 
ambitious land preservation agenda, to ensure that Lincoln avoided resembling most 
suburban municipalities. By the time the Times article appeared the town had preserved 
more than a thousand acres of land and received the most government assistance for its 
agenda of any municipality in the Commonwealth. These efforts had made Lincoln, in 
the poetic boosterism of the Brooks’, “one of the last green islands in an encroaching sea 
of urban sprawl.” The residents of Lincoln viewed their community’s success in 
preserving open space as a model for the nation.172 
  In the postwar period, Lincoln’s opposition to development and large lots 
increased its desirability for many of metropolitan Boston’s most prominent citizens 
including architect Walter Gropius and critic Bernard DeVoto, the editors of both the 
Boston Globe and Christian Science Monitor, not to mention many Harvard and MIT 
professors and executives at Route 128 firms. 173 These new residents provided the town 
with a reputation as a liberal and exceptional community. The combination of its open 
space agenda, concentration of cultural and social leaders and commitment to liberal 
causes enabled Lincoln to maintain its sense of distinctiveness and exceptionalism and 
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offered a means to define itself as different from the average suburb. Residents even 
viewed themselves as distinct from the residents of towns like Dover, Wellesley and 
Weston, which were equally wealthy and spacious, but did not have the same tradition of 
liberal activism.174 One citizen declared: 
“Lincoln is not a typical suburb by any shake of the stick. We get very 
angry at being lumped with towns like Dover, Sherborn, Wellesley and Weston. 
We think we are a lot more socially consciously than they are. We think we are 
a lot more open to new ideas than they are.175  
 
The sense of exceptionalism even enticed suburban critic Robert Woods who lived in 
Lincoln in the 1950s and 1960s.  At the outset of  Suburbia, Woods avoided accusations 
of hypocrisy and questions of why he chose “to live in a place I criticize so strongly” by 
declaring that Lincoln was by no means the typical suburb.  “Lincoln is undoubtedly an 
anachronism,” his disclaimed using a discourse of distinctiveness, “But it is a pleasant 
and hospitable anachronism and while it exists I am quite happy to indict myself.”176 The 
factors that made Lincoln so aesthetically and socially “pleasant,” however, did not just 
contribute to the town’s exceptionalism, but also factored in the significant rise in both 
real estate values and average family income after 1945. These escalating prices ensured 
that Lincoln avoided the labels, physical features, and socioeconomic dimensions of the 
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Massachusetts Political Culture 
 
The migration of white-collar residents and their new forms of socializing and 
civic engagement led to the reshaping of the political landscape of the Route 128 suburbs 
and the state of Massachusetts as a whole. Scholars initially predicted that the postwar 
suburban migration would prove a windfall for the Republican Party at the local and 
national levels. Writing in 1958, sociologist Robert Wood observed that postwar 
demographic had produced a Republican “suburban majority” and a severe crisis for the 
Democratic Party. Dwight Eisenhower’s majority victory in the suburbs of Boston and 
across the nation forced concerned observers to take seriously the warning of Senator 
Robert Taft who proudly declared in 1952: “The Democratic Party will never win another 
national election until it solves the problem of the suburbs.”177 Many other observers 
feared that suburbanization would mark the end of the Democratic Party in Massachusetts 
and perhaps the nation. However, these predictions proved overstated as many of the 
area’s formerly Republican strongholds increasingly developed into bastions of suburban 
liberalism.  
Kevin Phillips and other observers have often argued that the suburbs of Boston 
became increasingly Democratic because of the large numbers of white ethnics, 
especially Catholics, who brought their party loyalties with them when they moved out of 
the city.178  This explanation, however, only partially explains the party realignment of 
the middle-class suburbs of Boston. Political scientist Edgar Litt has contended that in 
Massachusetts a new generation of suburban residents were the products of the “New 
Deal and the Fair Deal that provided access for the offspring of immigrants to the 
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professional scientific technical and administrative positions in society” and that also 
offered them access to suburban residency and at the same time fueled their allegiance to 
the Democratic Party.179 Litt’s observation more aptly underscores that the 
transformation of suburban party allegiances lay more in the contradictory policies and 
ideals of New Deal Liberalism.  Future congressman and Concord resident Chet Atkins 
similarly observed that in his hometown and in neighboring communities in the 1950s 
“there were a lot of professors and a lot of people from around the country, a mobility 
you hadn’t seen before, who were coming in and teaching at MIT, Harvard, Tufts, Boston 
University who were Democrats…coming out of the whole New Deal experience.”180  
The actual people who brought about the political realignment of the Route 128 
suburbs reflected a broad spectrum of past experiences and ideological convictions.  
Several leading grassroots liberal activists emerged from backgrounds rooted in the leftist 
politics of the Popular Front and the Progressive Party of the 1930s and 1940s. Jerome 
Grossman of Newton who became a leader in peace and liberal politics in the 1960s and 
1970s, came from a family that was long active in the state and national Democratic 
Party.181 Grossman, nevertheless, described himself as a “maverick” who deviated from 
his family’s political views following the death of Franklin Roosevelt. A graduate of 
Brookline High and Harvard, Grossman had begun reading The Nation when he was 
fourteen which he later explained, “gave a political context to my lifelong identification 
with the deprived” and “distrust of power.” During the 1930s the New Deal’s promotion 
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of social welfare and organized labor came to further define “his political consciousness.”  
These convictions steered Grossman to become active in the campaign of Henry Wallace, 
whom he believed “articulated and updated the Roosevelt vision” and argued against the 
“militaristic policies” of the Truman administration.  “I was like a sailor lost on the sea,” 
Grossman stated, “until the Progressive Citizens of America (PCA) appeared in 1946 and 
proclaimed, “Land ho.”182 Yet after the Wallace campaign fell short, Grossman became 
increasingly less excited about the party and more involved in the peace and anti-nuclear 
efforts of the late 1950s. 
Brookline resident Phyllis Ryan, who, along with her husband William, became a 
leader of the fair housing and civil rights movements, was born 1927 to Russian Jewish 
immigrants and had grown up in Brookline. She first became interested in political 
activism during college as a member of Students for Henry Wallace, which came to 
inform her political viewpoints and later forms of grassroots activism. Likewise, several 
of the women who became leading members of the peace movement had past experience 
in leftist politics. Alice Aronow and her husband had both been active members of the 
Progressive Party, and Mary Berger became involved in the Wallace campaign as well as 
several efforts to counter the Red Scare in the late 1940s and early 1950s.183  
Several grassroots activists later described not becoming politically engaged until 
moving to the suburbs. Lexington resident Marion Colletta, who had grown up in East 
Boston, always supported Democratic candidates but did not become politically active 
until she moved to Lexington in the early 1950s when one of her neighbors invited her to 
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a meeting of “Volunteers for Stevenson.” Colletta recalled that at the time Lexington was 
“very Republican” and she joined a group of young women from the community going 
door-to-door for Stevenson, many of whom had recently graduated from Radcliffe or 
other elite institutions. “ I guess they were kind of surprised to find that we weren’t all 
dirty and from the slums,” she stated at the reaction of the town’s Republican residents. 
“I guess they thought only people from the slums were Democrats.”184 While these 
volunteers did not lead presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson to victory at the local or 
state level in 1952 or 1956, their efforts did help many of their neighbors to see the party 
in a different light. The door-to-door campaigns of the Stevenson forces reached people 
like Jackie Davision, who was a Republican when she moved to Lexington, but through 
activities like tennis and the League of Women Voters, she made friends who revised her 
party allegiance. “It was interesting to meet some Democrats for the first time in my life 
and learn that they had ideas,” Davison later explained of her Democratic neighbors. 
“They had the issues that were the most appealing. So I left the ranks of my childhood 
and became—may not as vicious in some sense as some “born Democrats---but as a 
“born-again Democrat, I got to be rather enthusiastic.”185  
Concord real estate developer James Craig, who later became a leader in the 
affordable housing movement of the late 1960s, also described a political conversion 
once in the suburbs and inspired by his neighbors. Craig stated that he and wife were 
“cradle Republican[s],” growing up in Connecticut and Vermont respectively. Craig later 
said of his wife “I don’t think she’d ever really met a Democrat until we moved to 
Conantum.” Of the neighborhood, however, he stated, “living here changed our political 
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views. We became radical Democrats, real McGovernites.”186 This group of committed 
activists, nevertheless, only represented a small minority of residents even in the liberal 
strongholds of Lexington, Concord, Newton, Brookline or Lincoln.  
The pro-government, pro-business influence of the high-tech industry ensured that 
political moderation increasingly defined the political culture of the Route 128 suburbs in 
the postwar period. In 1962, the New York Times sent a reporter to Lexington to examine 
the ways in which the rise of the high-tech industry was changing national politics. The 
article highlighted the fact that many of the “nuclear age engineers” creating “new 
arsenals of space weaponry” worked “in an atmosphere of identification badges and 
restricted admittance,” making many of the engineers more inclined to support executive 
privilege and Cold War secrecy.187 However, several of the Lexington engineers 
interviewed did express a weariness at the “vacillating foreign policy” that had existed 
since the end of World War II, and some advocated a more realistic approach to the Cold 
War than that offered by the federal government during the late 1950s and early 1960s.  
This moderate pragmatic viewpoint differed from Lisa McGirr’s interpretation of the 
political ideology of employees in defense-related industries in Orange County. McGirr 
contends that the fact that many middle-class residents depended on the Cold War for the 
livelihoods heightened their anticommunism that made them more inclined to a 
conservative political platform.188 Even if the products they helped to develop served 
defense goals, most of the engineers and white collar professionals in the Route 128 
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industries had a less direct relationship to the military than their counterparts in Orange 
County, which perhaps tempered what would have likely been more hawkish views. 
The cohort of Lexington engineers interviewed by the New York Times railed 
most vocally not against communists, but, rather, against corruption within the 
Massachusetts government and the state Democratic Party. Massachusetts had a long 
tradition of political corruption, but in the 1950s, the state government and the 
particularly the Democratic Party boasted a long rap sheet of patronage, bribery and other 
illegal activities which led to high taxes and other forms of inefficiencies.189 Many of the 
interviewed new executives in these Cold War-related industries came from out of state 
and voiced frustration at the high taxes and mismanagement prevalent in the 
Massachusetts political system.  “I was born and raised in Chicago, which is no lily-white 
political atmosphere, but I am dismayed,” declared a Raytheon engineer in reference to 
the problem of state-level corruption.190 Edgar Litt compared the outlook of these 
professionals to the early 20th century Progressive movement as they both demonstrated a  
“commitment to the rational ordering of the environment” and “equal opportunities” 
based on merit rather than “personalized reward,” which made them not squarely in step 
with either political party.191  
Historian and Massachusetts resident James MacGregor Burns defined this group 
of white-collar suburbanites as “mugwumps,” resuscitating a label from the late 
nineteenth century political lexicon used to connote the reformist and independent 
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inclinations of a group of white middle class voters from the Northeast.192 In a 1962 
article, Burns explained that these postwar Massachusetts “mugwumps” were “the 
independents who the P.T.A’s, League of Women Voters, taxpayers’ associations, good 
government leagues and a multitude of specialized reform groups such as the Civil 
Liberties Union and civil rights organizations. But they are not to be found in the 
organization of the two political parties.”193 Instead he reduced, their priorities to “civil 
liberties, education, civil rights, urban renewal, conservation and the need for honest and 
effective government.” Burns stressed that this reform-minded and educated constituency 
was “neither apathetic nor alienated” but they had “simply taken a long, hard look at both 
parties and found them inadequate to their political aims.” 
The set of convictions and lack of party loyalty adopted by this white collar 
constituency made the political geography of Massachusetts more complicated and 
bifurcated than it had been prior to World War II.194 On the whole, white-collar 
professionals in the Route 128 suburbs tended to vote in national elections for the 
Democratic Party, which projected their sense of foreign policy pragmatism and equal 
opportunities on domestic issues, while in Massachusetts elections they supported the 
Republican candidates who stressed the importance of government reform and fiscal 
moderation. This pattern also defined the preferences of many self-identified suburban 
“Yankee Republicans” who felt increasingly alienated from the national party, which 
over the course of the postwar period was gradually moving farther geographically 
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southward and westward and ideologically rightward. 195 Moreover, many upwardly 
mobile suburban residents had traditionally embraced the Republican Party as a marker 
of an elite status.  However, the presence of John F. Kennedy in state and national 
politics helped make the Democratic Party acceptable to the same group of voters. In 
1960 and afterwards, Democratic candidates consistently won the presidential contests in 
Massachusetts, providing the state with a national reputation as “a great bastion of the 
Democratic Party.”196 
These election results, however, did not indicate the “steady retreat” of the 
Republican Party in Massachusetts and other New England states.197 Strengthened by its 
associations with reform and fiscal responsibility and support from moderate 
suburbanites, the Republicans remained a vibrant force at the state level throughout the 
postwar period. Moreover, the state Democrats continued to focus on working- class and 
ethnic minorities and ignored serious outreach to middle-class residents, which hindered 
the success and power of the Democratic Party in the increasingly suburbanized state.198 
The stance of the state Democrats led many self-identified liberals to maintain similar 
dualistic voting preferences as their more moderate counterparts. For instance, a 1965 
survey of residents in the Conantum neighborhood of Concord, which served as a 
stronghold of progressive activism throughout the postwar period, revealed that while 60 
percent of residents generally voted Democratic and 40 percent Republican in national 
elections, in state races many residents reversed party affiliations and 30 percent voted 
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Democrat and 70 percent voted Republican.199 This bifurcated voting tendency reveals 
that following World War II in Massachusetts, and especially the suburbs of Boston, 
party and ideology consistently did not collapse into a single straight line.  
These voting patterns suggest, nevertheless, that the political, social and physical 
landscape of Massachusetts looked undoubtedly different by 1960 than they had just 
fifteen years earlier. The rise of the post-industrial economy and racial and spatial 
inequality embodied by Route 128, produced tensions not only between both core and 
periphery as demonstrated in the battles over housing and school desegregation, but also 
within the various suburbs, conflicts that would come to a head in the fight over passage 
of the property tax limitation measure Proposition 2 ½ discussed in the final chapter. 
However, this set of structural, cultural and political changes did establish the 
foundations for grassroots activism on fair housing, school integration, peace, 
environmentalism and liberal candidates, which the following chapters explore.  
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Chapter 2:  




On August 31, 1963, during the same week as the March on Washington, thirty 
members of the Boston chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) stormed onto 
the Lexington Battle Green, the site of the famous “shot heard round the world” and the 
mythical birthplace of the American Revolution. The protestors challenged the 
conventional image of civil rights activists. Singing “We Shall Overcome,” the group of 
predominately white women protestors marched beneath the iconic statue of John Parker, 
the leader of the Minuteman and a symbol of the suburb’s prominent past. Walking the 
picket line, they carried homemade signs with messages emblazoned such as “Birthplace 
of American Liberty??,” “Jim Crow Must Go,” and “Lexington Live Up to Your Name.”1 
The protest intended to draw attention to the case of James Parker, against whom a 
Lexington real estate agent had allegedly discriminated when the African-American 
Foreign Service officer sought to rent a cottage in the affluent suburb for himself and his 
family. Placing its outrage in spatial terms and the cognitive map of Massachusetts 
distinctiveness, CORE distributed leaflets to curious onlookers declaring: “There is 
Discrimination in the North! It Exists in Lexington too!”2 
The protest became front-page news drawing attention to the issue of racial 
discrimination in the Northern suburbs and the large movement that had emerged to 
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combat it.  The controversy created embarrassment for a town that had prided itself as a 
bastion of liberalism. Officials worked to reach a swift conclusion and the Parkers settled 
into their new home in time to enroll their children in the first day of school.3 Despite this 
rapid resolution, the Parker case had wide reaching repercussions within this suburban-
based movement that exposed its competing definitions of “fair housing.”  
Most historians have been largely dismissive of the white middle-class activists 
who led the fair housing movement throughout the North and West relegating their 
activities to a footnote about the naïve and integrationist impulses of northern liberals in 
the early 1960s. This grassroots movement constituted more than simply a form of white 
naiveté and deserves serious consideration. In metropolitan Boston the network of white-
collar professionals and housewives that first took hold in traditionally liberal Route 128 
suburbs like Lexington in the late 1950s came to include 3500 members and 37 chapters 
by the mid-1960s.4  Fusing a belief in the racial liberal mission of changing hearts and 
minds with a commitment to working within the channels of the government, these 
committees fought to raise tolerance for residential integration among their fellow 
suburbanites and to help individual African-American families find homes in their 
communities. They proved most effective at working within the political system to 
promote and enact policies prohibiting discrimination in housing, thereby ensuring that 
Massachusetts had the most extensive fair rights laws in the nation by the mid-1960s. 
While other scholars acknowledge the Massachusetts’ fair housing laws as evidence of 
the state’s progressive position on civil rights in the postwar period, none have examined 
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the role of suburban groups securing the passage of this legislation. 5  In doing so, these 
groups joined a much broader biracial and metropolitan coalition that fought to assure the 
state’s vanguard position on housing discrimination in the 1960s. 
Tracing the evolution of the Massachusetts fair housing movement provides a 
way to rethink liberal politics and policies surrounding racial equality and housing 
discrimination in three important ways.  First, it offers new insights into both the dialectic 
relationship between government policy and grassroots social movements surrounding 
race and housing. Second, it reveals the existence of a form of grassroots politics in these 
affluent suburbs fighting for housing law that upheld an individualist and class-based 
vision of racial equality.  Finally it contributes to the scholarly project to push the story of 
civil rights into the North, but expands that framework to reveal the biracial and 
metropolitan dimensions of those efforts. By examining these issues, the chapter reveals 
how this movement laid the foundation for many of the major accomplishments and 
tensions within both the civil rights and liberal coalitions in metropolitan Boston in the 
1960s and beyond.  
Fair housing activism has been largely neglected in studies of civil rights history 
and policy. Traditionally when scholars have addressed the issue they focus either on the 
efforts of Martin Luther King, Jr.  in Chicago or on white working- and middle-class 
resistance to fair housing in Cicero and California. 6 These interpretations fail to 
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recognize activities at the grassroots level in the early 1960s and the central role of white 
middle-class suburbanites in fighting for rather than only against fair housing laws. 
Scholars who have addressed legal and policy efforts to combat discrimination in housing 
have tended to focus on Washington and the drive that culminated in the passage of the 
Fair Housing Act of 1968. 7 Attention to state action is particularly crucial, for 
understanding both the legislative and grassroots response to the problems of residential 
segregation in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Civil rights advocates recognized the virtual impossibility of influencing the 
adoption of fair housing laws at the federal level in the 1950s and turned instead to the 
states where they found much greater success.8 In fact, by the time Congress passed the 
1968 Fair Housing Act, many states, particularly in the North and West, had longstanding 
and wider-reaching laws restricting residential discrimination. Thomas Sugrue’s The 
Origins of the Urban Crisis has created a crucial framework for understanding the 
interplay between federal housing policies and grassroots actors by exposing the ways in 
which the very localized issues of property and neighborhood assumed a new political 
prominence in the postwar period. 9 Nevertheless, scholars who have adopted this 
important paradigm have tended to focus on activities either at the national or municipal 
level and have largely overlooked developments in state government. Bringing 
developments at the state level into an analysis of the interplay between the government 
and grassroots movements offers a more complete and dynamic portrait of the laws, 
                                                
7 Charles M. Lamb, Housing Segregation in Suburban America Since 1960 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), especially Chapter 2.  
8 Meyer, As Long As They Don’t Live Next Door, 158. 
9 Sugrue, Origins. For works that have refined and extended this framework see Freund, Colored Property, 
Kruse, White Flight, Lassiter, Silent Majority and Self, American Babylon. 
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policies, and social activism that sought to eradicate racial inequality in housing in the 
decades after World War II.   
Attention to the suburban fair housing movement in metropolitan Boston also 
complicates many of the traditional interpretations of grassroots homeowner politics and 
suburban political culture in the postwar period. Scholars have tended to focus on the 
emergence of a form of reactionary populism among white middle-class suburbanites 
invested in property values, consumer entitlements and racial segregation that became a 
key force in both the fracturing of the New Deal Coalition and the success of Republican 
Party.10 However, examining the views of members of the fair housing committees 
reveals that not every suburbanite saw African-Americans as a direct threat to their 
financial and ideological investment in homeownership. These white middle-class 
suburbanites along the Route 128 corridor, in fact, deployed their identities as 
homeowners around the cause of fair and open housing, joining a broader coalition in 
Massachusetts that bridged racial and spatial boundaries to place the issue at the forefront 
of the local civil rights agenda in the early 1960s.  
These forms of biracial and metropolitan-based activism around the concept of 
fair housing provide a distinctly differently perspective on the battle for racial equality 
before 1966.  Standard narratives of the postwar civil rights movement tend to depict the 
South as the nation’s sole venue of racism and activism, ignoring places like Boston, 
which had both a small African-American population and an enlightened and progressive 
reputation.11 Recent pathbreaking studies of the freedom struggle in the North provide an 
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Historiography of the Civil Rights Movement,” American Historical Review 96 (April 1991), 456-471; 
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essential corrective to the Southern exceptionalism of the civil rights story. They show 
that groups in the urban centers above the Mason-Dixon line emerged more in response 
to local economic and political structures of discrimination than to the developments in 
the South.12 Examining the fight for fair housing in Boston shows that structural 
interpretations of racial inequality, did not just suddenly appear in the middle of the 
decade with Martin Luther King, Jr’s march through Chicago and the rise of Black 
Power, but had been a fundamental feature of civil rights politics throughout the postwar 
period. In fact, until the middle of the 1960s, housing constituted the central arena of 
concern most civil rights organizations in the Bay State. Historians of the civil rights saga 
who have shifted their gaze toward Boston, however, have concentrated almost 
exclusively on the issue of school desegregation and the infamous busing crisis in the 
1970s.13 By failing to pay closer attention to the housing movement in Massachusetts, 
earlier accounts obscure a longer and more nuanced history of civil rights activity that 
bridged both the racial and urban-suburban divides. Applying a metropolitan framework 
to the study of postwar civil rights and politics underscores the ways in which economic 
                                                                                                                                            
Evelyn Brooks Higgenbotham, “Foreword” and Jeanne Theoharis, “Introduction” in Freedom North: Black 
Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940-1980, Jeanne Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, eds. (New 
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12 See for example Martha Biondi, To Stand and to Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New 
York City (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003) Countryman, Up South; Theoharis and 
Woodward, Freedom North; Jeanne Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, ed. Groundworks: Local Black 
Freedom Movements in America (New York: New York University Press, 2005); Sugrue Sweet Land of 
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Jeanne Theoharis, "I'd Rather Go to School in the South: How Boston's School Desegregation Complicates 
the Civil Rights Paradigm," in Freedom North, Theoharis and Woodard, eds, 140-144. See also Jeanne 
Theoharis, “‘They Told Us Our Kids Were Stupid’”; Ruth Batson and the Educational Movement in 
Boston” in Groundworks, Theoharis and Woodard, eds. 
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structures did not tie these spaces together, but also provided the mechanisms to create 
coalitions, campaigns and outlooks among residents that both transcended and reified 
racial and spatial boundaries.14  
Despite their role at the center of this coalition to abolish residential 
discrimination, many white suburban activists did not wholly reject a political outlook of 
middle-class entitlements, market-based individualism, and normative notions of family 
and gender. The agendas and policies these participants supported remained rooted in a 
suburban-centered ideology of equal opportunity and gradual integration that ultimately 
succeeded in helping only handful of primarily middle-class African-American families 
like the Parkers move into the suburbs. While these results did have symbolic 
importance, they failed to significantly alter the political, spatial or racial structures of 
metropolitan Boston. By 1963, many of individuals and groups involved in the campaign 
recognized the limitations in these types of fair housing law and activism and sought to 
revise their agenda accordingly. These more urban-minded activists, particularly those in 
the Congress of Racial Equality and Fair Housing Inc., began moving away from a legal 
and individualist interpretation of the concept of fair housing and toward a more 
economic-based approach that emphasized improving the housing conditions of lower 
income African-Americans. Yet this shift produced divisions within and across 
metropolitan lines that revealed fundamental differences in how the various members of 
this coalition interpreted the concepts of fair housing, racial equality and suburban 
activism. Examining these fissures and tensions ultimately exposes the potential and 
limits of both the fair housing movement and suburban liberalism to create meaningful 
solutions to the problem of residential segregation.  
                                                




Good Neighbors  
 
“‘They should have the protection of the law like everybody else,’ Frank 
said, “…I don’t approve of discriminatory legislation and that’s what the 
Massachusetts Fair Housing Bill is. It deprives the homeowner of his right 
to chose. The constitution my dear Irene, tries to guarantee equality of 
opportunity, not equality of status.’ 
Irene said, “Status and opportunity are inseparable.” 
‘Can’t we shut them up?” Eddie Constantine asked 
‘It’s sex for Irene’, Carol told him.’”15 
 
This exchange comes from a cocktail party scene in Couples, John Updike’s 
salacious story of marriage and adultery set in the fictionalized suburb of Tarbox north of 
Boston in 1962. Amidst tennis dates, dinner parties and extramarital escapades, Irene 
Saltz, wife of an engineer at one the firms along Route 128, tries to recruit the members 
of her set to join the town’s Fair Housing Committee, but their activity amounts to little 
more than forms of foreplay and cocktail banter. Though this movement did evolve from 
a suburban-centered worldview, it was more than simply a byproduct of housewife ennui. 
The founders possessed a genuine concern about the restrictions that African-Americans 
confronted in the housing market. Combining the tenets of racial liberalism and market-
based individualism, they sought to creating  “open access” to suburbs by simultaneously 
promoting “ tolerance” and “interracial understanding” among their neighbors and 
assisting African-Americans purchase homes in their communities.16  
The first committee began in Natick in early 1957 after an accountant named 
Robert Brainerd heard an African-American at his Unitarian Church outline the difficulty 
and humiliation that his family endured in the quest to obtain housing in Boston’s 
                                                
15 John Updike, Couples (New York: Fawcett Books, 1996), 229.  
16 Richard O’Donnell, “How Negroes Fare in the Bay State” Growing Population Needs Homes,” Boston 
Globe, May 23, 1961.  
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suburban ring. Outraged, Brainerd gathered other local residents to create the Natick 
Committee on Homes for Minority Groups.17 By 1960, these types of committees had 
spread to 18 communities and in 1961 these local committees formed the Greater Boston 
Federation of Fair Housing Committees in order coordinate activities and create a united 
front.18  The creation of the Federation lent the issue of fair housing the structure and 
legitimacy of an organized movement. The same year, the Boston Herald reported that 
“more than 2000 Massachusetts residents have joined a new grassroots campaign to 
eradicate racial discrimination—not in distant Alabama but in their own backyard.”19 The 
article touted the rise of a cluster of fair housing committees in the archipelago of suburbs 
of along the Route 128 such as Belmont, Brookline, Concord, Newton, Lexington, 
Wellesley and Needham. The nascent coalition was led by both liberally minded middle-
class professional residents who “decided that they wanted to do more than just ‘feel 
guilty’” and interpreting residential segregation as community problem sought to 
convince their fellow neighbors that ‘discrimination is ‘legally and morally’ wrong.” 
The scene from Couples does accurately portray how the initial leaders of the 
suburban fair housing movement relied on their social contacts and networks to build the 
movement by recruiting fellow co-workers, neighbors, school parents and church and 
synagogue members to join the movement through events such as coffees klatches, 
cocktail parties and informal individual discussion.  The early membership involvement 
of the committees mirrored the traditional and heteronormative gender roles of postwar 
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suburban life. Many married couples got involved together, expanded and even reshaped 
their traditional gender roles and familial responsibilities.20 Since many of the men had 
full-time jobs, women disproportionately formed the backbone and behind- the-scenes-
momentum of the movement.21 Usually college-educated and in their late 20s and 30s, 
these women extended a long tradition of Northern middle-class female activism dating 
back to the nineteenth century and the abolition movement, as well as their more recent 
experiences in organizations like the League of Women Voters. The suburban fair 
housing movement, however, did not fall in complete symmetry with the “men led, but 
women organized” paradigm.22 Women like Phyllis Ryan of Brookline, and Sadelle 
Sacks of Belmont became leaders at both the local and metropolitan level. Ryan, in fact, 
later became a major figure in the local civil rights movement, serving as community 
relations person for the Fair Housing Federation and soon after as the press representative 
for CORE, the Massachusetts Freedom Movement, and the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference. Several men actively contributed to day-to-day activities as well. 
They included academics, lawyers and business executives who used their knowledge 
bases and contacts to create the intellectual and institutional infrastructure for the cause. 
This application of professional expertise would become one of the key and 
distinguishing features of the fair housing movement specifically and suburban liberalism 
a whole. 
                                                
20 May, Homeward Bound.  
21 Sociologist Rhoda Lois Blumberg has suggested In her study of white mothers in the North who became 
involved in the civil rights movement, sociologist Rhoda Lois Blumberg has suggested that most of these 
women “considered their ideological commitments to motherhood and to the cause of racial justice 
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West and Rhoda Lois Blumberg, eds (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
22 See Charles Payne, “‘Men Led, But Women Organized’: Movement Participation in the Mississippi 
Delta” in Women and Social Protest, 156-165. 
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Religious organizations proved equally important in the formation and 
infrastructure of this grassroots movement.  By the late 1950s, the national leadership of 
most mainstream dominations had disseminated general statements in support of “open 
housing,” influencing the imperatives of many congregations in the Boston area.23 
Members and observers usually emphasized the  “indigenous,” “spontaneous” and 
“grassroots” origins of the suburban housing groups, and while these adjectives were not 
misnomers, external organizations, particularly religious organizations, undoubtedly sped 
their pace of development.24 The New England Regional Office of the American Friends 
Service Committee created a Community Relations Committee in 1958 to work on race 
relations and housing discrimination in the suburbs. The Friends hired a paid staff to 
worked with AFSC members living in the suburbs to “spark” interest and worked with 
other religious leaders at both the local and metropolitan level.25 One reporter described 
“religious leaders of all three major faiths” as the “driving force behind” the fair housing 
movement.26 Clergy such as Father Thomas Macleod of St. Brigid’s Church in Lexington 
encouraged their congregations to get involved and in many cases served as the early 
chairs of the local committees. These clergy also provided both a religious imperative and 
a language of morality to the cause.27  
The movement also revealed the clear influence of the notions of racial liberalism 
described in Gunnar Myrdal’s seminal 1944 work, An America Dilemma, and the broader 
surge of social science literature concerning discrimination in the postwar period. In the 
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American Dilemma, Myrdal presented racism as the product of personal prejudice and 
moral deficiencies rather than state-sponsored policy. He stressed that racism should be 
eradicated not through restructuring the market economy and the political system but, 
rather, through changing the “hearts and minds” of individuals.28 Embracing this idea, the 
liberal residents who spearheaded the fair housing movement ascribed to the belief that 
the clearest way to overcome the problem of racial segregation was by implanting 
interracial tolerance and understanding in their neighbors.29  The fair housing 
movement’s grassroots emphasis on working at the neighborhood level demonstrated 
their recognition that racial discrimination was not just a Southern problem, but operated 
in the Northern suburbs as well.  However, in their first years of operation most of the 
members of the organization repeatedly distinguished the purpose of “fair housing” from 
that of “civil rights” and defined themselves as part of the “Fair Housing Movement” that 
differed from the Civil Rights Movement. This distinction had regional, race and class 
valences differentiating their cause and movement from African-American activists on 
streets of the South and Roxbury. The emphasis on “housing practices” simultaneously 
implied that, unlike the more systemic problems of Southern white supremacy, residential 
segregation represented the last and only barrier to racial integration and equality. The 
individualist ideas of Myrdalian theory, therefore, also dovetailed with the consumer-
oriented politics of New Deal liberalism and its emphasis on homeownership, 
encouraging adherents to work within, rather than, to remake the system of capitalism 
especially the housing market.  
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 The two main planks of the local committees’ agenda bring into sharpest relief the 
influence of the individualist ideology of postwar social science and liberalism on the fair 
housing movement.  First, the groups aimed to use educational outreach to change the  
"hearts and minds" of skeptical suburbanites and promote tolerance and understanding 
within their communities. Recognizing the role that property values played in shaping the 
political subjectivity of suburban residents, these groups focused most urgently on 
convincing their fellow residents that a black neighbor did not create real estate value 
declines. The Brookline Fair Housing Practice Committee (FHPC) published a series of 
articles in the local newspaper that incorporated information from a variety of academic 
studies to emphasize that panic selling, not racial integration, caused a decline in property 
values.30 These groups also sponsored many talks by a variety of government officials, 
politicians, community activists and academics including of the leading experts on 
intergroup relations who were affiliated with area institutions.31  Several of the groups 
even tried to suggest that integrated housing would enhance property values in an effort 
to fuse the priorities of middle-class homeowners with the basic theoretical findings of 
intergroup relations scholarship.32 The Newton FHPC did not just present general 
information, but produced its own. The group conducted a study to prove that black 
families moving into all-white neighborhoods in Newton did not affect property values. 
Marshalling the professional resources of the committee, a local sociologist supplied the 
demographic information, a lawyer offered the real estate analysis and a group of 
housewives conducted the field research and clerical tasks. Members deemed this 
                                                
30 “Group Works to Dispel Prejudice Fantasy and Fear,” Brookline Chronicle-Citizen, March 17, 1960; 
“Property Values Don’t Fall When Negroes Move In,” Brookline Chronicle-Citizen, April 7, 1960. 
31 Fair Housing Federation, Fair Housing News, January 1962, LCRC. 
32 “200 Join Move for Fair Housing in the State.” 
 
115 
collaboration so successful that Morton Rubin, the sociologist, even published a scholarly 
article in the Journal of Intergroup Relations that touted both the importance of research 
for suburban fair housing committees, and the benefits of enlisting housewives as 
volunteer research assistants for social scientific study.33 Research methods aside, this 
attempt to assuage anxieties of skeptical residents reveals the ways in which the fair 
housing movement did not challenge, but, rather, worked within the framework of and 
complimented white residents’ investment in the material and ideological privileges of 
suburban homeownership.   
The second component of the local committee’s shared agenda, focused on 
assisting individual African-American families who wanted to move into their various 
communities. This effort exposed the market-based and individualist ideology shaping 
many suburbanites’ acceptance of racial integration. This line of activity also relied 
heavily on suburban-centered tactics and contacts, In order to secure “open occupancy” 
listings, the suburban activists used their personal contacts to gain promises from 
homeowners and real estate brokers that they would sell homes on a nondiscriminatory 
basis. The groups also used their informal social networks to encourage homeowners to 
do the same and even convinced some residents to list their houses directly with their 
local committee. In addition, the members worked closely with potential African-
American buyers or lessees (usually referred by the AFSC), accompanying them to look 
at available housing options, and serving as advocates, negotiators, and mediators in the 
purchase or rental process. Some residents devoted long hours and full weekends to 
helping just one African-American family find housing in their community.  
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The placement activities of the suburban committees produces a disturbing 
cartography of segregation in metropolitan Boston in the postwar period and reveals just 
how embedded residential discrimination had become in the physical and social 
geography of the region.  Many of the prospects that enlisted the help of the suburban 
groups had had protracted struggles finding housing in the suburban Boston, having 
experienced overt racial prejudice from landlords and tenants. For instance, Samuel 
Turner, a native of Newton and teacher in its public schools, who had earned the title 
“Outstanding Young Man in Newton,” found a home in that community only through the 
assistance of the local committee after a 12-month search. 34 In Belmont, the committee 
went into action after an African-American Harvard dean’s attempt to move into a 
particularly exclusive neighborhood in the upper middle-class town created a surge of 
protest. Committee members worked to change the attitudes of the dean’s new neighbors 
and reassure them that the presence of the black Ivy Leaguer would not tarnish the 
prestige of the area or the valuation of its property. They also stressed that dean only 
wanted to raise his family in a neighborhood “suited to his intellectual and financial 
position.”35  
These forms of assistance bring into sharp focus the explicitly classed and 
suburban-centered dimensions of grassroots fair housing activism.36 It was no 
coincidence that the beneficiaries of the committee’s strategies were almost exclusively 
white-collar professionals and academics who had recently relocated to the Boston area 
for professional purposes, but reflected middle-class and suburban-centered dimensions 
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of the movement itself. The mission statements of the early groups asserted that their 
shared purpose was to ensure that “all persons” could “secure homes for their families 
without restriction based on color, creed or national background.”37 Many of the groups, 
nevertheless, qualified “all persons” with designations such as  “good character” or even 
“financially qualified.”38 These mission statements illustrate the narrow parameters by 
which many of the activists defined the seemingly broad idea of “fair housing.” The 
groups frequently adopted the terms and ideas, “equal opportunity” and  “freedom of 
choice,” which constituted common planks of the racial liberal ideology interpreting 
racial discrimination in terms of individual prejudice not structural inequality. 39  
This therapeutic and individualist viewpoint of racial liberalism exacerbated 
notions of class discrimination at the heart of the fair housing agenda.  This discourse of 
choice and opportunity also reflected a distinctly white middle-class understanding of 
racial integration that promoted individual meritocracy and consumer rights and 
normalized class exclusion as a natural feature of the suburban landscape.40  In line with 
the racialized and classed vision of suburban life, the Belmont FHPC exposed a cognitive 
map of the metropolitan region by affirming its “maintaining and improving the high 
standards of attractive well-kept homes, fine schools and local enterprises” in Belmont 
and not creating new  “slums and ghettos.”41  While the group clearly aimed this point at 
skeptics fearful about their declining property values, their choice of imagery exposed the 
ways in which this strategy of promoting racial integration rested upon an explicit 
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language and ideology of class exclusivity. Code words like “slums” and “ghettos” also 
highlighted the movement’s appropriation of social scientific ideas about the pathological 
consequences of African-American urban life in order to bolster a class-based vision. 42 
Jeanne Theoharis has suggested that using the discourse of cultural pathology allowed   
“northern liberals” to “claim attention to race, while maintaining that the structures of 
schooling, housing, and jobs in these cities were open and that success was determined 
“through hard work and abiding by middle-class social norms.” 43 This language, 
therefore, enabled white suburban supporters of the fair housing movement to inhabit a 
middle ground from which to express their commitment to a very limited and very class-
based view of racial equality.  
The movement’s  “Good Neighbors for Fair Housing” campaign further 
underscores the ways in which the movement embodied and promoted notions of 
suburban racial liberalism and class discrimination. The Brookline committee first 
launched the door-to-door campaign in the winter of 1962, asking residents to a sign a 
pledge which it defined as “a simple concrete way…to show broad community support 
for the principle of Fair Housing.”44  The idea quickly spread to the towns of Arlington, 
Belmont, Lexington and Wellesley. The three-point contract began with a sweeping 
articulation of the racial liberal principle “that all people regardless of race, religion, or 
national origin should have equal opportunity for housing.”45  Moving to the more 
concrete, the pledge made the signer promise to rent or sell the property he or she owns 
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or manages without regard to race, religion or national origin and to encourage neighbors 
to join with them to achieve an integrated neighborhood. 46 
 Although a promoting seemingly simple promise, the campaign’s “Good 
Neighbor for Fair Housing” poster best illustrates the initiative’s complex web of 
meanings. Drawn by a member of the Brookline committee in stick-figure form, the 
poster featured two identical single-family homes. In the forefront of the picture two 
stick-figured men talked while leaning on push mowers, behind them two women spoke 
to each other from within inside the respective houses and off in the distance (or 
conceivably the back yard) two small girls held hands.  The pair of smiling families 
exactly mirrored each other except that the artist had colored in the faces of the family on 
the right to mark their race.47 Similarly, the message of a Lexington Civil Rights 
Committees flyer to “make possible for every one of Lexington’s neighbors to view a 
prospective neighbor not as a Negro, but as a doctor, engineer, or businessman” could 
have provided the poster’s accompanying text. 48  This image and text shows the ways in 
which the fair housing groups ascribed to a color-blind ideology of equality anchored in 
notions of class difference. The poster also illuminates the ways in which both the 
campaign and suburban-centered movement as a whole rested upon a postwar ideology of 
the nuclear family and traditional gender roles. The mission statement of many of the 
groups articulated the common goal of making their communities open to “families” of 
all races, nationalities and religions and the groups usually referred to the prospective 
homeowners they aimed to help in terms of familial units. This designation both built 
upon and reified the family-centered ideology and traditional gender norms of postwar 
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suburbia.49 Yet the visual and rhetorical emphasis on domesticity also implicitly 
contained the racialized and class-coded message that the fair housing committees did not 
aim to recruit dangerous and deviant single black “bachelors” into the suburbs, but, 
rather, safe and stable middle-class families.50 Thus, the movement and its iconography 
implicitly suggested that the concept of a “good neighbor” ran in two directions.   
The campaign gathered 4000 signatures across five communities in the span of 
two months and in doing so helped to promote the reputations of these communities as 
strongholds of liberalism.  In Brookline, committee members convinced fourth-fifths of 
residents canvassed to sign the petition thus boasting what one members characterized as 
“a better than 80 % batting average.”51 The 12-week drive of the Lexington Civil Rights 
Committee (LCRC) had the most favorable response garnering the signatures of 1540 
residents. 52 Never losing an opportunity to make an allusion to the town’s historic 
importance, a local reporter observed that this enthusiastic response proved that the 
“birthplace of American liberty” continued to be “its most ardent champion. ”53 Once the 
drive concluded, LCRC members Irene Blum and Dee Zobel conducted an analysis of the 
basic demographics of the signers broken down by location, gender and profession. 54 The 
detailed study demonstrated community-wide support for the pledge, but did show a 
disproportionately high response on certain streets where particularly active committee 
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members lived.  Using information from the town directory, Blum and Zobel reported 
that 802 men and 738 women had signed the document representing a spectrum of white-
collar vocations. While “housewives” represented more than one-third of the total 
signers, engineers constituted  “the most predominant profession by far,” with teachers, 
doctors, physicists, chemists, business executives and lab workers following behind.55 
The favorable response from members of the scientific industry directly corroborates the 
key role of the rise of Route 128 in bolstering the causes fair housing and suburban 
liberalism.  
The “Good Neighbor” initiative received the strong endorsements of the area 
press. The Boston Globe and the Boston Herald each featured editorials on the campaign 
and cited the canvassing as an important effort “to implement basic American principles” 
and attack the “citadel of prejudice in the North.” 56  The Globe observed that the drive 
proved the “enormous reservoir of good will” in Boston suburbs and showed the ways in 
which individuals had the power to affect and change public opinion. 57 It also gained 
strong endorsements from both local and national politicians. U.S. Congressman 
Lawrence Curtis patriotically proclaimed the Brookline group as acting “in our country’s 
best interest in seeking to eliminate discrimination in housing” and a few months later 
Congressman Benjamin Smith read copy of the Lexington committee’s pledge on the 
House floor. 58 Moving up the levels of the government, the Brookline committee 
informed President John Kennedy, a native of the town, of their campaign as means to 
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indirectly pressure him to sign an executive order banning housing discrimination by the 
federal government. The campaign did not translate into immediate presidential action.  
Kennedy’s Special Assistant on Civil Rights Harris Wofford did, however, praise the 
committee for “advancing the cause of all Americans” as dubbed the pledge “kind of 
constructive response that the nation needs.” 59  
The  “Good Neighbor” campaign ultimately represented one of the high-water 
marks of the fair housing committee’s grassroots activities.60  The drive highlights the 
ways in which fair housing represented a grassroots movement at its most literal 
definition and its wide-ranging support shows that that indifference to issues of race and 
civil rights among suburbanites was by no means a given. The campaign also embodied 
the basic tenets of postwar racial liberalism in both its implicit focus on creating equality 
of opportunity and its confidence that changing the “hearts and minds” of individuals 
offered the surest route to ending racial discrimination. The effort proved extremely 
popular largely because it provided a way for residents in these largely affluent 
communities, even those not formally affiliated with their local fair housing group, to 
demonstrate their commitment to the cause and to liberalism more broadly.   
  The limits of this commitment and approach became patently clear, nevertheless, 
with a story out of Lexington just a few months after the campaign’s conclusion. A 
distressed women wrote to the LCRC to complain about how her efforts to sell her house 
to a black family failed after her neighbor, who had signed the pledge, blocked the 
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transaction.61  This story confirms Sugrue’s observation that in “wealthy suburban 
circles” in the 1960s  “collecting signatures on pro-housing integration petitions proved 
to be easy,” but “creating integrated housing markets in the suburbs proved to be much 
harder.”62 Fair housing activists increasingly came to recognize in order to create 
meaningful integration it would have to use other means and thereby turned to the formal 
channels of the law.  
 
Fair Housing Law  
The suburban fair housing movement’s advancement of legal and political 
solutions underscores suburban liberals’ faith in the formal mechanism of the law to 
eradicate the problems of racial segregation. This effort not only highlights the 
effectiveness of suburban residents at working within the formal channels of government, 
but also the ways in which the movement successfully harnessed and applied the 
professional expertise of its members, especially attorneys, to create laws and policies 
that upheld their vision of equality. Yet, this effort ultimately reproduced several of the 
same strengths and weaknesses of the “Good Neighbor” campaign and the fair housing 
movement’s other projects and therefore provides another lens through which to examine 
more broadly the ideology and tactics of grassroots liberalism.   
The Massachusetts response to the crisis of racial discrimination in housing first 
emerged in the immediate aftermath of World War II as state officials responded to fears 
that racism violated the American creed and marked a potential weakness in the arena of 
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foreign affairs.63 In 1946, Massachusetts became the third state to create a Fair 
Employment Practices Commission. The three-member volunteer board had the mandate 
to recommend legal action, but its “gradualist” process of “conference, conciliation and 
persuasion” actually served to keep cases of employment discrimination out of the 
courts.64 Four years later the state legislature expanded the scope and jurisdiction of the 
commission to include oversight of discrimination in public housing and public 
accommodations and changed the agency’s name to Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination (MCAD). 65 The amplified powers of MCAD solidified Massachusetts’s 
position at the forefront of the national civil rights battle. But as the decade unfolded, 
both the agency and local civil rights activists increasingly understood the need to extend 
the reach of state power beyond only public housing and into the private housing market.  
Throughout the 1950s, the local chapters of black-led groups like the NAACP and 
the Urban League had made the issue of housing, both public and private, central to their 
effort to create legal remedies to correct spatial and racial segregation.66 In 1957, the 
League, the NAACP and the American Jewish Congress sponsored legislation to include 
publicly financed private housing within the anti-discriminatory laws and the 
enforcement powers of MCAD. The Fair Housing Practices Law, signed into state law on 
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June 7, 1957, enlarged MCAD’s jurisdiction to include private housing for any person 
buying or renting a house under Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or Veteran 
Administration (VA) programs, urban renewal or redevelopments projects. 67 Since 
almost 80 percent of housing purchased in the state had some assistance from the FHA, 
the law had bold intentions and constituted a clear effort by the Commonwealth to create 
accountability for the discriminatory actions of the federal government. However, the 
legislature did not apply the statute retroactively and MCAD received almost no 
complaints in its first years of existence because almost no housing in the entire state fell 
within its jurisdiction. By the late 1950s the Commonwealth had the largest number of 
anti-discrimination statutes in the nation, but this abundance did not immediately 
translate into effectiveness.  The MCAD commissioners, therefore, looked to form an 
alliance with suburban fair housing groups to ensure that the effect of the commission 
and corresponding laws was more substantive than symbolic. 
In 1959, members of the burgeoning fair housing committees joined other civil 
rights groups and MCAD commissioners to form a broad and successful coalition that 
fought to give the state more aggressive oversight of private housing.  These efforts led to 
a revised statute, signed in the summer of 1959, that significantly expanded MCAD’s 
jurisdiction and enabled the state to once again proudly hold the claim to the title as 
national leader “in the quality and quantity of its civil rights legislation on housing.”68 
Since MCAD lacked the resources to launch a publicity campaign to alert the public of its 
expanded capacities, the fair housing groups took up the task. Committee members 
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marshaled existing public relations contacts and communication networks to disseminate 
information about the law. These activists wrote articles for the local newspapers, placed 
cards on cars in various suburban town centers and distributed colorfully illustrated 
pamphlets throughout their communities.69  They also contacted local real estate agencies 
and landlords to ensure that they understood the revised statute and promised to act in 
compliance with it. 70  
The local fair housing committees also played a crucial role in the MCAD hearing 
process, supplying many of the discrimination cases that came before the Commission 
after 1959. Suburban activists in contact with many victims of racial discrimination 
through the movement’s placement activities and committee members often encouraged 
prospective buyers or renters to file charges and then helped them navigate the multi-step 
hearing process. The effectiveness of the local committees to both encourage compliance 
and supply cases, nevertheless, became circumscribed by the fact that the expanded laws 
did not cover the majority of housing stock in places like Newton and Wellesley that had 
the most active fair housing groups. The expanded law only covered about 15 percent of 
housing in the state and in 180 of Massachusetts’ 351 cities or towns all homeowners 
could lawfully discriminate if they owned conventionally financed homes. 71 The 
committees in these areas instead sought to work with local realtors to obtain 
“compliance with the spirit of the law.”72 This promise sounded symbolically significant, 
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but it underscored the limitations of the purportedly landmark legislation in actually 
eliminating housing discrimination in the Bay State and particularly in its suburbs.  
By 1960, MCAD muted its initial enthusiasm for the private housing law. 73  In 
addition to the fact that it only covered apartments and new single-family developments, 
MCAD quickly recognized the housing market usually moved faster than the processes of 
administrative agencies. In many cases by the time the Commission made a finding of the 
existence of discrimination, the property in question had already been rented or sold. The 
Federation, therefore, joined with members of other organizations, including CORE, the 
NAACP, and Americans for Democratic Action and the American Civil Liberties Union, 
to sponsor revised legislation that would allow MCAD to apply for an injunction 
restraining the landlord or agent from action on the property in cases where a preliminary 
investigation showed probable cause of discrimination.74 The various suburban housing 
committees launched a letter-writing campaign and staged organized visits to the State 
House to pressure representatives.75 Additionally, twenty-two members of the local fair 
housing committees testified at the Judiciary Committee hearings, using personal 
anecdotes to demand the broadening of MCAD’s jurisdiction.76 These contributions 
exposed specific ways that suburban residents could help influence legal and change and 
the Federation would increasingly rely on and refine these strategies in the following 
years. When the law had passed in the spring of 1961, State Representative Sumner 
Kaplan of Brookline publicly credited the fair housing committees “for educating our 
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otherwise indifferent legislators to the importance of this vital piece of legislation.”77 
William Ryan observed the committees had contributed to the “climate of opinion” 
among Massachusetts politicians in which they were “required to damn discrimination 
with as much fervor as a Minnesota politician is required to damn margarine.”78 The 
lobbying activities also brought the Federation into closer physical and ideological 
collaboration and conflict with other civil rights organizations like CORE trying to 
eliminate residential discrimination in metropolitan Boston.  
 
CORE 
In the fall of 1958, at the same moment that the fair housing committees in Boston 
held their first coffee klatches, quintessential postwar liberal Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. 
responded to an inquiry from James Robinson of the national chapter of CORE about the 
possibility of opening a chapter of the organization in the Bay State. The Harvard 
historian and future Kennedy staffer, citing the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination and the suburban housing committees, answered, “While conditions are 
far from perfect here, I would suppose that CORE activities might be more urgently 
needed in other parts of the country.”79  While Schlesinger’s reply represents one strand 
of postwar Northern white liberal thinking about race, the individuals who opted to 
ignore his counsel represent another. The group’s mission to draw attention to issues of 
spatial inequality and enforce the implementation of fair housing laws put it at the center 
of most cases of residential discrimination in the Boston area. The experiences and 
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activities of CORE’s Boston chapter, therefore, provide an important piece of the 
narrative of the civil rights struggle around housing as well as the development of 
grassroots liberal activism in Massachusetts in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  
A group of Cambridge residents had initially contacted the national office of 
CORE in the spring of 1958 about the possibility of reviving the area’s long dormant 
chapter. Perplexed by reports of discrimination against blacks home seekers in their 
community, these residents believed that CORE’s biracial and nonviolent philosophy 
would provide the best means to confront these problems. CORE Field Secretary Gordon 
Carey shared their view that the housing problem in Boston appeared “ particularly 
suitable to the member-participation, direct-action approach of CORE” and tried to assist 
with the formation of the chapter.80 The first meeting, held in December 1958, attracted 
17 participants, who largely mirrored racial, class and political affiliations of the 
members of the suburban fair housing committees. The founding members of Boston 
CORE also shared with their suburban counterparts both a commitment to the broad 
ideals of equality and the vision of an integrated society. The group had hoped achieve 
these expansive goals by focusing their energy on housing discrimination within 
Cambridge, particularly in the area encircling the Harvard campus by running tests with 
“bona fide” tenants.81 They had difficulty, however, finding people who sought their 
services and began to look for alternative arenas to apply their energy and activism.  
During their early planning, the founding members considered that Boston CORE 
might be effective “assisting suburban committees which are working against 
discrimination in housing” and sought to create contact with the grassroots fair housing 
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committees.82 Yet CORE found these relationships difficult to forge. Reporting to the 
national office in June of 1959, the local leadership of CORE acknowledged that 
“avoiding misunderstood duplication of effort with some of the mushrooming 
community-wide fair housing committees in the Boston suburbs” had created an area of 
“major concern” for the local chapter.83 Boston CORE reported that the groups seemed 
“somewhat distrustful of them” and sought advice from the national office on how to 
navigate “successful relationships.” Even though the fair housing committees might have 
felt a sense of encroachment on their turf, CORE recognized key differences in their 
viewpoint and philosophy. Most of the suburban groups understood the issue of housing 
as the movement’s first and foremost function, even if they had different opinions about 
exactly what it meant. CORE on the other hand nevertheless self-consciously avoided 
“think[ing] of itself as a ‘housing committee” and inverted the fair housing group’s 
model to see itself as committed to the civil rights-inflected goal of racial equality which 
they sought to achieve through means of challenging residential segregation. 84 CORE 
also rarely invoked the concept of “fair housing” and instead committed to the slightly 
more specified issue of “housing discrimination.” While these differences initially 
appeared slight, as the effort to combat residential discrimination intensified they took on 
increasing significance. Despite these ideological divergences, CORE’s early activities 
did closely correspond and overlap with those of the suburban movement. In 1959, 
CORE joined the local committees in the fight for the passage of the Fair Housing Law.85 
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After the law’s enactment, CORE joined the fair housing committees in the task of 
disseminating information about the under-publicized act. While fair housing committees 
performed this service throughout the suburbs, CORE focused on the urban areas, 
distributing 5,000 leaflets in predominately black neighborhoods. The pamphlet outlined 
both the meaning of the law against discrimination as well as the free services that CORE 
offered to apartment and house hunters.  
Supplementing its effort to influence legal change, CORE also began to develop 
strategies that would challenge individual discriminatory practices while at same time 
drawing attention to the larger cause. These activities resembled some of the work of the 
suburban housing committees, but assumed more of a direct-action approach and style. 
Boston’s chapter pioneered a formula of testing realtors by sending in white teams to 
apply for the same unit denied to an African-American family. Once they established the 
existence of clear discriminatory practices, members sought to negotiate with the 
developer or owner to seek fair treatment, and if these efforts failed, they then filed 
formal charges with MCAD.86 This technique provided a relatively simple way of 
determining whether black and white families received equal treatment. It also proved a 
form of activism where white middle-class volunteers could be particularly effective. In 
the summer of 1959, CORE launched its inaugural test on the VA after the federal 
organization’s local housing office turned down the request of an African-American had 
tried to buy one of its ranch houses for his family.  Boston’s CORE sent one black and 
one white family to inquire separately about single-family houses in the VA’s suburban 
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developments. The VA staff told of the many option available to the white family while 
offered none to the black family, which, helped CORE establish a “clear pattern of 
discrimination.”87 
 During the next year CORE continued to develop these tactics, coordinating 
more than 50 cases of racial testing in apartment buildings and new housing 
developments throughout the metropolitan area. In the summer of 1960, the organization 
staged its boldest project. Ulysses Marshall, a black electrical contractor, asserted the 
Woodvale development in Danvers repeatedly discriminated against him over a two-year 
period and eventually decided to file a complaint with MCAD.  Marshall’s lawyer 
Edward Barshak contacted the Greater Boston CORE to provide further evidence for the 
case using its testing and direct action techniques. During two tests real estate agents at 
the large suburban housing development literally ran away from the black testers trying 
to obtain applications. In response, CORE members staged a series of sit-ins in one of the 
model homes, which successfully shut down the developer’s business activities for 
multiple days.88 Returning to the site, ten CORE members picketed the Woodvale office 
with provocative messages like “Democracy Begins at Home” and slyly inverting the 
development’s sylvan name: “Woodvale Tries to be Whitevale.”89 These theatrical tactics 
gained national press attention, which along with evidence from the tests, motivated 
MCAD to take action. The Commission issued a cease-and-desist order in which it found 
Woodvale’s builders and owners guilty of discrimination.90 The activities, therefore, 
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proved the effectiveness of direct-action not only to shape public opinion, but also to 
ensure compliance with the legal process.  
The successful strategies of testing and pickets further distinguished CORE from 
other local civil rights organizations, especially the suburban fair housing activists. While 
both groups sought to challenge discriminatory practices and create integrated housing in 
the suburbs, they did not just develop diverging tactics, but also covered different 
geographies. Many of CORE’s projects occurred in middle-class communities like 
Danvers and Waltham that lacked active fair housing communities. The reason that 
CORE’s activity centered around these particular places was less to fill in the gaps in 
FHPC’s activities, but, rather, because these communities contained the type of housing 
that fell under the jurisdiction of the 1959 law. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
more affluent communities like Lexington and Newton by contrast had used zoning 
ordinance to construct the kind of multi-family and mass-produced housing covered by 
the law.  
The chapter not only became a leader in combating housing discrimination in the 
Boston area, but also among other CORE affiliates. By 1961, Boston surpassed New 
York as the most active and effective chapter in the arena of housing and earned the 
notice and praise of the parent office. Executive Secretary James Robinson lauded the 
Woodvale situation as the “first really different thing which CORE has done in the field 
of housing.”91 And James Farmer, the eminent national chairman,  suggested the housing 
tactics of the Boston chapter provided a valuable blueprint for how to get roots in local 
communities and establish “viable” groups in the North.92 The chapter’s strategies for 
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combating discrimination became a model for other affiliates to emulate and the national 
leadership sponsored a week-long Summer Institute in Boston 1961 which attracted 19 
participants from 12 groups across the country to learn techniques for challenging racial 
discrimination in the North based on the twin ideals of open access and direct action. 
Despite this attention, the Boston CORE chapter suffered from what Anne 
Harkless diagnosed as “the great handicap of isolation,” especially from the city’s black 
community. 93 The leaders of the primarily white group complained about “not being well 
rooted in our own Boston area.”94  Many of the African-Americans whom CORE had 
helped combat individual housing discrimination had joined the organization, just as 
many of the individuals whom the FHPCs assisted had become members of those 
committees. Yet these additions amounted to “token integration, ” and the CORE chapter 
searched for ways to cultivate connections across racial, class, and spatial divides.95  
Capturing the sentiment of much of the membership, Anne Harkless asserted that CORE 
should be a “living example of racial equality, and this means being thoroughly 
integrated.”96 The group, therefore, decided in 1961 to shift the location of its weekly 
meetings from the American Friends Meeting House on historic Brattle Street in 
Cambridge to Freedom House, a social service agency in Roxbury. The change of 
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In its effort to further alleviate its sense of isolation, CORE also began to work 
more closely with other organizations in the Boston area concerned about the problems of 
residential discrimination. CORE members joined with representatives from a wide 
spectrum of social justice groups, such as Americans for Democratic Action, the Jewish 
Labor Committee and the Fair Housing Federation, to create in 1962 the Massachusetts 
Committee Against Discrimination in Housing. 97 Adopting a broad definition of “fair 
housing” and “housing discrimination,” the group promoted the two-fold goal of open 
non-segregated communities and increasing the supply of low and middle-income 
housing throughout the state. 98  They used the New York Committee on Discrimination 
in Housing and the National Committee on Discrimination as models and sought not to 
usurp the authority or autonomy of any of 14 organizations involved. Rather, by  
“coordinating, and supplementing, the legislative, research and educational activities of 
affiliated groups,” it provided them with a means to share information and to take 
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cooperative and collective action. 99 The Housing Advisory Research Committee 
represented the most concrete and effective way that the MCDH achieved these goals.  
Helen Kistin, a member of the Newton Fair Housing Practices Committee and the Fair 
Housing Federation, chaired the subcommittee that consisted of local university faculty 
and professionals in urban planning. These academics and professionals generated to 
research, data, and reports the problems of housing for the affiliated groups. The 
establishment of the MCDH and its broad-based membership reveals not only the ways in 
which housing discrimination operated at the forefront of the local civil rights struggle in 
the 1960s but also the collectivity and reach of the movement around it.  
The 1962 legal case Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination v. 
Colangelo, which successfully upheld the constitutionality of the Massachusetts fair 
housing statutes, clearly demonstrates the unity of this coalition, its effectiveness at 
creating change through legal means, and its commitment to adopting individualist 
solutions to structural problems.100 In 1960, a Maurice Fowler, a single African-American 
member of the Air Force, sought a “garden-type” apartment at the Glenmeadow 
development in Waltham, but real estate developer A.J. Colangelo turned him down on 
the basis of his “bachelor status.”101 Fowler’s lawyer Edward Barshak, a member of the 
Brookline Fair Housing Practices Committee, contacted CORE, which discovered that 
many white “bachelors” lived at Glenmeadow and the owner also offered apartments to 
two white CORE testers. This fact pattern almost duplicated that of the Woodvale case 
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demonstrating the similarities, in the types of residential discrimination that occurred in 
Greater Boston and the cases that CORE pursued. As with Ulysses Marshall, Barshak on 
behalf of Fowler filed a complaint with MCAD and at the final hearing CORE presented 
overwhelming testimony and evidence which convinced the Commission not just to rule 
in Fowler’s favor, but to require that the real estate developer pay damages. After a series 
of appeals, Colangelo and the rental agent appealed the state Supreme Judicial Court to 
challenge MCAD’s order and the constitutionality of the 1959 law on the grounds that 
they had been denied due process, protection of private property, and the freedom of 
association.  
The case attracted the attention and participation of many members of the fair 
housing movement who saw it as the ideal opportunity both to apply their professional 
knowledge to their social activism and to test the constitutionality of the state’s housing. 
Harvard Law School professor Albert Sacks, whose wife Sadelle Sacks was a leader in 
the Federation and the Belmont FHPC, along with assistant Attorney General Gerald 
Berlin, represented MCAD and together wrote the Brief for the Petitioner. 102 The Fair 
Housing Federation also officially joined with the American Jewish Congress, the 
NAACP and four other civil liberties and religious group to submit a joint Amici Curae 
brief written chiefly by Laurence S. Locke and Norman Landstrom, two of the central 
figures in the Federation. Covering a wide range of issues, the petitioners and amici briefs 
combined structural evidence and broad appeals into a convincing and nuanced argument 
about the need for legal action in the area of housing.103   
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The briefs transcended arcane legal technicalities and case law and instead offered 
a sweeping argument that drew on a wide range historical, political, foreign policy and 
social science research to prove that housing served as the basis for all other forms of 
institutionalized racism.  The petitioners and amici relied most heavily upon a report 
officially entitled “Statistical Study of Housing Discrimination Against Negroes in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts” by Helen Kistin presented in the appendix to the 
state’s brief. The addition of the study to the brief illustrates the ways in which the 
housing movement both produced and depended upon expert interpretation of data. In 
this remarkable study that included 34 pages of text and 19 tables, Helen Kistin of the 
MCDH drew upon twenty years of census data to illustrate the problem of residential 
segregation in stark statistical terms. Her report showed that spatial segregation had 
increased between 1950 and 1960 and that the majority of black families in Boston lived 
in substandard housing for which they paid disproportionately high rents. The study and 
briefs together create a stark portrait of economic, spatial, demographic upheaval of the 
1950s, which, as Landstrom and Locke stressed had made the Boston area a “dramatic” 
example of “the national trend towards development of a central city with its ‘black core’ 
in a ring of ‘lily-white suburbs.’”104  
Despite this careful attention to the dynamics of structural racism, these lawyers 
still couched their respective and collective arguments in the racially liberal language of 
individual rights and moral wrongs. Reflecting their commitment to the basic tenets of 
racial liberal ideology, the petitioners emphasized the psychological damage of racial 
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discrimination on its victims. In an emotional appeal that borrowed directly from both 
Gunnar Myrdal and the Brown decision, Sacks and Berlin contended that housing 
discrimination had “ramifications beyond bricks and mortar and beyond not just the 
hearts and minds of men of all races and nationalities, and to their modes of living 
together in one society.”105 Moving from the most inward effects to the most outward, 
both briefs fused a language of Massachusetts distinctiveness with that of Cold War 
anxieties. They noted that Boston served as the “the seat of world-renowned universities 
and hospitals” attracting “visitors from all over the world” many of whom “were 
colored.”  They warned that failing to “protect the dignity of our foreign guests” when 
they sought housing would not only tarnish the state’s reputation as the cradle of liberty, 
but also impede “our country’s position in the global struggle for men’s minds” 
especially within the newly formed Asian and African countries “whose friendship and 
support we need.”106  
On May 16, 1962, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in a 6-1 decision 
upheld both the Commission Against Discrimination’s initial decision and the 1959 Fair 
Housing Law.107 For the activists committed to the cause of fair housing the successful 
outcome of the case validated their efforts and reinforced the ways in which grassroots 
actors and activity could use the law to create meaningful change.108 The Colangelo 
decision made Massachusetts the only state with a constitutionally upheld statute 
prohibiting discrimination in private housing and provided an important local and 
national precedent. Colangelo also created the legal basis and political climate for 
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MCAD to propose a bill to expand the parameters of the existing Fair Housing Law to 
cover all private property. In the spring of 1963, with little opposition the Massachusetts 
legislature passed a new act that outlawed discrimination in the sale or rental of all 
private housing, with the sole-exception of a two-apartment house if the owner occupies 
one of the apartments as his or her home. The new statute corrected the major weakness 
of the earlier laws increasing the amount of coverage from 15 to over 90 percent of all 
housing in Massachusetts. The revised law restored the state’s claim to have the strongest 
anti-discrimination laws in the nation. Many observers quickly inserted the new statute 
into the narrative of Massachusetts exceptionalism. Governor Endicott Peabody 
appropriated the legislation into a progressive image of his own administration and the 
state as whole.109 Using a language of degree which constituted a central element of this 
discourse, the governor stated, “We realize full well that every indignity practiced openly 
in the South is practiced to a lesser degree here in Massachusetts,” but he urged Bay State 
residents to continue to serve as a model and beacon for “our brothers of both colors in 
the South.”110  
 
“Lexington Live Up to Your Name”   
With a new law and coalition to match, the fair housing cause appeared by all 
accounts to be at a high point in the summer of 1963. However, James Parker’s case 
against the Lexington real estate agent was one of the first cases filed with MCAD under 
the new law and revealed the limitations of this seemingly new strength and exposed the 
deep-rooted fissures within the individual groups and the movement as whole. On August 
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27 1963, Parker and his wife Odessa had gone to Lexington in response to an 
advertisement for a cottage for rent.111 When they arrived for the showing, the owner 
Mark Moore, Jr., a prominent local real estate developer, whose advertisements in the 
local newspaper promised homes “for the discriminating buyer” without a hint of irony, 
expressed visible surprise. Using the excuse that another couple had already put an offer 
on the cottage, Moore told Parkers that the house was not available. Frustrated, the 
Parkers boarded a plane back to Washington. 
The previous spring members of the LCRC had learned the strategies of racial 
testing pioneered by CORE and when Barbara Petschek, who along with her astronomer 
husband was very active in the suburban civil rights group, learned of the Moore and 
Parker interaction, she recognized that it offered an ideal chance to experiment with these 
new skills.112 Along with fellow member Julian Soshnick, a state assistant attorney 
general, she contacted the developer posing as interested buyers. After Moore informed 
them that they could move in on September first, Soshnick revealed his true identity and 
interrogated Moore on his discriminatory rejection of the Parkers.113 The next day 
Soshnick filed an official complaint on behalf of Parker with the MCAD and 
simultaneously the Foreign Service officer contacted the Boston Chapter of CORE and 
alerted it of his case. CORE immediately announced that it would stage a demonstration 
on the Lexington Battle Green that Saturday morning as means to draw attention to 
Parker’s case and promote compliance with the Fair Housing Law.  
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CORE’s picketing in Lexington duplicated the strategies of non-violent direct 
action that the group had skillfully deployed in its previous housing protests around 
Boston’s metropolitan region. Since the older anti-discrimination statutes had not covered 
the majority of housing in these towns, the Lexington situation, nevertheless, signified 
the first time the group had brought its tactics into one of Boston’s more affluent suburbs. 
In another key departure, instead of staging the rally outside the offending developer’s 
office as they had done in other instances, they chose the location of the Battle Green, 
appropriating the site’s symbolic and historic associations with freedom, equality and 
democracy. The placards that CORE members carried made explicit references to the 
town’s revolutionary tradition with such as read “Birthplace of American Liberty??” And 
“Lexington Live up to your Name,” thereby simultaneously invoking and questioning the 
community’s reputation. Recognizing that the victim coincidentally shared his last name 
with the Minuteman cast in iron under which they marched, one sign asked: “If John 
Parker could live here, why can’t Jim Parker?”114 This question brought into clear focus 
the convergence of traditions that the protest appropriated and contested.   
The widespread media attention that the demonstration received captured some of 
the multifaceted meanings of the protest. The Boston Globe made the picketing front 
page news and a picture of the in the prominent above-the-fold location. Above the 
caption  “Peaceful Protest Beside Minuteman Statue” the photograph depicted two white 
women in the foreground walking side by side holding a sign that read “Jim Crow Must 
Go” with the Minuteman statute hovering in the immediate background. 115 The image 
brought both the spatial and gendered meanings of the protest into sharp focus. As with 
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most of CORE’s activities, white middle-class women comprised the majority of the 
protestors on the Green. As they marched along the Lexington Green’s edge on that late 
summer morning, most of the women wore modest dresses or skirts, dress shoes and 
coiffed hair. This projection of middle-class respectability and femininity did not occur 
accidentally, but rather, served as part of a purposely-coded presentation that assured 
onlookers that these white middle class women were non-threatening and innocent.  
CORE had crafted a detailed list of picketing rules that required “neat dress” preventing 
women from wearing “slacks or shorts” and outlawed disrespectful activities like 
smoking as means to assure the “effectiveness of the project.”116 Some of the female 
protestors pushed baby carriages and others had small children in tow, which marked 
their roles and responsibilities as mothers and drew on the strong political and social 
associations of motherhood.117 This careful performance illuminates the ways in which 
many of the female picketers did not seek to transgress but rather refashion and 
strategically deploy their traditional gender roles and racial and class standing in order to 
gain sympathy and support for their cause.118  
The press couched coverage of the Parker family in the discourses of middle-class 
respectability and domestic ideals as well.  The Globe depicted James Parker as a World 
War II veteran, civil servant and devoted father. By noting that his wife had served as 
president of the American Women’s Club in Barcelona and the stellar academic record of 
their children, the paper emphasized the ways in which the Parker family upheld the 
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normative ideals of the postwar nuclear family.119 Through this portrait, the Parker family 
served as the ideal poster children for the fair housing movement’s colorblind and class-
specific appeals.120  In newspaper interviews, James Parker’s comments upheld and even 
reified the fair housing movement’s implicit image of what a “good neighbor” looked 
like. Parker presented himself as an apolitical concerned parent who desired to move into 
because of the  “town’s reputation for having an outstanding school system.”121  
Revealing his own class biases, he stated that he would not move to Massachusetts at all 
if he had to live in Roxbury and send his children to the Boston Public Schools. Parker 
also relied on his out-of-state, expatriate status as a means to profess innocence to the 
realities of American racial and class structures. He explained, “We’ve been away for so 
long that I was not psychologically prepared for it.  If I had been assigned to the Deep 
South and this had happened, it wouldn’t have been such a shock.”122 Parker’s statements 
both challenged the sense that the racial discrimination and segregation merely 
constituted Southern problems and complicated the racial and moral geography of the 
Northern middle-class imaginary. Like the CORE protester’s use of the Jim Crow 
analogy, these comments reflected both a critique and invocation of Massachusetts 
exceptionalism. Noting that he was “surprised that the incident had happened in New 
England,” Parker amplified that regional difference by an appeal to a sense of Northern 
morality and social consciousness.123 His perspective both upheld and challenged the 
notions that the Bay State was more tolerant and enlightened than the Deep South.  
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The press and other observers also focused extensively on Parker’s Foreign 
Service career to amplify a sense of moral outrage. In the postwar period, the federal 
government had gone to great lengths to promote worldwide the U.S. reputation for racial 
progress and the case was a potential embarrassment to this agenda. Like the briefs in the 
Colangelo case, the repeated allusions to Parker’s career suggested that Lexington had 
not just tarnished its own reputation, but had hindered the larger global war against 
Communism. CORE also did not fail to recognize the importance of Parker’s military and 
foreign service experience. In a follow-up protest at the Battle Green a few days later, a 
picketer carried the provocative sign that read, “Mr. Parker as a Negro has defended us 
but he can’t live here.”124  
The very public nature of the Parker controversy, coupled with political pressure 
at both the state and local level, led MCAD to schedule an expedited conciliation 
session.125 The Commission found “probable cause of discrimination” by Moore and the 
Parkers quickly settled into their new home. 126  Despite this unusually rapid resolution, 
the Parker case had wide- reaching repercussions within the Boston fair housing 
community, calling into question the very meanings and functions of the cause. The first 
round of tensions emerged when a delegation of LCRC members returned from a trip to 
the March on Washington and urged CORE not to protest.  When the civil rights activists 
ignored these pleas, some members of the LCRC issued sharp barbs in town and Boston 
area newspapers. Father Thomas MacLeod, serving as the organization’s official 
spokesman, provided the most biting critique of CORE’s actions. MacLeod’s statement 
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sought to dismiss the demonstration by charging that it violated the principles of non-
violent direct action. “I am in complete sympathy with the sit-ins in the South where they 
demonstrate against laws which are both immoral and unconstitutional,” he explained, 
“but I deplore the actions of CORE...in this instance and disassociate myself with their 
methodology.”127 By offering his support for the sit-ins while critiquing CORE, the priest 
upheld a spatial and racial geography and logic that privileged racism and protest in the 
Deep South and marginalized and negated instances of discrimination and activism in the 
suburban North. The LCRC board eventually released a public statement declaring that it 
was “in agreement with the objectives of CORE…and recognizes that a variety of 
approaches should work in harmony toward a common goal” and later expressed  “the 
desirability of close and friendly communication with civil rights organizations in this 
region.” 128 Yet the initial responses heightened longstanding tensions between CORE 
and the suburban committees. 
CORE intentionally avoided making any public statements against the LCRC. In 
two confidential memos to the Lexington group written a few months after the situation’s 
resolution, however, CORE chairman Alan Gartner dubbed the behavior of these 
members “objectionable and irresponsible.”129 He contended that the public’s lasting 
impression of the incident would focus not on Mark Moore’s discriminatory actions, but 
on the conflict between the groups, which he called “ a loss for us all.”130 In an effort to 
move beyond the schism, Gartner “unequivocally” declared that CORE and the LCRC 
should take away from the incident the lesson that “internicene (sic) warfare among the 
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civil rights groups leads to no gains for civil rights and indeed only to satisfaction to it’s 
opponents. ” He voiced a desire to continue to cooperate with the LCRC, but bitingly 
declared, “We cannot accept a “’States rights’” concept of local sovereignty.”131 In spite 
of its obligatory homage to conciliation, Gartner’s memo further reflected the conflicting 
definitions of the causes of fair housing and civil rights, which would come to take the 
activists of CORE and the leadership of the suburban group in increasingly divergent 
directions.    
 
Divergent Directions  
The Parker protest had occurred at a moment of organizational and ideological 
transition for Boston CORE. Soon after the Parker incident the chapter moved its office 
permanently to Roxbury. The new location in a storefront on Blue Hill Avenue 
significantly expanded its black membership base and lent it more legitimacy as a civil 
rights organization.132 Simultaneously, CORE also widened its areas of concern into 
employment and education. 133 While housing discrimination remained the group’s 
central focus, the members began to revise their definition and activities in that arena, 
moving away from a commitment to the principles of open occupancy and compliance of 
fair housing legislation. CORE members gradually recognized that the organization’s 
efforts to alleviate residential discrimination by encouraging compliance with the law 
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mainly helped a small handful middle-class blacks, like James Parker, Maurice Fowler 
and Ulysses Marshall, to gain access to white suburban communities. The parameters of 
Massachusetts fair housing statutes had partially circumscribed the reach of CORE’s 
activism. Despite their expansive language of freedom of choice and equal opportunity, 
these laws themselves only really addressed the concerns of a small cohort and the vast 
majority of the state’s African-American population and their housing problems fell 
outside the laws’ jurisdiction. By late 1963, CORE, therefore, realized the patent 
limitations of the legal and ideological concept of fair housing to creating residential and 
racial equality. While the group did participate in a few more cases to promote 
compliance, most notably a nine-week picket of a Dorchester realtor’s office, these 
activities became a secondary piece of its housing strategy.  
Instead, CORE redirected its energy and activism towards actions to improve 
housing conditions within Boston. The move to Roxbury altered the group’s angle of 
vision and brought members in close contact with the severity of the city’s housing crisis. 
Almost immediately upon setting up its new office the group launched a campaign “to 
remedy housing blight.” 134 Between 1964 and 1965, CORE sent inspection teams into 
buildings to canvass for health and safety violations, staged a successful month-long rent 
strike to force landlords to make necessary repairs, organized pickets of tenants to protest 
the suburban homes of landlords, led the press and local and state politicians on walking 
tours of Roxbury’s housing stock and pressured city officials to intensify enforcement of 
building codes.135  Many of their tactics mirrored the group’s earlier suburban strategies 
applied to a new setting and issue. These activities reveal, nevertheless, how CORE had 
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transitioned away from a vision of fair housing and spatial equality that privileged racial 
integration and move towards an approach that emphasized community empowerment 
and control.  This shift in attention placed the group in closer concert with the needs of 
Boston’s black population, but it made the possibility of meaningful collaboration with 
the suburban fair housing groups increasingly remote.  
The controversy in Lexington also had important implications about the 
placement activities of the Federation and its individualist and middle-class approach to 
reducing racial and spatial segregation. In the first years of operation, the majority of the 
suburban groups received placement referrals from the regional office of the American 
Friends Service Committee. The Friends maintained a clearinghouse at their Cambridge 
office that contained the lists of available housing and contact information of the various 
FHPC’s for prospective minority buyers to peruse. In the spring of 1961, the AFSC 
decide to discontinue the service and officially transferred the program lists to the 
Federation. Upon assuming these new responsibilities, the suburban activists became 
shocked to learn that most of the urban black population of Boston had never heard of the 
fair housing committees and those who did know of their existence remained skeptical 
that these groups could actually help them. 136 As a means of creating a stronger overall 
presence within the black community, the Federation board decided to open a separate 
organization called Fair Housing, Inc. (FHI) in a 10-by-10 foot office in a corner of the 
lobby at Freedom House. 137  Sadelle Sacks of Belmont assumed the post of executive 
director and oversaw as group of largely female volunteers from the various local 
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committees who spoke with prospective families, putting them in contact with the various 
suburban committees with available housing listings.  
FHI focused primarily on working with the suburban committees to assist 
prospective nonwhite buyers and sellers. Like the committees who relied upon its 
services, FHI devoted a great deal of energy and resources to helping individual African-
American middle-class families. Between 1961 and 1963, the organization had only 
secured housing placements for slightly more than one hundred people spread out among 
various suburbs. A map of Boston in FHI’s annual report, which used little Monopoly-
style houses to mark locations where the organization had made successful placements, 
punctuates the breadth, but lack of depth of its efforts.138 In fact, its reports frequently 
cited Lexington as a success story because the very active committee there had boosted 
the number of nonwhite families in the town to just over 40.139 The FHI board and staff 
acknowledged the symbolic importance of its placements in reducing racial animosity 
within Boston’s white suburban ring, but they grew increasingly disillusioned and 
discouraged with the ability of these methods to reduce racial and residential inequality 
across metropolitan boundaries.  
FHI’s leaders, therefore, decided to expand the definition of “Fair Housing” in 
their name to mean more than simply equal rights in the suburbs. The organization’s 
mission, like the concept of “fair housing” more generally, rested upon the problematic 
assumption that all blacks wanted to live in the suburbs. The organization never 
succeeded in creating a massive exodus out of Boston because the number of African-
Americans, who wanted to move into suburban areas and could afford it actually 
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represented a very small minority of the city’s black population.  FHI, therefore, suffered 
from a spatial mismatch between its urban-based potential clients and its suburban-
centered services. The majority of people who sought out assistance from FHI fell into 
the low-income bracket and for these prospective clients not just suburban 
homeownership, but homeownership in generally, remained elusive. In an effort to 
convince African-Americans to move beyond Roxbury, the group touted the “success 
stories” of black families that had moved to the suburbs and staged meetings where they 
could describe their own experiences.140 Yet it had little effect. While FHI had long lists 
of single-family houses in the Boston area available to nonwhite buyers, these homes 
usually fell within the relatively unaffordable $18,000 to 20,000 price range. And, the 
areas like Lexington or Wellesley most “open” to residential integration also had rigid 
zoning ordinances, which meant that they had no apartments available for rent or lease. 
These communities also had a surplus of volunteers willing to help black buyers by 
accompanying them on home tours and serving as key negotiators with the owners and 
neighbors. The organization, nevertheless, encountered far more difficulty replicating 
these services in urban areas. As Sacks conceded “The grass roots movement has never 
secured a foothold in city.”141 Despite the Federation’s repeated acknowledgement of 
needing to create chapters within Boston’s city limits, only the affluent predominately 
white neighborhoods of Back-Bay and Beacon-Hill ever established committees. The 
inability of the Federation to set up a fair housing committee in Roxbury further confirms 
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the racialized and classed dimensions of the movement and its definition of fair 
housing.142  
Acknowledging this set of problems, Sacks announced in the fall of 1963 that 
“our major area of concentration must be in the low-income housing field.”143 Coinciding 
with the Lexington controversy, the staff of FHI began to try to replicate the services of 
the local committees for these potential clients within Boston and even used the same 
guide that they had developed for suburban housing aides. These efforts proved 
extremely difficult, in part because the largely white middle-class female volunteers 
lacked similar personal connections and contacts they had cultivated in the suburbs. More 
significantly, however, the organization shared CORE’s discovery of the extreme 
shortage of adequate low-cost rental housing within the city of Boston, particularly for 
families with more than 2 or 3 children, who represented the majority of the agency’s 
clientele. This search narrowed even further since, unlike CORE, FHI remained 
committed to the goal of integrated housing and thereby consciously avoided segregated 
or racially transitional neighborhoods. FHI had earlier fulfilled this commitment to 
“integration” by placing prospective occupants in predominantly white suburbs. But, this 
solution proved unworkable because most African-Americans refused to move to white 
neighborhoods such as South Boston or Charlestown that fell within their price range 
because of their reputations for racial hostility.144 
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Exacerbating the dilemma, the majority of families, who sought housing in the 
few units that fell within the parameters of FHI’s criteria, experienced overt 
discrimination from landlords. In keeping with the well-established practices of the 
suburban committees, FHI sought to counter these discriminatory practices by urging 
compliance with the law. Between September 1963 and August 1964, the staff assisted 
49 families draw up and file formal complaints with the MCAD. Yet few of these cases 
yielded positive outcomes and in many instances the complainants came to feel that 
“they, rather than the respondents, were being investigated for wrongful acts.”145 These 
experiences convinced the FHI staff of MCAD’s ineptitude and they decided that they 
could no longer rely solely on state law to ensure adequate and non-prejudiced housing 
options for their clients. 146  In the fall of 1963, the organization received a federal grant 
from the Housing and Home Finance Agency to help families who experienced “the 
effects of discrimination at its worst.” 147 The FHI determined that decent housing even in 
a segregated neighborhood constituted the first step in the overall campaign to end racial 
discrimination in housing. By 1966 FHI had organized a separate program for poverty-
level families with emergency needs. This new project exemplified the ways in which the 
FHI had come to interpret the meaning of “fair housing” and racial discrimination in 
economic rather than legal terms and in doing so further distanced and estranged its 
agenda from that of its suburban colleagues.  
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From Fair Housing to Civil Rights 
If the effects of the Parker incident created a symbolic turning point for CORE 
and FHI, it had a far more tangible impact on the LCRC. The organization, like many of 
its counterparts throughout the Boston suburbs, continued to grow rapidly. The Lexington 
group had nearly a thousand members by 196, and even included as one member 
facetiously noted “a liberal (pun intended) sprinkling of Negroes.”148 The committee’s 
effective membership recruitment strategies coupled with the increased national attention 
to the civil rights movement, fueled this steady expansion.  The majority of these 
members, nevertheless, maintained a nominal commitment limited to paying the $5 
annual dues and receiving a copy of the monthly newsletter.  
Within the group’s small active leadership, however,  “a series of internal 
squabbles” ensued. These tensions revealed that just as there existed a range of 
definitions of fair housing among the larger Boston social activist community, a spectrum 
of conflicting interpretations operated at even the most local level. LCRC member B.W. 
White summarized the viewpoints of the two main factions in an internally circulated 
paper. He dubbed the first group the  “lets increase the pressure” camp, consisting 
primarily of people like MIT physicist David Riener and Astrid Haussler, an activist in 
the Fair Housing Federation, who believed “the primary function of the Committee 
should be to identify with the Negro minority and give it every assistance and assurance 
in maintaining and increasing its pressure for equal status.” Their opponents, whom 
White called the “lets lower the resistance” group, interpreted the role of movement as 
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“reducing the resistance of the White community.”149 This camp included Frances and 
Charles Weiser and Father MacLoed, who had fiercely criticized CORE’s demonstration. 
These members favored non-threatening activities like sponsoring speeches, 
neighborhood coffees and good neighbor pledges. Yet instances such as the Parker-
Moore controversy had exposed the limits of this style of outreach in actually combating 
residential discrimination. Critics like Haussler believed that these benign strategies 
smacked of moderation and “go-slowism.”150 The “pressure reducers” also believed the 
LCRC should focus its energies exclusively on Lexington rather than extending its reach 
to include the metropolitan region as whole. White, himself, adhered to this line of 
thought and suggested that the LCRC’s physical and ideological position in the suburbs 
made it “uniquely qualified” to address the specific issue of white resistance to civil 
rights than more urban-centered organizations like CORE and the NAACP. Advocating a 
division of labor across spatial and racial lines, White and others made a case that the 
LCRC’s “suburban middle class” position could “be much more effective in the “role of 
resistance relaxer than of pressure increaser.”151 In his “thought piece” White suggested 
that Lexington residents whose outlook and aims aligned with CORE or the NAACP 
should definitely go help them, but discouraged the entire suburban committee from 
doing so. A few of the more active members of the Lexington group took up White’s 
counsel. In the subsequent months, some either completely renounced their membership 
in the LCRC, or instead increasingly focused organizational attention on CORE and the 
Fair Housing Federation rather than on the suburban committee.  
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While these tensions magnified the clear divisions in their outlooks, both sides 
still operated under the political and social rubric of postwar liberalism. The participants 
on both sides of the debate defined themselves as “white liberals” and even Astrid 
Haussler conceded that her adversaries were not “arch-conservatives,” telling a fellow 
member that she “didn’t think they were political conservatives—just moral ones.”152 The 
debate reveals that fundamental differences underpinned the liberal coalition even at the 
most seemingly homogenous and localized level.  The discord, moreover, reached 
beyond different understandings of civil rights activism to the realm of power struggles 
and personality conflicts between the LCRC’s leadership. In a particularly colorful and 
candid 1964 letter to Dave Reiner, Haussler described one member as a “petulant 
Pekinese,” another as not “the smartest person in the world” and compared Charles 
Weiser to the punchline of a joke involving the immobility and idiocracy of the 
leadership of the Republican party.153 Calling a recent meeting “a travesty of common 
sense,” Haussler complained, “It’s hard on the nerves and the digestion to be eternally 
embroiled in quarreling with such grim and humorless people. It takes all the fun and 
challenge out of working for civil rights.”154 It seemed that the personal had come to 
impede the effectiveness of the political.  
The tensions set off by the controversy became most pronounced in Lexington but 
represented “the growing pains” of many of the other local committees between 1963 and 
1965.155 Indeed, the Federation experienced a similar set of tensions as its local chapters. 
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In October 1963, just after the CORE-LCRC controversy, the group hosted a conference 
to discuss its future. The dialogue centered around whether the group should continue its 
focus exclusively on the issues of serving the housing needs of minorities in the suburbs, 
or given the “era of terrifically increased civil rights agitation by Negroes,” should it take 
a much more expansive interpretation of its mission. 156 The  “polarized” viewpoints of 
the participants represented a macrocosm of the ongoing debate in Lexington. At the 
conference, Father MacLeod recapitulated his comments from the LCRC executive 
meetings and called for a continued division of labor within metropolitan Boston’s civil 
rights community. He stated that just as “Negro leadership” sought to represent its base, 
so too did the Federation have a “similar obligation” to serve “according to the 
conscience and desire of its own membership” and to keep open occupancy as it primary 
focus. 157 Members like Franklin Jackson of Burlington, however, suggested that the 
movement not only expand its purview beyond the suburbs into the entire metropolitan 
region, but also that it acknowledge that housing operated as but one node in a matrix of 
inextricably intertwined issues including those of employment and education. The 
African-American engineer warned that if the Federation did not accept responsibility for 
all these inter-connected areas it would “fall behind the movement for rights.”158  
Although Jackson and MacLeod shared the ultimate goal of racial integration, their 
comments reveal patently different interpretations of what they envisioned as means to 
that end. The conference participants, ultimately, decided to strike a happy medium 
between these two viewpoints and resolved that housing should remain the foremost 
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concern of the Federation, but elected to increase both its attention to other forms 
discrimination and its collaboration with other rights groups in the metropolitan region. 
In order to reflect this revised agenda and strategy, the delegates also voted to officially 
the name of the organization to the Massachusetts Federation for Fair Housing and Equal 
Rights. The decision to add the “Equal Rights” marked an effort to keep with “the trend 
among fair housing groups to bring their committee names into line with their growing 
recognition of the inseparability of housing problems from those of education and 
employment.”159  
Between 1963 and 1965, most of the local chapters also widened their interests 
and activities to other civil rights issues and many of them became actively involved in 
the growing controversy over integrating the Boston Public Schools. The majority of 
committees took on new names to reflect this expanded range of interest: with the 
Brookline Fair Housing Practices committee now the Brookline Civil Rights Committee, 
the Newton group the Newton Committee for Fair Housing and Equal Rights.160 These 
name changes, although a seemingly minor variation, symbolized the ways which the 
members of the local committees and Federation shifted from seeing themselves as part 
of a specific fair housing movement to participant in the broader local and national fight 
for civil rights. Despite their new names, however, the Federation and the local 
committees still struggled to define their suburban-centered purpose. In the spring of 
1964, incoming Federation president Roy Brown delivered a speech entitled “What We 
Are and Where We Are” which encouraged the group to embrace not shun its unique 
geographic and ideological position. He insisted that, “the Federation’s strength lies in 
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the unique grass roots character of its constituent committees” and made a convincing 
case, stating “No other civil rights group is so favorably situated to speak for and to the 
essentially white suburban white areas of greater Boston.”161  
Recognizing one area where this grassroots structure and suburban base could be 
particularly beneficial, the Federation began to broaden its legislative agenda and 
lobbying role. At the 1963 conference the participants had finally decided to address the 
organizational tensions between the Federation and the suburban chapters.  The delegates 
voted to change both the direction of authority and decision-making away from a 
consensus among the local committees in favor of the Federation’s executive board, 
bestowing it with broader mandate to pursue more substantive issues of public policy. 
After this restructuring, the Federation’s board began to focus much more of its attention 
on working within political channels. Its legislative subcommittee, chaired by Ellen 
Feingold, emerged as the most active wing of the organization. She was also an active 
member of the Americans for Democratic Action and brought the committee into 
frequent contact and collaboration with the ADA and other lobbying groups like the 
League of Women Voters. Even as the Federation came to assume similar form and 
function to these other statewide liberal organizations, its focus on issues of civil rights 
especially housing provided an important source of differentiation.  
The grassroots and suburban infrastructure of the Federation, moreover, provided 
a unique advantage in its legislative pursuits. Most of the 3500 largely white middle-class 
suburban members spread throughout about 37 communities maintained only a nominal 
affiliation to the organizations. However, invoking the numerical strength of this 
powerful constituency provided the legislative committee a powerful lobbying device and 
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gave them leverage particularly in building coalitions of suburban politicians to pass 
certain pieces of legislation. The leaders also marshaled the organizational structures of 
the local chapters frequently to pressure their state and national representatives through 
letter-writing campaigns and visits to the State House. By the middle of the 1960s, 
therefore, the Federation had become one of the states most powerful and effective 
advocates for laws related to housing and other civil rights issues.  
 
Conclusion  
By the time Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968 outlawing 
discrimination in housing, the fair housing movement in Massachusetts had largely 
dissipated, yet its imprint on the legislation is clear. The story of the grassroots fair 
housing movement demonstrates the potential of suburban activists to work within the 
law to create political and policy change. The activists helped transform the notion that 
African-Americans should have the right and opportunity to live anywhere from a fringe 
into a mainstream belief over the course of the 1960s. Yet, suburban liberals’ faith in 
meritocratic individualism also enshrined class segregation as an accepted and guiding 
principle of both state and federal housing policy. The movement, as Thomas Sugrue 
suggests, led to a shift in “attitudes” that “was not accompanied by a shift in behavior.”162  
That metropolitan Boston remained roughly as racially and economically 
segregated in 1970 as had been in 1955 also reveals how the ideology of suburban 
liberalism and its individualist solutions to structural problems constricted efforts to 
create racial and spatial equality. Likewise, the middle-class black professionals and their 
families sprinkled throughout the Boston suburbs reinforced the sense that individualized 
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and morally-based actions had helped to break down the barriers of segregation.163 This 
movement provided suburban whites with a new language of colorblindness that 
provided them with a way to articulate their liberalism and innocence from producing or 
solving the root causes of racial inequality. In addition, the movement did not just fail to 
challenge notions of the market-based privileges and entitlements of suburban residency; 
it unintentionally reified and emboldened this ideology. Looking at the issues of 
educational integration and affordable housing construction discussed in subsequent 
chapters provides a means to further explore the progressive and problematic 
implications of suburban liberal notions of racial and spatial equality and the ways it both 
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Chapter 3:  
Suburban Civil Rights 
 
Introduction 
 Just after dawn on the snowy morning of February 26, 1964, 100 white teenagers 
from Newton gathered in the back of the suburb’s stately brick city hall to board eight 
yellow school buses headed for Boston. As the excited and talkative adolescents carried 
permission slips in one hand and their lunches in the other, the scene resembled the 
typical school-sponsored excursion.1 Yet, this was no ordinary field trip. The Newton 
students joined a group of 1,000 white middle-class youth from over 20 suburbs that 
came into the city to participate in Stayout for Freedom, a one-day boycott of over 20,000 
pupils that protested discrimination and segregation in the Boston Public Schools. Instead 
of attending formal classes, these white and African-American children spent the day in 
Freedom Schools in church basements and community centers around Roxbury and the 
city’s other predominately black neighborhoods learning the music, history and strategies 
of the Civil Rights Movement.  The day of interracial education and conversation had a 
dramatic impact on the attitudes of the students involved. Boarding the bus home, one 
suburban ninth grader, she observed, “I wish more adults had been there to share this 
with us.”2  The events did not just transform the outlooks of the individual participants 
but also directly shaped the future of civil rights activity in Massachusetts.  A day after 
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the protest, Governor Malcolm Peabody established a blue-ribbon commission whose 
findings eventually led to the passage of the Racial Imbalance Act, the landmark and 
controversial legislation that made the Commonwealth the first state to outlaw school 
segregation. The day’s activities inspired a group of suburban activists to establish the 
Metropolitan Council of Educational Opportunity (METCO) a program that transported 
black students from Boston into predominately white suburban school systems and would 
become one of the first and largest voluntary integration programs in the nation.  
The image of throngs of white suburban students boarding buses to join in a civil 
rights protest directly defies the conventional associations of busing in Boston in the 
postwar period. Most accounts of the conflict over school segregation barely mention the 
1964 Stayout and focus instead on the violent white working-class opposition to court-
ordered busing that erupted ten years later.  Yet by dismissing this event and the 
movement that spawned it, these standard narratives not only obscure a much richer story 
of civil rights activism in postwar Boston, but also the role of white suburban liberals in 
that struggle.3 An inquiry into the Stayout, the passage of the Racial Imbalance Act, the 
development of METCO and the crucial contributions of white middle-class activists to 
those events upsets conventional depictions of civil rights and suburban political culture.  
In doing so, it shows how the ideology of suburban liberalism that favored individualist 
solutions to structural problems came to shape the policies of racial integration and 
diversity in education both locally and nationally.  
The web of suburban fair housing groups and their umbrella organization, the 
Massachusetts Federation for Fair Housing and Equal Rights played a distinct and 
                                                
3 See Lukas, Common Ground. Ronald Formisano mentions the Stayout in passing and dubs it “relatively 
tame.” See Boston Against Busing, 33. 
 
164 
important but largely unexplored role in the struggle for educational equality. Beginning 
in 1964, many white suburban members of the Federation joined in the black-led 
movement to combat the discriminatory patterns in education. These activists expanded 
the grassroots strategies they had developed to fight against residential discrimination and 
applied them to the effort to desegregate Boston’s public schools. The group spearheaded 
the lobbying campaign that led to passage of the Racial Imbalance Act in 1965. 
Following that success, the Federation coordinated the establishment of the METCO 
program helping to secure both federal funding and suburban support for the project.  
Understanding the crucial role of the Federation in these activities illuminates not only 
the inextricable ties between the fight against residential and educational discrimination 
but also the relationship between civil rights and suburban liberalism.  
The METCO program, like the busing crisis, has long loomed large in the racial, 
spatial and political imaginaries of many Massachusetts residents. Yet few accounts have 
accurately identified or explored the roots of the program. Observers have alternately cast 
METCO as a top-down form of social engineering hatched by government bureaucrats or 
a program created solely by black parents in the inner city.4 These conflicting depictions 
have obscured both the unique coalition of black and white activists and school officials 
that created it, and the fact that its formation relied on a partnership between a grassroots 
movement and the federal government. These interpretations also overlook the roots of 
the program in both the physical structure of the fair housing movement and its suburban-
centered philosophy. Suburban liberal ideology and activism both enabled and 
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constrained METCO’s development and in turn shaped future efforts to create racial and 
spatial equality at both the local and national level.  
The role of white middle-class activists in METCO’s founding provides a 
compelling example of a grassroots movement that sought to direct federal spending to 
underwrite its programs and policies. The development of the initiative illuminates that 
the dialectic relationship between government policies and grassroots social movements 
animated the suburban liberal vision of racial equality.5 The widespread support for the 
program among suburbanites in large part relied on its small size as well as its 
government funding. METCO embodied and contributed to the development of the 
bifurcated political outlook of many white middle-class liberals. Many of these suburban 
residents actively supported federal spending to promote racial equality, but remained far 
less enthusiastic to see their own local property taxes fulfill similar functions.  
The development of METCO also reveals how the ideology of grassroots 
liberalism shaped the policies of the federal government. The busing program’s suburban 
advocates formulated a persuasive argument for the program that a decade later, both 
influenced, and anticipated a key rationale for Affirmative Action policies. This case did 
not focus on the ways such a one-way busing program would create a remedy to past 
injustice, but rather emphasized its particular educational benefits for white middle-class 
children by preparing them to operate in a multiracial world. Scholars are beginning to 
examine the ways in which Affirmative Action emerged “from below,” but few have 
grappled with the constitutive role white middle-class liberals played at the grassroots 
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level.6  Exposing the individualist ideology of suburban liberalism underpinning the 
government’s response to racial equality in education, therefore, provides an important 
way of understanding how and why these policies have failed to solve the enduring 
dilemmas of structural inequality at the local and national level. By the late 1960s, the 
METCO confronted increasing difficulties balancing its original two-pronged mission of 
providing quality educational opportunities for African-American students and creating 
limited integration in the suburbs. Exploring these tensions provides a crucial way of 
understanding the possibility and limitations of racial liberal ideology and how its focus 
on individualism and integration both assisted and constricted the broader effort to 
achieve meaningful educational equality in Massachusetts and the nation.  
 
“Two Small Latin Words”  
The Boston School Committee’s long upholding of  “the neighborhood school” as 
a romantic ideal and policy matter clearly favored some city areas over others.  In 1960, 
roughly half of the black population of Boston lived in Roxbury, North Dorchester and 
the South End, where the schools were overwhelmingly nonwhite and overcrowded. 
Officials had not built new school buildings in these neighborhoods in over thirty years 
and most of the existing ones violated health and safety codes. The city also spent an 
average of $100 more per pupil on its white students and provided them with a more 
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advanced curriculum and more experienced teachers. 7 In the early 1950s, a group of 
African-American parents came together to challenge these deliberately discriminatory 
practices. Roxbury mother Ruth Batson, who would become one of main leaders for 
Boston’s African-American community and later the director of METCO, led the effort.  
The child of Garveyite parents and lifelong resident of Roxbury, Batson was an early 
supporter of John Kennedy, the first black delegate from Massachusetts to the 
Democratic Convention, and would later hold a variety of political appointments 
including a stint on the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.8 Batson’s 
outlook and activism resisted convenient categorization. She combined a Black 
Nationalist background, a faith in the formal channels of political institutions and a 
personal concern about the education of her own children.9  
  In the early 1950s, after losing a bid for a seat on Boston School Committee, 
Batson turned to the Boston chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People  (NAACP) for help in demanding educational equity. In the first decades 
after World War II, the chapter had become a point of convergence and training ground 
for many of the figures who would soon play leading roles the local black freedom 
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struggle.10 Batson helped move the issue of “de facto segregation” in the public schools 
to the center of the local chapter’s interest. 11 The Branch’s increased attention to 
educational inequity also flowed from the agenda of the national NAACP.  After its 
success in the Brown case, the NAACP legal team had turned to challenging school 
segregation in the North and West.12 This case depended on a regionally determined 
dichotomy that distinguished the racial discrimination of the Jim Crow South, which they 
termed “de jure,” from the “de facto” segregation above the Mason-Dixon line, which 
allegedly derived largely from residential patterns. With an eye to these national goals 
and strategy, the Boston chapter began to gather evidence for a test case that they hoped 
would persuade the Supreme Court to rule the de facto segregation of the city’s public 
schools unconstitutional. 13 When that project failed, the committee members shifted their 
attention away from the federal courts and instead sought to devise strategies to force 
local and state authorities to intervene. The notoriously intransigent and all-white Boston 
School Committee represented the first target in this multi-step campaign. 
In the late spring of 1963 Batson, Paul Parks and the other members of the 
NAACP education subcommittee introduced a case to the Boston School Committee that 
fused the specific concerns of black parents about resource distribution with the 
NAACP’s broader legal and legislative aims. 14 After a series of tense exchanges, the 
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School Committee, chaired by the long-time integration opponent Louise Day Hicks, 
held a public hearing on June 11, 1963 that lasted over eight hours in a room filled to its 
capacity. Upholding the very idea of “de facto” segregation, the NAACP and other 
representatives at the meeting consistently acknowledged that they did not blame the 
School Committee for the existence of racial discrimination in the school system but 
believed that that body must rectify the situation.15 As Batson told the room, “It is the 
responsibility of school officials to take an affirmative and positive stand on the side of 
the best possible education for all children,” suggesting this was impossible where 
segregation existed.16 The Committee gave no official response.  
Four days after the hearing, four civil rights leaders endured a seven-hour closed-
door session with the school committee. At this meeting, the representatives from the 
black community boiled their argument down to 14 specific demands. The majority of 
their requests addressed problems of educational resources such as reduction in class size, 
improvements in the school buildings, human relations training for teachers and the 
hiring of more black teachers and principals. Point 1, nevertheless, called for “an 
immediate public acknowledgement of the existence of de facto segregation in the Boston 
school system.”17  While the School Committee cautiously agreed to study most of the 
requests, the majority of the members staunchly refused to publicly recognize the 
existence of “de facto” segregation and thus the school board and civil rights community 
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of Boston moved closer to what J. Anthony Lukas called “an impasse over two small 
Latin words.”18 
As the NAACP leadership engaged in another round of closed-door negotiations 
with the Boston School Committee, other black activists planned a school boycott. 
Reverend James Breeden a minister at St. James Episcopal Church in Roxbury and Noel 
Day, Executive Director of St. Mark Social Center also in Roxbury, the leaders of the 
newly formed Massachusetts Freedom Movement and former college roommates served 
as the central organizers. By encouraging black students to “Stay Out for Freedom,” the 
project aimed to dramatize  “the intolerable conditions” of “de facto segregation” and 
literally expose the 13 Boston public schools with  “predominately Negro pupil 
enrollment.”19 On June 18, 1963, 8,260 junior and senior high school pupils, about 30 
percent of the total secondary population, stayed away from school. 20 The absentee list 
included 5,200 whites. While Louise Day Hicks claimed that many white parents kept 
their children at home to avoid violence, more likely, given the day’s “magnificent 
weather,” many used the boycott as an excuse to “play hooky.”21 
One-third of the 3,000 African-American students who opted out of class and a 
handful of white children did not “play hooky” but instead attended “freedom schools. ”22 
Noel Day, who had previously served as a junior high teacher in Harlem, crafted the 
curriculum planning classes in “Negro history,” the rights and responsibilities of 
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American citizenship, the meanings of non-violence and civil rights as a means to 
“supplement public education and to protest existing inadequacies in the system.”23 At 
the Saint Mark Social Center, the site of the largest Freedom School, a group of 250 
“cheerful” and “well behaved” children learned freedom songs and listened to speeches 
from this prominent bill of speakers. An impressive roster of activists and academics such 
as Anson Phelps Stokes, Harvard Professor Thomas Pettigrew, CORE chairman Alan 
Gartner and Boston Celtics star Bill Russell all took the day off from work to be part of 
the “Freedom Faculty.” 24 The basketball MVP toured all nine schools telling the 
“spellbound” students “to be proud of their badge of color” and urging them to stay in 
school from then on.25  
The first of their kind in the country, the Freedom Schools and the larger Stayout 
proved a successful way to draw attention to the problem of school segregation. The 
tactics established an important precedent for civil rights groups throughout the country. 
Similar protests rippled throughout the North and West during the next year, using the 
Boston Stayout as an inspiration and model. In Chicago over 200,000 children stayed 
home or attended Freedom Schools in the fall of 1963. In February 1964, in New York, 
the largest civil rights demonstration in American history occurred when more than 
300,000 African-American and Puerto Rican students took part in a one-day boycott to 
demand integration.26 The Freedom Schools concept elicited such a favorable response 
within the African-American community in Boston that the organizers decided to extend 
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the project through the summer and fall of 1963. Day and Breeden established Freedom 
School classes three nights a week at three churches in Roxbury, Dorchester and the 
South End open to both adults and children “to encourage dignity, self-respect and 
feeling of effectiveness” and to provide a vehicle for “organized creative action.”27 
The Stayout might have brought the issue of the educational inequality into the 
local and national spotlight, but it did not persuade Boston school officials to officially 
concede their position. Over the course of the summer, the NAACP and other civil rights 
activists staged routine picketing of Boston School Committee buildings, but they 
remained at a stalemate with Hicks and her allies. The assassination of Medgar Evers, 
George Wallace’s stand at the University of Alabama and the violence in Birmingham 
also occurred during the summer of 1963. These activities in the Deep South coupled 
with the looming School Committee election in November created a backdrop to the 
battle that neither side could ignore. With new school year quickly approaching, the 
Boston NAACP held a press conference on August 16, 1963 and made an important 
concession. Branch president Kenneth Guscott announced that the chapter had decided to 
consciously substitute the term “racial imbalance” for the “de facto segregation,” which 
he asserted had become “too charged with past emotions and events.” 28 This decision fell 
in line with a national shift in the language surrounding school segregation. By the 
summer of 1963, school officials in California, New Jersey and New York had all 
announced formal policies about “racial imbalance,” which the U.S.  Commission on 
Civil Rights defined as “the existence, however innocently caused, of that degree of 
racial homogeneity in a given school which interferes with the achievement of equal 
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educational opportunity for Negro pupils.”29 The national NAACP as well as many of its 
local northern chapters had also adopted this language substitution as part of the broader 
shift in their strategy away from the federal courts and toward trying to end racial 
discrimination through the passage of state laws.30   Members of the Boston School 
Committee dubbed “racial imbalance” as a “superior descriptive term” and an 
improvement over de facto segregation. Governor Endicott Peabody also praised the 
substitution as a more meaningful label since it did not “suggest that there’s been any 
active policy by an public officials to bring it about.”31 The NAACP did not wave the 
white flag quite yet, however, for soon after Guscott publicly qualified the organization’s 
stance announcing: “We used the term ‘de facto segregation’ because that’s what the rest 
of the country used. But the NAACP will accept any other term that anybody else wants 
to use …as long as there is recognition that a problem does exist.”32 
If the NAACP ceded some rhetorical ground, it did not relent in its campaign or 
direct action strategies. After school officials continued to willfully ignore their demands, 
the organization sponsored an all-night sit-in inside the Boston School Committee 
building on September 6, 1963, days after the March on Washington.33 These activities 
undoubtedly more closely connected the Boston struggle with southern events such as the 
lunch-counter sit-ins in Greensboro, but Massachusetts activists did not simply mimic 
their southern counterparts. Rather, the sit-in constituted a calculated decision on the part 
of the northern activists to build upon the growing national concern for the civil rights 
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activities in the Deep South in order to draw sympathy for their very localized case 
against the School Committee. In the November School Committee election Hicks won 
68.8 percent of the vote and the NAACP-backed candidate lost.  It seemed that the 
comparisons to George Wallace and other southern segregationists helped rather than 
hurt the chairwomen.  Thus, as School Committee members began to fully understand the 
potential political benefits of racial antagonism, it only strengthened their unwillingness 
to negotiate and indicated to both the Boston’s civil rights community that the fight 
remained very much on.  
 
Stayout for Freedom 
Many white middle-class suburbanites, particularly those involved in local fair 
housing groups, had watched these events unfold in Boston from a removed, yet 
concerned position. By the summer of 1963, many leaders of the Massachusetts 
Federation for Fair Housing and Equal Rights had begun to acknowledge that the housing 
operated as one node in a matrix of causes of racial segregation that included the arenas 
of employment and education.34 The showdown between the School Committee and 
activists in Boston only strengthened this conviction of the need to expand the 
movement’s singular focus. Yet these fair housing activists remained unsure about how 
exactly their suburban-centered outlook and membership could intervene. 
 The suburbanites found the ideal opportunity in the winter of 1964. Noel Day and 
James Breeden decided to plan a second Stayout on February 26 to challenge the School 
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Committee again and to correspond with a chain of school boycotts around the country.35 
The second boycott adopted the same basic template as the June initiative, but revised it 
in a few key ways. Since organizers had more time to plan, they both expanded the 
project to include all grade levels not just older students and also constructed a more 
elaborate and detailed curriculum and schedule of events than the more improvised 
program in June. The organizers also made key shifts in the language of their pleas and 
plans. The issue of “de facto” segregation had been integral to the agenda and purpose of 
the boycott in June and while this term still appeared throughout the literature, its status 
became downgraded. Instead, the Stayout planners asserted that the purpose of the project 
was to call for  “a reasonable plan for integration” of the Boston Public Schools.36  
The call for integration did not mean that leading black activists had abandoned 
their focus on issues of equalized educational opportunities. By the winter of 1964, 
nevertheless, many of the movement leaders had realized that integrated schools provided 
a more reliable means of guaranteeing adequate resources for black students. Activists 
like Breeden and Day began to couch their demands in more racially liberal terms that 
emphasized the psychological harm of segregated conditions wrought on individual 
children by “distorting their minds” and “dull[ing] their spirits.”37  The decision to revise 
their demands reveals that while the School Committee remained their symbolic 
adversary, the state legislature represented the real target of the activity. For liberal 
politicians and their suburban constituents, the individualist call of integration had more 
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traction than structural demands for resource distribution. This shift in language also 
aligned with both the local and national NAACP’s effort to encourage state action on the 
problem of “racial imbalance.” The Stayout’s organizers sought to apply this 
commitment to racial integration not just in rhetoric. If the June Stayout had dramatized 
de facto segregation through empty classrooms, the winter version sought to make its 
case by creating integrated ones. Breeden announced the plan for “integrated Freedom 
Schools where the presence of thousands of white and black children learning together 
demonstrate the promise of what our public schools could be.”38 Expecting that it would 
be difficult to find willing participants in Boston, the Massachusetts Freedom Movement 
looked beyond the city limits and into the suburbs. The civil rights group recruited Hubie 
Jones, one of the only African-American members of the Newton Fair Housing Practices 
Committee to chair its Suburban Support Committee. As his first official task Jones 
organized a meeting at the Stone Church in Lincoln on January 31. The event brought 
together representatives from 21 towns, all of whom agreed to not only endorse the 
endeavor but also to send students to participate in the Freedom Schools.39 Warmed by 
the tide of support, Thomas Atkins, executive secretary of the NAACP told the audience 
“I only wish some of you still lived in town!”40  
Following the meeting, thirty communities set up formal local suburban support 
committees, generally offshoots of the local fair housing chapters, to contribute on many 
different levels. The coordinators in each town drew upon the previously established 
social networks and publicity strategies of the fair housing movement to circulate 
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information about the Stayout. During the first weeks of February, volunteers passed out 
enrollment applications and permission slips at local junior and senior high schools, took 
out paid ads in town newspapers, distributed fact sheets to their friends and neighbors, 
and made countless phone calls to recruit student participants, adult chaperones, and 
teachers. 41 Praising the ways that suburban residents contributed to the planning of the 
Stayout, Hubie Jones announced, “Frankly I have been overwhelmed by the support from 
suburbia. So much so that is shaken my pessimism about the negative role that most 
suburbanites play and have played in the whole struggle.”42  This metropolitan 
cooperation had important benefits for the organizers on both sides of the spatial divide. 
The Stayout provided the ideal vehicle for concerned suburbanites to contribute to the 
fight against school discrimination. It also bolstered the case of the members of the fair 
housing committees who sought to enlarge the physical and ideological scope of the 
movement. For the Boston activists, the suburban participation both amplified their case 
about the value of integrated education and provided additional manpower.  
Over a thousand students from more than 20 suburban communities boarded 
buses to Boston on February 26, with 100 representatives from Newton, 100 from 
Brookline, and 90 from Lexington.  While many of the students who volunteered were 
the children of members of the local fair housing groups, others heard about it at school 
and recruited their parents. One Wellesley chaperone explained,  “With three children 
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participating how can you help but get involved?”43 Many detractors cited the fact that 
the Stayout coincided with winter vacation in many suburban school districts as the 
explanation for this flood of participation, and some even suggested that the organizers 
had picked the date on purpose.44 It was in some ways more impressive the number of 
students who willingly gave up a day of school vacation to show, as one Wellesley eighth 
grader stated, “people we care, and that we feel there is a problem being ignored.”45 
Katherine Ashbrook, a high school senior from tony Weston explained that she wanted 
“to learn more about the conditions and the problems in Roxbury from Roxbury 
students.”46  Breeden observed that the involvement of these suburban volunteers  gave 
“substance to our theory that young people themselves desire integration.” 47 
Arriving on banner-strewn buses, these suburbanites joined with the 20,571 
Boston students who opted to stay out. Roughly 10,000 of the black absentees attended 
Freedom schools at 34 churches, social centers and neighborhood houses in Roxbury, the 
South End and Dorchester.48 These figures far surpassed the estimations of the leadership 
and caused some last minute reshuffling.  More than 200 black and white volunteers 
taught on the Freedom School faculty including many local civil rights activists like Ruth 
Batson, Paul Parks, Mel King, Alan Gartner and a coterie of  “housewives, parents, 
teachers,” many of them members of the suburban fair housing movement. 49 Serving as 
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both principals and teachers, these “trained leaders” led courses and discussion groups 
where students could express their views on racial segregation in housing, employment, 
and education as well as other community issues. A guide for discussion leaders 
explained their role as helping “the students see themselves in a new and different way, 
and to encourage them that there are indeed many things which they can do.”50 A cohort 
of prominent psychologists and academics such as Gordon Allport, Charles 
Pinderhughes, Herbert LeVine, and Sumner Rosen both spoke to the students and 
provided materials for the lessons plans, highlighting the racial liberal emphasis on the 
psychological damages of racial segregation running throughout the Stayout.  
 The “educationally and culturally enriching” curriculum contained materials on 
the “psychological effects of segregated education,” “the Negro’s contribution to 
American history,” the issue of teenage unemployment, and “college scholarship 
opportunities.”51 The program also included chances for singing “freedom songs” and 
socializing, which hit a literal and figurative high note when a Harvard freshman picked 
up his banjo and led a thousand students gathered at the Saint Mark Center in an 
impromptu sing-a-long of “We Shall Overcome.”52 For many of the white and black 
children, the event marked both their initial exposure to much of this information and 
their first time learning in an integrated setting. One onlooker later described watching as 
the children listened intently “as if they were trying to gulp and chew a lifetime of 
learning in one day.”53 When the students filed back on the buses, they received 
“Freedom Diplomas” signed by Breeden and Day, proclaiming that the student had 
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completed the requirements “of an experiment in democratic education” and joined  
“other citizens of Boston in the pursuit of freedom and equality.”54  
The day’s program and curriculum proved so successful that it became one of the 
major inspirations for the Mississippi Summer Project’s own network of 41 Freedom 
Schools which similarly sought to enrich the education of young black southerners. In 
fact, not long after the Stayout, Noel Day traveled to New York to participate in the 
planning of the Council of Federated Organization’s effort. Drawing many of his 
experiences and ideas from the event a few weeks earlier, he served as primary author of 
the Mississippi Freedom School curriculum, designing lesson plans intended for 
volunteers with neither teaching experience nor knowledge of African-American history. 
55 Thus, the Boston Stayout showed that the circulation of ideas in the civil rights 
movement flowed not just south to north, but in the reverse direction as well. 
The activities of the February Stayout continued after the Freedom Schools let out 
when 1800 people gathered just below the governor’s office at the Robert Gould Shaw 
tableau at the entrance of Boston Common. Wielding placards and singing freedom 
songs, the integrated crowd marched in procession from the State House to City Hall 
Plaza. Participants milled around the newly-designed piazza while a delegation of civil 
rights activists met with Mayor John Collins in an hour-long closed-door session. 
Although he had opted to send his four children to school that day, Collins dubbed the 
conversation “useful” and the meeting at his city hall office provided a fitting 
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culmination to the day’s events. 56  The overall outcome of the Stayout significantly 
pleased Boston civil rights activists. The NAACP’s Thomas Atkins hailed the boycott as 
“100 per cent successful,” Noel Day called it  “a great day,” and James Breeden dubbed it 
a “resounding success.”57 
This sense of accomplishment owed much to careful orchestration of the Stayout 
planners. Boston Globe reporter Ian Forman dubbed the principal leaders as the “ivy 
league team,” a depiction with a particular set of class-based connotations that sought to 
accentuate the distinctiveness of the event and its leaders. Day and Breeden, the “solidest 
one-two punch in the civil rights movement,” had graduated from Dartmouth two years 
apart and served as the public face of Stayout. 58 While this duo oversaw the operation of 
the Freedom Schools classrooms, William and Phyllis Ryan, a white Brookline couple 
active in the civil rights cause, manned a command center in a bare room on the fourth 
floor of the Saint Mark Center. The Harvard professor oversaw the transportation of 
students to and from the Freedom Schools in what he would later describe as “a plague of 
yellow buses…crisscrossing the streets of Roxbury.”59 Bespectled in “horn-rimmed 
glasses” and with his shirtsleeves rolled up and tie pulled loose, Ryan resembled “a 
harried MTA starter on his telephone directing rush hour.”60 Phyllis Ryan ran the public 
relations wing of the operation; a duty she had performed in countless other civil rights 
campaigns in and out of the suburbs. Ryan also willingly supplied the coffee. As she 
made a cup for a reporter, Ryan announced  “in a wry tone” that “this is probably the first 
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revolution where coffee is served.”61 Her purposefully ironic comment reveals an 
acknowledgement that neither the Stayout nor its leadership could hardly be deemed 
radical. Even as they upset certain racial and spatial boundaries, they upheld and even 
reified both a distinctively a middle-class and gendered image and ideology.  
The classed dimensions of the Stayout extended into the press coverage of the 
project as well. Phyllis Ryan’s media savvy was extremely useful to the project. Major 
newspapers in Boston made the event front-page news with images of rows of attentive 
white and black children sitting side by side, putting in visual and printed form the civil 
rights activists’ case about the value and necessity of integration. 62 The press treatment 
of the February events far surpassed that of the first Stayout in part because its larger size 
and because of the inclusion of white students. The suburban students represented only 
one-tenth of the participants in Freedom Schools and one-twentieth of the Stayout, but 
they received a disproportionate amount of the press consideration, particularly in the 
Boston Globe, which had a wide circulation throughout the metropolitan area.  Reporters 
relied on such racialized and classed adjectives as “well-dressed,” “soft spoken,” and 
“pretty” to describe the white adolescents and never failed to note that most of these 
children came from “well-to-do families.”63 The presence of white middle-class children 
apparently assured a quick way to elicit media attention and suburban sympathy.  These 
descriptions and the overall media attention, therefore, illuminate the effectiveness of the 
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Stayout in using suburban students to solidify support for the cause of school segregation 
among Massachusetts residents and politicians. 64 
 These appeals, however, did little to move the obdurate Boston school officials’ 
sympathies.  Superintendent William Ohrenberger publicly denounced the event as a 
“Pyrrhic victory” and Louise Day Hicks as usual went even further calling it “a 
tremendous failure.”65 Although the Stayout had failed to persuade the School Committee 
to change its position, the project did have an important impact on the effort to challenge 
racial and spatial segregation in education in both the short and long term. By galvanizing 
state officials, civil rights activists in Roxbury and concerned suburbanites in the cul-de-
sacs of Boston’s outer ring, the events served to both strengthen the channels of 
interracial and metropolitan cooperation and quicken the pace of the legislative activity.  
 
The Racial Imbalance Act 
Fulfilling the goals of organizers, the most immediate response to the protests 
emerged from the State House.  The day after the Stayout, Governor Peabody announced 
plans to establish a blue-ribbon advisory committee to study the problem of “racial 
imbalance.” The distinguished appointees included four university presidents, prominent 
Boston businessmen, and religious leaders like Cardinal Richard Cushing and President 
of the Massachusetts League of Women Voters Lucy Benson. State Commissioner of 
Education Owen Kiernan served as the chair.  The Globe praised the group for the “civic 
standing of its members.” The Herald gushed that the project represented a “heartening 
development” proving that “Massachusetts, if not its capital city, is in the forefront of the 
                                                
64 Uncle Dudley, “The Boycott Aftermath,” Boston Globe, February 27, 1964.  
65 Harvard Center for Law and Education, “A Study of the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act,” 27.  
 
184 
great national drive for the equalization of public education.”66 The much-touted task 
force announced its first findings in the summer of 1964, uncovering racial imbalance in 
55 schools across the state and 45 in Boston alone.67  On April 8, 1965, the Kiernan 
Commission released its final report entitled “Because It is Right—Educationally” and 
condemned “racial imbalance” as harmful to both white and black children and as “a 
serious conflict with the American creed of equal opportunity.” The Commission 
recommended a law officially outlawing the practice. 68  
The Boston School Committee voted to reject the claims of the Kiernan Report 
within hours of its release. Louise Day Hicks dismissed it as “pompous proclamations of 
the uninformed” and dubbed the Kiernan Committee “ a band of racial agitators, non-
native to Boston, and a few college radicals who have joined the conspiracy to tell the 
people of Boston how to run, their schools, and their lives.”69  The Report’s release, 
nevertheless, came just a month after the violence in Selma, Alabama where Reverend 
James Reeb, a white Unitarian minister from Lexington was clubbed to death at the hands 
of a white mob. For nearly a week, media coverage of Reeb’s death ran next to news of 
Selma which brought the confrontation on Pettus Bridge home for many Bay Staters and 
made Hick’s inflammatory remarks appear that much more bewildering. Over 20,000 
people attended a memorial service for the slain minister on Boston Common. Speakers 
at the event drew comparisons between the situation in Alabama to those “less bloody, 
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but in the long run, no less destructive processes of injustice” occurring in the Boston 
public schools.70  
When Martin Luther King, Jr. came to Boston on April 22, 1965 it further 
amplified the pressure on the School Committee. At a rally at Boston Common as the 
25,000 people crowd waited for the minister to speak they chanted, “Will you follow 
Louise Day Hicks or Martin Luther King?”71 King couched his speech in the rhetoric and 
imagery of Massachusetts exceptionalism. The famed civil rights leader declared, “It 
would be dishonest for me to say Boston is Birmingham or that Massachusetts is 
Mississippi.” However, acknowledging the poverty and segregation in the city’s 
predominately black neighborhoods, he announced, “Boston must become a testing 
ground for the ideals of freedom.”72 As the arguments and agendas of local and national 
civil rights movements intertwined, it created a powerful sense of urgency for solving the 
problem of racial segregation in Boston’s public schools. Soon after, newly-elected 
Governor John Volpe announced the need for “appropriate legislation” as “an important 
step in this particular issue and in putting the force of our state government behind the 
fight for equal rights.”73 
In June 1965, the State Board of Education submitted a pathbreaking bill to the 
Massachusetts legislature prohibiting racial imbalance in the state’s public schools. 
Synthesizing the recommendations of the Kiernan Commission, the proposed act sought 
to empower the Board of Education to withhold state funds from any town that had not 
adopted a reasonable plan for eliminating racial imbalance. Beryl Cohen, a liberal state 
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representative from Brookline, volunteered to sponsor the bill. In what one observer 
dubbed “a case study in coalition politics,” he enlisted a group of citizens to help to work 
to get the landmark legislation passed. 74 He first gathered a team of lawyers and civil 
rights activists, many from his own constituency, to essentially re-draft the Board of 
Education’s initial proposal.75 Cohen then recruited Helene LeVine, the chair of the 
Massachusetts Federation for Fair Housing and Equal Right’s legislative committee, to 
help build support for the legislation both in suburban communities and at the State 
House. LeVine and other members of the Federation readily embraced the challenge. 
With opposition to the legislation increasing among representatives of city districts, the 
response of the Federation confirmed that its structure and strategy provided an effective 
way to provoke legislative change.  
To build support for the law, Federation leaders fine-tuned the lobbying formula 
they had crafted in earlier campaigns for fair housing laws. During the summer of 1965, 
Federation members collaborated with representatives of CORE, the NAACP, and the 
Massachusetts Freedom Movement.  In “interracial teams,” volunteers from the city and 
suburbs canvassed the State House, demanding face-to-face meetings with state 
politicians.  This integrated coalition sought presented a particular image of themselves 
and their cause that capitalized on the growing concern about civil rights both nationally 
and locally. The black organizers gave volunteers explicit instructions to avoid engaging 
in a technical discussion of the bill. They urged them instead to place their appeal in 
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moral and emotional terms as parents concerned about their children.76 The Federation 
and local chapters supplemented these meetings with other grassroots tactics such as 
petitions and letter writing-campaigns. This support from concerned suburbanites in the 
38 communities with Federation affiliates demonstrated the geographic scope and 
political reach of the organization. These lobbying efforts forged a bipartisan coalition of 
representatives from suburban and rural areas and successfully overpowered the Boston-
based opposition. In August 1965, the bill eventually passed in the House and Senate.77 
In the aftermath of this hard-fought victory many politicians, civil rights leaders, and 
media observers identified the suburban groups as the driving force behind the 
legislation. 78 Federation members basked in this credit. 
As he signed his name to the Racial Imbalance Act, Governor Volpe invoked the 
Massachusetts’ exceptionalist mythology especially its precedent-setting record as the 
site of the nation’s first public school, college, and school board.79  The Racial Imbalance 
Act made Massachusetts the first state to outlaw racial imbalance in its public schools. 
Yet, the actual statute had more rhetorical than enforcement power. The law classified a 
racially imbalanced school as one that had 50 percent nonwhite students, and by 
“nonwhite” it meant explicitly African-American. By defining imbalance in these terms, 
the law naturalized a white norm while conveniently ignoring the city’s Asian and Latino 
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populations.80  It also exempted areas without a large nonwhite population, including 
every suburb of Boston, all of which technically had racially imbalanced schools. Like 
the purportedly landmark Massachusetts Fair Housing Law passed six years earlier, 
therefore, the communities like Brookline, Newton, and Lexington that had been most 
enthusiastic in their lobbying efforts all fell outside the boundaries of the new statute’s 
jurisdiction. In addition, the law contained significant mechanisms to delay 
implementation since it gave school systems found in violation both the leeway to devise 
their own plans for remedy and the chance for judicial review. These stipulations enabled 
Boston to avoid actually having to rectify the racial imbalance in its schools for over nine 
years. Thus as the praise for law dwindled and the Boston School Committee sought to 
devise ways to evade it, both black activists and their white suburban supporters searched 
for alternative solutions to the increasingly untenable situation in the city’s public 
schools.  
 
A Suburban Education for Urban Children 
Many white participants in the February 1964 Stayout had returned home to their 
respective communities with a desire to extend the experiment of interracial education 
and their coalition beyond that single day. These residents envisioned reversing the 
paradigm and rather than an “urban education” for suburban children, they would offer 
“suburban education” for urban children. This idea evolved by the winter of 1966 into the 
Metropolitan Council of Educational Opportunity (METCO), a voluntary one-way 
integration initiative to transport black students from Boston into predominately white 
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suburban school systems. While the Stayout had served as the primary inspiration, three 
other factors also played an important role. These diverse forces ultimately fused to shape 
METCO’s unique parameters and its unusual combination of suburban liberalism, 
African-American activism, and government policy.  
First, the initiative drew on a series of smaller programs that brought African-
American students into predominantly white suburbs.  The Boston-Prince Edward 
County Exchange served as the earliest predecessor for METCO. In 1962, the American 
Friends Services Committee had organized a program arranging for a few students from 
the Virginia County that closed its public schools to avoid compliance with court-ordered 
desegregation to spend a year in Boston. The Virginia students lived with host families 
and attending school in the districts involved tuition-free.81 Even after the year-long 
experiment ended, Leslie “Skip” Griffins, one of three students placed in Newton, had 
decided to complete his education at the suburb’s high school, where he had a standout 
academic and athletic career and eventually earned admission to Harvard.82 This success 
story further convinced some Newton residents that if they could offer tuition waivers to 
students from the South, then they could provide for African-American children with a 
far shorter commute. In early March 1964, a few Newton residents submitted a proposal 
to the city’s School Committee that it admit 50 African-American students free of tuition 
beginning that September.83   The Newton School Committee rejected the proposal, 
claiming that it had no legal responsibility to educate non-residents.  
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Although the proposal to admit black students from Boston into their districts 
failed, many of the individuals committed to civil rights in the suburb found alternative 
ways to create integrated educational opportunities. Rev. Charles Harper of the Eliot 
Church in Newton and fellow residents organized a monthly after-school program based 
on the Freedom School model for 80 students from the city and the suburbs beginning in 
the spring of 1964. The project, like the Stayout, sought to provide  “a realistic inter-
racial, inter-cultural and inter-economic setting” through a curriculum that included 
African-American history, slave songs, and lectures from local and southern civil rights 
activists. 84  Residents in over a dozen towns on or near Route 128 established similar 
programs during the summer of 1964. The Federation proudly noted that the pictures of 
white and black children swimming and playing appeared in town newspapers throughout 
Boston outer ring that summer, provided  “dramatic evidence” that the “civil rights drive 
has spread from urban centers to the surrounding suburbs.”85 
Second, METCO drew on a program initiated by a group of Roxbury parents in 
1965 called Operation Exodus.86 The program sought to take advantage of Boston’s open 
enrollment policy that allowed students to attend any school in the city as long as it had 
open seats, but forbade the use of city funds to bus children. Ellen Jackson and the other 
members of North Dorchester-Roxbury Parent Association decided that if the city refused 
to provide transportation to the open seats, they decided they would do it themselves 
arrange the busing of 250 children from the city’s predominately black and low-income 
                                                
84“Freedom School to Be Held at Eliot Church,” Newton Graphic, April 2, 1964;  “Roxbury-Newton 
Freedom School to Open Nov. 10, ” Newton Graphic, November 5, 1964.  
85 “Summer of Discovery,” Massachusetts Federation for Fair Housing and Equal Rights, FHER Key, 
September, 1965,” LCRC.  
86  James Teele, Ellen Jackson, Clara Mayo, “Family Experiences in Operation Exodus,” 1966, Box 28, 
Folder 3, Metropolitan Council for Educational Opportunity, Inc. Records, Archives and Special 
Collections Department, Northeastern University, Boston MA (hereafter: “METCO”). 
 
191 
areas to open seats in schools throughout the city.87 The Federation supported the 
initiative by raising money for its operation and hosting speaking engagements for Ellen 
Jackson in their communities.88 “As parents, we are concerned not only with our own 
children’s education, but the education of all children, ” one Newton women declared of 
her and her fellow residents commitment to Operation Exodus.89 This logic influenced 
many of the same suburbanites to support METCO as well.   
A controversial proposal of Boston Redevelopment Agency head Edward Logue 
served as the final inspiration for the METCO program. The nationally renowned urban 
planner had publicly denounced the recommendations of the Kiernan Report upon its 
release in April 1965. Logue especially took issue with a suggestion hidden in the 
appendix that a “mutual exchange of students” might provide a short-term solution to 
racial imbalance in Boston. He decided to create an alternative remedy to the problem of 
school segregation that looked beyond the city’s corporate limits and included the entire 
metropolitan region.90  Logue had no background in educational policy and he drew upon 
instead his urban redevelopment expertise to craft a proposal for a one-way busing of 
4,000 “imbalanced” fifth through eighth grade black students from Roxbury into the 
surrounding suburbs. He sought to “transport the children, but not the problem of racial 
imbalance” and therefore compiled a list of 21 towns to receive the “disadvantaged” 
youth that lacked a significant black population, were within a half-hour of the city, and 
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had a per pupil expenditure that exceeded that of Boston. 91  He stipulated that this 
formula of “scatteration” would prevent overcrowding and keep the black student 
population in the towns well below the tipping point.92  
Logue’s metropolitan busing plan demonstrated his deep commitment to the basic 
tenets of postwar liberalism, especially its abiding faith in state power to solve problems 
of social inequality. Logue, who had pioneered strategies of acquiring federal funding for 
urban redevelopment, suggested that money from the Federal Aid to Education Act or the 
Federal Poverty Program could cover the estimate $5 million per year cost of his plan.93 
These funding suggestions derived directly from his conviction that “essential to any 
enduring solution to the problem of racial imbalance” would be that it not affect the 
property tax base of either Boston or the participating towns.94 Logue conjectured that 
many people who had encouraged their children to participate in the Stayout and had 
joined the march during Martin Luther King’s visit, but might be less “willing to practice 
at home the Civil Rights they bespeak elsewhere” they might be less enthused to 
underwrite these convictions with their property taxes.95 
 In spite of these creative funding suggestions, Logue’s “scatteration” plan 
sparked immediate controversy and denunciations. Many suburban school administrators 
responded that their districts already confronted overcrowding and in addition they did 
not have the authority to accept pupils from outside their community. 96  Several 
observers viewed the proposal not only as a form of “forced busing” but also an example 
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of downtown bureaucracy and social engineering at its worst. The Boston Globe editorial 
page suggested that Logue “scatter his ‘scatteration’ ideas far enough that they get lost.”97 
Louise Day Hicks promised to “vigorously oppose” the scheme, arguing that busing 
would not alleviate the problems “for the Negro child” and might even make them 
worse.98 Owen Kiernan expressed “grave doubts” that such an endeavor would cost only 
$5 million. State officials shied away from the plan and instead pursued the central 
recommendations of the Kiernan Report. Logue was not incorrect, however, when he 
identified that the sizable number of suburban residents were dedicated to racial equality. 
Many of the local chapters of the Fair Housing Federation took Logue’s plan seriously 
and established study groups to explore and debate his recommendations. 
The combination of the suburban exchange programs, Operation Exodus, and 
Logue’s plan inspired Brookline School Committee member Leon Trilling committee to 
make an appeal to Brookline to admit a group of African-American students into the 
district. An astrophysics and aeronautics professor at MIT, Trilling embodied many of the 
characteristics of the activists who served as the backbone of the grassroots liberal 
movement. The son of Jewish immigrants who had fled Poland in the 1930s, Trilling had 
moved to the United States when he was 16 and received both his B.A. and Ph.D. from 
Cal Tech. He came to the Boston area to work at MIT in the early 1950s and opted to 
settle in Brookline. After learning about the severe discrimination in the Boston Public 
Schools, Trilling began to recognize that even though he was in immigrant he had 
confronted no barriers in his own professional advancement. Yet, this “equality of 
opportunity” was not available to most African-Americans. This concern impelled him to 
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first join his local fair housing group and then to run for the Brookline School 
Committee, where he became a strong advocate for integrated education.99  
Trilling submitted a proposal to encourage Brookline to accept a group of 
African-American students, placing particular stress on the benefits of such a program the 
white children by preparing them for life in a “multi-racial state.”100 In order to 
persuasively argue this point, the MIT Professor relied on the findings of the Kiernan 
Report, which had emphasized that “racial imbalance is also harmful to white children,” 
and that segregated schools “presented an inaccurate picture of life to both white and 
Negro children and prepares them inadequately for a multi-racial community, nation and 
world.” 101 The final wording of the Racial Imbalance Act had downplayed this point and 
mostly focused on the injurious effects of separation on black students. Trilling 
emphasized the harm segregation created for white children and made it the central thesis 
in his case to enroll black students into Brookline’s schools.  This argument piqued the 
attention of both school committee members and local residents. The positive reaction 
convinced Trilling to widen the scope of his plan to include not just Roxbury and 
Brookline but metropolitan Boston as a whole. He arranged a meeting with the board of 
the Massachusetts Federation for Fair Housing and Equal Rights in early November to 
discuss his vision for busing across the urban-suburban divide.   
Logue’s metropolitan-based program would provide the template for the proposal, 
but Leon Trilling did make a few important revisions.102 While Logue had pitched his 
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program as the sole remedy to the issue of racial imbalance, Trilling presented his version 
as a “temporary” and  “partial solution.” The MIT professor expanded the reach to 
include all grades, not just middle school, but his suggestion of “1 or 2 Negro children 
per class in any suburban school district” fell even further below the tipping point of each 
suburban classroom than Logue’s blueprint. 103  Unlike the BRA head’s plan, Trilling did 
not suggest a list of towns to receive the nonwhite students based on a complicated 
formula, but rather he sought to involve only those communities that wanted to 
participate. Crafting the program as a “voluntary” means to create “equal opportunity,” 
Trilling’s suggestion that the plan be optional rather than compulsory constituted his most 
important alternation to Logue proposal. In doing so, Trilling repackaged a program 
rooted in the technocratic ideology of growth liberalism and placed it in distinctly racial 
liberal terms.  
Through these revisions, the concept of metropolitan busing no longer appeared a 
top-down program of government bureaucrats, but a spontaneous and grassroots reaction 
of concerned suburbanites. The plan’s emphasis on free choice also provided a way to 
make the program palatable to black parents in Roxbury. Many members of the black 
community joined the clamors of opposition to Logue’s scatteration idea, resentful of the 
way it had depicted urban parents and their children as passive victims. 104 This revised 
version of the plan appealed to many parents and civil rights leaders since it enabled 
them, like the suburban districts, to participate by choice rather than force. Trilling’s 
alterations, therefore, revealed an astute understanding of how to transform a potentially 
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controversial vision of racial and spatial equality into ideas acceptable to both skeptical 
white suburbanites and African-Americans in the inner city. Although metropolitan 
busing plan now appeared as a bottom-up, grassroots, and optional solution, Trilling 
shared Logue’s skepticism that most suburban areas would volunteer to financially 
underwrite the endeavor. Trilling’s proposal, therefore, incorporated many of Logue’s 
ideas about ways to secure federal, state, and philanthropic funding.  
Trilling’s proposal intrigued the executive board of the Massachusetts Federation 
for Fair Housing and Equal Rights, which felt the program represented a logical 
extension of the growing suburban concern with the Boston schools. In a report to local 
chapters, Federation Civil Rights Coordinator Astrid Haussler summarized the chain of 
events that set the stage for the proposal of urban-suburban cooperation. She recounted 
that suburban interest in the Boston Public schools had been  “initially awakened” by the 
Freedom Schools and Stayout, “further aroused” by the efforts to pass the Racial 
Imbalance Bill and “stimulated” by summer programs.105  Haussler, therefore, arranged 
for representatives from twenty local chapters to attend a panel on November 4, 1965 at 
which Paul Parks moderated a discussion of the plan between Deputy Commissioner of 
the Massachusetts Department of Education Dr. Thomas Curtin, Trilling, and three 
suburban school officials. Six days later, the Sudbury Human Rights Council and League 
of Women Voters co-sponsored a meeting at which Parks, Edward Logue, and Boston 
School Committee member Thomas Eisenstadt debated the problems of the city’s schools 
in front of an audience of 500 people. During the conversation, the concept of a 
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metropolitan program once again circulated and elicited a favorable response from the 
audience.106  
The positive reaction at these two forums propelled the Federation board into 
action. The day after the Sudbury meeting, Haussler and Elizabeth Keil worked through 
the organization’s contact list verifying the support and interest of the local committees. 
Then, on November 15, Haussler, Keil, Aina Cutler of the Wellesley Fair Housing 
Practices Committee, and Layla Weisner, the League of Women Voters’s State Chairman 
for Human Resources, met with Trilling at his MIT office to map a plan of attack. 
Around the same time, Paul Parks convened with State Department of Education officials 
Curtin and Joseph Killory, who interpreted the program as means to pursue the goals of 
“open enrollment” and “quality integrated education” and requested more information.107  
Parks also recruited his longtime NAACP comrade Ruth Batson, who was then serving as 
a MCAD commissioner, and Elizabeth Johnson, one of founders of Operation Exodus, to 
the nascent project’s first official meeting. These various constituencies converged at 
Brookline High School on December 14, 1965, where Trilling laid out his plan. 108  
Following the presentation, the audience pondered the possibilities of a two-way 
exchange and a comprehensive metropolitan school system. While many of the 65 
participants shared a sense this could be the ultimate goal of the project, they recognized 
that such a project was currently “impractical politically” and instead decided to pursue a 
“short-range” plan of one-way busing.109 The contributors also reached a consensus on 
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three basic conditions for the program:  it must include funding from sources other than 
town budgets, the number of Boston student could not make the suburban classrooms 
reach a point that was “educationally unsound,” and that any student invited to join had to 
be allowed to complete his or her entire education in the suburban district. As the 
members of the audience set up subcommittees to address specific questions of funding, 
program planning, and community coordination, Haussler optimistically reported to the 
Federation after the meeting “a pilot program of this type could well be put into effect by 
the fall of 1966.”110  
By the end of December, the organizers had decided to formally name the project 
the Metropolitan Council for Educational Opportunity (METCO).  The title succinctly 
captured both the urban-suburban dimensions of the endeavor as well as its emphasis on 
the racial liberal ideal of “equal opportunity.” Along with a new name, the founders 
refined METCO’s mission statement. The new plan called for bringing 200 non-white 
children with a range of academic abilities and economic backgrounds to a handful of 
districts in order to “provide a meaningful educational experience for city and suburban 
children in relation to integrated learning” and create a “partial solution to the issue of de 
facto segregation.”  111 The grant proposals the founders submitted to the federal 
government and private organizations further illustrate the suburban-centered ideology of 
racial and market-based individualism. Describing the problem that the project sought to 
counter, the authors of METCO’s application quoted at length from a background paper 
prepared for Kiernan Commission Report by psychologist Charles Pinderhughes. 
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Providing a classic case of racial liberalism, Pinderhughes had argued that racial 
segregation had a “compartmentalizing” effect on both white and black children that 
interfered “with abilities to relate, form ideas and to process feelings.”112 This emphasis 
on the emotional damage demonstrated one facet of suburban-centered vision of racial 
integration.  
The insistent refusal to place any financial burden on the participating 
communities represented another. The decision of METCO to seek public and private 
funding upheld Logue’s logic about the unwillingness of suburban residents to outlay 
local tax funds. It also reflected the professional expertise and experiences of many of the 
organization’s charter members. The subcommittee charged with writing the funding 
applications consisted of many academics like Trilling who relied on federal and private 
grants to pursue their professional research and were thereby particularly adept at 
navigating these types of bureaucratic channels. The committee also included suburban 
school superintendents like Charles Brown and Robert Sperber of Newton and Brookline, 
respectively, both of whom represented districts with national reputations for academic 
excellence and endorsing experimental programs. After some discussion, the financing 
subcommittee decided Title III of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 
which underwrote “innovative or exemplary ways of attacking persistent problems” 
would be their best chance for funding.113 Haussler captured the confidence of many of 
METCO’s early boosters when she declared that “the creative innovative nature of the 
project should make it relatively easy to secure initial funding.”114  The application, 
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nevertheless, stipulated that a school system must sponsor the plan and Brown 
volunteered himself and the town of Newton to do so. The central role of the school 
officials like Brown demonstrated the ways in which the organization’s board and 
purpose combined a set of figures and issues rare for a nonprofit organization. The 
involvement of these administrators also distinguished METCO from Operation Exodus. 
Despite the fact that the two programs offered similar services, Exodus was often unable 
or ineligible for many of federal or private grants since it lacked both a resourceful 
executive board of trained professionals and sympathetic city school officials willing to 
sponsor its applications. This difference points to one of the reasons why Operation 
Exodus financially floundered while METCO flourished.  
In the late spring the U.S. Department of Education approved a two-year grant of  
$265,000 to cover the tuition and transportation costs of METCO. The project also 
received a $100,000 check from the Carnegie Corporation to pay for the staff salaries and 
leasing office space. The Massachusetts Department of Education granted its Assistant 
Director of the Division of Elementary and Secondary Education Joseph Killory a 
sabbatical so that he could assume the position of Executive Director. The uncontested 
decision to appoint Killory as the inaugural director lent METCO legitimacy as an 
educational program as well as implicit sanction from state.  Ruth Batson decided to 
leave her position as MCAD Commissioner to become Associate Director, and Elizabeth 
Johnson of Operation Exodus accepted the role as Staff Assistant. The organization also 
established a Board of Directors, which Trilling chaired, and included school officials, 
civil rights activists, and other leaders of the suburban fair housing movement.115  
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Throughout the winter and spring this newly formed staff and board compromised of 
school officials, civil rights veterans, and grassroots suburban activists met in the 
evenings in empty MIT lecture halls and the Brookline High School auditorium in order 
to continue to formulate their plans. 
 
Getting the Buses Rolling 
 Suburban participation marked METCO’s first order of business. Throughout the 
winter and spring of 1966, the Board of Directors attempted to persuade school 
committees in their respective communities to join. These activities and the vocal 
membership of the local fair housing groups clearly helped establish a favorable climate 
for the program and reinforced the ways in which METCO program built directly upon 
the organizational and ideological scaffolding of the Federation.   In order to appeal to a 
white middle-class suburban sensibility, many of these advocates pitched the program in 
a language of low taxes, quality education, and equal opportunity. Proponents in places 
like Wellesley, Newton, and Lexington asserted the federal government would assume 
the financial responsibility and the program would not burden local tax rates. Assuaging 
concerns about overcrowding, the supporters reassured the suburban school committees 
and administrators that they would retain wide discretion over the number of students 
accepted into their districts and their classroom placements.  
The argument that METCO had specific educational and social value for white 
middle-class students by preparing them to operate in a diverse and multi-racial society 
constituted the most effective component of the promotional campaign. This point fused 
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many suburbanites’ abstract concerns over the problems of racial and spatial inequality 
with their more immediate worries that their tax dollars provided the best possible 
education for their children.  Reiterating Trilling’s initial case, these METCO advocates 
drew on the Kiernan Commission’s findings to suggest that school segregation harmed 
children on both sides of the metropolitan divide. One pamphlet circulated among 
interested suburban districts declared, “Suburban white youngsters have been cut off 
from contact with young children of races, to the detriment of the education and total 
development of members of both groups.” Further outlining the “benefits for suburban 
children,” the pamphlet then presented an argument that would later become a key 
rationale for the survival of Affirmative Action programs suggesting the inclusion of a 
few African-Americans in each suburban classroom would help prepare white pupils to 
succeed in a diverse society.  “Suburban children expect to work and learn with Negro 
youngsters,” it contended, “And expect to be provided with educational experiences 
which will better prepare them for life in a multi-racial world.”116 Superintendent Brown 
agreed, telling the Newton School Committee that the admission of black pupils would 
aid in the education of local white children who were “deprived” in the sense that “they 
have no realistic contact with other parts of our society.”117 The discursive shift of 
disadvantage and deprivation away from black inner-city youth and to white middle-class 
suburban students proved incredibly effective at goading municipalities to join.  
The plan received a largely positive response in the initial communities 
approached.  The school committees of Newton, Brookline, Lexington, and Wellesley all 
quickly signed on followed by Arlington, Braintree, Lincoln, and Concord. Many 
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residents praised the decision as a sign of their community’s enlightened progressivism. 
Others recognized the program as a chance for students “to break down the barriers of 
misunderstanding between blacks and whites” and “see democracy in action.”118 These 
endorsements were not entirely universal. Some citizens feared the inclusion of the 
“disadvantaged” students would weaken the academic standing of their currently “top-
notch” and nationally ranked school systems. Yet none of these dissenters caused any 
town to forgo participation in the program.119  The lack of sustained opposition to 
METCO was in some ways remarkable given the protracted and violent battle the 
occurred over busing in Boston a few years later.  
This support underscores how the features of METCO, particularly its limited size 
and lack of local financial commitment, tapped into and reified an agenda of suburban 
homeownership. METCO’s emphasis on individual interracial contact as opposed to 
structural intervention in the market economy represented the type of government 
response to racial inequality that many white suburban residents favored. One Lexington 
resident articulated his willingness to support this kind of “person-to-person” initiative 
rather than “impersonal programs like welfare, urban renewal and antipoverty 
programs.”120 Despite their commitment to the ideals of equality, many residents even in 
traditionally liberal communities clung to a political outlook of middle-class entitlements 
and market-based individualism. As a result they supported one-way, voluntary programs 
like METCO, which did not have the hassles or financial sacrifices of a more systemic 
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fully metropolitan solution. This program success, like the fair housing movement, 
depended on appealing to many middle-class white suburban residents interpretation of 
racial discrimination in terms of personal prejudice rather than structural inequality. 
METCO’s host family program bore the clear influence of the fair housing 
movement. The idea did not appear in Edward Logue’s initial proposal. However, it 
represented a crucial way in which the suburban activists remade the technocrat’s vision 
of metropolitan busing into their own. METCO organizers stipulated that the suburban 
communities match each child from Boston with the family of a student from his or his 
school, grade, and preferably class to serve as a suburban “host.” The planners envisioned 
that host families would provide offer  “a second home” in the suburbs as “a place to go 
for lunch, or if he is ill, or he desire to become in a social way in the community.”121 This 
idea did have certain practical purposes, particularly in towns where students ate lunch at 
home. Yet it also directly echoed and extended the individualist and racial liberal 
ideology at the heart of the suburban fair housing movement by emphasizing one-on-one 
interaction as the best way to erase and transcend the boundaries of racial and spatial 
inequality. It also revealed the literal and figurative domestic ideology underpinning the 
suburban commitment to civil rights as it rested on the assumption that women would be 
at home feed and supervise the children after school.  
The Federation supplied METCO not only with its board members and grassroots 
infrastructure and ideology but also its adroit lobbying skills. Almost immediately after 
Leon Trilling presented his idea to the Federation board, members realized that the 
ambitious program needed legislative sanction. Helene LeVine and the legislative 
committee drafted a bill to legally allow children to attend schools in cities or towns other 
                                                
121 “Proposed Plan for Cooperative Program of Education Between Urban and Suburban Schools.”  
 
205 
than that which they resided. Senate Majority leader Kevin Harrington submitted the bill 
to the Massachusetts legislature in December 1965 even before the organization had 
formally agreed on a name. The purpose of the legislation was not just to provide 
METCO with a sound legal basis, but also a source of future financial subsidy.  The 
organizers of the legislative drive recognized that federal and philanthropic funding were 
both short-term and unreliable and anticipated that the program would need state money 
for the future. The “METCO bill,” an extension of the Racial Imbalance Act, enabled the 
State Board of Education to financially support any program where one town adopted a 
plan to assist in elimination the racial imbalance of another town. The Federation 
lobbyists ensure the successful passage of the METCO bill. 122   
In addition to developing this legislative authorization, the METCO founders also 
sought the endorsement of the Boston School Committee. Since the program had 
alternative sources of funding and functioned as a non-profit, it did not actually require 
any official approval of the Committee. Yet the board and staff of METCO believed that 
such an affirmation would help further solidify its legitimacy.123 On March 28, 1966, the 
Boston School Committee voted 3-2 in favor of the program, but its approval included 
the contingent clause “that this program shall no require the expenditure of funds of the 
City of Boston.” 124 Like the suburban enthusiasm for the project, the School 
Committee’s support, therefore, derived from the fact that it both cost the city no money 
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and provided the body with a means to appear committed to alleviating racial 
imbalance.125  
While many members of the METCO board sought to secure these state and local 
level endorsements, Ruth Batson assumed responsibility for raising awareness and 
support within Boston’s black community. At first glance, Batson appeared an unlikely 
convert to the suburban-centered initiative since her commitment to alleviating the 
inadequacies in the Boston Public Schools had been so vocal and longstanding that it had 
her earned the reputation as the “de facto lady.”126 However, Batson never believed that 
METCO provided the sole answer to the problem of racial imbalance, and she always 
acknowledged that transporting 220 children to the suburbs would do nothing for the vast 
majority of African-American students that remained in Boston.127  Yet, she recognized 
that METCO offered both improved educational opportunities for the small number of 
children involved as well as a means to potentially publicly shame the Boston School 
Committee into addressing the racial inequality of the city’s schools. Her support for and 
involvement in METCO, therefore, emerged less from a deep-rooted commitment to an 
abstract ideal of integration and more because she understood its material and symbolic 
potential to gain quality education for black students in Boston. 
 Batson became an extremely effective spokesperson for METCO. Her previous 
activism had earned her a great deal of respect and trust among Boston’s black 
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community. She also understood what aspects of the program to accentuate in order to 
make METCO appealing to potentially skeptical members of the city’s African-American 
population. In presentations at Roxbury churches and civic centers, she presented 
METCO as a temporary rather than permanent program with only a few years of funding, 
and assured parents that the students would return to the city’s public schools “as soon as 
Boston ‘straightens out.’”128 She also stressed that since the program paid their tuition the 
black children would not be suburban “charity cases.”129 This feature combined a faith in 
both government intervention and self-determination undergirding the black freedom 
struggle locally and nationally. 130  
Batson proved equally skillful at assuaging the anxieties of white suburbanites. At 
meetings sponsored by either local fair housing groups or METCO coordinating 
committees, she often couched her discussion of the program in the racial liberal 
language of equal opportunity and quality education. Batson often adopted the apolitical 
language and imagery of a concerned parent rather than the potentially polarizing 
discourse of the black freedom struggle. She explained, “We want to better our entire 
area and we believe the best way to do it is educate all our population on an equal 
basis.”131  In fact, she would repeatedly publicly state that METCO served educational 
rather than civil rights goals. While this distinction might have been meaningless for 
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many members of the black community, it helped make METCO appear less threatening 
to suburban residents. 132 
In addition to speaking at these meetings, during the summer of 1966 Batson and 
her assistant Elizabeth Johnson worked to recruit prospective students. They notified civil 
rights and church groups about the application process and placed advertisements on the 
local R&B station. Batson and Johnson interviewed every one of the 600 applicants and 
their parents and then attempted the arduous process of selecting the 220 students to 
comprise METCO’s inaugural class. Using a complex set of criteria, the METCO staff 
members sought to create a “representative” cohort that had a balance of boys and girls, a 
range of economic backgrounds, family sizes, and a cross-section of city’s predominately 
black neighborhoods.133 In keeping with the definition of race in both the Racial 
Imbalance Act and the METCO grant applications, the planners selected only African-
American children with the exception of the sole white applicant whom they opted to 
accept.134 Finally, they tried to admit students from a range of different academic 
achievement levels, although they decided to exclude any student with a serious learning 
disability or other significant educational or disciplinary problems.135 This final goal 
sought to assuage the concerns of many skeptical white and blacks that the program 
enabled the suburbs to “steal” the best black students from the Boston. 
The participating suburban districts provided the METCO staff with a range of 
available spaces.  Brookline and Newton, for example, offered 75 and 50 respectively in 
a variety of grades. Lincoln provided just 10 seats in kindergarten. Batson and Johnson 
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then worked to match the open seats with the location preferences that parents had 
selected on their children’s application. The list of preferences reveals that the 
prospective parents sought inclusion in the program more for its quality educational 
opportunities than a commitment to integration.136 The hierarchy of choices imposed a 
specific racial and economic grid on metropolitan Boston. Just as the name Roxbury 
evoked a particularly racial and economic taxonomy of association for white suburban 
residents, the names of the various suburbs had their own specific meanings in the minds 
of much of Boston’s black community.  137  Brookline, Newton, and Wellesley sat at the 
top of most parents’ lists because of their proximity to the city and national reputations of 
their respective schools systems. Many parents associated Lexington and Concord with 
their historical reputation of tolerance and enlightenment and thereby they followed close 
behind. The applicants expressed more reticence about Lincoln since it was one of the 
wealthiest towns in Massachusetts, a 45-60 minute bus ride from Boston’s predominately 
black neighborhoods, and the only town involved that had not even a single black 
resident. Yet if Lincoln appeared too well heeled, many parents eschewed Arlington and 
Braintree for not being ‘elite’ enough, and they represented the least popular choices.138 
The cognitive cartography embedded in these preferences, therefore, illustrates the racial, 
class, and spatial assumptions which both and white and black participants brought to 
METCO. 
The METCO staff firmed up their plans in the late summer, sending out 
acceptance letters and placement notifications, holding orientation sessions for entering 
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students and suburban school principals and teachers, and mapping bus routes from city 
and into the various communities. The first day of classes in early September 1966 went 
smoothly and with the exception of one minor incident in Wellesley the students 
experienced none of the racial tension for which the participants and staff braced 
themselves.139 In fact, the program first confronted logistical rather than racial problems. 
The staffs backgrounds in education administration and grassroots organizing made them 
more adept at preparing a federal grant application and recruiting participants than for 
coordinating of bus pick ups and drop offs. The operation of the buses created constant 
difficulty for the program in its first years. Despite these kinks, METCO both yielded 
great deal of praise from school principals, suburban and city parents, and state 
politicians, and attracted a swell of interest from urban students and suburban towns 
wanting to get involved.140 Many boosters sought to increase involvement by highlighting 
the mutual opportunities of the program for white and black children. “The black urban 
child has gone to a vastly better educational setting in the suburbs,” David Sargent of 
Wellesley encouraged,  “while the suburban white child has had a multi-racial experience 
that will prepare him for the multi-racial world.” 141 By its third year in operation, the 
state of Massachusetts had assumed financial responsibility and Batson had become 
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During its first three years METCO remained a small program, transporting just 
386 students to 14 communities.142 However, the combination of the release of the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder’s controversial Kerner Report and the 
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in the spring of 1968, in the words of Batson, 
“sharply changed the picture.”143 Many residents viewed the program as a tangible way to 
help ease the nation’s urban problems,  and in the span of two months 36 towns voted to 
submit plans for involvement and those already participating decided to increase their 
level of commitment. By June 1968, these suburban communities had officially offered a 
total of 1200 seats for children from Boston. Many towns also opted to reduce their 
tuition fees in order to spread out the state funding to more communities and children. 144 
METCO staff member Katherine Jones successfully convinced the Newton school 
committee that reducing tuition constituted one way that the community could accept 
“local responsibility” for “the imperatives placed before it by the President’s Commission 
Report on Civil Disorders.”145 These efforts established an important future precedent 
and earned the praise of the Governor and other state officials as a sign that the suburbs 
were willing to accept financial responsibility for the larger problems of the city.146 “All 
of us in Massachusetts should take pride in this program,” the Governor later publicly 
declared, “which has quietly and effectively demonstrated that integrated education is 
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possible, that city-suburban cooperation is possible, and cooperation between the state 
government and the local communities is both possible and productive.” 147 
Despite this heightened attention to the program, by the late 1960s the METCO 
leadership found it increasingly difficult to balance its dual goals. Brookline 
Superintendent Robert Sperber observed that METCO had succeeded in its first goal of 
gaining a better education for black children, but had confronted more difficulty in 
creating positive racial understanding between white suburban children and blacks 
students from Boston. He surmised,  “It is not as simple as we once thought, just putting 
black and white kids together.”148 In the late 1960s, racial tensions had increased among 
the students especially at the high school level with a few reported physical fights and 
many other tense verbal exchanges.149 Mrs. Clarence Good, a Lexington host parent, 
observed: “it’s unquestionably easier for younger children to get along.” Ruth Batson 
elaborated on this statement, noting that “With little kids you have simple problems; with 
bigger kids, more complicated problems.”150 Many older black students began to more 
honestly voice their frustrations and sense of alienation at being of one of only faces of 
color in suburban schools. “The white kids here do not know the blacks kids,” one 
Lexington students asserted, “because there aren’t enough black kids to integrate the 
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school.”151 The variety of complaints underscored just how limited a remedy the program 
provided to the problems of racial and spatial separation. 
 Several participants began to challenge the implications of the host family 
program that made them feel like guests and “thankful” to their white peer. “They should 
be thankful to us,” one METCO student attending Lexington High maintained, “We’re 
really educating them because a lot of the kids never saw a black kid before. They only 
saw people like Aunt Jemima.”152 These comments countered many white suburban 
parents and journalists who signaled the host family program as the most positive 
component of the initiative. For instance, a 1969 New York Times article highlighted this 
part as a rare example of racial understanding in the United States. The article described 
in detail a get-together between Mr. and Mrs. Edwin Williams of Roxbury and Mrs. and 
Mrs. Alexander Neiley of Lincoln. The couples chatted over sherry in the host family’s 
living room overlooking two acres of woods, a tennis court and a horse-filled barn as 
their daughters Rhonda Williams and Susan Neiley played a game of monopoly in the 
playroom. The scene itself highlighted  the types of racial and class disjunctures at the 
heart of the program.153  
The celebration of these moments of interracial discussion also obscured that 
though the program placed a strong emphasis on equality, the African-American students 
involved bore much of the burden for participation. Most of the participants from the city 
had to attend school away from their neighborhood, in a largely white and affluent 
community, commuting by bus at least a half-hour away. This experience led many 
METCO students to feel like outsiders both in the suburbs and Boston’s black 
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community.154 “It’s a lonesome thing to be a Metco student,” Bernice Bullock,  who had 
attended Marblehead High, observed. “Now that I’m at Boston University. I’m much 
happier.”155 Many METCO participants experienced a sense of guilt that they had 
betrayed their neighborhoods and felt they should have stayed to help the fight to achieve 
educational equality there. Likewise, some students protested the inequity in resources 
between the city and suburbs. “I don’t see why they (the suburban community) should 
have everything,” one student stated, “I’m going to get a good education so that when I 
grew up, I can see that Roxbury has just as much as they do.”156  
Batson recognized that this rise in discontent and sense of separatism had a 
variety of sources.  She attributed some of this friction to the fact that the suburban 
schools taught critical thinking skills rather than rote learning. This new educational style 
encouraged METCO students to be more assertive than when they had first enrolled. She 
stressed long hours on the bus to and from the suburbs helped students furthered the unity 
among the children involved and heightened their sense of difference from their white 
suburban classmates.  Batson recognized that the most important factor motivating this 
sense of separatism, nevertheless, came from increased concentration of the wider black 
freedom struggle on developing a sense of racial pride. In response to the reports of racial 
friction and student dissatisfaction, Batson contended that “the black community, 1969, is 
a far different community and METCO has felt the effect.”157 Ruth Batson later observed 
more succinctly and directly, “The children pulled apart as the black movement grew.”158 
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The response to these racial tensions exposes white and black leaders different 
definitions of the program’s goals and purpose.  Many of the white suburban leaders 
understood these changes within a racial liberal framework of individualized interaction.  
Leon Trilling contended that the racial frictions  “might be a blessing in disguise.” He 
declared that through these encounters “blacks and whites gain a more realistic 
understanding of the problems, aspirations, and life-styles of each other.”159 Other 
suburban liberals shared this view, stressing that the “Roxbury students” gave “suburban 
residents a healthy glimpse of the turmoil in the ghetto.”160 In contrast, many of the 
program’s primarily African-American staff had never articulated a commitment to the 
ideal of integration and had always understood the voluntary program as a means to 
provide quality educational opportunities for a small number of black children. They saw 
the high number of METCO graduates who went on to higher education as the clearest 
indication of the program’s success.161  
When students issued these new demands and critiques, the African-American 
staff pushed for the organization to place more programmatic emphasis on fostering a 
sense of positive black identity for the children involved in the late 1960s. METCO 
established tutoring and psychological services at its central offices in Roxbury intended 
to address the unique educational and emotional demands of its students.162 The program 
also pressured suburban schools to implement more African-American history and 
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literature in the curricula, and recruit more black teachers.163 Robert C. Hayden, the 
executive director who replaced Ruth Batson upon her resignation at the end of 1969, 
made fostering positive black identity among METCO students his primary objective. 
“We do not want black youngsters to lose their identity while in the METCO 
experience,” he stressed.  Hayden, therefore, sought to shift the program’s definition of 
racial integration away from an individualist focus on the similarities between white and 
blacks and towards an appreciation of racial, economic and spatial differences.164 Hayden 
encouraged suburban school districts to solicit the advice of METCO participants in 
revising their curricula noting that  “black students can bring to the classroom new 
perceptions of urban life and the social problems we all must face both in Massachusetts 
and the rest of the country.”165 
 Most suburban parents and school administrators readily embraced the 
multicultural materials, tutoring services and teacher training as another way of 
broadening the education of white middle-class children. Katherine Jones, Newton’s 
METCO director observed, “Newton kid’s are in a vacuum…they are getting an unreal 
picture of the world.”166  Jones emphasized the program’s heightened attention to racial 
differences gave these white students increased exposure to the realities of the inner city.  
Discussing the new requirement, a white mother from the town of Needham succinctly 
asserted, “the schools would be worse without METCO.”167 With this attitude in mind, 
the organization appropriated its new racial consciousness into a sellable attribute to 
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suburban communities. In the early 1970s, the organization circulated a pamphlet within 
the suburbs entitled “We Wish You could meet a METCO Boy and Girl.”168 The 
pamphlet alerted prospective communities that METCO provided suburban children with 
a “new appreciation, a new awareness, a new and realistic understanding of our multi-
racial world.” It also contended that METCO provided unique advantages to suburban 
teachers as “a challenge to their professional skills” stressing “the backgrounds that 
inner-city children and youth bring to the classroom have provided important new 
resources. ” The pamphlet quoted one teacher who somewhat paternalistically observed, 
“Having a METCO student in the class peps things up. They’re not afraid to be square. 
They haven’t learned not to raise their hands and say something.”169 The pamphlet did 
not mention the widespread sense of alienation among METCO students. Instead, the 
literature still presented its benefits largely within a racial liberal framework, citing one 
METCO child’s color-blind observation: “With your friends you can talk about 
everything it doesn’t matter whether you live in Wellesley or Boston.” 
The program sent a very different message of its purpose to urban black students 
and parents than it did to whites living in the suburbs. METCO distributed a student 
handbook in the early 1970s that declared:  “Opportunity is the key word in the name.” 
Recounting METCO’s history, the booklet explained that the program’s founders 
envisioned it as a chance for black children to gain a better education, not mentioning the 
dual goal of fostering integration anywhere in the instruction manual. The handbook 
focused primarily on the special responsibility and burden the students had assumed by 
participating in the program and punctuated the themes of community control and self-
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determination. In the handbook and in other forums, Hayden and the staff stressed that 
though the students were not “civil rights leaders,” their participation did have political 
consequences.170 “You are in a unique position to offer your ideas, energy and talent to 
your suburban school community and most important to your own Black community,” 
the handbook instructed. “It is expected that you will take full advantage this opportunity 
as YOUNG, GIFTED AND BLACK YOUTH and become successful METCO 
students.”171 The handbook provided specific instructions about how to handle racial 
incidents telling students they were not expected “to turn the other cheek!” Yet it 
cautiously warned them to “think critically” and acknowledge that these types of 
incidents often created negative stereotypes about black people. In line with these 
instructions, METCO adopted as its motto for students “Whatever You Are—METCO 
is!!” This slogan had a double meaning rooted in the traditions of both community 
control and the politics of respectability and constituted a definitive departure from the 
messages and expression the organization offered to white suburbanites. The program, 
nevertheless, continued to try and keep its messages to white and black participants in a 
tense and often contradictory, but, workable balance.  
 
Armor Report  
 
METCO’s struggle to maintain this dual agenda confronted new difficulties 
following the release of a controversial social scientific report called the “Evidence on 
Busing” or “Armor Report.” In the spring of 1972, Harvard sociologist David Armor 
announced the findings of a study to be published in the summer edition of the national 
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periodical The Public Interest, which raised serious doubts about the benefits of 
integration.172 Although he discussed integration programs in a number of northern cities 
including Hartford, New Haven, White Plains and Ann Arbor, he relied most heavily on 
an earlier study he conducted about METCO called “Attitudes and Attitudinal Changes of 
Secondary School METCO Students. ” Between 1968 and 1970 Armor, with the 
program’s approval, had circulated a series of questionnaires to METCO participants and 
compared them with the answers of a control group compromised of their siblings. The 
questionnaire had asked the students questions such as “Do you sympathize with the 
Black Panthers, or not” and used affirmative answers to conclude that METCO 
participants had become “increasingly skeptical of the idea of school integration” and had 
begun “to embrace ideological movements which stress black separatism and control.”173  
The responses led Armor to deduce that “integration heightens racial identity and 
consciousness, enhances ideologies that promote racial segregation, and reduces 
opportunities for actual contact between the races.”174  
 These findings directly contradicted the main ideological underpinnings of 
postwar racial liberalism. Armor’s report challenged the basic ideas of leading liberal 
sociologists such as Gunnar Myrdal, Kenneth Clark, Gordon Allport and James Coleman, 
a direct influence on METCO, who long promoted that “social contact” between groups 
would reduce racial prejudice and bring equality. The Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board 
of Education decision had essentially codified this theory as the goal of school 
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integration. In direct repudiation, Armor suggested a “contact-conflict” theory in which 
black students who attended predominately white schools became more aware of the 
cultural and economic differences that separated them from their classmates.  He declared 
that while the black community might believe that the gain in educational opportunity 
outweighed the benefits of integration. He insisted,  “if blacks and whites are ever to live 
in an integrated culture, they must begin learning and accepting their differences; and this 
cannot happen without contact.”175 Armor concluded, however, that this evidence 
demonstrated that “mandatory busing for the purposes of improvement and interracial 
harmony is not effective and should not be adopted at this time.”176  
When the Boston Globe announced Armor’s evidence in a front-page article with 
the headline “Busing Found to Have Backfired,” it produced a litany of immediate and 
angry responses at the local and national level. Many activists and academics and 
concerned citizens feared the report would undermine the ongoing struggle to 
desegregate the Boston Public Schools. Leading African-American activist Mel King 
criticized Armor for addressing integration in sociological and psychological terms, 
unlike most blacks who “are talking of integration in political and economic 
problems.”177 King and his allies also denounced the report as another example “of so-
called liberals who come into the ghetto conducting academic citizens of the misery of 
black citizens.” Armor defended himself by saying “personally I am not prepared to 
abandon integration as a goal” and described himself as a “liberal.”178 Several other 
academics disagreed with this self-assessment. Thomas Pettigrew, a former student of 
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Allport, a leading authority on race relations, and Armor’s colleague in the Harvard 
sociology department, led these charges.179 In a subsequent issue of the Public Interest 
Pettigrew and a group of other social scientists prepared published a point-by-point 
critique of Armor’s “evidence on busing.”180  The rebuttal maintained Armor had relied 
on faulty evidence about METCO to present “a distorted and incomplete review of this 
politically charged topic.”181 They claimed that the research had little to do with busing 
beyond its title and took issue with Armor using a voluntary one-way program to draw 
broad conclusions about mandatory two-way integration. The authors also found many 
weaknesses in Armor’s actual research, which helped further diffuse the impact of these 
findings.  
The representatives of METCO provided Armor with his most strongly worded 
criticism. These responses, nevertheless, revealed the differing interpretations of 
integration among the program’s participants.182 Like Pettigrew, the representatives of 
METCO challenged the basic parameters of the study, particularly that it focused on a 
small sample of secondary students and that the unique program should not be used as a 
proxy to draw conclusions about mandatory desegregation. Board President and 
Wellesley business executive David Sargent declared that METCO represented “an island 
of cooperation and trust and mutual support in a time when polarization and dissention 
seem to be the rule” and “unique institution” that deserved “the support it has always had 
from black and white, urban and suburban, grassroots and political leadership.”183 Robert 
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182 METCO had willingly participated in Armor’s study and even used some of its findings in a press 
release on the program, METCO, Press Release, March 8, 1970, Box 10, Folder 44, METCO.  
183 David R. Sargent, METCO Responds to the Globe, 1972, Box 1, Folder 57, METCO. 
 
222 
Hayden denounced the study on slightly different grounds. Recapitulating many of his 
earlier comments, he emphasized that improved education not improved race relations 
was the primary purpose of METCO.184 The executive director also raised concerns that 
the report jeopardized these educational opportunities. Urging the state not to decrease its 
financial support in the face of the Armor Report, he sympathetically implored, “the kids 
have been social pioneers” and they “have assumed responsibility for their own education 
and have brought about changes in suburban schools.” 185 Although the controversy 
eventually subsided, and the state continued to underwrite the program, METCO 
continued to struggle with maintaining the dual agenda outlined by these representatives.  
 
Conclusion  
By the time of the Boston busing crisis, METCO garnered local and national 
attention and praise as the largest voluntary integration program in the country. The 
project served as a model to other cities across the nation that sought to implement 
similar solutions to the problems of school segregation. Yet the unique set of contingent 
factors that coincided to create METCO in Boston made it equally difficult to replicate in 
other metropolitan areas, especially the cooperation between black and white, urban and 
suburban, government and grassroots. The white and black sides of this partnership 
explicitly emphasized the importance of each other in the realization of the project. When 
a colleague at NYU expressed interest in starting a similar program in the Westchester 
suburbs, Leon Trilling told his fellow physicist that bringing Ruth Batson on board was 
an “essential” ingredient to the program particularly because she had the “the full 
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confidence of the community.”186  Likewise, when asked to name individuals at the 
forefront of the black freedom struggle in Boston, Batson supplied Trilling’s name citing 
him as the person “whose idea it was to conceive Metco and worked in a very 
quiet…very low profile, low key way to get this off the ground.”187  Batson would credit 
the Federation as the “dedicated partner” in the development of the program.” She 
announced, “I can honestly state that METCO would not have become a reality without 
their membership’s resolve and determination.”188 
Despite praise and the dedication of its participants, METCO never ushered in  
“national acceptance of public school integration” as one of its early fliers had touted.189 
It did not create a comprehensive two-way busing system in metropolitan Boston, as a 
few of its founders had initially hoped.  The inability to graduate beyond its short-range 
goals of busing a small number of inner-city children into the suburbs reveals some of the 
basic limitations in the individualist ideology of the grassroots suburban civil rights 
movement as a whole.  While the dispersal of activists in a variety of communities made 
the movement effective in building support for legislation like the Racial Imbalance Act, 
this physical fragmentation hampered its ability to challenge racial and spatial 
discrimination. Like the fair housing movement that had preceded it, METCO was able to 
bring a small number of African-Americans into the suburbs but failed to significantly 
reshape the patterns of racial, economic, or spatial inequality, creating a largely 
individualist solution to a set of primarily structural problems. These possibilities and 
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limits would become even clearer during the busing crisis, which had important 




Chapter 4:  
 Political Action for Peace 
 
Introduction  
On October 15, 1969, 100,000 Massachusetts residents stood on Boston Common 
to protest the Vietnam War. Keynote speaker Senator George McGovern applauded those 
present and their chants of “Peace Now” as practicing “the highest patriotism.” 1 The 
event, known as the Vietnam Moratorium, was the biggest demonstration in Boston 
history and though reporters deemed it “political Woodstock,” a large portion of the 
crowd defied the image of the music festival or typical Vietnam protest.2 Alongside 
longhaired and bell-bottom attired college students stood rows of well-dressed white 
middle-class suburbanites. For many of these people it was the first time they had 
publicly protested the Vietnam War. Frank Rizzo, a graduate student long active in the 
antiwar movement, declared of these participants and the event as a whole,  “To even 
think five years ago about this kind of a crowd—and I don’t mean just numbers because 
most these people are middle class types—would have been impossible.” 3 The Boston 
Common rally represented only the biggest event in the national and local Moratorium. 
During the day more than 50,000 suburban residents in 130 communities around 
metropolitan Boston took part in smaller demonstrations on their town greens and other 
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public spaces. 4 Throughout the country, citizens participated in similar activities to 
express their opposition to the Vietnam War.5  In total, two million people in more than 
200 cities participated in what became the largest civil demonstration in the history of the 
United States.  
The idea for the large-scale antiwar demonstration was not the product of New 
Left activists but it was in fact the brainchild of a suburban liberal business executive 
from Newton, Massachusetts named Jerome Grossman. The chairman of the largely 
suburban-based group called Massachusetts Political Action for Peace (PAX), Grossman 
along with his fellow members had conceived of the Moratorium as a means to involve 
more moderate suburban residents in their broader mission to end the war. Collaborating 
with student organizers to make a local idea national, the group consciously aimed to 
incorporate a wide spectrum of people and attitudes about the war. Despite the clear 
importance of the October 15 event, seminal works on the sixties tend to focus on student 
organizers of the large-scale protests in Boston, Washington and New York and either 
ignore or deemphasize the crucial role of Grossman and the smaller vigils in the town 
centers of Lexington, Concord, Winchester, and Weston. In general, the standard 
narratives of the antiwar movement pay virtually no attention to suburban liberal groups 
like PAX, Citizens for Participation Politics (CPP) and Voice of Women (VOW), and 
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ignore the suburbs as the site for legitimate activism.6 Student activists in both the Boston 
area and across the nation played an essential and central role in the antiwar movement. 
Yet as events like the Moratorium illustrate that they did not act alone and often operated 
in partnership with middle-class liberals.7 
 By downplaying this scope of this event and the suburban liberal movement that 
incubated it, these standard narratives not only obscure a more textured story of the 
antiwar and electoral politics of the period, but also the crucial role of white suburbanites 
in it. Tracing the activities of these forms of peace activism from the early 1960s to the 
Moratorium challenges the conventional arguments about the antiwar movement, postwar 
liberalism and suburban politics in a few key ways. First, it reveals a more ideologically, 
demographically and chronologically expansive vision of the antiwar movement. Second, 
it provides new insight into the tension postwar liberal coalition, by showing that the 
challenges to Cold War liberalism came from not just from the radical fringes, but from 
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closer to the center. Third, it reinforces the vibrancy and limits of suburban liberal 
politics. 
The Moratorium marked almost a decade of activity for PAX and grassroots 
suburban-based peace activism in Massachusetts. Since the early 1960s, these groups had 
sought to use their suburban-centered identity and ideology to work within the system, 
especially the formal channels of electoral politics, to stop the construction and use of 
nuclear arms and United States military intervention. Through the Moratorium and other 
activities, these suburban liberal activists would come to directly influence the antiwar 
sentiment and electoral politics in the Bay State and the nation. Exploring their activities 
helps expand the temporal scope of antiwar period beyond dramatic campus 
confrontations of the late 1960s. It reveals both a lengthier chronology predating the 
Vietnam War itself and an early and ongoing emphasis among suburban activists of 
working within rather than outside the formal channels of power to prevent nuclear 
proliferation and war.  
Suburban grassroots peace activism also provides a way of reperiodizing the 
standard chronologies and narratives postwar liberalism. Scholars have long cited the 
Vietnam War and Eugene’s McCarthy’s presidential bid as the central challenges to Cold 
War liberalism in the late 1960s.8 The activities of the suburban-centered peace 
movement provide an important site for complicating this explanatory framework and re-
considering the tensions in the liberal consensus. By transforming opposition to the Cold 
War and Vietnam from a fringe to dominant belief within both the Democratic Party and 
the suburbs, this constituency played a central but often underappreciated role in shaping 
politics at the local and national levels. Massachusetts suburban peace activists offered a 
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critique of Cold War liberalism and U.S. foreign policy even before the escalation of the 
Vietnam War. Activists like Grossman, nevertheless, remained committed to reforming 
rather departing from the Democratic Party and its liberal principles before, during, and 
after the 1968 election.  
Like other forms of liberal grassroots activism, peace advocates applied their 
suburban identities and social networks toward peace politics. Women became 
particularly central in the peace movement, and an analysis of their activities thereby 
highlight the ways in which liberal causes provided many female residents with the 
means to reshape traditional roles of wife and mother. At the same time it exposes how 
these women helped to advance the peace cause by couching it in normative values of 
gender and family. The male and female members of suburban-based movement’s 
frequent invocation of their parental identities, nevertheless, exposes a class-based 
tension at the heart of this form of grassroots activism since the white suburban liberals 
who were often the most vocal parents against the war were statistically the people whose 
children were least likely to actually serve in Vietnam.9  
The peace movement embodied and perpetuated the tendency of suburban liberals 
to become most committed to causes that were spatially distant and required the least 
personal or financial sacrifice. These grassroots peace groups emerged during the same 
historical moment and geographical space as the suburban fair housing and civil rights 
movement and overlapped both ideologically and tactically. In the early 1960s, members 
of these peace and civil rights groups together sought to build a coalition opposing the 
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ways that military spending not only created dangers abroad, but racial, spatial, economic 
inequality in the nation’s urban centers. Yet as the Vietnam War escalated, the peace 
activists moved away from attention to forming such a coalition and addressing the 
structural issues that defined it and towards trying to involve more white suburban 
residents in their movement.  The suburban-centered tactics of these activists attracted 
both more attention and white middle-class members to the antiwar cause and in doing so 
forged a new political base for liberal political candidates. Yet by focusing its attention 
and resources on activities like the Moratorium and the campaign of Eugene McCarthy, 
the suburban grassroots activists increasingly excluded lower-income and racial 
minorities and the issues that concerned them from its frame of focus.  The 
Massachusetts antiwar movement’s suburban-centered strategies, therefore, channeled 
the peace movement in particular ways. 
 
 Hughes Campaign 
 
H. Stuart Hughes’s campaign for the Senate in 1962 first motivated suburban 
liberal peace activism in Massachusetts and served, in the words of E.J. Dionne, as a 
“trial run for the antiwar movement. ”10 The campaign brought together suburban 
residents and students committed to peace, nuclear disarmament, and other liberal causes. 
It demonstrated to them the possibilities of using the formal channels of politics to 
mobilize residents and to raise attention to their cause. In the immediate decades after 
World War II, the combination of the Red Scare and the broader postwar culture of 
consensus had muffled existing pacifist activity in metropolitan Boston, as elsewhere. By 
the mid-1950s, however, a small minority of residents began to articulate a new set of 
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fears about the threat of Cold War and the potential harm of nuclear weapons and started 
to call for disarmament and an end to nuclear testing. Jerome Grossman, the organizer of 
the Moratorium who would later earn the titles of “dean of the Massachusetts Peace 
movement” and “Number One Suburban Do-Gooder,” was one such suburbanite and his 
background provides a valuable lens into the membership of this movement.11  
Grossman lived with his wife and three young children in the Waban 
neighborhood of Newton and served as president of Mass Envelope, his family’s 
stationary manufacturing company. Although he supported both Henry Wallace and the 
Progressive Party in the late 1940s, he spent much of his spare time during the 1950s 
with his own children and as a League Little coach and a member of the Parent-Teacher 
Association.12 It was his “very-child oriented” suburban-centered worldview coupled 
with his predilection toward progressive politics that sparked his initial concern about the 
dangers of nuclear weapons.13 In the mid-1950s, a friend brought Grossman to an 
American Friends Service Committee meeting in Cambridge where he learned more 
about the power and danger of nuclear weapons. The information hardened Grossman’s 
opposition to the Cold War and nuclear armament. Grossman soon after joined the 
National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), which was working for a nuclear 
test ban. He grew quickly disillusioned, however, by the groups approach which he saw 
as consisting primarily of writing letters to newspapers, organizing “quiet” dinners, and 
protesting small military installations. “We were talking to ourselves, a very thin slice of 
the citizenry, an upper middle-class phenomenon,” he later declared, and “we weren’t 
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reaching the public. ” By 1960, he had decided to leave the group in search of a more 
effective means to build widespread public outrage over the Cold War.14  
Grossman shared the conclusion of members of the small local campus peace 
movement that peace activists should use “the political system to bring issues and ideas” 
to the public  “because we can’t reach them any other way.”15 A group of students and 
faculty from Boston area universities had participated in the national rallies demanding a 
nuclear test ban in New York and in Washington that drew crowds of 6,000 people in the 
early 1960s. The activists, nevertheless, realized that these demonstrations did little to 
alter federal policy and decided that a political campaign might provide a more effective 
way to draw attention and power to their ideas. 16 In the spring of 1962, delegates from 
the group met with Harvard history professor H. Stuart Hughes, urging him to run for the 
U.S. Congress on a peace platform.17 The grandson of former Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes, he had served with the Office of Strategic Services in 
World War II, worked at the State Department, and was a leading member of SANE. He 
had also authored six books including An Approach to Peace, which presented his views 
on the need for unilateral disarmament.  
The always erudite Hughes agreed to run but told them that the Senate was a more 
appropriate forum for their experiment since the Constitution gave it more of a role in 
foreign policy. The Senate also proved preferable since Republican George Lodge, the 
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son of Henry Cabot Lodge, and Democrat Edward Kennedy, in his first run for public 
office, were already engaged in a highly publicized fight for the seat left open by John F. 
Kennedy. The peace activists knew from the start that victory in the race of political 
pedigrees was a longshot. Yet, they saw the opportunity as a means to obtain a wide 
forum for peace issues, show the failures of the federal government’s action on the 
subject, and get the attention of the President who had a personal investment in the race.18 
Though a registered Democrat, Hughes ran as an Independent in order to stay in the race 
beyond the primary and to draw attention to the fact that there was “ a lack of new 
thought in both major parties on foreign relations.”19 Hughes’s campaign platform 
focused on issues of peace including limiting the buildup of nuclear weapons by the 
United States, ending all nuclear testing, admitting China to the United Nations, and 
alleviating the dependency of Massachusetts on military contracts through conversion to 
a peacetime economy. No candidate, either locally or nationally, since Harry Wallace in 
1948 had provided this serious a critique of Cold War liberalism. Hughes’ stance quickly 
gained the support of both peace-minded students and a number of suburban residents, 
including Jerome Grossman. 
The effort also drew the attention of the suburban-centered peace organization 
Voice of Women-New England (VOW). Four married mothers--Mrs. Mark Howe of 
Cambridge, Mrs. Roger Fisher of Cambridge, Mrs. Donell Boardman of Acton, and Mrs. 
Eugene Beslisle--founded the organization in the fall of 1961 to take local action against 
atmospheric testing and towards the goal of “a world without war. ”  The all-female 
group, which had an affiliation with the Women’s Strike for Peace and shared the 
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maternalist ideology of the national organization. VOW based its mission upon a sense of 
faith and duty that “women acting together, can raise a plea for human survival that can 
be heard round the world” and those “whose business is to bring up and protect the 
world’s children” must as they “do at home---plead for patience.” 20  
While the group technically encompassed all of New England, the founders 
attracted the greatest following in the affluent suburbs along Route 128 outside Boston. 
The early members, like Jerome Grossman, shared concern for the future of their children 
and families and a desire to avert the threat of nuclear war.21 Rhona Shoul of Newton had 
been politically active in college and then as a social worker, but after getting married 
had devoted her full energy to her family. She recognized the dangers her young children 
confronted in a world of political tension and unnecessary militarization and decided to 
take action.22 Shoul helped to form a local chapter in her own town along with close 
friends Kay Stein and Louise Lown in January 1962, which quickly became the nucleus 
of the organization.  Upholding their commitment to maternalist ideals, during its first six 
months the hundred members of the regional group staged a vigil at the State House, 
collected two thousands signatures for a petition opposing nuclear war which they 
delivered to Rose Kennedy in Hyannisport, and passed out leaflets at local supermarkets 
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entitled “Radioactivity, Food and You.”23 When Stuart Hughes spoke at a VOW meeting 
in the spring of 1962 it galvanized the women into action, and they made his candidacy a 
top priority. Several members took leadership roles on his staff.24 The campaign provided 
the group with a means to prove itself as a legitimate peace organization and exposed 
these individual members to the possibilities of working through the formal channels of 
elected politics for nuclear disarmament.  
Massachusetts’s election law required an independent candidate running for state 
office to collect 72,500 signatures before July. Hughes would later attest to the 
importance of the deadline in creating widespread support for his bid. He surmised that 
without the necessary signatures “my candidacy might never have been more than 
drawing-room conversation in the neighborhood of Harvard Square.”25 Chester Hartman, 
a young urban planner also active in the fair housing movement, whom others deemed an 
“organizational genius,” served as the mastermind of the ten-week petition drive 
recruiting hundreds of volunteers.26 Hartman picked local coordinators, assigned each 
town a signature quota, and prepared detailed instructions on how to canvass. The project 
became most effective, according to Hughes,  “along the arc of educated, prosperous 
suburbia running through the near-urban Brookline and Cambridge through Newton, 
Lexington and Lincoln to exurban Weston and Wayland.” Hughes recalled that in these 
Route 128 communities “liberal-minded middle-class housewives did most of the 
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work.”27 Many of these women belonged to VOW and relied on their existing suburban 
social networks in order to get signatures. Ruth Siedel the Brookline coordinator led a 
group primarily of young mothers “deeply concerned about the kind of world their 
children are going to grow up in.” 28 The group quickly collected 5,200 signatures, which 
constituted 16 percent of Brookline’s voting population.  
The signature drive faced more difficulty outside of the affluent suburbs. 
Hartman, therefore, recruited college students from Boston-area colleges to supplement 
the local efforts. During the week, the undergraduates would canvass Boston 
neighborhoods and housing developments and on the weekend Hartman chartered buses 
to caravans to industrial cities like Worcester and Springfield and smaller towns across 
the state.  The campaign eventually gathered 149,000 signatures from residents in 262 
Bay State municipalities. The Town of Clerk of Watertown dubbed the Hughes signature 
campaign the “best organized effort of this kind I’ve seen in 25 years in office.”29 The 
Boston Herald Traveler published a cartoon of a bespectacled Hughes holding up a long 
sheet of names at the front of a large parade of people holding up signs of support with 
the caption “Anyone Else?”30 Like the Good Neighbors for Fair Housing Pledge 
campaign that also occurred in 1962 in the same communities, the effort brought into 
sharp focus the effectiveness of grassroots suburban liberals to build support for their 
causes.  
The Hughes campaign sought to maintain the momentum of the signature drive 
through the November election. Jerome Grossman decided to take a leave from his job to 
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serve as campaign manager and oversee the fundraising and canvassing activity. The 
campaign continued to draw together a diverse coalition of supporters. College student 
Philip Shrag later recalled the excitement of working with “housewives, doctors, union 
organizers, retired people, lawyers and others” for “the same goals of nuclear arms 
control and better distributive justice.”31 Building on the infrastructure established by 
signature drive, the campaign experienced its greatest success in its fundraising efforts. 
Throughout the fall, suburban supporters hosted a series of fundraising parties in the 
suburbs as well as cultural events such as an art auction, a chamber music concert, and a 
performance by folk singer Pete Seeger called “Sing Out for Hughes.” The campaign 
eventually raised $150,000 through direct solicitation.32 During the last six weeks of the 
campaign, local Hughes outlets adopted a program of “intensive peace education” by 
door-to-door outreach to “every voting household,” distribution of buttons and stickers, 
and periodic driving of a sound truck through residential neighborhoods. 33 Stuart Hughes 
encouraged campaigners to summon their final reserves “because literally every vote for 
us will have world-wide importance.”34  
Hughes, Grossman and many of the staff members recognized by the fall that 
Kennedy would be impossible to beat, but believed that their model of grassroots action 
could “be of great value as a guide to future campaigns” and a strong showing would lead 
to “dozens of similar political efforts in New England and throughout the nation” in the 
1964 election.35 Volunteers in Brookline, Lexington, Newton and Cambridge, therefore, 
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continued to canvass their communities distributing leaflets with slogans such as “The 
Nuclear Age is No Time for Politics as Usual!” and  “Make Your Vote Count!”36  The 
members of the Brookline for Hughes committee took out an advertisement in the local 
newspaper endorsing him as the only candidate who “really recognizes that 
thermonuclear war is the greatest threat of our time.”37 “We are not just supporting a 
candidate,” Brookline volunteer Ethel Alper explained about her reasons for continuing 
to campaign,  “We are supporting an ideal.”38 In late October Hughes himself declared,  
“the response to this candidacy has been spectacular. We have made a great dent in 
Massachusetts politics. We have created a new political style which will serve as an 
example for the future.”39 
The outbreak of the Cuban Missile Crisis just weeks before the election presented 
a major setback for the campaign. In line with his platform Hughes widely distributed a 
plan for peaceful resolution that suggested Kennedy abandon unilateral action and “act 
calmly” through the United Nations.40 This unpopular position made Hughes’ chances of 
victory even more remote. In the general election, Kennedy became one of youngest 
people ever to win a Senate seat. Hughes became notable in another sense as one of the 
few candidates in American political history to receive significantly more signatures to 
get on the ballot than actual votes in the election. Hughes won 52,000 votes or 2.3 
percent, of the vote doing best in upper middle-class suburban precincts such as 
Lexington, Brookline and Newton and parts of Boston and Cambridge where he had the 
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most active local organizations. Hughes blamed his lack of support outside the suburbs 
on the media’s overemphasis of his position on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Campaign 
workers privately noted as another major setback the fact that the academic and well-
pedigreed Hughes had difficulty connecting to blue-collar citizens and only seemed 
comfortable with voters at suburban cocktail parties where the guests had a similar 
economic and educational level.41 
Many participants, nevertheless, interpreted the success of the campaign less in 
the votes tallied than in the number of volunteers it had attracted. More than three 
thousand people worked for Hughes over the course of the campaign, and the candidate 
later deemed it “the largest amateur organization” in “recent American political history” 
and one of “most devoted and “most united.” Hughes believed that the significance of his 
candidacy lay in the fact that for “the first time since the 1930s the whole liberal 
dissenting constituency found itself under one tent.”42  The campaign also demonstrated 
that a large contingent of these dissenters lived in Boston’s most affluent suburbs. 
Hughes declared that during the 1950s his followers “had quietly gone about their 
business, behaving as their neighbors did, swallowing their anger and their fears for their 
children,” and the campaign provided them a chance to channel those views politically. 
He later called it “a precursor of larger things to come.”43 While the low turnout 
prevented organizers from achieving the overarching goal of proving the political 
viability of the peace issue in this particular campaign, it did convince the campaign 
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leaders both the possibility of working within the political system and the importance of 
the liberal suburbanites in order to do so.  
 
Political Action for Peace  
In the aftermath of the election, the members of the Hughes campaign sought to 
direct the momentum from the effort into a more permanent organization committed to 
the political viability of peace issues.44  Throughout November and December 1962, the 
primary Hughes activists including Jerome Grossman, Chester Hartman, Elizabeth 
Boardman, Marty Peretz, Philip Shrag and the candidate himself staged meetings in 
living rooms throughout the Route 128 suburbs to discuss the best way to translate their 
efforts around a single candidate into an organization committed to working for peace 
through politics.45 Thus, the group agreed on establishing an organization with the 
purpose to “develop and apply political power in order to bring the issues connected with 
ending the arms race to the center of the political arena.”  They decided to call 
Massachusetts Political Action for Peace or PAX (the Latin word for peace). 46 At the 
first official PAX meeting on January 5, 1963, at Weston’s town hall, 90 people present 
agreed to establish “a new political voice in Massachusetts” dedicated to ensuring that the 
“sentiment for peace is clearly heard at election time and strengthened in the period in 
between campaign.” In order to fulfill this goal, they adopted the Hughes Peace Platform 
as their guiding ideological mission and “common basis for activity.” 47 They decided to 
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advance its principles by encouraging and supporting candidates committed to peace and 
disarmament to run for national office both within and outside the two-party system. 
While they hoped for electoral victory, when that would be difficult, like with the Hughes 
campaign, they would run “educational campaigns.” During off-election periods, the 
PAX agreed to educate local communities on peace issues and sponsor legislation. The 
founding members elected Jerome Grossman as chairman, Sumner Rosen as vice-
chairman, Chester Hartman as secretary and H.A. Crosby Forbes as the treasurer.48 
Wayland housewife Flora Dunham, who joined the Hughes Campaign at the 
encouragement of her teenage son, took the paid position as executive secretary. PAX 
opened a headquarters at 18 Brattle Street in Cambridge and recruited 1500 initial 
members largely from the lists compiled during the Hughes campaign.  
 During its inaugural year, the Federal government established a Partial Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty that President Kennedy signed with the Soviet Union over the summer. 
PAX celebrated the signing of the treaty and took indirect credit. The leaders believed 
that the Hughes campaign had helped alert the public, politicians, and the president about 
the issue. When the Senate ratified the treaty, Stuart Hughes proclaimed,  “Far-out ideas 
that were first voiced in Massachusetts during the senatorial campaign…have since been 
take [n] up by responsible spokesmen.” He went on to state, “it would be wrong, of 
course, to try to claim credit for these heartening new developments. What would be 
more correct would be to show how a non-conformist and electorally hopeless campaign 
could inject a more imaginative type of thinking into American public discourse.”49 After 
the announcement, Grossman declared it was gratifying to have the president adopt the 
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language and ideas of the peace movement but warned that if PAX became “merely blind 
supporters of the Kennedy administration and cease to pressure it, we will be doing a 
disservice to that Administration, our country and the world.”50  
PAX struggled, however, to fight for peace and nuclear disarmament in a moment 
when the government appeared more responsive to their goals.  After some deliberation, 
the PAX members decided to focus their attention on “planning for peace,” especially 
conversion of the state and national economy. In the spring of 1964, PAX along with 
local chapters of the United Auto Workers and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), 
sponsored a conference entitled “After the Arms Race” about how to address the unmet 
economic needs of many poor Massachusetts residents.51 PAX members interpreted the 
issue as a way for peace groups to build connections with other constituencies affected by 
the focus on arms, especially African-Americans in the inner city.52 This stance proved 
both ideologically progressive and politically convenient since the Civil Rights 
Movement was experiencing its greatest mainstream success in 1964 and provided a 
means to draw both more members and more attention from politicians to the peace 
cause.  At its second annual state convention held in Cambridge in May 1964, PAX 
revised its platform to include more attention to issues of economic inequality. “Both 
American and Russian societies are confronted with major internal social and economic 
problems,” the Preamble asserted.  “Neither society can solve these problems or those of 
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world poverty as long as they spend a major part of their budgets for instruments of 
war.”53  
PAX took other steps to assist the national and local civil rights movements. PAX 
publicly supported the February 1964 Stayout and urged parents and children to 
participate in what it dubbed “a nationwide act of conscience.” Grossman also provided 
the mimeograph paper for the School Stayout. In a letter of gratitude, James Breeden, the 
co-organizer of the event, expressed a hope that the Stayout helped develop closer ties 
between PAX and the Massachusetts Freedom Movement (MFM) and “lay the ground for 
increased cooperation and common awareness between our groups.”54 Breeden and his 
fellow Stayout organizer and MFM leader Noel Day later became members of the PAX 
Advisory Committee, which marked the first step in fusing the issues of peace and civil 
rights.   
The 1964 election provided a means for the two socially conscious groups and 
their overlapping suburban members to align in a formal coalition. PAX worked with 
MFM on the presidential and a congressional campaign in order to prove its credibility as 
a political action committee and further illuminate the links between peace and civil 
rights. In the presidential contest, these groups shared more of an opposition to 
Republican Barry Goldwater than an abiding support of Democrat Lyndon Johnson. 
Goldwater’s campaign struck against the core principles of these movements, and they 
interpreted his platform as “destructive to an open society at home and a peaceful 
world.”55   Members of PAX and other peace groups feared that the “extremist” and 
“unpredictable” Goldwater was more apt to use nuclear weapons than Johnson, while the 
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Arizona Senator’s consistent opposition to civil rights deeply troubled and concerned 
activists in that arena.  In response Grossman and Breeden decided to form a coalition 
named the Committee Against Political Extremism (CAPE). Though the name provided 
the group with the appearance of an anticommunist organization, the target was in fact 
Goldwater’s ideology and political style.  The members of the alliance included PAX, the 
Massachusetts Freedom Movement (MFM) the Massachusetts Federation for Fair 
Housing and Equal Rights, and the local chapters of the Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). 
The steering committee of the ad hoc group revealed the overlapping interests of the 
grassroots peace and civil rights movements in the cause. James Breeden served of 
chairman of the committee that included Grossman, Julius Bernstein Alan Gartner of 
CORE, Paul Parks, and Phyllis and William Ryan.56 
 CAPE had two simple goals: first, to turn out a large vote against Goldwater, and 
second, to convince leading officials in the state Republican Party to repudiate him. 
While the group recognized Goldwater’s slim chances for victory, they saw his 
nomination “as a major threat to society” and his control of the Republican Party “a 
continuing danger.” 57 Breeden publicly declared that by nominating Goldwater the 
Republican Party had “contemptuously slapped the face of all citizens who have recently 
turned America toward the goal of equality of all.” He warned that CAPE would “oppose 
with all the energy of our combined strength, this man who would turn America away 
from that goal.”58 Throughout the fall, in order to fulfill that mandate, CAPE issued 
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sharply-worded press releases denouncing Goldwater’s stance on civil rights, and PAX 
distributed copies of “Goldwater on Foreign Policy.” 59 CAPE also sponsored a series of 
rallies, including a huge protest when Goldwater spoke at Fenway Park that September. 
The silent vigil drew thousands of people to nearby Lansdowne Street and sent a clear 
message of opposition.60  
The additional steps CAPE took to ensure Goldwater’s sound defeat demonstrate 
the specifically suburban liberal dimensions of its strategy. Breeden and Grossman co-
authored an instructional leaflet entitled “What You Can Do to Defeat Goldwater and 
Goldwaterism” to mobilize the members of CAPE’s affiliated groups, particularly the 
ones with a well-organized and geographically-wide base.61  The suburban-centered 
Federation for Fair Housing and Equal Rights enthusiastically took up the instructions of 
the flyer providing “hands, brains and funds.”62 The Lexington Committee for Civil 
Rights became particularly active, encouraging members to send letters to Republican 
candidates, donate funds, and purchase bumper stickers produced by PAX that read, 
“Stop Barry—the Life You Save might be your own.”63 Once again demonstrating the 
effectiveness of suburban liberals at working within formal channels of power, supporters 
sent hundreds of postcards to several leading state republicans including Edward Brooke, 
Eliot Richardson, and John Volpe voicing their opposition to Goldwater and support for 
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CAPE.64 The various activities of this full-frontal campaign influenced Brooke to 
completely disassociate himself with Goldwater, while Richardson and Volpe publicly 
voicedtheir strong reservations. 65 After Johnson’s landslide victory in both the state and 
national elections, CAPE felt its job was done and disbanded.  
This liberal peace and civil rights coalition confronted more difficulty in its 
simultaneous effort at the congressional level. In line with its goals, PAX decided in 1964 
to mobilize an electoral campaign as a means to fulfill its founding mission. Recognizing 
that civil rights more than peace was the “great liberal issue of the movement,” they 
selected as a potential candidate Noel Day. PAX believed Day represented one of “the 
few civil rights figures who understood and could articulate the essential interconnection 
of civil rights with the issues of poverty, unemployment and peace.”66 The 31-year-old 
African-American activist and social worker ran the St. Mark Social Center and, along 
with his former Dartmouth roommate Breeden, had co-organized the School Stayouts and 
served on the PAX Advisory Committee. When representatives approached Day about 
running for Congress, the political novice was initially reluctant, but PAX persuaded him 
by promising to provide financial and personal support. Day and his advisors decided 
registering as an Independent had symbolic and practical value as it showed his desire to 
remain outside the two party system and it would allow him to voice his position seven 
weeks beyond the primary.67 
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The campaign architects selected the Ninth Congressional District as the site for 
the effort, which for two reasons proved “symbolically ideal.”68 First, the district 
included 97 percent of Boston’s black population and the only significant concentration 
of racial minorities in the Bay State. The District, which comprised 16 of the city’s 22 
wards including the precincts of the notoriously all-white blue-collar and racial 
discriminatory South Boston, had never elected an African-American to any political 
office. In fact, Day was the first African-American ever to run for Congress in 
Massachusetts.  Second, Speaker of the U.S. Representatives John McCormack had 
represented the Ninth District for 36 years and run opposed in most of the past elections. 
Many observers attuned to the intricacies of Boston politics interpreted Day’s 
announcement of candidacy on June 4, 1964 as an act of “audacity.”69 Yet for PAX, 
which hoped less for Day’s victory than for an educational forum to discuss peace and 
civil rights, McCormack represented the “perfect symbol of entrenched political power.”  
Day himself believed by challenging “a figure of such great national and local stature” he 
could  “highlight the failure of the existing political system to meet basic social needs” 
and “the consequences of political impotence on the part of the disadvantaged.”70 Day ran 
on a platform of “poverty, peace and civil rights” and promised to surpass McCormack’s 
record in each of those areas. He also sought to draw state and national attention to the 
problems of poverty and discrimination within the speaker’s home district. 
                                                
68  Hartman, “The Noel Day Campaign.”  
69 Richard Neff, “’Rights Leader in Race,” Christian Science Monitor, No Date, LCRC.  
70  Hartman, “The Noel Day Campaign.”   
 
248 
Day and his strategists hoped to use the campaign to bring together the 
fragmented issues and constituencies of “poverty, peace and civil rights.” 71 His speeches 
and campaign literature also emphasized this goal. For instance, a leaflet entitled “Time 
for a better life” declared that Day’s candidacy “unites the vital issues of our time: for 
real disarmament, civil rights, better cities, [an] end to poverty…an economy and society 
that invests in human lives.” Another flyer with the heading “Time for Investment in 
Human Lives” in support of “planned disarmament” asserted that “United States spent 
“56 billion dollars a year on bombs and missiles” and “a part of this billion could be used 
for job retraining, building schools and decent housing, training doctors and teachers and 
creating better cities.”72 These claims reveal the ways in which Day aimed to translate his 
focus on issues specific to the black community into concerns of society as a whole.  
The campaign organizers came to boldly envision the campaign “as the prototype 
of a movement” to bring together “the economically insecure and disadvantaged,” “the 
civil rights movement, the peace movement,” and “the radical intellectuals “in order to 
reveal “the relatedness of their interests and to create a new base of political power. ”73  
The campaign fell short of these lofty goals, however, as the coalition disproportionately 
consisted of white suburban liberals. Many grassroots liberal suburban activists saw 
Day’s candidacy as a means both to combine their interest in peace and civil rights and to 
test the possibilities of electoral politics for creating social equality. PAX provided over 
half the funds for the campaign and much of the organizing energy. Many of the people 
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who had been active in the Hughes campaign sought to recreate their tactics in that effort 
as well.  PAX members canvassed the district in order to place Day on the ballot and to 
increase his support. The group encouraged “car-loads of suburban men and women,” 
providing them “with maps, voter lists and moral support. 74 The members of VOW also 
became involved in this effort soliciting signatures and participating in telephone 
drives.75 Members of these groups performed other traditional campaign duties such as 
leafleting, running a sound truck, and going door-to-door. The Fair Housing Federation 
provided the Day campaign with the mailing list of its more than 3000 members 
throughout metropolitan Boston to send out information about the campaign.76 Federation 
president Roy Brown sent a follow up letter to members stating that it “always 
recognized the inseparability of politics and from real social advances” and emphasized 
that the campaign was a “logical extension of  [Day’s] civil rights activities.”77 The letter 
provided members with further information about Day and how to get involved in the 
campaign. Taking up this call, the Lexington Civil Rights Committee invited Day to 
speak in the suburbs about the campaign.  
Despite this outpouring of support from suburbanites outside of the district, Day’s 
candidacy floundered. The architects had hoped that Day would translate the support he 
had received within the African-American community for the Stayout into votes on 
Election Day. He was unable, however, to match the energy and excitement of the 
February event. Contributing to the problem, Day himself did not appear as committed as 
supporters would have liked.  Throughout the campaign, he remained primarily focused 
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on his ongoing civil rights and community organizing obligations. When he did campaign 
he primarily went to events in places like Lexington and Newton, where those in 
attendance could not vote in the race.  Furthermore, the members of Boston’s African-
American leadership failed to take Day’s candidacy seriously. These leaders interpreted 
the campaign as one run and financed by “white outsiders” and believed that the 
emphasis on peace issues gave it too much of a “middle-class flavor.”78 Day eventually 
received 7,440 votes amounting to five percent of overall total cast. He did best in the 
precinct with the highest concentration of African-Americans and worst in the five most 
predominately Irish-Catholic areas where he received only 341 votes combined. PAX had 
not anticipated a win, but this poor showing brought into sharp focus its failure at both 
fielding a credible campaign and in using the political system to build a diverse coalition 
around the issues of peace and civil rights. The loss sent PAX into a period of internal 
reflection that extended beyond simply the Day campaign to PAX’s overall goals and 
purpose.79  Hartman observed, that PAX had “started out largely as a peace group,” but 
“gradually and without specific acknowledgment” had been “pulled (and pushed) into a 
role as the omniliberal political organization” and needed to redefine its mission.80  
 
“A Moral Blunder” 
As PAX sought to reassess its mission, the United States military’s presence in 
Vietnam came to define the group’s purpose and future. Following the 1964 election, 
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PAX realized its unique focus on mobilizing popular support through political channels 
could provide “a much-needed voice” against increased Vietnam involvement. 81  After 
the election, it decided to devote the majority of its energy and money to seeking 
alternatives to the Johnson administration’s current policy and action. In line with its 
ideological opposition to armament, Jerome Grossman and other members of PAX feared 
the situation in Vietnam would lead to a nuclear war between the United States and either 
the Soviet Union or China and would further exacerbate racial and economic inequality.82  
In December 1964, the group circulated a petition to President Lyndon Johnson signed by 
400 people urging against the expansion of the war in Vietnam and plans to bomb supply 
routes in the country.83 In a corresponding press release PAX member H.A. Crosby 
Forbes dubbed escalation “a military, a strategic and above all, a moral blunder” and 
warned it “would have demoralizing effects on our own society.”84 When the telegram 
failed to deter Johnson from escalating military action, the group developed a series of 
tactics to raise public and political attention to the dangers of the situation. Using the free 
paper supplied by the Grossman’s envelope company, throughout the winter and spring 
of 1965 PAX issued many position papers, printed 200,000 pamphlets calling out the 
“inhumanity” and “illegality” of American action. In addition, it distributed bumper 
stickers saying “END VIETNAM WAR NOW” with the aim to get them on cars from 
“coast to coast.” 85 These Vietnam-related activities provided the group a new focus and 
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by 1966 the PAX ranks included 6,000 people predominately concentrated in the Route 
128 suburbs.  
The military escalation in Vietnam also reenergized VOW, and the group played a 
crucial role in awakening opposition to the war within the suburbs, especially among 
women.   Following the Hughes campaign and the test ban, VOW, like PAX, struggled 
with where to channel its energy. The group became involved in many of the national and 
international women’s pacifist activities, and some members even traveled to Moscow as 
guests of the Soviet women’s committee.  The group also took an increased interest in 
civil rights.  Rita Paine of Weston led a delegation of members into Boston to participate 
in the School Stayout and members had canvassed for Noel Day. The war provided VOW 
the ideal issue to fulfill its goals of promoting peace and disarmament through political 
activism and civic education. In 1965, group became involved in a variety of activities 
including letter writing campaigns, telephone chains, and on July 4th sponsored an 
airplane banner that flew over public beaches and Fenway Park declaring “End the War 
in Vietnam, Use UN for Peace. Write LBJ.”86  
VOW members experimented with a variety of tactics to deploy their unique 
position as the suburban middle-class housewives and mothers toward the war 
opposition. Similar to the women who had participated in the fair housing movement, 
these women strategically deployed gender norms and the strong political and social 
associations of motherhood to advance the antiwar cause.  VOW members recruited new 
members through their suburban social networks urging neighbors, PTA members and 
fellow congregants to join the organization. The group gained many of its new members 
from the ranks of the suburban fair housing movement, like Anita Greenbaum and Kay 
                                                
86 Voice of  Women-New England Newsletter, October 1965, Box 1, Folder 20, VOW.  
 
253 
Stein of Newton who had grown increasingly worried about Vietnam. VOW also 
attracted other new members like Dorit Glass who had recently moved to the Boston 
area. She knew few people and the organization provided an opportunity “to meet others 
nearby and make friends with women who had political ideas similar” to her own.87  
VOW sponsored traditional suburban social and fundraising activities to draw 
financial and numerical support for the war opposition. The group organized an annual 
“Flea Market for Peace” asking members to donate “unbroken” antiques, “unwanted” 
wedding gifts, old jewelry, and other small items.88 These activities raised the necessary 
funds for VOW to charter buses, cars, and even planes so that its members could attend 
the national protests in Washington against the war. VOW members also took part in 
protests closer to home. In 1966, the group, along with the local chapter of the Women 
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), began holding a weekly silent 
hour-long vigil on Wednesdays at noon in the front of the Old State House in Downtown 
Boston with an average of 25 people attending each session. The participants found the 
effort rewarding and many suburban communities developed baby-sitting pools so that 
mothers could attend. 89 A few months later, the VOW and WILPF decided to hold a 
simultaneous weekly vigil on the Battle Green in Lexington.90 
 The growing suburban involvement in the opposition to the war encouraged 
VOW to become more experimental and aggressive in its tactics and position.91 By 1967, 
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the group realized that the combination of their suburban image and social connections 
could provide respectability and financial support to more radical causes. “We were 
comfortable middle-class women,” Rhona Shoul later recalled, “if you’ve got these kinds 
of resources that a lot of people don’t have, then you’ve got a responsibility to do 
something.”92 The group began to believe that imploding the military conscription system 
provided a main way to stop the war and thus encouraging draft resistance offered them 
“the most obvious way to channel time and money.” In October 1967 Michael Ferber, a 
leader of New England Resistance, spoke to VOW about the nonviolent tactics of his 
group to help men avoid the draft. Soon after, the police arrested Ferber at a rally on 
Boston Common for burning his draft card, which became a cause celebre for radicals 
across the country.93  Several VOW members had joined the 4,000-person crowd and 
came to believe that the organization must support young men whose conscience 
prevented them from cooperating with the draft. 94  VOW hosted activities such as a 
“festive supper party” in Newton for 150 people where members New England 
Resistance and Boston Resistance Group engaged in informal dialogue with their 
suburban supporters. At the beginning of the evening Reverend Harold Fray, minister of 
the Eliot Church, stated that the presence of so many “middle-class types”—doctors, 
                                                                                                                                            
Women-New England, Newsletter, May 1967, Box 1, Folder 21, VOW; “Antiwar Protest is Held in 
Lexington,” New York Times, July 5, 1967.  
92 McKormack, “Good Politics is Doing Something.”  
93 For more on this event and the draft resistance movement in Boston, see Foley, Confronting the War 
Machine.  
94 Voice of Women-New England, Newsletter, November 1967, Box 1, Folder 21, VOW clearly deployed 
their middle-class, middle-aged identities as polite and respectable suburban mothers and housewives to 
earn parental respect and admiration of the resisters. VOW. Many young women had confronted difficulty 
joining Boston’s draft resistance movement. Leslie Cagan who would become a prominent feminist and 
peace activist, later described a meeting where the leaders told the females present that they could not 
speak because they did not face conscription. Amy Swerdlow suggests older women like the member of 
VOW met more success in large part because they did not seek to enter as peers or equals but came from 
the vantage of mothers and housewives. Amy Swerdlow, “‘Not My Son, Not Your Son, Not Their Son’: 
Mothers Against the Vietnam Draft” in Give Peace A Chance, 159-170. 
 
255 
lawyers, technicians---at a meeting of this sort clearly indicated that the conscience of 
America is awakening.”95 The event raised over $1,000 to benefit the Resistance 
Movement.  
Opposing the draft appealed to the maternalist instincts of VOW members on a 
general level, but specifically many with teenage and college-aged sons who potentially 
faced conscription. They persuaded school officials in Newton and Lexington to allow 
high school students to discuss their options and alternatives with draft counselors.96  The 
involvement in the Resistance cause inspired many of VOW members such as Shoul, 
Elizabeth Boardman, Alice Aronow and Helen Damon to encourage their own sons to 
become conscientious objectors. 97 In addition, the group worked with a group of mothers 
from Roxbury to extend some of these form of draft counseling toward the black 
community as well. These activities reveal the behind-the-scenes ways that upper-
middle-class suburban residents sought to participate and support the growing antiwar 
effort. VOW and its allies, however, rarely discussed the limited number of residents 
from places like Newton, Brookline and Lexington who actually served in combat in 
direct contrast to the statistics from places like South Boston, Chelsea and Roxbury. In 
doing so, they contributed to naturalizing the forms of class inequities at the very heart of 
the conscription issue.98  
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“Suburban Chic”   
For the more politically minded members of the Massachusetts peace movement, 
this increased activism had potential pitfalls.  Jerome Grossman believed that the 
Vietnam War had accelerated a “drift” toward educational and protest activities among 
peace activists. He continually sought to remind PAX of its commitment to the “premise 
that the most effective and efficient way of bringing about desirable changes in foreign 
and military policy is through the application of political pressure based upon political 
power” and their “largest contribution can be made within a specifically political 
framework.”99 Between 1965 and 1968, PAX sought to create  “action programs” with 
“political effects” that would “ be relevant in the American political scene” and play “a 
catalytic role” by forging an alliance with “civil rightists, the suburban liberals, the 
academics and the students.”100  
PAX also took steps to more directly challenge Johnson and his administration. 
Grossman recalled learning about the Gulf of Tonkin invasion while standing in the 
picket line outside the Goldwater rally in Fenway Park and saying to those around him, 
“maybe we’re picketing the wrong candidate.101 By 1966, he and his collaborators had 
shifted their anger to the president, helping to organize a large demonstration when 
Johnson came to speak in Boston. But they hoped to do more than simply protest. PAX 
took to heart the lessons from the failed Hughes and Day independent candidacies and 
realized that the group could be more effective by working within the framework of a 
political party. As the 1968 election approached, Grossman saw a challenge to Johnson’s 
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hold on the presidency as a means for the grassroots group to direct popular opposition to 
the war into political action. 
 Grossman, therefore, joined Allard Lowenstein and Curtis Gans of the Americans 
for Democratic Action (ADA) in their ongoing campaign to “Dump Johnson.”102 He 
traveled with them to meetings with Senators George McGovern, William Fulbright and 
Robert Kennedy, but each of them refused the offer. In August 1967, Grossman and his 
wife attended a dinner party at the Wellesley home of Dr. Lester Grinspoon. Fellow guest 
Dr. William Davidson, a close friend of Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, asked 
Grossman what he thought about his chances for the presidency. Grossman responded 
enthusiastically, stating he and PAX would be able to rally support and money for the 
effort as they had done in many previous campaigns. The next day, McCarthy himself 
phoned asking Grossman to come to Washington.103 Soon after, Grossman went back to 
the Capital bringing with him fellow PAX members Chester Hartman and Marty and Ann 
Peretz who spent five hours talking to McCarthy. Upon returning to Boston, they called a 
special PAX meeting where Grossman reported about McCarthy. “He has gray hair, 
wears a gray suit, has a gray personality,” Grossman disclosed, “but he’s all ours and he’s 
wiling to challenge Lyndon Johnson on the Vietnam War.”104 The members erupted in 
cheer convinced that they had found a candidate to challenge Johnson.105 
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PAX played a central role in getting the McCarthy campaign off the ground in 
Massachusetts and nationally in the early winter of 1968.  Though many members wished 
he would take a firmer and more radical stand on peace, they declared themselves as 
“going all out for Senator McCarthy.”106 PAX established the foundations for 
McCarthy’s challenge to Johnson in the state’s April 1968 presidential primary. The 
group began a weekly newsletter to inform potential volunteers about ways to assist the 
effort and to give them general information about the candidate. PAX also composed a 
list of 11 reasons that people, especially “main line Democrats,” should support 
McCarthy. They distributed and published the bullet points in the PAX newsletter, which 
by 1968 went out to 14,000 people.  The “Why Work for McCarthy” list stressed that 
such action would create “a change in the power structure of the Democratic Party,” 
influence the Democratic National Convention, get the peace issue discussed within a 
political context and demonstrate the political strength of the “anti-Vietnam forces at 
their broadest point.”107  
 By January 1968, Grossman was commuting to Washington a few days a week to 
work for McCarthy as National Director of Administration. These efforts gave PAX early 
influence with the candidate and a great deal of oversight over the structure of the 
campaign.108 The national campaign had planned to bypass the state, but Grossman and 
PAX persuaded the strategists that Massachusetts constituted “a hotbed of antiwar 
sentiment, with well-organized peace groups chomping at the bit to go work for a peace 
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candidate.” The national staffers assented.109 PAX and its network of supporters also 
provided early funds and volunteers for McCarthy’s bid in the primary in nearby New 
Hampshire. In addition, PAX encouraged the campaign to focus its energy on suburban 
communities and college campuses across the country. PAX recognized the “vast 
majority” of students were not part of SDS or Draft Resistance but still opposed the war, 
and so McCarthy would be wise to mobilize this constituency. 110 
 Even after the official establishment of Massachusetts for McCarthy Campaign, 
PAX continued to play an intrinsic role particularly in solidifying support among 
suburban liberals. The group provided the campaign with the model of grassroots 
mobilization that it had employed during the Stuart Hughes and Noel Day campaigns. 
Led by Concord lawyer Paul Counihan, the McCarthy campaign built directly upon 
infrastructure established by PAX and VOW by targeting areas already politically active 
against the war such as Lexington, Concord and Newton.111 Like earlier efforts, these 
suburban volunteers deployed both their social networks and social conventions in order 
to draw support and funds for the candidate. The members of PAX and VOW hosted 
countless “Wine and Cheese for McCarthy ” parties with speakers outlining the virtues of 
the candidate and the need to end the war.112Most journalists both at the time and 
subsequently focused on McCarthy’s student supporters in Massachusetts and overlooked 
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the importance of the suburban liberals in the success of his campaign in the Bay State.113 
During the primary, however, Abigail McCarthy described her husband’s constituency as 
“academia united with the mobile society of scientists, educators, technologists and the 
new post-World War II class.” 114 This description aptly characterized both the base of 
McCarthy’s support and the membership of the area’s peace groups. Most of these 
supporters did not need to get “Clean for Gene” because they already exhibited the image 
of suburban respectability.115  
The McCarthy campaign, in turn, provided suburban liberals in these 
communities the ideal means to channel their growing opposition to the war. VOW 
encouraged members to get involved who “crave an activity more effectively than 
demonstrations.”116  Lexington’s Bonnie Jones, active in both peace and civil rights 
causes, observed that most local liberals believed in her town “in being part of the 
process, the so-called mainstream, and participating in it and trying to change it from 
within” and the McCarthy candidacy represented an effective means to do so.117 The 
campaign marked the first time that so many suburban liberals at the grassroots 
converged around a single issue. Jones explained that before the campaign in Lexington 
“there were networks of people. The people I knew in town were active similar political 
organizations---Civil Rights Fair Housing---and they were sort of interlocked while other 
people in town got involved in the Democratic Town Committee, the League of Women 
Voters. The anti-war movement really bridged all of those in the suburbs.”118 The 
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excitement of the initiative also attracted many suburban residents who had never before 
been politically active. The campaign offered a safe way to channel their frustration at the 
war and get involved in local social life. One Lexington liberal activist later recalled 
“people who I never think of as being active in politics got drawn [in].”119  
Suburban support for McCarthy increased considerably after his success in the 
New Hampshire primary and remained strong even with Robert Kennedy’s decision to 
enter in the race.120 McCarthy ran officially unopposed in Massachusetts because the 
election fell after Johnson withdrew and before Hubert Humphrey or Kennedy had a 
chance to put their names on the ballot. The campaign, nevertheless, tried to bring out a 
big vote in order to send a message to the rest of the nation about McCarthy’s viability.121 
Suburban volunteers went into action making phone calls, leafleting shopping centers, 
and going door-to-door in order to fulfill that goal. PAX’s supplemented these efforts by 
placing 200 McCarthy ads in Boston subway cars.122 On April 30 McCarthy won the 
biggest number of votes in the history of the Massachusetts Democratic Presidential 
Primary, a higher tally than even John F. Kennedy in 1960. 123 The state headquarters 
glowed that “the Massachusetts effort has been exactly what Eugene McCarthy believes 
to be the political salvation of this country: involve by and direction from the 
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grassroots.124 Encouraged by these words, many residents remained committed to 
keeping the candidate “viable, visible, and valuable.”125 During the late spring, in order to 
provide funds for the candidate in the Oregon and California primaries, many residents 
continued to hold fundraisers with a uniquely suburban-bent sponsoring picnics, concerts, 
“cocktailathons,” raffles, and selling McCarthy fabric and buttons. 126 Yet by the summer, 
when McCarthy’s chances for victory appeared increasingly slim, his support lessened 
considerably.  
Despite the fact that McCarthy had not secured the Democratic nomination, 
Grossman, PAX and other suburban liberal activists saw the campaign as a major 
success. For those activists who had gotten their start working for Stuart Hughes six years 
earlier, the campaign finally confirmed the viability of working through the political 
system to achieve their goals.127 McCarthy’s effort had not only issued a career-ending 
blow to Johnson, but also placed antiwar issues into the center of the election and the 
Democratic Party’s agenda. Likewise, the campaign had both helped increase support and 
infrastructure for the opposition to Vietnam in the suburbs and had demonstrated that 
“massive grassroots sentiment can be transformed into effective political action.”128 
Although historian Allen Matusow later deemed “being for McCarthy was the latest 
variety of suburban chic” many of these residents remained committed to peace and 
political activism event after the campaign fell out of vogue.129  
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In spite of the election of Richard Nixon, the McCarthy campaign gave liberals a 
means to create a more formal and more long-term influence on state and national 
politics.  Throughout the summer and fall of 1968, Massachusetts campaign leaders 
including Paul Counihan, John Elder, Jerome Grossman, and Alvin Levin staged a series 
of meetings to discuss how to create an effective and broad-based political organization 
in the “spirit and format of the McCarthy Movement.”130 During the primaries, the press 
had dubbed the McCarthy style of campaigning with its emphasis on grassroots tactics 
and issues of social justice as the “New Politics” in contrast to the “old politics” the 
Democratic Party “Establishment.”131 The group of activists decided to take the “new 
politics” idea in both its name and practice. Although it retained its old headquarters, by 
September “Massachusetts McCarthy for President” had officially evolved into “Citizens 
for Participation Politics.”132 The organization sought to work for both legislation that 
would reform the political, social and electoral structure of the state and candidates who 
supported and embodied its “new politics” ideals. CPP’s commitment to operating within 
the formal channels of political power to realize its vision of democracy highlight the 
ways in which the organization embodied the direct influence not of just the McCarthy 
campaign, but other suburban liberal groups like PAX and the Fair Housing Federation as 
well.  
   Two weeks after Nixon defeated Humphrey, 400 people, largely from Boston’s 
suburbs, convened in Worcester for the official formation of the CPP.133 The convention 
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adopted a charter that reflected its commitment to reforming the political process and an 
emphasis on voter participation. “It is the goal of CPP,” the statement of purpose 
declared,  “to make the governmental and political process more responsive to the will 
and need all the people through their broader participation in that process and in the 
formulation of programs which affect them.”134 Expressing this commitment to “broad-
based participation,” the group sought to place the majority of its “decision making 
power at the grass-roots local level.”135 It also decided not to create formal ties with 
either party in part because in Massachusetts Republicans had filed more liberal 
legislation than Democrats and in part because it would enable them to put issues ahead 
of party labels.136 
The CPP concept attracted suburban residents like Emily Frankovich of 
Lexington who would become a major grassroots organizer for political causes during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. A reporter turned housewife, Frankovich had become active 
in the local League of Women Voters and strongly committed to working within the 
established system. Though against the war, Frankovich scoffed at activities like the 
silent vigils on the Battle Green, which she believed did nothing to affect candidates and 
politics. She had not considered McCarthy a credible candidate, but during the 1968 
Democratic National Convention her son was sick and she had “nothing to do except 
watch the convention on TV.”137 Watching the protests, she realized that 20 years earlier 
she would have been part of the action and then began thinking about the possibility of 
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her own son going to fight in “a silly war.”138 She sought to do something to change the 
political structure to end the war and decided to get involved in CPP as a means to work 
within the political process. She soon became the chair of what became one the group’s 
most active chapters.  
 CPP shared both an overlapping membership with PAX and a commitment to 
harness grassroots sentiments in the political action. CPP, nevertheless, sought to expand 
beyond PAX’s exclusive focus on peace get involved in a wide range of state and local 
issues. Following the convention CPP immediately began supporting legislation on 
electoral reform, civil service reform, air pollution, and became actively involved in the 
highway protest movement discussed in the following chapter. As CPP organized, PAX 
went through a period of self-redefinition. Despite, the success of the McCarthy 
campaign, the group had lost key members including Chester Hartman who came to 
believe that PAX was not radical enough. 139 After lengthy discussions, the group decided 
to get more involved in community organizing as a means to galvanize political action for 
peace. PAX had 14,000 people on its mailing list and decided, “now that public sentiment 
has become more liberal, it’s time that these 14,000 people move.”140 The leaders 
recognized “peace groups traditionally talk to themselves” and in order to avoid that 
tendency they had to focus more on activities that reached and mobilized people at the 
grassroots. This new emphasis brought PAX into even closer ideological and physical 
collaboration with CPP.  
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Hydrogen Bombs in Our Backyard  
 
The members of CPP and PAX discovered their first opportunity to work together 
and prove themselves as effective practitioners of “new politics” in a campaign to stop 
the construction of an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system in the suburbs of Boston. 
These groups mobilized a suburban-centered effort that ultimately redirected national 
defense policy, enhanced their shared cause, and provided an important blueprint for 
subsequent action.  The ABM issue dated back to the 1950s when the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff first proposed a nuclear weapon shield. In 1967 Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara announced that the United States would proceed with plans for a thin ABM 
system called “the Sentinel” that would detect enemy missiles by means of radar and 
destroy them with thermonuclear warheads. Each of these warheads cost at least $1 
million and would be a hundred times more powerful than the bomb dropped in 
Hiroshima. The plans called for 14 ABM bases spread throughout the United States with 
two in Massachusetts in the North Shore suburbs of Reading and North Andover. 
Congress allocated the first appropriation for the project in the summer of 1968. The 
military soon after broke ground in Reading and on a three hundred acre site in North 
Andover, a 13,000-person community 20 miles north of Boston. The army planned on 
placing radar tracking facilities, a power plant, military housing and long-range Spartan 
missiles at the location, 160 acres of which sat on state forest.141  Many well-known 
scientists, including Jerome Wiesner, the provost of MIT and National Science Advisor 
to President Kennedy, had publicly spoken out against construction, warning that such a 
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shield could not stop a nuclear weapon.  The issue proved more complicated, 
nevertheless, because Raytheon, the largest defense company on Route 128 had a $60 
million contract to build the missile site radars and this money would greatly enhance the 
Massachusetts economy.142   
The members of PAX, long fearful about the threat of nuclear weapons and 
staunch advocates of disarmament, strongly opposed the ABM idea and by December 
1968 turned their full attention to stopping it. In line with its commitment to grassroots 
methods, PAX decided that arousing widespread community concern provided the most 
effective way of preventing construction.143 PAX recognized, nevertheless, that the 
residents of the communities surrounding the proposed sites, including Andover, 
Lynnfield, Reading and Wakefield had voiced little opposition to either the Vietnam War 
or the ABM system and voted consistently Republican. The group, therefore, began 
formulating an outreach campaign to invoke action among more politically moderate 
local residents by working through established local structures such as newspapers, 
churches and town government. 144 PAX learned that other peace groups like CPP had 
expressed interest in organizing work on ABM and in early January PAX invited them all 
to a meeting at its main offices to coordinate their efforts in sparking local outrage about 
the missiles.145 Members of CPP, VOW, WILPF and the Boston Branch of the Federation 
of American Scientists all attended and agreed to create the ad hoc New England Citizens 
Committee on ABM. CPP offered the endeavor office space at its new headquarters.  
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The leaders of this project recognized that the Army’s slated meeting to outline 
the plans for the ABM program in Reading offered the ideal space to showcase the 
widespread opposition to the plan. In January, the ad hoc committee worked to expand 
opposition on the North Shore and throughout the state before the meeting. VOW mailed 
4,000 letters to people throughout Greater Boston alerting them about the hearing. PAX 
leafleted the Reading-Lynnfield area with over 20,000 flyers warning about the dangers 
of the site. These pamphlets simultaneously addressed the global threats of the ABM and 
more localized issues in order to appeal to suburban homeowners. Residents of 
Lynnfield, Wakefield and North Reading received warnings that the site would affect 
property values, water supply, flood control, public services and television reception. 
Opponents also pointed out that that the project would employ 500 people and suggested 
this new influx of population would place a burden on the community, its services, and 
its schools. For many citizens these threats about property values and tax rates aroused 
more concern than potential nuclear radiation. For instance, Edward Kendrick of 
Wakefield and Beverly Bjorkman of Reading got involved in the anti-ABM effort 
because they feared the installation would force local officials to change their zoning 
laws to allow apartments for Army employees.146 Activists also sought to appeal to the 
growing environmental consciousness of suburban citizens by emphasizing that the site 
in North Andover sat on Massachusetts conservation land and had already destroyed 90 
acres of timber, which also helped stimulate opposition.  
The 1,300 people who crammed into the Reading High School Auditorium for the 
January 29 meeting overwhelmed the Army representatives. Many noted scientists and 
engineers, including MIT professors George Rathjens and Leo Sartori, testified against 
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the Army’s plans. They challenged the military’s lack of concern for the local area, 
pointing out that an accidental explosion would obliterate everything in a five-mile 
radius. The outrage from local citizens, however, proved most influential. Before the 
meeting, PAX produced a set of issues for residents to ask the Army representatives 
ranging from narrow questions such as “will the ABM here disturb our television?” to 
broader concerns about U.S. civil defense and foreign policy.147 The residents, most 
likely relying on this PAX-produced material, posed highly critical and specific questions 
and concerns about the construction of the multi-megaton system. Local residents pointed 
out that the project threatened more than protected their lives and homes. Many 
“housewives and homeowners” argued that this federal money would be better spent on 
domestic programs than on the missile race.148  General Robert Young of the Army 
Ballistic Agency, the administrator in charge of the project, was clearly unprepared for 
these questions and focused his responses on issues such as drainage and landscaping.149 
The citizens found this lack of interest in their concerns infuriating. By early February, 80 
percent of Reading residents polled opposed construction of the system, an exponential 
leap from just a few months before. 
The meeting further stirred suburban grassroots opposition to the system. In 
addition to citizens in Reading and Lynnfield, residents from many other Boston suburbs, 
with the assistance and guidance of PAX and CPP, formed local anti-ABM committees. 
The movement became particularly active in the northwestern suburbs along Route 128 
such as Concord, Lexington and Winchester, both because of their relative proximity to 
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the site and the number of scientists and engineers who lived there. These residents 
supplemented the existing anti-missile arguments with their professional expertise. While 
many of these engineers might have benefited financially from the ABM contracts, their 
concerns about the security of their towns, homes, and most of all family superceded such 
economic interests. The fusion of scientific knowledge with suburban-centered ideology 
of taxes, property and children helped to further stirred grassroots opposition to the 
ABM.  The success of PAX’s educational drive and the role of experts as leaders allowed 
the local groups to display a heightened scientific knowledge in their public statements 
and forums. Ordinary suburban residents used scientific facts to declare that the system 
was not foolproof especially since the Soviet Union had the technology to penetrate the 
shield. They alleged that it would not protect from an attack launched from a submarine 
or from the South Pole, and would be a great threat to anyone living near the sites since 
an accidental explosion would destroy everything within a five mile radius and bring 
grave harm to areas up to a hundred miles away.150 The committees circulated flyers with 
dire warnings such as “Missile Sites Near Concord” and  “Hydrogen Bombs in 
Winchester’s Backyard? The Pentagon wants to put them there.”151 The local ABM-
committees, like the larger Ad Hoc group, encouraged local residents to channel 
frustrations into letters to their local, state and state officials. The Concord committee led 
by Paul Counihan who had served as the chairman of Massachusetts for McCarthy 
emphasized, “let your voices be heard in Washington” and  “remember it is your tax 
dollar at work.”  
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The Ad Hoc Committee and the local groups continued work within the formal 
channels of government in order to prevent the ABM construction.152 Their letter-writing 
campaigns, for example, proved an extremely powerful means of changing defense 
policy. Senators Kennedy and Brooke both responded to the demands by local citizen and 
publicly expressed doubts about the efficacy of the Sentinel system. Kennedy deemed the 
proposal a “serious mistake” and “a waste of money.”153 On February 4, 1969, the entire 
Massachusetts Senate passed a resolution voicing grave concern and calling for 
suspension of construction until revaluation.154 All of these officials expressly stated they 
were responding to the “rising tide of public opinion.”155 By the time the U.S. Congress 
put the issue to a vote, many previously uncommitted politicians in Massachusetts and 
other parts of the nation opposed further development of the ABM system.  
Local interest in the ABM issue waned as a protracted debate over the system in 
Congress ensued. The United States eventually established the ABM Treaty with the 
Soviet Union in 1972, in which both countries agreed to surrender the rights to protect 
populations and weapons through such systems.156  Though it took years for 
representatives to terminate officially the project, by late 1969 the Pentagon did 
permanently abandon plans for the sites in Reading and North Andover. A year later 
Republican Governor Francis Sargent reached an agreement with the White House and 
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the Department of Defense to develop a state park on the former North Andover ABM 
site.157  The Massachusetts Department of Natural Resources decided to transform the 
area already excavated to hold the missiles into a swimming pool.  Upon announcing the 
plans, which the federal government agreed to subsidize partially, Sargent declared, “the 
Commonwealth will be able to develop what has become an albatross around the neck of 
the Defense Department to a valuable addition to the State’s park system.”158 The short 
and long-term outcome ultimately provided a potent example of the possibilities of 
ordinary citizens to work for peace causes and change state and national policy.  
 
Household Word 
The ABM campaign demonstrated to groups such as PAX and CPP the political 
potential of galvanizing moderate suburban citizens and led directly to the idea of the 
moratorium. Even in the throes of grassroots organizing against the ABM, these groups 
already began searching for a way to reproduce the action on a national scale in order 
convince President Nixon to withdraw United States troops from Vietnam.159 PAX feared 
that Americans had become complacent they decided that they needed to take “strong 
fresh action” to “renew activity against the war” and demand a timetable for 
withdrawal.160 In the spring of 1969, the group met to discuss how to build on the 
grassroots model it had established in the McCarthy and ABM campaigns in order to, in 
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the words of Jane Webb, “do something to turn people on--- to take a symbolic act to 
dramatize the people’s opposition to the war. ”161   Fall River business executive Betram 
Yaffee suggested that PAX prepare a mass demonstration six months in the future where 
Nixon would be handed an “ultimatum of some kind” to deliver on his campaign promise 
to end the war.162 Jerome Grossman expanded on this idea, proposing a “deadline 
demonstration. ” He suggested that PAX and other groups pick a day when to expect 
Nixon withdraw troops and if the administration did not do so, then people around the 
country would launch a one-day general strike to halt the wheels of commerce in protest 
of the war.163  
In early May, PAX sent a “market survey” to over two hundred peace, labor, 
religious and liberal organizations across the country explaining their desire to “develop a 
national mechanism to which the rank and file of Americans can attach themselves as 
easily and traditionally as possible” and the possibility of a strike. 164 PAX received a 
mostly negative response from these organizations.  Labor groups immediately opposed 
the idea because it would mean most working-class people would suffer from a day 
without pay.  Likewise many peace activists decried “my employer is not in league with 
the bad forces, so I don’t want to do it that way.”165 Sam Brown, a Harvard Divinity 
School student and former youth coordinator for McCarthy Campaign, was one of the 
few people to respond favorably to the idea of nationwide action. Brown believed, 
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however, like the McCarthy Campaign the “real seedbeds of anti-war sentiment were the 
college campuses and the white-collar suburbs” and knew from experience these 
constituencies would find a strike  “too militant.”166 Brown suggested PAX organize a 
day of discussion and debate and call it a “Vietnam Moratorium.” The less forceful term 
displeased the members of PAX who according to Ray Dougan,  thought that it was too 
long, that people “not would relate to it,” and that it connoted “death.”167 They reluctantly 
agreed, but demonstrating continued reservations interchangeably referred to the event as 
the Moratorium and “Vietnam Peace Action Day.”168 The planners opted to hold the 
protest in October and while they abandoned the strike idea, the organizers decided to 
stage it on a Wednesday rather than on the weekend to dramatize it as a “refrain from 
business as usual.”169  
The PAX members decided to focus primarily on planning the activities in 
Massachusetts and placed Brown in charge of coordinating the national effort. This 
division of labor created a divergence in the local and national planning that shaped the 
development of the project.  Brown soon moved to Washington where he formed the 
Vietnam Moratorium Committee and recruited David Mixner, also from the McGovern 
campaign,  and David Hawk and Marge Sklencar of the National Student Association to 
help him. The young leaders decided to focus on college campuses. Similar to the 
McCarthy campaign, Brown believed that the Moratorium would give them a way to 
reach students who opposed the war but felt alienated by the New Left. During the 
summer, the committee sent out a call for action to campuses across the country. Brown 
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and his collaborators explicitly emphasized the event was not a strike and they “did not 
want to cripple universities or shut them down, but simply to use them as a base for 
working against the war.170 The committee received a very positive response from the 
student groups they contacted.  
 As Brown and the National Moratorium Committee surveyed the national 
landscape, Grossman and PAX concentrated on plans for Massachusetts. PAX tried to 
make the event different from other antiwar events by “engag[ing] more moderate 
elements of the community who have recently adopted pro-withdrawal positions.”171 
They primarily targeted the suburbs just as they had done during the McCarthy and ABM 
campaigns because they recognized the power of these residents to gain the attention of 
politicians. Time later recognized the ways in which the Moratorium idea embodied “the 
New Politics” vision and paralleled the McCarthy and ABM campaign tactics “to speak 
with a moderate yet deeply committed voice, to work through zealous grass-roots 
volunteers” and “to force the issue of the war to the forefront of American 
consciousness.”172 Like the McCarthy campaign, PAX especially wanted to reach those 
who disliked the war but who had “not yet expressed themselves through political 
action.”173  
Demonstrating the middle-class and suburban dimensions of its vision, PAX 
called on the contacts it had created during the McCarthy and ABM campaigns to find 
specific ways to involve “businessmen, officers works, professionals, clerks, union men, 
etc.” They encouraged local organizers to design events that would provide a means for 
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this constituency to comfortably channel its opposition to the war. PAX’s early 
pamphlets explicitly placed the event and its purpose in non-threatening and moderate 
terms that would appeal to middle-class suburban professionals,  dubbing it a “work for 
peace” day and a moratorium “on business as usual.”174 Grossman hoped that by getting 
local residents to go door to door in their home towns where “people trusted them” and 
knew them “as the person who coached the Little League” or the “person who helps them 
burn the leaves” it would help destigmatize the antiwar issue and get many more 
suburban residents involved.”175 PAX initially received a “lukewarm” response among 
their local contacts. Yet by mid-September the idea took off beyond their “wildest 
imagination” and by October “the response and enthusiasm” became “almost 
unbelievable.”176 The small PAX headquarters quickly transformed into a hub of activity 
overflowing with suburban housewives, many with small children in tow, professionals 
who came at lunch and after work, and college students from area schools. These 
volunteers helped coordinate the local activities and arranged a large rally on Boston 
Common with speakers George McGovern, John Kenneth Galbraith, Howard Zinn, 
James Breeden and Peter Camajo of the Student Mobilization Committee.  
Involvement grew very rapidly in the Boston suburbs. By early October, over a 
hundred towns organized vigils, petition drives, and community clean-ups grew. “This is 
a real grass roots affair now,” longtime PAX member Helen Rees of Newton declared. 
“The people have taken over.”177 The sudden response from previously politically 
inactive communities and residents had a variety of roots. Many people had grown 
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frustrated by the continuing war and Nixon’s handling of it even in the few months since 
PAX had first announced the project. “Last year I tried to get a McCarthy write-in 
campaign started in this town and I coudln’t (sic) even get it off the ground,” Joan 
Stander of Weston observed, “With the moratorium its been completely different. We’ve 
had a wonderful response. I think people are just fed up to the teeth with the war.”178 One 
Washington coordinator sarcastically dubbed the President “one of our best 
organizers.”179 After Nixon had dismissed the Moratorium at a September 26 press 
conference and declared it would not persuade him, it further catalyzed public interest. 
Ellie Gelhar of Concord got involved in order to send a message to Richard Nixon. “He’s 
been trying to pass off this whole thing as a student movement,” she explained “I think 
when he sees the kind of people who are involved in this protest he may begin to realize 
that there is broadly based opposition to the war.”180  Natick housewife Pam Kaufman 
agreed that in her community the participants in the activities would be “the people who 
voted for him. How long can he ignore that?”181 This response proved, in the words of 
one Cohasset woman, that “All kinds of people are in favor of stopping the war. It’s 
become a much broader cause.”182 The breadth and moderate bent of the event itself 
helped to stimulate this turnout. Harvard Junior and organizer Jeff Rosen aptly observed, 
“Our image and tone are constructive and this gives people who can’t accept radical 
tactics a way of joining.183  
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Grossman played a pivotal role in distancing the event from any radical 
associations. In interviews, the balding 52 year-old presented himself as a concerned 
middle-aged businessman and suburban dad and wore a suit and tie in every public 
appearance. He never failed to mention his credentials as a Little League coach nor the 
fact that his political awakening had occurred as a member of the PTA. “ I feel that as a 
businessman I have a vested interest in stability, and I think that one of the most insane 
things about the Vietnam war is the way it has insinuated instability in our society and 
our economy,” he told a Boston Chamber of Commerce publication.  184  Often glossing 
over his previous ten years of leftist activism and commitment to peace causes, he stated 
that if Nixon agreed to withdraw troops within six months, “I would be very happy to go 
back to the envelope business.” In a direct appeal to middle-class individualist ideology 
and patriotic individualism, he announced,  “The climate that encourages people to start 
business is the same climate that encourages people to try to change Vietnam War policy, 
ABM policy and to express their feelings.” Grossman announced his own plans to forgo 
sitting on the podium on Boston Common to spend the day handing flyers outside his 
local supermarket in Newton because he believed that was the overarching purpose of the 
event.185 These statements and image construction provided an extremely effective way 
to convince moderate middle-class suburbanites to embrace the Moratorium-related 
activities. The participants nevertheless represented a wide spectrum of positions about 
the war, ranging from those who opposed the war in an abstract way to more outspoken 
suburban liberals and students who sought to pressure Nixon to take decisive action 
toward withdrawal. Grossman believed that the range and lack of partisan or ideological 
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affiliation constituted the very strength of the idea. “You could be against the war for 
whatever reason you liked,” he later remarked of the participants.186  
The positive response from formal institutions, professional groups, and 
politicians clearly underscored the moderate tone and breadth of opinions that the 
Moratorium came to encompass. Several Boston area universities including Northeastern 
University and Boston University suspended classes, and Harvard and MIT treated 
classroom attendance as a matter of individual conscience. Groups of Boston physicians 
and lawyers organized Moratorium committees, and members of the Harvard Medical 
School faculty planned to hand out postcards outside downtown hospitals calling for the 
war to end in six months.187  The largest and most surprising outpouring of support came 
from national, state and local politicians. While George McGovern and Eugene 
McCarthy had been early champions, in early October more centrist politicians like 
Edward Brooke and Ted Kennedy voiced support.  A delegation of 23 US representatives 
requested “special orders” to speak on the House floor on the eve of the Moratorium in 
order to keep Congress in an all-night session. At the state level, the Massachusetts 
Senate and its president Maurice Donahue officially decreed the day a chance “to give 
moral witness” against the war’s continuation.  Governor Sargent endorsed the event and 
agreed to participate. In a statement of support, Sargent made no direct reference to 
Nixon’s Vietnam policies and instead promoted it as “a day of contemplation on the war” 
and a means to honor those who died.188  The selectman in even the area’s most 
conservative suburbs, such as Duxbury and Hingham, released proclamations of support, 
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and the traditionally conservative Boston City Council passed a resolution asking Nixon 
to end the war.189  Boston Mayor Kevin White announced he would let city employees 
participate in any way deemed appropriate, and that he himself planned to spend the day 
first at a church service and then at the rally on the Common.190 
This outpouring of support from powerful institutions provided the event an 
increased legitimacy and respectability, yet it also further galvanized opposition from 
members farther to the left. Along with the American Legion, SDS was one of the few 
organizations to publicly oppose the Moratorium and their response revealed deeper 
fissures within the factions of the antiwar movement.191 The Boston chapter of SDS 
released a pamphlet entitled “The Moratorium is a Cover Not a Solution” which 
dismissed the event as “just old wine in new bottles.”192 The authors accused the 
organizers of trying to “draw people away from real anti-imperialist fights” and “get 
them engaged in meaningless symbolic actions.” SDS member and Harvard Senior 
Myron Mather publicly dubbed the protest “irrelevant” and predicted, “all those 
McCarthy jackasses will just be indulging in their patriotic, onanistic impulses.”193 Even 
members of PAX grew concerned that perhaps the pendulum had swung too far and that 
endorsements deeming it a day of contemplation obscured the original focus of applying 
pressure to the Nixon administration. Several members began to joke that the event had 
become so “establishment-oriented” that before long Richard Nixon himself would 
announce his support.194 “When we first organized this we were afraid of getting co-
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opted from the left,” Ken Hurwitz explained, “Now it’s happening from the other side. 
The danger is from the right.”  At a meeting the week before the event, Bay State 
organizers decided, therefore, to shift their energy from building support to stressing the 
original intent on encouraging US policy closer to withdrawal from Vietnam.   
 The day of activities far surpassed the expectations of organizers and thereby 
quelled these concerns and anxieties. Almost every town around Boston held some event 
ranging from small church services, rallies and candlelight vigils on village greens to 
readings of the 89,000 names of the war dead. High school students became particularly 
active in orchestrating local events. In many of the more conservative communities, 
students spent hours preparing posters and trying to induce adult interest.195 The 
Commissioner of Education had required schools stay open, but suggested that the “war 
be considered within the framework of classroom discussion.”196 Dozens of suburban 
high schools scheduled special seminars or let students out early to attend local activities. 
A reporter noted that one of the more remarkable images was the number of teenagers 
partaking in the candlelight vigils that occurred on town greens throughout Boston’s 
suburban ring and then staying afterward to help cleanup. 
 The Boston Globe reported that the communities along Route 128, especially in 
the more “liberal towns,” became particularly energized by the Moratorium. 197  In 
Newton, Alfred Halper turned his home into the unofficial headquarters for grassroots 
activity before October 15. Halper recruited housewives to canvas residents to sign a 
petition to Nixon calling for withdrawal and place a hand-painted yellow sign on their 
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lawns on October 15 declaring, “End the War Now.”198  The campaign received  
“marvelous” response. Lincoln residents transformed local Pierce Park into “Peace Park” 
where housewives and students constructed semi-circular huts to house tables for peace 
petitions, batches of homemade bread, and information about the draft. A group of 
students and adults also staged a “guerilla theatre” mock press conference with 
participants wearing huge papier-mâché masks of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. 
Lexington, with its existing well-organized network of antiwar residents, became 
particularly active in the Moratorium activities.  Local CPP head Emily Frankovich along 
with Unitarian minister John Wells had led the organizing committee recruiting 
participants by directly appealing to a fiscally-moderate suburban sensibility. The 
organizers dubbed the war “a tax drain, ” taking 25 percent of all tax dollars from 
Lexington citizens and asked rhetorically  “should responsible citizens be involved in the 
quest for peace, or shall students be left alone in this desire?”199  On the day of the 
Moratorium, the group enlisted 200 volunteers to go door-to-door soliciting signatures for 
a peace petition.200 The group also planned to have a large event on the Lexington Battle 
Green with a high profile speaker for suburban residents who did not want to make the 
journey into Boston. They first sought out McGovern, who had already committed to 
appearing on Boston Common, and then turned to Governor Sargent who agreed.201 
Sargent’s speech on the Lexington Battle Green served as one of the highlights of 
the activities across the state. In an internal memorandum leading up to the event, several 
liberal members of Sargent’s administration recognized the potential implications of the 
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governor taking an official stance against the war. Staff member George Washington 
stressed to Sargent advisor Al Kramer “millions of students marching and George 
McGovern speaking will not persuade Nixon to end the war. Dissent by Republican 
Governors and Senators will. ” He went on to predict that “dissatisfaction is now rampant 
in liberal Republican circles, it would start a chain reaction which would force the 
President to stop the killing.”202 Sargent took Washington’s advice.  With an airplane-
made peace sign in the sky overhead, he eloquently pronounced, “I am here to say the 
war in Vietnam must end. Not alone because it is killing Vietnam. But because it is 
killing America…This war is costing America its soul.” In the middle of the speech, 
Sargent confronted a small group of teenage hecklers. The governor, a World War II 
veteran, broke from his prepared remarks and declared, “I know war. I was in it and you 
never were, so you listen to me…I suggest you listen first and then yell. That’s how we 
do it in America.” 203 The setting of the birthplace of the American Revolution made the 
comments even more dramatic and helped define Sargent as one of the nation’s leading 
antiwar Republicans.  
Across the country, citizens participated activities similar to those organized in 
Boston and its suburbs, which showed the scope of opposition to the war. Small towns 
like North Newton, Kansas, Duluth, Iowa, Golden Colorado, and Cheyenne Wyoming 
staged events. In New York, Eugene McCarthy and Sam Brown spoke to large crowds in 
Times Square, twenty thousand business people attended an event on Wall Street. In the 
nation’s capital forty thousand people participated in a candlelight procession from the 
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Washington Monument to the White House. 204 The peacefulness of the events provided a 
sharp contrast to violence of the Weatherman’s Days of Rage held in Chicago the week 
before and provided the entire project with a sense of respectability. The Moratorium 
received a great deal of media attention before, on and after October 15th, which further 
contributed to its mainstream legitimacy. The event appeared on the front page of most 
newspapers across the country and the major television network newscasts devoted their 
programming to it. Time Magazine placed it on the cover of its October 17, 1969, edition 
with an article declaring that by making “moratorium” a “household word, the events 
meant that “Nixon cannot escape the effects of the antiwar movement.”205  
The events of October 15 marked an important turning point in public sentiment 
about the Vietnam War, and shifted the conversation away from not if but when the 
United States would withdraw troops. Historian Melvin Small later dubbed the 
Moratorium “the most successful anti-war demonstration of the entire Vietnam War era, 
and the most successful protest in American History.”206 The Moratorium made 
opposition to the war acceptable and even the dominant sentiment across the country, but 
especially in the suburbs. The event also proved the effectiveness of combining local 
activities with large national rallies as a means to influence public opinion. The 
Moratorium, therefore, served as a direct inspiration and model for both the inaugural 
Earth Day events six months later and the Nuclear Freeze movement in the 1980s. 
The rally on Boston Common served as the climax of the Moratorium events and 
helped to solidify the Massachusetts reputation as the “most liberal place in the United 
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States.” The composition of the large crowd on the Common, nevertheless, also exposed 
the limits of the organizer’s suburban-centric vision. The participants in Moratorium 
events in Boston and the nation predominantly consisted of college students and middle-
class white suburbanites. PAX and the National Moratorium Committee had consciously 
sought to target these groups. Yet, by doing so, had also excluded other parts of the 
population from getting involved. Even with the removal of the strike concept, the events 
did not appeal to the majority of working-class people, especially in rural areas, who did 
not want to take the day off from work. The absence of the state’s African-American 
residents proved a particularly telling factor. Although James Breeden did appear on the 
podium on the Common and other civil rights leaders took part in events throughout the 
country, they clearly did not represent the attitude of many members of the African-
American community toward the event. Though PAX had made half-hearted attempts to 
arrange for events in Roxbury, a spokesman for Boston’s black community stated that 
they would rather focus on domestic injustice than the war.207 The response provides 
important insight into the changing image and platform of Bay State peace groups.  
Just five years before the Moratorium, PAX and other peace organizations had 
established efforts like CAPE and the Noel Day Campaign to expose the links between 
military spending and racial and economic equality. By 1969 these activists increasingly 
deemphasized the structural component of its opposition to the war. PAX also shifted its 
attention away from trying to reach low-income and racial minority voters and focused 
almost exclusively on galvanizing the suburban white middle-class. While working on 
the McCarthy campaign, some members of PAX had suggested the group try to engage 
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the black community.208 The campaign organizers basically ignored these ideas, deciding 
to concentrate instead on liberal suburbs like Lexington, Concord and Newton. By trying 
to make peace politics more acceptable to moderate citizens, however, the suburban-
centered effort had led PAX to focus less on the war’s misallocation of government funds 
and resources. This shift, therefore, pushed the grassroots liberal groups further away 
from the structural critique of the war and from creating coalitions that transcended race 
or class lines.  
The middle-class emphasis of the Moratorium and movement as a whole, 
moreover, obscured the racial and class inequalities at the heart of the war itself. The 
suburban activists of PAX, CPP and VOW rarely pondered the criticisms of a wounded 
veteran from Dorchester who pointed out the disproportionate number of war casualties 
from his neighborhood as compared to “fancy suburbs” such as Lexington, Milton and 
Wellesley.  “You’d be lucky to find three Vietnam veterans in each of those rich 
neighborhoods,” the Boston soldier cracked, “never mind three that got wounded.”209  
Historian Christian Appy calculated that while the towns of Lexington, Milton, and 
Wellesley combined had the same 100,000-person population as Dorchester, those 
suburbs lost 11 residents in the war while the city neighborhood had 42 casualties and 
many more injuries.  Appy found the same disparity throughout the affluent Route 128 
suburbs such as Dover, Lincoln, Sudbury and Weston, deducing that “boys who grew up 
in Dorchester were four times more likely to die than those raised in fancy suburbs.”210 
At the same time an exceptionally higher number of citizens in these affluent 
communities got involved in the Moratorium activities as compared with residents of 
                                                
208 Mass PAX, Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, December 4, 1967, Box 5, Folder V.20, CPPAX.  
209 Appy, Working-Class War, 12.  
210 Appy, Working-Class War, 12. 
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working-class Boston neighborhoods like Dorchester who remained virtually absent. The 
tactics of PAX and its allies, therefore, erased the fact that for the most part it was not 
upper middle-class suburbanites, but low-income communities for whom the war took an 
immediate burden and everyday toll. A working-class mother who lost her son in 
Vietnam pointedly captured this sentiment dismissing the protestors as primarily “rich 
women” from “the rich suburbs” whose kids were in college rather than the military.  
“I’m against the war too—the way a mother is. The way a mother is, whose son is in the 
army, who has lost a son fighting in it,” the women declared, “the world hears those 
demonstrators making their noise. The world doesn’t hear me, and it doesn’t hear a single 
person I know.”211 Her comment illuminates the ways in which the Moratorium and other 
suburban liberal activities downplayed the class inequalities and resentments 
underpinning the entire issue of the Vietnam War.  
 
Conclusion  
For PAX and its members, the Moratorium confirmed the importance of 
grassroots activity within the suburbs to help to stop the war and provided them with a 
clear plan for the future. The events, however, did not lead Nixon to declare an 
immediate and full troop withdrawal as the organizers had initially hoped.  Brown and 
other student organizers hoped to plan for an even bigger demonstration in Washington 
as part of the promise to hold an event every month. While PAX members still 
considered the Moratorium a great success, it was not the neighborhood-focused initiative 
that they had hoped to organize. In subsequent meetings, the PAX leader stressed the 
                                                




singularity of the event and wanted to concentrate their efforts locally. “It’s obvious that 
100,000 people won’t turn out on the Common for the same thing,” Ray Dougan 
declared.212 “What happened in the communities is the real story of Oct. 15,” Grossman 
stated of their decision not to get involved in the November event.  
The Moratorium had further convinced PAX they needed to reach middle 
Americans in order to change the Nixon Administration’s policy and that the potential for 
violence at such a large rally would alienate moderate opponents. The November event 
brought 250,000 people to Washington and became the biggest demonstration in 
American history. The crowd, nevertheless, was far younger and more militant than the 
month before, and by April 1970 the National Vietnam Moratorium Committee agreed 
with Grossman that the large antiwar demonstration had run its course and decided to 
disband. 213 By this time, PAX and its collaborators had already returned working more 
directly within the political system and electoral politics as a means to change the course 
of the war. 214 As chapter 6 shows, by building on the foundations of the Moratorium, it 
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Healy, “Peace Groups Need New Thing,” Boston Globe, April 22, 1970; David E. Rosenbaum, “Vietnam 
Moratorium Committee is Disbanding,” New York Times, April 20, 1970.  




Grappling With Growth   
Introduction  
On October 19, 1972, local resident Claire Ellis penned an impassioned plea to 
the Concord Journal. The letter was prompted by her sense that, “Concord is unique and 
special.” Ellis declared:  “the towns surrounding Concord have for most part, already lost 
their country town atmosphere and their beauty and have joined the mass of 
commercially oriented communities.” Residents of the affluent suburb of Concord took 
aggressive measures throughout the postwar period to preserve the image of their 
community as the home of Walden Pond and the incubator of American 
environmentalism. Ellis asserted, “Us ‘newcomers’ were drawn to this town because of 
these many things. Had we wanted super highways or a main street emblazoned with 
lights until the wee hours we would have lived elsewhere.” Ellis was no bystander in 
Concord’s confrontation with growth, but, rather, the leader of a citizens group formed in 
the early 1970s to stop the expansion of the Route 2 highway from encroaching on 
hundreds of acres of conservation and park land in the town.  “It’s time some little town 
in the U.S.A. had the guts and determination to stand up and refuse this kind of ‘progress 
and efficiency,’” Ellis urged, “rather than bow down to coercion of being one more of 
this speed-crazed, polluted world.”1  Concord residents fulfilled Ellis’s populist rallying 
call by successfully thwarting plans for the Route 2 expansion, preserving the suburb’s 
natural beauty, historical significance, and economic exclusivity. In reference to this 
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mobilization, one longtime resident declared he “had never known the people of Concord 
to be so aroused and outspoken on an issue.” 2  
The Concord campaign represented a broader suburban environmental movement, 
which during the decades after World War II redirected the ideology of postwar 
liberalism away from a growth oriented-vision and toward an emphasis on quality of life 
issues including a new appreciation of nature. The new focus shaped state and national 
policy and galvanized both grassroots activism and structures of racial and economic 
exclusion. White middle-class homeowners in Concord and several affluent suburbs near 
the interchange of Route 128 and Route 2 actively resisted overdevelopment and sprawl 
through such tactics as minimum acre zoning, private land trusts, and conservation 
commissions.3 This movement placed Massachusetts at the forefront of the emerging 
national effort to confront the consequences of sprawl and directly influenced the passage 
of new environmental protection legislation and the development of a new environmental 
consciousness at both the state and national level. These locally based efforts to protect 
open space and stop growth simultaneously solidified both land conservation and race 
and class-based exclusivity at the center of the political agenda of many of the most 
affluent and most liberal suburbs in the Boston area.  
 In the late 1960s, suburban open space activists joined a revolt against the most 
quintessential symbol of postwar growth:  the highway system.4 The participation of 
                                                
2 Cyrus F. Gibson to Al Kramer and Guy Rosmarin, October 30, 1972, Box 20, Route 2 Folder, FWS. 
3 For more on the national open space movement see Adam Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside: 
Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
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4 This chapter gives only a brief discussion to the highway revolt in metropolitan Boston. For a terrific 
overview of the movement in Boston see Alan Lupo, Frank Colcord, Edmund P. Fowler, Rites of Way: The 
Politics of Transportation in Boston and the U.S. City (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971); For 
more about the national highway revolt see Raymond A. Mohl, “Stop the Road: Freeway Revolts in 
American Cities” Journal of Urban History, Vol. 30. No.5 (July 2004), 674-706; Tom Lewis, Divided 
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these white suburban activists transformed the local anti-highway campaign in Boston 
from an urban-based fight about housing displacement into a metropolitan-wide 
movement about environmental protection. The contributions of the suburban 
conservationists confirmed the overall effectiveness of liberal activists at working within 
the established channels of government to achieve change. Indeed, the efforts of this 
coalition successfully convinced Governor Francis Sargent to declare the first ever 
moratorium on highway construction and to redirect the state’s transportation policy 
toward mass transit. In addition, the coalition made the idea of citizen participation an 
integral component of the environmental and transportation planning process. The 
campaign inspired similar shifts in the federal government policy, permanently changing 
the parameters of transportation and environmental politics and policy in the Bay State 
and the nation. This alliance between neighborhood activists and environmentalists also 
successfully transformed highways from representing a symbol of postwar growth 
liberalism’s success to a sign of its destructiveness.  
 The highway revolt offers a clear counterexample to the metropolitan and racial 
polarization that characterized the Boston busing crisis and many other key issues of the 
1960s an 1970s.5  As the momentum of the revolt shifted away from opposing highway 
construction in the city and the battle over expanding Route 2 and towards building a 
more comprehensive metropolitan rapid transit system in the suburbs, nevertheless, the 
limits to the multi-faceted transportation alliance and the individualist tendencies of 
suburban residents became more evident. These later battles underscore that the anti-
highway movement did not surmount, but, in fact, reinforced the individualist and 
                                                                                                                                            
Highways: Building the Interstate Highways, Transforming American Life (New York: Viking Books, 
1997), 179-210.  
5 See for instance Formisano, Boston Against Busing, 165, 234.  
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isolationist tendencies of suburban political culture, which would have far-reaching 
repercussions for the physical, social and political landscape of the Bay State in the 
decades to come.6  
 Scholars have traditionally dismissed the anti-sprawl philosophy of Claire Ellis 
and her fellow residents as a convenient medium through which to practice the 
exclusionary politics of suburban privilege. Mike Davis, for example, pessimistically 
reduces the “slow growth” movement to the “latest incarnation of a middle-class 
subjectivity that fitfully constitutes and reconstitutes itself around the defense of 
household equity and residential privilege,” strengthening the structures of racial and 
economic segregation. Several historians have revised this argument to suggest that the 
selective embrace of locally-based environmentalism, in fact, advanced pollution and 
degradation in low-income communities.7 On the other side, Adam Rome has 
demonstrated the central role of suburbanites in shaping the modern environmental 
movement while downplaying the exclusionary dimensions of their political worldview.8 
This chapter offers a more nuanced understanding of both the strengths and limitations of 
the movement by examining suburban environmentalism from the context of grassroots 
                                                
6 This point mirrors Louise Dyble’s argument that the freeway revolt in Marin County outside of San 
Francisco “signaled the rise of the growth- control movement, a new and powerful expression of localism 
and self-interest that shaped the future of suburban and rural areas.” See Louise Nelson Dyble, “Revolt 
Against Sprawl: Transportation and the Origins of the Marin County Growth-Control Regime,” Journal of 
Urban History, Vol. 34, No. 1 (November 2007), 39.  
7 Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (New York: Vintage Books, 1992); 
159; Andrew Hurley Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race and Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana, 
1945-1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Matthew Klingle, Emerald City: An 
Environmental History of Seattle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007) especially pp. 201-280.  
8 See Rome, Bulldozer in the Countryside, especially pp. 1-14.  
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liberalism and the open space movement rather than the racially segregated homeowner 
associations of suburban Los Angeles or the lakeside retreats of U.S. Steel Executives.9 
  Many suburban residents who became proponents of stopping highway 
construction voiced a genuine concern about environmental degradation advanced by 
postwar growth. In spite of such concern, however, these activists pursued policies and 
strategies that by in large sought to preserve their accustomed standard of living than 
advanced structural and environmental equality. Like other components of postwar 
liberalism, these land preservation campaigns aimed not to radically restructure the 
market economy, but, rather, to improve the quality of life of individual suburban 
residents. 10 The movement’s new dedication to quality of life issues saved conservation 
land from destruction and preserved several low-income neighborhoods in Boston, 
reoriented transportation policy at the state and national level, and secured 
environmentalism as an increasingly important component of suburban liberalism. Yet, it 
also emboldened a sense of individualism and distinctiveness among many of the 
residents in the affluent towns along Route 128, which made them increasingly unwilling 
to take responsibility for their role in producing the problems of environmental and social 
inequity. Thus, like many of other components of postwar liberal vision these attempts to 
grapple with growth fortified the structures of spatial, economic and racial inequality. 
 
                                                
9 The work of Peter Siskind proves one notable exception. See Peter Siskind, “Suburban Growth and Its 
Discontents: The Logic and Limits of Reform on the Postwar Northeast Corridor” in Kevin Kruse and 
Thomas Sugrue, eds, The New Suburban History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Peter 
Siskind, “Growth and Its Discontents: Localism, Protest and the Politics of Development on the Northeast 
Corridor” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2002). 
10 For more about the links between the growth of environmental concern in the 1960s and the ideology of 





In the decades after World War II, the rapid growth of industry and suburban 
development along Route 128 stoked anxieties about the threat of overdevelopment. 11 
Many of the communities on or near Route 128 first aimed to solve the problem through 
rigid zoning policies that called for single-family homes on at least one acre of land.12  
These practices ensured that many people who opted to settle in communities like 
Concord, Lexington, Lincoln and Wayland were, in the words of one local official, 
“largely those who cared about open space” and could afford the price of homes in these 
exclusive enclaves.13 Many of these environmentally-conscious residents and their 
officials came to believe that zoning alone was not enough to prevent urban sprawl. 
Zoning, in this view, constituted a “negative power” that could circumscribe, not create, 
open space.14 As one Lexington resident Roland Greeley explained, “Most people come 
to Lexington because they like among other things its rural atmosphere,” and “30,000-sq-
foot zoning” is simply not enough to “preserve the open-ness which we cherish.”15 Thus, 
suburban residents like Greeley searched for a way to establish a “positive power”—one 
that would protect the pastoral charm and the undeveloped land of their respective towns.  
                                                
11 Officials in several of these towns contacted the Massachusetts Department of Natural Resources 
complaining  having to confront “extraordinary housing and industrial development” and asking for 
recommendations for how to “preserve the ancient charm” and avoid “the destruction of the physical assets 
on which community.” See, Massachusetts Department of Natural Resources, Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Natural Resources, Fiscal Year 1955, State Library Massachusetts, Boston, MA 
(hereafter: “SLM”).    
12 For more about the zoning policies of the Route 128 suburbs see chapter 1. 
13 Lincoln Planning Board, Comprehensive Development Plan for the Town of Lincoln, Massachusetts, 
August 1965, Box 3, Folder 46, LER.  
14  Michael N. Danielson, The Politics of Exclusion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 36.  
15 Roland B. Greeley, “A Proposal for Town Action to Preserve Local Space, No Date, Box 1, Natural 




 Once such resident was Wayland native Allen H. Morgan. Wayland sits twenty 
miles west of Boston on a reedy floodplain along Sudbury River. Wayland’s swampy 
ecology had prevented significant development prior to World War II and thus, for many 
years, it remained largely a farm and steeple dotted town.16 Morgan spent his childhood 
exploring the town’s marshes and woodlands, which instilled his lifelong fascination and 
love of nature. He left Wayland for college and the Army. When he returned to the town 
in the 1950s, he found Wayland fundamentally transformed. Sitting on the edge of the 
Massachusetts Turnpike and less than five miles from the newly constructed Route 128, 
the town became an ideal location for engineers and executives employed in the office 
parks beginning to spring up along the highway Like many of its neighbors, Wayland 
experienced a building and population boom. Atop the beloved landscape where he used 
to bird watch, Morgan was appalled to find “subdivisions and shopping centers.” 17 But 
he was not merely lamenting the aesthetic change in his hometown, Morgan also grew 
worried that the new development would cause flooding, pollution and property damage. 
One summer evening in 1953, Morgan sat on his patio with his neighbor George Lewis. 
The two men surveyed his yard, looking out toward the adjacent creek and began to 
discuss the problem of open space and floodplain destruction in Wayland for the 
“hundredth time.” Morgan suddenly suggested they form a private trust to purchase and 
preserve the town’s natural habitats.18 Soon after his discussion with Lewis, Morgan 
gathered a duck-hunter, sportsman, amateur farmer, and one man who joined “not 
                                                
16 For more on how technologies made building on spaces like hills, marshes and floodplains possible see 
Adam Rome, Bulldozer in the Countryside. 
17 Allen H. Morgan, A History of the Massachusetts Audubon Society (Draft), 1980, Box 3, Folder 14, 
Allen H. Morgan Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA (hereafter: “AHM”).  
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because of any love of Nature but because he believed in keeping a few suburban 
amenities intact” to establish Sudbury Valley Trustees (SVT). 19 These inaugural SVT 
members recognized that they had little conservation expertise and “no more political 
influence than the usual homeowner.”20 Instead, the participants sought to use their 
homeowner sensibility and professional knowledge of law, business, education and 
engineering, which explains why they pursued the localist course of creating a private 
trust within their own community.  They envisioned that the trust would buy parts of the 
floodplain and protect it both from encroaching development, and state and federal 
taxes.21 By 1958, five years after its founding, SVT had four hundred members and had 
placed more than four hundred acres of local marshland in the tax-exempt trust.  
The SVT represented a departure from earlier conservationists who had focused 
primarily on saving exceptional tracts of forest, beach or wilderness removed from urban 
life. In contrast, the SVT adopted as its guiding philosophy that “any natural land is 
worth saving” and focused on saving the less sublime areas within the metropolitan 
ring.22 Explaining the group’s mission, Morgan stated, “suburban open space does not 
have to be glamorous or unique to be worth saving. Any unspoiled natural area in any 
area is threatened today and will be spoiled tomorrow unless someone starts fighting for 
it right now.”23 A deviation from many of the mainstream treatises of the 1950s that 
extolled suburbanization, these conservation activists believed that vigorous open space 
protection not unbridled growth offered white middle-class homeowners a high quality of 
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21 Allen H. Morgan to C. Russell Mason, January 7, 1955, Box 1, Folder 15, AHM.   
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life.24 Yet while the SVT leaders opposed urban sprawl, they never fully rejected the 
basic tenets or structures of suburbanization. Indeed, members repeatedly stressed that 
they did not oppose all development but, rather, advocated for building decisions that 
took into account ecology and aesthetics. Morgan explained, “We are not against houses 
or people. But neither are we against nature or natural beauty.”25 Like open space 
advocates at the national level, Morgan and collaborators understood the private trust as a 
tactic to preserve land without challenging the fundamental dynamics of the suburban 
real estate market.26 The SVT contended the land in the trust would actually enhance 
local property values by reducing the damage caused by annual flooding and adding to 
the pastoral aesthetic of the area. Similar to large-lot zoning, they argued, the trust would 
also limit population, lessen the demand for municipal services, and reduce the overall 
local tax rate.27 Grassroots liberals who promoted fair housing and voluntary busing used 
similar claims to suggest that involvement in their respective movements would augment 
the reputation of the overall community and the value of individual properties. In both 
cases, arguments successfully marshaled the support of residents in the affluent suburbs 
along Route 128.  
The success of the SVT inspired similar organizations throughout Massachusetts 
and the nation. Many of the affluent communities along Route 128 established their own 
private trusts using SVT as their model. For instance, in nearby Lincoln a group of 
                                                
24 Amy L. Scott shows Boulder activists adopted a similar argument to promote open space protection Amy 
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26 Rome, Bulldozer in the Countryside, 128-139.  
27 For more about land regulation and population control, see James G. Coke and Charles S. Liebman, 
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residents formed the Lincoln Land Conservation Trust in 1957 for the purpose of 
“maintaining the rural character of the community.”28 The Trust purchased land 
surrounding the town’s idyllic reservoir, in order to prevent encroaching development. 29 
Over next decade, the Trust employed tax-deductible land donations and easements 
across private property to expand the size of the area to create more than 12 miles of 
trails for walking, biking and horseback riding. 30 Around the same time, Concord too, 
established the Concord Land Conservation Trust “to assist in and promote the 
preservation of the rural character of the Town, the development of walking and riding 
trails therein, and the establishment of sound conservational practices.”31 In its first two 
years, the Concord trust acquired a large pond and a square mile of wetlands. The open 
space agenda of these private land acquisition organizations provided, in the words of 
Adam Rome, “a critical stage in the evolution of the modern environmental 
movement.”32  
The open space movement in the Route 128 suburbs, nevertheless, would not 
have reached the magnitude and success it did without the development of the 
Massachusetts Conservation Commission program. The conservation commissions, like 
the land trusts, had roots in the preservation impulses of white middle-class suburbanites. 
In 1955, around the same time that the SVT began to purchase its first acres of wetlands, 
                                                
28 League of Women Voters of Lincoln Massachusetts, “Lincoln: Guide to Government, 1963,” Box 3, 
Folder 31, LWVL. 
29 Open Space Institute, “Landsaving, Lincoln Style,” Open Space Action, 1968 (reprinted by the Lincoln 
Land Conservation Trust), Box 3, Folder 39, LER.  
30 For example, a Lincoln resident sought sell a thirty-acre tract of trail lined wood and marsh to a real 
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adjoining section and donated it to the Land Conservation Trust and the planning board waived the zoning 
requirements for the property, see Paul Brooks, “Suburban Land Use” The Conservation Leader, Vol. 4 No 
1 (September 1968), Box 7, Folder 90, LER.  
31 Concord Land Conservation Trust, “Agreement and Declaration of Trust,” No Date, Collection of 
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a group of residents in the North Shore town of Ipswich grew “indignant” when they 
learned that a builder had begun “a drain and fill” project on a large plot of marshland. In 
their attempts to stop the project, the resourceful residents of this idyllic town discovered 
an existing Massachusetts statute related to industrial development giving a community 
the power to acquire land, which “enhanced community values.”33 With the help of their 
state representative John F. Dolan, the Ipswich group drafted a more comprehensive 
piece of legislation. The proposed statute called for the created of conservation 
commissions conceived of as official agencies consisting of three to seven unpaid 
members appointed by the city manager or selectman that would inventory local open 
and wet lands, coordinate resource programs, advise authorities on proper natural 
resource protection policies, and undertake “action projects” to advance the community’s 
preservation interests. The bill passed in 1957 without controversy since most legislators 
interpreted it as an extension of the earlier legislation and did not involve the outlay of 
any funds.34  In its first years of existence, the program received little notice and by 1960 
less than 20 percent of communities in Massachusetts admitted to even awareness of the 
Conservation Commission Act.35 When Charles H.W. Foster became Commissioner of 
Natural Resources in 1960, nevertheless, he recognized the potential of this town-
centered program. He saw it as means to build support for the programs and policies or 
the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), to strengthen government and citizen 
relations, and to shift some of the responsibilities of natural resource protection and 
                                                
33 Andrew J.W.  Scheffey, Conservation Commissions in Massachusetts (Washington, DC: The 
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34 Scheffey, Conservation Commissions, 30.  
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regulation onto local communities.36 Under his leadership, the DNR launched a public 
relations and educational outreach campaign in order to expand the program sending 
copy of the law and a fact sheet highlighting its provisions to every town and city in the 
Commonwealth.  
The DNR promotional campaign received the most enthusiastic response from 
residents in the towns along Route 128 that identified residential and commercial 
development as the dominant threat to the core values of their communities. The 
commission network’s growth in places such as Lincoln and Concord and Weston led 
supporters and skeptics alike to deem it a “suburban-centered movement.”37  Many 
observers would later praise the bodies as phenomena that grew not from “the drawing 
board” but the “bottom up,” and since suburban residents had drafted the initial 
legislation it inscribed a particular worldview into the structure of the commissions.38 The 
suburban orientation propelled the commission agenda largely toward open space 
preservation. This focus made the program less appealing to more growth-oriented lower 
middle-class suburbs like Burlington and Waltham or to larger cities like Boston and 
Springfield, where residents saw open space preservation as threat to their tax base and 
demonstrated an overall indifference to conservation issues.39 The communities that 
became most active in the program had already initiated the process of land control by 
                                                
36 Massachusetts Department of Natural Resources, Press Release, January, 19, 1969 Box 2, Folder 
Publicity DNR, 1960-1961, CHWF.  Foster believed that the commissions “offer the most promising 
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37 Monica A. Amiel, “A Comparative Analysis of Conservation Commission Enabling Legislation in Seven 
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establishing strict zoning policies and local planning boards. 40 The commission structure 
also aligned most amenably with the political organization and ideological orientation of 
small and affluent communities. In a study of the bodies, Andrew Scheffey deemed them 
a “distinctly ‘yankee’ phenomenon tied unmistakably to the tradition of the town 
meeting, the common and home rule.”41 The non-partisan commission model was 
particularly appealing to the reform-minded residents in these affluent and traditionally 
liberal communities who praised government control and management and eschewed 
formal identification with either political party. 
 The structure of the commissions also lent itself best to upper middle-class 
communities where the residents boasted both strong professional expertise and active 
volunteer social networks. Charles Foster conceded that the commissions operated most 
successfully if the members represented “a scattering of professional backgrounds” 
noting that “legal, engineering, educational and public relations experience” were most 
useful. The influx of scientists and engineers to the Route 128 suburbs proved 
particularly instrumental to the success of the commission cause. Mrs. Luther Davis, a 
Wayland housewife, observed that many of the most dedicated conservationists in her 
town consisted of transplanted engineers as well as  “landscape architects, city planners, 
geographers cartographers.”42 Many of these trained scientists brought a pragmatic view 
of land conservation to their commission work. For instance, Thomas Flint, an engineer, 
who became the first head of Concord Commission claimed he was less aligned with 
“passionate conservationists” and, rather, viewed the movement’s purpose to be 
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“resource management and regeneration” not complete land protectionism. 43 His 
interpretation revealed that for several participants the program’s title was not strictly a 
useful alliterative. Many residents who became involved in the commission movement 
also had experience in town government and other local civic organizations. Flint, for 
instance, had previously served as chairman of the local Finance Committee, Public 
Works Department, Water Department and Long Range Comprehensive Commission. 
The knowledge and contacts Flint and other commissioners acquired from these 
earlier experiences not only made them familiar with the procedural elements of 
participating in a local governmental group, but also helped to create close relationships 
between the members of the commission and other town agencies. These contacts proved 
particularly invaluable in convincing their respective town meetings to allocate funds for 
acquisition of conservation land. The commissioners, moreover, relied upon the well-
established social networks of their respective municipalities. The Concord commission 
credited its success largely “to the voluntary support and assistance of many capable 
individuals in the community who were not only aware of the problems and the needs but 
willing to do something about them.”44 Like the grassroots activists championing for civil 
rights and against the Vietnam War, the conservation movement drew on contacts in 
neighborhoods, schools, churches, country clubs and civic organizations, such as the 
League of Women Voters, to raise awareness and support for their conservationist 
agenda. 
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While the grassroots infrastructure played a crucial role in laying the base for the 
commission movement, state policy and financial assistance ultimately ensured the 
agenda’s success. In 1960 the Massachusetts legislature approved the ambitious Self-
Help Conservation Program enabling the DNR to reimburse up to 50 percent of the land 
acquisitions of the local conservation commissions. The Self-Help guidelines stipulated 
that each project and the eventual land acquired had to be planned and executed entirely 
by the local commission, with the state serving “as merely as an advisor and fiscal 
partner.”45 The pioneering policy made Massachusetts the first state in the nation to use 
financial incentives to fulfill conservation responsibilities. 47 The use of “Self-Help” in 
the title, however, evokes a charged discourse laden more with conservative rather 
conservation ideology. Like the mortgage policies of the Federal Housing 
Administration, the generous subsidies that underwrote this project illuminated another 
way in which government policies provided a set of entitlements to suburbanites masked 
in seemingly neutral terms. The program demanded that a community have a 
conservation commission to qualify and such commissions disproportionately existed in 
wealthier suburbs such as Lexington, Concord, Lincoln and Weston. Low -income and 
industry-heavy communities like Burlington and New Bedford were slow to establish 
commissions. The city councils in these cash-strapped cities lacked the budget surplus to 
fund even a fraction of the costs for the conservation initiative.48 Wealthier suburbs, by 
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contrast, had well-established conservation networks and the surplus to cover the initial 
investment for state-subsidized acquisition program. The Self-Help program, therefore, 
further enhanced the open space priorities of places like Concord, where the Town 
Meeting annually allocated the maximum amount allowed by the state to participate in 
the initiative. Thus, although, the Concord commission spent $60,000 on open space 
purchases between 1959 and 1964, the state reimbursed $24,750.  
The federal subsidization of the Self-Help program only served to increase the 
inequalities in the conservation agendas of tony suburbs and lower-income communities. 
In 1965, Congress passed the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, which established 
a fund to help states develop water and land resources by providing 50 percent of the 
money. In 1966, Massachusetts conservationists built upon the momentum of the federal 
law to persuade the state legislature to increase the annual budget of the Self-Help 
program from $200,000 to $700,000.49 In addition to increasing the budget, the 
legislature also approved policy changes that enabled any commission that applied to a 
federal conservation, recreation or open space program to then receive an additional 25 
reimbursement from the state. This combined state and federal funding meant that local 
commissions could receive up to 75 percent reimbursement of total acquisition costs.50 
The federal funds encouraged a more diverse range of communities to join the 
conservation movement so they could benefit from the budgetary windfall. In 1966 the 
cities and towns Brookline, Burlington, Cambridge, Melrose and Watertown all 
established units, and by 1969 275 municipalities across the state had created 
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commissions.51  Affluent suburban communities, nevertheless, continued to 
disproportionately benefit from the Self-Help program.52 For instance, the town of 
Lincoln consistently received more state land acquisition funds than any other 
municipality in Massachusetts, which is particularly remarkable given the small 
population of the community.53 These forms of state and federal subsidy also explain why 
these open space expenditures experienced little opposition from suburban residents since 
in most towns land acquisition constituted a small fraction of their annual budgets. 54 At 
the same time, the program provided the conservation movement more power within 
suburban municipalities because it served as an avenue to channel state and federal 
money into the community.  
The combination of this public and private, local and national land conservation 
efforts in Concord and its neighboring communities demonstrates the ways in which 
grassroots suburban activists successfully navigated the formal channels of the political 
system in order to protect their communities from the destructive effects of urban sprawl. 
Other historic preservation and conservation activities of the state and federal 
government also significantly enhanced the open space and anti-growth agenda of these 
affluent suburbs. In the postwar decades both the federal and state government continued 
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their ambitious programs to preserve historic sites and wilderness lands.55 During this 
period, Concord became a “regional center” of state and federal parks and lands. Within 
the town’s 24.96 square miles lay the idyllic state-owned Walden Pond and 
surrounding.56  Just a few miles away lay the federally-owned 750-acre Minuteman 
National Park, which the U.S. Congress had created in 1959 in order to preserve the 
scene of the initial battles of the American Revolution. The park stretched along Route 
2A into Lincoln and Lexington and included several historic sites and buildings in those 
towns, but the Old North Bridge in Concord served as the main area. 57 During this 
period, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service also established the Great Meadows National 
Wildlife Refuge. The Refuge’s 2,727 acres of marshland spread through six suburbs 
including Concord. Thus, despite the town’s proximity to a major transportation and 
industrial nexus of Route 128 and Route 2, by the late 1960s, over a fourth of the total 
acreage of Concord was state, federal, local or privately-owned conservation land.  
Active involvement in the deliberate process of land protection in the Boston 
suburbs directly enhanced local residents’ connection to the communities and physical 
spaces in which they lived. Adam Rome contends that the open space movement across 
the nation “helped to define communities, to mark one place off from another, and so 
gave residents a sense of belonging, a vital rootedness.”58 For residents who had recently 
moved to these towns along Route 128 appreciating the natural amenities served a 
parallel function as joining in various social institutions offering a means of feeling part 
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of the community and connected to its past. In places like Concord, Lincoln, and 
Lexington, this project and process took on a heightened meaning since it fused saving 
the average meadow or marshes with preserving exceptional spaces like Walden Pond 
and the Old North Bridge. The large amounts of open space coupled with the proximity 
of these historic landmarks offered residents further confirmation that their communities 
differed from the average suburb of sprawling ranch homes and strip malls. These 
markers also suggested by virtue of opting to live there the residents were distinct from 
the average suburbanite.  
This grassroots conservation movement also strengthened the growth-control 
politics and priorities of the affluent communities along Route 128. Throughout these 
suburbs, “conservation commissions have become a strong arm of local government,” a 
reporter observed in 1969. 59 “In Concord today, or in Wayland or Lincoln or Sudbury,” 
another reporter commented in the mid-1960s, “a hard core of conservation-minded 
citizens make up a healthy majority of the Town Members…It is a rare conservation 
article that doesn’t sail through virtually without opposition.”60 The attention to 
conservation by these towns enhanced certain features of the suburban political 
sensibility, especially a commitment to property values and lower local taxes. In 1965, 
the Lincoln planning committee asserted, “the economic incentives for a perpetuation of 
Lincoln’s fields and forests are real: the market value of property in the Town is 
enhanced by open space, and the cost of a program to secure from adverse development 
is low.”61 These communities also recognized that land preservation kept tax rates low 
and prevented multi-unit development projects. The Concord Conservation Commission 
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successfully convinced the town to acquire a 92-acre parcel by invoking cost as a main 
consideration. The Commission deemed the acquisition a “bargain” since “State Funds 
cut the cost to Concord Taxpayers in half” and was “wise investment” since it “will save 
the Town costs of many town services which would result from housing development.”62 
This growth-control agenda, thus, limited the amount of land available for new 
development, especially dense multi-unit housing, affordable to most lower and middle-
income people. Thus, by limiting the property available for development, open space 
movement compounded the severe housing shortage throughout metropolitan. This, in 
turn, exacerbated overcrowded conditions in the city and many inner-ring suburbs.  
By the late 1960s, the Massachusetts Department of Natural Resources began to 
raise concerns that the open space movement had constructed literal and figurative 
barriers around suburban communities. The state Department of Natural Resources 
clearly supported the push against rather than for urban development. Yet, the 
preservation impulse, DNR officials observed, fostered “forms of ecological and political 
isolationism” because communities were “very reluctant to cooperate with their less well-
to-do neighbors for fear of having to share their natural resources.”63 This resistance to 
collaboration with their “less well-to-do neighbors” stifled serious discussion regarding 
how forms of land preservation themselves increased racial and class inequality and often 
burdened other parts of the metropolitan region. Some advocates had proposed more 
coordination between communities, but most suburban residents’ locally based 
understanding of environmental issues prevented this type of cooperation from occurring. 
                                                
62 Concord Natural Resources Commission, “Article 46: Punkatasset” Flyer, 1971, CDNR.  
63 Conservation Commissions At A Crossroads, Environmental Resource, Massachusetts Department of 
Natural Resources, Number Ten (Autumn 1973), Folder 890, Jack Backman Papers, Special Collections, 
State Library of Massachusetts (hereafter: “Backman”). 
 
309 
While members of the movement often claimed that their local conservation areas were 
open to anyone, the lack of easily accessible public transportation routes to left such 
places beyond the reach of most lower-income and car-less people.  
Notwithstanding the broader effects, many participants and observers extolled the 
positive and democratizing potential of conservation activism among suburban residents. 
The author of a study of the commission movement from the early 1970s noted that they 
had shaped “public opinion at the local level” and created “a major catalyst in giving 
political backing to environmental decisions going through the legislative process” at the 
state and federal levels.64  By the late 1960s, most of the commissions had expanded their 
scope of activities beyond just open space preservation in their own municipalities into 
other actions that demonstrated concern and consciousness about the wider ecosystem 
including regulation of wetlands, water pollution control, solid waste disposal, and 
educating their communities about various issues related to environmental quality.65 
Scholars such as Andrew Scheffey still wondered if the suburban-based conservation 
activities were “primarily a protectionist device” or could they “meet the needs of an 
expanding metropolis.”66 As the suburban environmental movement joined in the effort 
to stop highway development it revealed the possibilities and limits of this form of 
activism to protect the environment on a metropolitan scale.  
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“People Before Highways ”   
 The battle to save Fowl Meadow, a 400-acre wildlife preserve in the southern 
suburbs of Canton and Milton, thrust local conservationists into an ongoing urban-based 
battle being waged to oppose highway construction. Fowl Meadow exemplified the type 
of open spaces that the conservation commissions clamored to protect, but the site 
conflicted with plans for the construction of the Southwest Expressway. The seeds for the 
controversy had its roots in the Master Highway Plan for Metropolitan Boston issued in 
1948. The Massachusetts Department of Public Works (DPW) proposed an ambitious 
web of circumferential highways and radial roads that would become the basis of state 
transportation decision for the next half-century. In the Bay State this new federal 
windfall enabled the building of Route 128, the Southeast Expressway, and the Central 
Artery, a partially elevated expressway that cut through the heart of downtown Boston. 
As the lynchpin of the Master plan, the architects envisioned an “Inner Belt” within the 
boundaries of Route 128 connecting Cambridge, Somerville, Brookline and the Boston 
neighborhoods of Roxbury, Charlestown and the Fenway. Additionally, the “Inner Belt” 
would link seven radial routes including Route 2, I-93 North, I-95 North and South, and 
the Southeast Expressway. To the planners, the belt would enable drivers to go around 
Boston without going through its center.67  
 By the end of the 1950s, federal funding enabled DPW officials to implement 
most of the Master Plan, and the Inner Belt remained the biggest missing piece. The state 
sought to fill in that gap.  The Inner Belt plan, however, threatened to cut through the 
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heart of a series of largely three-decker dotted lower middle-class and working-class 
neighborhoods. 68 In Cambridge, residents decided to fight back to preserve the 
cohesiveness and socioeconomic diversity of their neighborhoods. In threatened areas 
yard signs and placards in storefront windows, declared, “Cambridge is a city not a 
highway.” The protest spread to residents in neighborhoods throughout Boston whose 
homes the Inner Belt would also destroy. The opposition soon included African-
Americans from Roxbury, a racially and economically diverse group of residents from 
the South End, working class whites from Somerville and Jamaica Plain, and white upper 
middle class residents of the inner-ring suburb of Brookline. With the help of several 
MIT-affiliated experts, this racially and economically diverse group of residents 
coalesced into the Greater Boston Transportation Committee on the Transportation Crisis 
(GBC). The coalition shared the immediate goal of stopping the construction of any new 
projects within the circumference of Route 128, but they also hoped to direct the 
metropolitan transportation system away from “its current over-emphasis on serving 
suburban auto-commuters at the expense of inner-city neighborhoods.”69 This twin 
agenda led the group to formulate a serious challenge to the pro-growth agenda of 
officials at the city, state and federal level. 
The anti-highway activists made little headway convincing Governor John Volpe. 
As a former construction official, the first federal highway administrator during the 
Eisenhower and the Massachusetts’ Commissioner of Public Works in the 1950s, Volpe 
had a long history of pro-road politics. When Volpe accepted the position as the 
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Secretary of Transportation under President Richard Nixon, however, the anti-Inner Belt 
movement had a crucial window of opportunity, and GBC seized it in a rally called 
“People Before Highways.” On Saturday January 25, 1969, two thousand people 
converged on Boston Common by the entrance of the State House to participate. The 
participants included busloads from Cambridge, East Boston, the South End, Mattapan, 
Jamaica Plain, Roxbury, and Brookline. The collection of participants did not resemble 
the typical protest of the late 1960s. The rally radiated a “festive, almost carnival mood,” 
“ballgame atmosphere.”70 Middle-aged Irish Catholic housewives and young African-
American community organizers stood side-by-side, holding signs: “Stop the Belt,” 
“Don’t Belt Us,” “Can You Roller Skate on an Expressway?” A dog wore a sign attached 
to a collar announcing, “I need a belt, but Cambridge doesn’t,” and many children 
clutched red balloons printed with the slogan, “Homes Not Highways. ” Governor 
Sargent, just two days into his term, eventually emerged on the State House. 
Appropriating the demonstration’s theme, he declared: “Never, never will this 
administration make decision that place people below concrete. ” At that, the crowd 
erupted in loud applause.71  
Although the movement initially pitted the state government and the grassroots 
movement against each other, following the People Before Highways rally, the grassroots 
coalition partnered with Sargent and his staff. The activists effectively capitalized on the 
unique personal ideology and leadership style of the new governor. Like his predecessor, 
Sargent was both a Republican and former Public Works Commissioner, but his pedigree 
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and path to that position differed significantly from Volpe. Sargent’s path to the 
governorship would ultimately shape his reaction to the Inner Belt issue. He had owned a 
sporting goods shop and commercial fishing business on Cape Cod, which led him first to 
the post as associate director of the DPW in charge of waterways and then head of the 
Department of Public Works. As Commissioner, Sargent had endorsed the Inner Belt, but 
his unusual resume made him open to reconsideration.72 In the months following the 
rally, he made no official announcement about his decision regarding the fate of the Inner 
Belt, but gradually shifted his position and that of the state government. In a series of 
speeches following the protest, he asserted that the nation’s long preoccupation with 
highways had diminished attention to other forms of transit that might serve the needs of 
urban residents more effectively. Instead, Sargent began to call for adoption of a 
“balanced transportation system” that would count highways as one form of transit 
among many other options. During his first months in office, the Governor also became 
more outspoken in his support of basic principles of the environmental movement. In an 
early speech as governor, Sargent asserted “protecting trees and guarding streams for 
fishing and saving flowers for the garden-club” was no longer sufficient and the people of 
Massachusetts had to instead focus on “saving our very selves.” He acknowledged while 
Massachusetts had some of the strongest anti-pollution laws in the nation, they were not 
enough and pledged to strengthen them significantly. This heightened understanding of 
the environment directly informed his changed attitude on the highway issue. 73 
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 In the aftermath of the People Before Highways rally, the anti-highway coalition 
also began to fine-tune its tactics to move the state’s priorities away from roadway 
construction and toward a mass transit-based policy for metropolitan Boston. This focus 
on mass transit caused the coalition to forge alliances with suburban residents. The 
organization believed that mass transit would help prevent the destruction of low-income 
neighborhoods in Roxbury and South End and increase the opportunities for poor 
Bostonians who lacked access to a car. However, the GBC also recognized transit as 
opposed to highways would benefit suburban residents as well.  “The core city is not the 
only area which will be adversely affected, ” the GBC posited. “the present plan destroys 
suburban communities as well.” Adopting the anti-growth arguments of the open space 
movement, the GBC explained  “new expressways encourage the present patterns of 
suburban sprawl which nullifies many of the features which drew people to the suburbs in 
the first place” as “quiet streets become busy connecting roads overnight; ugly and 
unplanned shopping centers bring noise and traffic.” Further fusing the issues of 
conservation and social inequality, the GBC acknowledged the problems of automobile-
produced air pollution had detrimental consequences for both poor inner-city residents 
and affluent suburbanites.  The GBC distributed a plea to “concerned citizens” 
throughout the metropolitan area to join in the fight for a better regional transit system.74 
During the spring of 1969, the group also reached out to the area’s well-established 
networks of suburban-based liberal organizations including the Massachusetts Federation 
of Housing and Equal Rights and Citizens for Participation Politics, both of which had 
                                                
74 Greater Boston Committee on the Transportation Crisis, A PLEA FOR CONCERNED CITIZENS TO 
JOIN THE FIGHT FOR A BETTER REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, July 4, 1969, Gordon 
Fellman Papers, Robert D. Farber University Archives and Special Collections, Brandeis University, 
Waltham, MA (hereafter: “Fellman”).  
 
315 
significant knowledge of working within the formal channels of the political system. The 
most crucial white liberal allies of GBC, nevertheless, would prove to be suburban 
environmental groups.   
 In the summer of 1969, the GBC allied with the group of environmentalists trying 
to stop the DPW from routing the Southwest Expressway directly through the Fowl 
Meadow wildlife preserve. Since in the early 1960s, the conservation commissions and 
environmental groups in the suburbs of Milton, Canton, Dedham, and Cohasset along the 
southern portion of Route 128 had sought to stop the plan. In doing so, they had devised 
an alternate route, which lessened the impact on the Metropolitan District Commission 
(MDC) owned area.75 These conservation groups in the suburbs surrounding Fowl 
Meadow established a separate organization called the Committee for Safety and 
Conservation (CCS) explicitly to fight the DPW plans.  Illustrating its commitment to 
both parts of their name, the icon the group adopted for its letterhead and other materials 
featured a flock of birds flying over an empty highway. The well-organized group 
initiated legal action against the DPW, which stalled the construction. For over two years, 
two concrete-slabs stood in the middle of the Canton woods, while the case remained in 
the courts. In February 1969, the state Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) ruled that diverting 
“parkland, great ponds, reservations and kindred areas to a new inconsistent public use” 
needed the sanction of the state legislature. In response to the SJC’s decision, the DPW 
took the offensive. They filed legislation to obtain a right-of-way to purchase a part of 
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Fowl Meadow from the MDC. This action put the state legislature directly into the center 
of the highway controversy. 76 
 The SJC’s Fowl Meadow ruling also brought the open space advocates and anti-
highway activists into alliance. To serve as its lobbyist, the CCS hired Guy Rosmarin, a 
young lawyer and political consultant from Brookline. Rosmarin previously worked for 
Democratic politicians Robert Wagner and Endicott Peabody. His initial efforts for the 
CCS had brought him into contact with the GBC who were trying to stop the entire 
highway plan. Rosmarin soon began attending their meetings staged in storefronts and 
the basements of public housing projects in Boston and quickly became a “workhorse” 
for the GBC and one of its main spokespeople. Rosmarin recognized that the suburban 
residents in the CCS were trying to fight “the route, not the road,” but he thought  it 
might be a better tactic to oppose entire state highway plan rather than only the part of I-
95 slated to run through Fowl Meadow. Rosmarin convinced the Committee for Safety 
and Conservation to join with the GBC to challenge the whole plan. This linking of the 
two campaigns provided the means to create a truly metropolitan alliance by bridging the 
spatial, economic and ideological divisions between the residents of the city and the 
suburbs and to better connect the issues of neighborhood and environmental destruction 
at the heart of the highway proposal.  
  The first chance to test the effectiveness of the partnership occurred when Milton 
state legislator M. Joseph Manning sought to add an amendment to House Bill 5270, the 
DPW’s request for the land transfer. Manning represented the district from which many 
of the members of the CCS resided,  and his amendment required the road agency to 
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prepare a feasibility study of the route.77 The anti-highway movement relied on its new 
suburban and conservation contacts to lobby the state legislature to support the measure 
such as members of the Fair Housing Federation and CPP. The region’s leading 
conservation groups also actively participated and encouraged their large membership 
bases to pressure their various state representatives. In its monthly Legislative Bulletin, 
the Massachusetts Forest and Park Association, one of the area’s oldest conservation 
groups, stated that the Fowl Meadow controversy had important implications for all its 
members because it tested the increasingly common question if “citizen-taxpayers” 
should have the opportunity to reduce the effect of highways on their natural 
environment. The Association also gently prodded members by suggesting, “the day may 
soon come when you will need reciprocal support on a local conservation issue.”78   
Stuart DeBard, a member of the CCS and a leading Massachusetts conservationist, sent a 
copy of the bulletin to Sargent aide Albert Kramer with a handwritten note scrawled at 
the top alerting him that “this goes to several thousand people.”79  
 The letters flooding the State House confirmed both the numerical and geographic 
reach of the grassroots conservation network as well as its effectiveness at pressuring 
state politicians. On July 16, the House of Representatives voted 132 to 90 in favor of the 
amendment. Michael Dukakis, then a young representative from Brookline, believed that 
the conservationists directly influenced the vote’s outcome and called their success “one 
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of the most exciting things I’ve seen since I’ve been in the legislature.”80 The vote 
indicated the growing political persuasiveness of the conservationists over the legislature. 
But the road-building agency reasserted its power forcing a reconsideration, which passed 
by four votes. Supporters of the westerly route rushed to save the project. After a series of 
additions and deletions, including at one point a proposal to depress the highway through 
Fowl Meadow, the bill moved to the governor’s desk. By law, Sargent had ten days to 
decide whether or not to veto the bill.  
 During the period Sargent deliberated, a group of grassroots organizations formed 
a coalition in an attempt to sway the governor to veto the bill. The group, which called 
itself the Emergency Coalition Against House Bill 5270, illustrates the breadth of issues 
and interests the anti-highway platform the highway fight encompassed. The Emergency 
Coalition joined conservationist organizations the MFPA, MACC, and the Neponset 
Valley Conservation Association, the urban-based GBC, South End Tenants Council and 
Council of Urban Priests and the liberal CPP and Americans for Democratic Action.81 To 
underscore the conservation concerns at the heart of the anti-highway stance and catch 
the governor’s attention, the Emergency Coalition sent Sargent a letter that used his own 
words against him.  The group began their letter by quoting a speech Sargent had 
delivered a few months earlier. In that address, Sargent had delivered the promise that: 
“The day I became Governor I told the people of my state that I would not tolerate the 
reckless ruin of environment. I will not. Nor should you.”82 Sargent’s aide Albert Kramer 
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recognized the larger strategy of the anti-highway movement. “Their base had broadened 
beyond neighborhoods to conservation, which the Governor instantly responds to because 
he relates to that.” Kramer conceded Guy Rosmarin and his allies “were effective. They 
knew what they were doing on that.”83 The new conservation-centered strategy failed to 
wholly convince Sargent to side with the anti-highway coalition. The governor did, 
however, offer a compromise. He signed the bill enabling the transfer of Fowl Meadow, 
but stipulated the transfer be withheld until a special task force completed a study of the 
project. The movement proved unable to stop I-95 from running through Fowl Meadow. 
The controversy, however, had solidified the coalition’s metropolitan dimensions, 
strengthened ties between the grassroots activists and Sargent’s staff, and equally 
important, transformed the highway issue from a problem of neighborhood disruption 
into one of environmental destruction. All of these dimensions would be crucial as the 
coalition intensified its focus on getting the governor to impose a moratorium on all 
highway construction.  
 
Moratorium  
 The Fowl Meadow fight electrified the GBC and its collaborators, and in its 
aftermath they began to focus their attention primarily on getting the governor to declare 
a stoppage of all highway construction and a complete restudy. In order to build support 
for the moratorium both on the streets and at the State House, the publicity committee 
began to distribute sheets of statistics confirming how the technical knowledge of urban 
planners continued to buttress the campaign in crucial ways. Steve Teichner, a former 
VISTA lawyer, led the legislative committee working to draft bills that represented the 
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organization’s position of construction stoppage and public transit. Guy Rosmarin also 
maintained almost daily contact with Albert Kramer and other members of the Sargent 
administration coordinating meetings between the Governor, the GBC and heads of other 
conservation, liberal, and social justice groups.84 
 The Fowl Meadow fight had reinforced for the GBC the importance of getting 
suburbanites involved in their campaign and, therefore, the activists sought to expand 
their base farther outside of the city. Citizens for Participation Politics proved a crucial 
ally in this outreach campaign. As chapter 4 discusses, CPP had begun in 1968 as a new 
political group committed to the election of liberal candidates and the passage of liberal 
legislation. It proved itself extremely effective at galvanizing suburban residents in 
support of these causes. The GBC’s commitment to citizen participation aligned closely 
to the name and mission of the CPP.  At its first state convention in May 1969, CPP 
endorsed state and federal legislation that would both halt all highway construction 
within Route 128 and involve citizens in the policy-making and planning process.85 A 
particularly crucial ally to the GBC campaign was CPP member Susan Straight, who 
would eventually head its suburban organizing committee. Culling the CPP and the 
Federation for Fair Housing and Equal Rights memberships to find contacts, Straight 
launched “a suburban push” by arranging meetings in variety of affluent suburbs such as 
Belmont, Brookline, Lexington, Wellesley and Weston. 86 She urged her contacts that 
only “through joint political pressure from the city and suburbs that the governor will act” 
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and warned that as suburban residents hedged “people’s homes and recreation areas are 
being demolished.”  87 
  The enthusiastic response Straight received from the suburban liberal groups she 
contacted demonstrated the metropolitan dimensions of the anti-highway issue. It also 
illustrates the increased interest environmental issues inspired among grassroots liberal 
groups and their members. In Straight’s view, suburban residents enthusiasm reflected 
their realization that the “United States has failed to develop workable environmental 
models, whether they be called urban centers or suburban communities.”88  In 1970, CPP 
established an Environmental Problems Committee to propose and lobby for state anti-
pollution legislation to regulate auto emissions and industrial water use, and to ban 
several pesticides.89  The anti-highway activities helped make environmental concerns a 
central component of the grassroots liberal political agenda in the years to come. 
 The highway debate also inspired the formation of a moderate Republican 
grassroots organization called Citizens for Proper Transportation Planning (CPTP).  A 
Republican law student named Stephen Crosby founded the ad hoc organization to 
galvanize suburban commuters and downtown business elites, who served as the 
foundation of Sargent’s base, to join the cause. In order to demonstrate to the governor 
“the wide spectrum of people who are dissatisfied with the highway-automobile-highway 
spiral” and in favor of  “a fundamental reconsideration of the transportation dilemma,” 
Crosby arranged a meeting between Sargent and the well-heeled CPTP membership. 90  
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The CPTP’s pleas became important in showing the governor that anti-highway 
sentiment was not exclusive to those whose homes fell within the roadway’s path. 
Following the meeting, Sargent wrote to Crosby: “I well understand the suburbanite’s 
realization that a highway, which reduces his commuting time by five minutes, still may 
not be in his overall interest.”91 Sargent also told Crosby “the lesson of the Sixties—that 
the corollary, and often destructive, effect of man’s ‘progress’ is direct and pervasive—
has come home to all citizens whether they live in the city or suburbia.”92 Sargent, as 
these comments show, was persuaded by the anti-highway coalition’s arguments that 
planning bureaucrats embraced an arbitrary and often irresponsible definition of the 
public interest. This realization had forced him to question the basic tenets of technocratic 
liberalism.93 
 On February 11, 1970, Sargent made “the most far-reaching and significant 
decision I have made during my term as Governor.” He announced he had “decided to 
reverse the transportation policy of the Commonwealth.”94 He called for the creation of a 
new plan, based on the concept of balanced transportation, which questioned not simply 
“where and how to build expressway, but whether he should complete them at all.” 
Sargent thereby ordered a stop to all highway construction within Route 128, including 
work on Southwest Expressway, Route 2, and the Inner Belt until the release of his new 
program. “Four years ago I was the Commissioner of the Department of Public Works,” 
Sargent candidly stated, “then, nearly everyone was sure highways were the only answer 
to transportation problems for years to come. We were wrong.”  The last three words 
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summarized the entire speech and Sargent’s efforts to reverse the basic tenets of growth 
liberalism. The decision solidified the governor’s popularity with voters throughout the 
state, but particularly suburban liberals. CPP, a barometer of suburban liberal sentiment, 
interpreted his transportation decisions as a sign of he had rejected “benevolent 
liberalism” and in favor of his “own brand of participatory democracy.”95 The towns 
along Boston’s outer ring such as Newton, Lexington Concord and Lincoln proved 
essential in Sargent’s successful re-election the following November.  
 The announcement put a hold on both the destruction of neighborhoods and open 
spaces like Fowl Meadow and thereby revealed the possibilities for changing policy when 
grassroots groups created broad alliances that transcended metropolitan lines and 
combined a broad range of people and issues.96 The effectiveness of the GBC directly 
depended on its combination of neighborhood activists, affluent suburbanites and white-
collar professionals.   Brad Yoneka, a community activist in the South End and coalition 
leader, conceded that the GBC would not have achieved the moratorium without the 
“help from conservationists, liberal republicans” and the members of CPP. He also 
declared that the success of the GBC proved that  “communities can define the issue, but 
middle-class skills are needed.”97 White middle-class experts were particularly 
instrumental in helping the group forge a close working relationship with members of the 
governor’s staff.  These bonds became so close that, following Sargent’s announcement, 
several members of the GBC, including Guy Rosmarin, decided to take positions within 
the administration as they believed they could contribute more to the cause by working 
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within the system of government. 98 These decisions strengthened the ties between anti-
highway activists and State House officials, which, in turn, shaped future transportation 
policies of the Bay State.  
In order to bring the bullet points of his speech into a coherent policy, Sargent 
created the Boston Transportation Planning Review (BTPR) to help him evaluate whether 
he should declare a permanent halt on highway construction within Route 128. He aimed 
for the $3.8 million study to be “open broadly participatory” and attentive to 
“transportation, socioeconomic and environmental values.”99 Alan Altshuler oversaw the 
seventy-five person committee, which included representatives from state agencies, 
municipalities around metropolitan Boston and groups such as the GBC, the Sierra Club 
and the Boston Chamber of Commerce. The BTPR’s focus on participation and openness 
transformed the process into an extended discussion between government bureaucrats, 
politicians, business people, and community activists and served as a model for 
transportation planning across the nation.100 According to Guy Rosmarin the BTPR  
“restored public confidence in government, dissolved the wall of hostility and suspicion” 
and “brought together people from the suburbs and the cities, rich and poor black people” 
to work “in common cause.”101 The GBC lauded the study as “precedent setting,” 
especially its awareness “that social and environmental costs must be included in any 
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consideration of the benefits of building a transportation system.”102 Throughout the 
restudy process, the region’s network of environmental groups remained among the 
loudest voices opposing highway construction in favor of the development of mass 
transit, which illustrated the increasing fusion of transportation and environmental 
concerns.  The representatives of greater Boston Conservation Commissions as well as 
members of the Audubon Society and Sierra Club frequently lobbied the governor, and 
they claimed the study’s the outcome one of the “most significant environmental 
judgments made by a Massachusetts Governor in the latter half of the twentieth 
century.”103 Grassroots groups were not the only ones pressuring officials to pay close 
attention environmental issues.  Rather, a series of new pieces of legislation and court 
decisions at the federal level made environmental concerns take on new importance in 
both the discourse and decisions surrounding the future of highway building in 
Massachusetts.  
 
The Federal Government’s “Discovery” of the Environmental Crisis 
The announcement of the moratorium and creation of the BTPR coincided with a 
new epoch of environmental politics in the United States. In the late 1960s, the discontent 
about the environmental crisis exploded at the national level.  These developments 
significantly changed the terrain of both local and national environmental policy and 
politics. Just before the moratorium on highway construction, Sargent deemed 1970 the 
“year of the environment,” which both reflected and galvanized the concern of 
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Massachusetts residents. The state Director of Conservation Services observed that 
residents throughout the state increasingly wanted to “do ‘their thing’ to make 
“Massachusetts a better place in which to live.”104 On April 22, 1970, almost 20 million 
people across the United States participated in Earth Day, which signified an important 
turning point in the popularization of environmental issues and created a favorable 
context for the passage of new laws in that pivotal year.  In addition to the Clean Air and 
Clean Water Acts, Richard Nixon signed into law the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) which one observer referred to as “the most sweeping environmental law ever 
enacted by a United States Congress.”105 The Act had three provisions: first, it asserted 
environmental quality as a leading national priority; second, it established procedures for 
incorporating environmental concerns into federal agency decision-making; third, it 
created the President’s Council on Environmental Quality (the precursor to the EPA) to 
coordinate all federal environmental actions.106 The second provision, Section 102, had 
the most direct effect on the highway controversy. It mandated that all federally funded 
projects prepare a detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that described the 
environmental effects of the action, identify any unavoidable harms, list any alternatives, 
and make all this information available to the public.107  The broad law provided 
environmental officials a crucial mechanism with which to hold federal agencies 
accountable for the social, economic and ecological consequences of their plans.  
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If 1970 served as the year of the environment on Capitol Hill, then 1971 
represented its year in federal courts. First, the Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling 
related to a highway battle in Memphis, which called for all transportation decisions to 
consider environmental costs and the citizen’s interests.  Section 4(f) of the Department 
of Transportation Act of 1966 had barred highway incursion could occur on public, 
conserved land, where a “feasible and prudent” alternative to building the highway 
existed. Section 4(f) differed slightly from NEPA because it specified more explicitly the 
types of circumstances in which impacts could occur. In Citizens of Overton Park v. 
Volpe, the Supreme Court upheld the law, reasoning the federal statute “indicates that 
protection of parkland was to be given paramount importance.”108 While the Court still 
left the final decision to the DOT, the ruling set clear boundaries on the agency’s 
discretion. In a related ruling, in the case Calvert Coordinating Cliffs’ Coordinating 
Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, a federal court further clarified 
NEPA guidelines setting standards for compliance and future court action.109Judge 
Skelley Wright determined that an Environmental Impact Statement was not simply a 
procedural requirement, but could itself be reviewed for quality and substance. 
Condemning non-compliance, he also found that an incomplete environmental review 
could be legal grounds for overturning a project. The complex dimensions of these new 
federal laws and rulings and their in role in establishing a new era of environmental 
activism came into sharp focus relief in the fight to prevent the expansion of Route 2 in 
Concord and Lincoln.  
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A Superhighway in Thoreau’s Backyard 
The plan for expanding Route 2 fell outside the official boundaries of the BTPR 
restudy, but the fight it spawned reveals both how new federal policy and grassroots 
activism around environmental issues together altered the debate about urban sprawl. 
Route 2 began in western Massachusetts and moved directly eastward traversing through 
rural towns in the center of the state, the suburbs of Acton, Concord, Lincoln and 
Lexington and bisected Route 128 before ended in Cambridge. Route 2 served as the 
major commuter road for residents in the western suburbs, but it was built in the first half 
of century and had struggled to absorb the increased traffic produced by postwar 
suburbanization. The 1948 Master Plan had first proposed significant expansion in order 
to make Route 2 an official expressway. While Sargent’s moratorium stalled plans to 
extend Route 2 farther into Cambridge and link it to Inner Belt, the DPW still sought to 
expand it in the other direction. The DPW, therefore, developed plans to partially relocate 
and expand an 11-mile section of Route 2 between Acton and Lexington, doubling it 
from four to eight lanes and adding a 64-foot wide median strip, overpasses, and a large 
cloverleaf. The DPW argued that these improvements would both increase the safety of 
the road and transform it into “the major freeway serving the northwest quadrant of the 
state.”110 The plan would have the most disruptive effects on the towns of Lincoln and 
Concord, where it demanded the relocation of a cluster of homes and would take two 
hundred acres of protected open space.111 The Department of Public Works received 
federal approval for the project in 1969 and was anxious to complete the highway in time 
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for the Bicentennial celebration of the battles of Lexington and Concord, which it 
predicted would bring an influx of traffic to the area.  
The residents of Lincoln and Concord grew extremely outraged at the prospect 
that a road comparable in size to Route 128 would slash through their idyllic 
communities, taking their homes and valuable conservation lands. On October 15, 1970, 
the Department of Public Works officials staged a public hearing at Concord-Carlisle 
High School about the proposed construction where they explained their objectives. 112 
Citizens filled the school’s auditorium to capacity in order to voice objections to the 
proposal, especially its seeming disregard for the environment. Many residents believed 
that the placement of a large cloverleaf almost adjacent to Walden Pond was reason 
enough to cancel the project. Other people became indignant about the road’s proximity 
to Minuteman National Park. “This enormous highway with its noise, air, and visual 
pollution, is totally incompatible with the historical character of this park which 
commemorates the birth of our nation,” Lynn W. Gelhar bemoaned. Gelhar denounced 
the plans as an “affront” to “all Americans, who through their taxes are paying for this 
facility.”113 The suburban homeowners used similar taxpayer logic to discuss the threat to 
local conservation lands. This response highlights Concord residents’ heightened sense of 
ownership over local open space since, indeed, the combination of their grassroots 
activism and tax dollars had directly contributed to preserving these places.  
The rise of the mainstream environmental movement in the late 1960s also fueled 
and informed residents’ outrage.  While Concord residents had demonstrated a 
longstanding commitment to land conservation, the rapid rise of the modern 
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environmental movement through events like Earth Day the previous spring had 
spawned, in the words of the Concord Department of Natural Resources,  “an awakening 
of ecological concern” and increased involvement of “the citizenry in the environmental 
crisis.”114 The growing national awareness about the environment thus broadened the 
scope of local citizens’ concerns about the highway and infused it with a more ecological 
focus. Many residents feared the expansion of Route 2 would significantly alter the 
ecology of the land surrounding the road by creating flooding, erosion, and the air 
pollution that would harm wildlife, vegetation, and water of the region. For instance, 
Concord resident and PhD candidate in Environmental Sciences and Engineering Richard 
Harris pointedly asked his fellow residents of the DPW plan:  “Do we understand the 
magnitude of the ecological consequences, and more importantly are we willing to accept 
the consequences?”115 
The recent passage of landmark federal environmental laws coupled with the 
moratorium also empowered local officials to confront the highway bureaucracy. Town 
leaders recognized that they had a unique responsibility to stand up to the road builders 
and protect their land and residents since, according to Lincoln Selectman Kemon 
Taschigou, “this is where conservation began.” 116  Following the October hearing, 
Lincoln and Concord officials collaborated to create an alternative design for the 
expansion. Their design suggested a diamond interchange in the place of the large 
cloverleaf, which avoided traversing through valuable conservation areas. According to 
reporter Sareen Gerson, the proposal by Concord and Lincoln sent a strong message. 
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Local officials and planners, Gerson opined, were “simply not swallowing, in the ‘old 
style’ way, plans for huge highways.”117  The strong dissatisfaction of local citizens and 
officials led the DPW to announce that it would delay plans to expand Route 2 and 
redraw the design in order to take these criticisms into consideration. The announcement 
of their restudy coincided with the enactment of NEPA, which meant that the DPW 
would also have to produce an Environmental Impact Statement in order to gain 
approval. The project marked the first EIS that the state DPW had to complete,  and the 
bureaucrats took extra care in order to understand the new process and create a model for 
future statements.118  
The delay in the project also allowed for grassroots mobilization of local residents 
in opposition to the proposal. Following the DPW hearing, a group of Concord residents 
formed the Citizens for Balanced Transportation (CBT). The name’s allusion to Sargent’s 
balanced transportation philosophy revealed the organizers’ politically savvy and their 
desire to ingratiate themselves with the governor and other politicians. The moniker also 
reflected the members’ desire to connote the group’s moderation, which had also inspired 
Sargent to embrace the terminology. The CBT was not categorically opposed to 
automobile travel or highways and agreed that the segment of Route 2 under 
consideration was unsafe and needed improvement. Yet the group believed there were 
ways to enhance safety without expanding roads.  The CBT leaders also firmly believed 
the highways should not be the only form of transportation available to Concord 
residents. In order to gain support for their position the members of the CBT adopted the 
features and tactics of many other suburban grassroots organizations. Like their 
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counterparts in civil rights, peace and conservation movement, the overwhelmingly white 
middle-class group relied on suburban social networks to encourage local citizens to 
participate.119 The CBT believed strongly that channeling this grassroots mobilization 
toward the formal structures of government provided the best way to stop the expansion 
of the highway and redirect the state transportation policy. “We write a lot of position 
papers, we circulate petitions, we write letters, ” declared CBT leader and Harvard 
Business School professor Cyrus Gibson. Explaining the group’s conscious deviation 
from more direct action techniques, Gibson elaborated, “we tend to deal through channels 
rather than go through courts—or push baby carriages in front of the bulldozers.” 120 
Although the CBT explicitly presented itself to government officials as an “ad hoc 
citizens group” of amateurs, the group’s published materials exposed several members’ 
high level of professional expertise about engineering and road design.121 Like the 
conservation commission groups and other forms of grassroots suburban activism that 
emerged from Concord and its neighboring affluent communities, the CBT included 
several engineers and scientists who used their professional skills to study details of the 
plans and propose alternative designs. To show that the safety of the road could be 
improved in “less environmentally destructive and quicker ways,” the group produced a 
set of studies.  It reinterpreted the traffic projections for 1990 to suggest increasing rail 
transportation in the area, which would make the extra highway lanes unnecessary. The 
group also stressed that if safety was the main concern of the DPW it should take these 
immediate actions rather than wait for federal approval for the expansion. The increased 
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emphasis on citizen participation in new transportation and environmental policy coupled 
with the members’ position as white middle-class professional from the affluent suburbs 
ensured that the CBT received access to officials at the top levels of state government 
including Environment Secretary Charles H.W. Foster Transportation Secretary Alan 
Altshuler, Commissioner of Public Works Bruce Campbell, and Governor Sargent and 
his close advisors. Between 1971 and 1972, CBT representatives and their grassroots 
suburban allies met regularly with officials at the State House and Public Works 
Department forging close relationships that would prove essential in preventing the 
roadway’s expansion. 122 
The argument that CBT and its collaborators constructed to gain the support of 
local residents and state officials demonstrate the clear influence of both the urban anti-
highway and mainstream environmental movements on suburban open space activism. 
The CBT literature acknowledged that the success of the GBC in Boston and the 
Supreme Court’s Overton decision signaled “that the time is appropriate for local 
initiative to halt mindless construction of the highway.” Likewise, Lincoln resident 
Gregory DeBarshye declared that while a decade earlier, the DPW might have had a 
“legitimate” case for the expansion, the indefinite delay of the Inner Belt and the growing 
recognition of the environmental impacts of roadway construction made those 
justifications “obsolete.” 123 The CBT borrowed the populist language of the urban-based 
activists, denouncing the DPW as “a bureaucracy that doesn’t want to change—a group 
                                                
122 Barker to Campbell, December 15, 1971; Memorandum from Allen H. Morgan to Charles H.W. Foster, 
re: Route 2 reconstruction (Lincoln-Acton). May 24, 1972, Box 20, Route 2 Folder, FWS; Charles H.W. 
Foster to Mrs. Alan Barrett, July 28, 1972, Box 20, Route 2 Folder, FWS; “CBT Told Route 2 to Become 
State’s Major East-West Highway” Concord Journal, February 17, 1972; “Altshuler Meets with Route 2 
Coalition,” Concord Journal, May 11, 1972.  
122  Mahoney, “Citizens Groups Up in Arms over Route 2.” 
123 “165 Lincoln Residents to the Editor,” Lincoln Fence Viewer, April 6, 1972.  
 
334 
of highway builders who are going to build come hell or high water.”124   The CBT and 
other suburban groups also shared the anti-highway protestors belief in the need to shift 
the state’s transportation priorities away from a focus on the automobile and toward mass 
transit. In one of its position papers, the CBT asserted, “ the use of the automobile for 
commuting imposes direct and indirect social costs on the total population which make it 
a poor alternative to mass transportation systems.”125 Cyrus Gibson publicly elaborated, 
“I think this new feeling—that maybe we’ve had enough of the automobile—is national, 
a national philosophy.”126  
The CBT, nevertheless, viewed mass transit as a way of increasing the quality of 
life of white suburbanites rather than as a route to create environmental and social justice.  
Instead of advocating that mass transit would increase the mobility of urban residents, 
they argued that mass transit would preserve the physical landscape and amenities of 
Concord. The CBT pointedly asserted that the expansion of the highway would 
significantly affect the “quality of life here in the future,” create the “pressure to build 
more housing,” the “irreparable shrinkage of land in the Walden reservation, and other 
historic and recreational parts,” and cause substantial “social and environmental 
effects.”127 The CBT, therefore, believed that mass transit offered a far more viable 
option, as it was less environmentally destructive and would not create the same 
corresponding sprawl. The group warned “if local and national pressures against highway 
construction continue to mount, Route 2 may be the last such road in the region,” which 
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could “lead to a rapid population growth in this area the pressure for housing 
construction” onto Concord.”128 In a further inversion of the arguments of the GBC and 
other social justice groups, the CBT and its allies presented the victims of inadequate 
transit not as jobless low-income minorities, but white middle-class homeowners isolated 
in the suburbs.129 Ultimately, the CBT reduced its aims to preserving “the character” and 
“the transportation vitality” of the area.130 The CBT’s emphasis on “character” reveals 
the implicitly exclusionary undercurrent of their vision. This emphasis helped legitimate 
the anti-growth ideology, providing an easier justification for suburbanites in Concord 
and elsewhere to oppose any form of new development, including mixed-income housing 
that would potentially change both aesthetic and social “character” of these communities. 
The equal value the group placed on character and transportation, moreover, punctuates 
the CBT’s belief that increasing mass transit offered the means of preserving rather than 
challenging socioeconomic dynamics of Concord and its neighboring suburbs.  
When DPW released the much-awaited draft Environmental Impact Statement for 
Route 2 in September 1972, it demonstrated the success and limits of this grassroots 
mobilization on influencing the altered design. The DPW acknowledged that the towns 
affected by the highway were distinctive in their “rural, colonial atmosphere” and sense 
of  “heritage” with “rolling hills,” “rambling stone walls,” “white steeples,” and village 
greens that “mark the authenticity of the New England type background of the 
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communities.”131 It observed that the towns were “proud of their part in American 
history” and have “reflected that pride by preserving the Yankee characteristics of their 
communities.” The DPW conceded that the project would require taking of several 
residences primarily in Lincoln, but suggested that since they were all single-family 
homes on large lots of land widely spaced apart it would “have minimal effect on the 
existing neighborhood integrity.” The DPW remained confident that these residents 
would be able to find similar homes elsewhere in their communities.  
The DPW’s efforts to demonstrate an environmental consciousness constituted 
the most compelling components of the statement. The engineers downplayed the 
ecological impact and instead emphasized the ways in which the plan would complement 
the area’s aesthetic beauty and commitment to open space. The design included several 
stone arch overpasses, which the engineers contended would enable “horse-back, bicycle 
and pedestrian traffic” and wildlife to move “unhindered” between Lincoln and 
Concord’s many acres of open space. The statement even included a sketch of a pastoral 
scene with a well-crafted elevated stone arch bridge surrounded by trees and plants and 
crossing underneath a bicyclist and horseback rider, both of whom the artist had depicted 
as white.132 The DPW clearly believed that bikes and horses offered sufficient alternative 
means of travel as the statement firmly dismissed the idea of increasing mass transit. The 
DPW asserted that the area already had “sufficient rail service” on the commuter line 
which in fact were “far from capacity” and that this existing lack of riders would create 
“financial disaster” if the rapid transit extended into the area past Route 128.  
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The guidelines of NEPA mandated the DPW stage a hearing and accept 
comments on the plan before they officially submitted the EIS to the Federal Highway 
Administration. This process invited citizen input in new ways. The DPW’s official 
hearing on the draft impact statement in late September drew over a hundred people who 
“fired questions” at the bureaucrats.133 The CBT voiced the strongest outcry against the 
plan formulating a critique grounded in its anti-sprawl philosophy. CBT leader Cyrus 
Gibson was particularly frustrated at how glibly the statement rejected a mass transit 
alternative and implied that people did not want rail service. “I believe commuters and 
others would flock to an efficient rail service which stopped where it should,” Gibson 
asserted. Like the CBT’s early position papers, Gibson raised fears that the highway 
would spread urban sprawl. He uncovered a single sentence in which the DPW suggested 
that a larger highway would make “the location of new industry in the area more 
feasible.”134 He suggested this new development would negate Concord’s twenty-year 
effort to prevent commercial and industrial development and population in its 
communities through rigid zoning policies. Gibson invoked a recent article from the New 
York Times about how Concord had taken vigorous steps to uphold the principles of 
Walden and look much as it did when Thoreau wrote it.135 Gibson implored that “if this 
road gets built “Thoreau’s Concord’ would totally unrecognizable to him and 
unacceptable to him, I think and unacceptable to today’s Concordians too.”136 Ultimately, 
Gibson indicted that the EIS represented “an insult to the intelligence of the citizens of 
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Concord” stating he could “list three hundred failings if I had to.”137  Although slightly 
fewer than three hundred, the CBT did conduct a more formal point-by-point critique of 
the EIS that cited dozens of shortcomings.138 The stipulations of NEPA required that the 
DPW include this critique and that of other citizens group in the final study it presented 
to the Federal Highway Administration. 
The release of the draft statement sparked the formation of another grassroots 
group of Concord citizens who enhanced the activities of the CBT by adopting an even 
more localist approach to the issue. The group called itself Residents Opposed to the 
Urban Traffic Encouragement (ROUTE) and had initially organized out a concern over a 
narrow section of the redesign containing Walden Pond, the town forest, the local public 
high school, and the Alcott Elementary School. The group quickly, nevertheless, 
expanded to include the entire community. 139 “It is time for all Concordians to take a 
hard look,” ROUTE stated of its organizing philosophy, and “insist that the essential 
nature of the Town be preserved.” In order to fulfill this aim, the group prepared a 
critique of the draft impact statement that dubbed it “a desperate attempt to justify a 
collection of decisions that were made before the first shots of the present Environmental 
Revolution began to echo around the globe.”140 “The authors of the impact statement 
know what a highway is and a superhighway,” ROUTE derided, “But there is less 
certainty that they are as familiar with meaning of the word ‘Environment.’”141 The group 
rejected the DPW’s attempt to satisfy environmental concerns through plantings and 
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stone arch bridges as trying to “dress their old and obsolete ideas in a flimsy dress of the 
new concern for the environment.” ROUTE concluded that it was clear that “nation-wide 
clamor against the disruptions and damage, the fumes and the noise of superhighways of 
the last ten years had not reached the ears of the authors of this report.”142 ROUTE’s 
arguments moved the discussion around the fate of Route 2 even further away from 
issues of metropolitan equality and more squarely toward the realm of suburban 
individualism. 
If members of ROUTE criticized the DPW for taking an outmoded view of the 
environment, their statements revealed their own definition centered on issues associated 
with suburban quality of life. The group largely concentrated on the ways in which the 
highway would disrupt the high standards of living and pastoral charm that Concord 
citizens had come to appreciate and expect. “Have you driven on the freeways in New 
York or Chicago or Los Angeles lately?” A ROUTE letter asked, “Do you prefer the 
country woods we have in Concord?” “Picture what the plan will do to our town,” 
ROUTE beseeched, “once the concrete is poured it will be too late to protest.”143 Like 
early open space activists, ROUTE sought to marshal the Concord residents’ investment 
in their distinctiveness from the rest of the nation. At the same time, ROUTE’s localist 
and populist discourse effectively transformed the affluent suburban residents as the 
innocent victims of the nefarious highway planners and the problems of urban sprawl. 
ROUTE accused the DPW of not addressing “the effects of a major East-West 
Massachusetts Highway upon the environment of a small community bisected by eight 
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ribbons of concrete, and an infinity, nearly, of approach ramps.” 144 This type of 
argument erased suburban residents own complicity in the processes they aimed to 
prevent. In doing so, this victim stance allowed ROUTE and its white suburban allies to 
avoid considering how their own “lifestyle” choices and consumer practices had directly 
contributed to the environmental crisis and traffic problems in the first place.145  
Several Concord residents offered a competing definition of high quality of life. 
These homeowners supported the expansion as a means to give suburban residence safer 
roadways and faster access to downtown Boston. Thomas Flint served as the de facto 
head of this informal constituency. Flint, the inaugural head of the Concord Conservation 
Commission and a leading area conservationist, appeared an unlikely proponent of the 
highway expansion. Yet, Flint was a trained engineer who had consistently adopted both 
a pragmatic view of resource conservation and a firm faith in the power of expert 
knowledge. Flint argued that Concord already contained some eight square miles of open 
space and the road threatened only about 1 percent of this land, which he dismissed as 
“less than the town will probably purchase at the next town meeting.”146 Flint’s 
comments created a window for other local residents to criticize the arguments and 
tactics of the CBT. In a letter to the Concord Journal, Mary LaBounty reported that she 
had informally surveyed seven members of the CBT about their own commuting 
practices and discovered that six of the seven members she polled traveled to Boston by 
car, thus accusing the organization of promoting an agenda of  “do as I say and not as I 
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do.” LaBounty argued that the Route 2 expansion was necessary not just for Concord 
residents to commute into Boston, but also for the many people who flocked to the town 
for its exceptional recreational and historic sites. Her reasoning, nevertheless, ignored the 
fact that the expansion would still only increase accessibility for the town to people who 
owned a car.147  
These criticisms did not hinder CBT’s and ROUTE’s campaign to stop the Route 
2 expansion. During the fall of 1972, the groups continued to simultaneously work at the 
grassroots and the formal channels of government. The groups created a petition 
objecting to the present plans by DPW and demanding a restudy.  In just four days, the 
groups gathered 2,500 signatures. They urged residents to sign if they were  “interested in 
the FUTURE OF CONCORD.”148 This strong support motivated the anti-highway 
leaders to write Senators Brooke and Kennedy and other federal officials warning them 
that the proposed Route 2 expansion would “irreparably damage the rural character of 
Concord, a historically significant town.”149 These citizens also relied on the lines of 
communication they had established at the State House. The CBT sent Sargent 
administration officials Al Kramer and Guy Rosmarin a large packet including the 
various statements of groups and individuals and newspaper clippings on the issue in 
order to demonstrate the strong grassroots desire for a restudy of DPW plan.150  
The activities revealed the scope of opposition and the overall success of the 
suburban-based group at working within the political system. The New England Sierra 
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Club joined in the lobbying efforts as well. The group galvanized its wide metropolitan-
wide membership by stressing the “adverse environmental impact of the project” which 
included the taking of several public areas purchased through the federal and state Self-
Help program that were “endowed with significant historic, conservation and education 
and environmental values.”151 This outpouring of opposition forced the DPW, once again, 
to order a restudy of the expansion. The CBT and Route 2 Coalition with the support of 
Sierra Club, GBC and CPP pleaded with Alan Altshuler to ensure the restudy of Route 2 
proceeded in a “fair and open manner” and that citizens groups like them be brought into 
the process.152 The lobbying worked.  Altshuler proposed that the BTPR consult on the 
process in order to ensure that the new EIS became a “first-class document.”153  
The restudy process did, in fact, involve more participation from local citizens 
and more attention to the ecological impact of the roadway, especially its effect on 
adjacent conservation lands and the water resources.154 The updated version of the EIS 
and implemented roadway revealed the direct influence of this grassroots-based input. 
The DPW abandoned the plans to add lanes and instead adopted a series of smaller 
improvements. Limiting the number of lanes ensured not only the preservation of key 
conservation land, but also alleviated the development pressures and sprawl that the 
larger highway might have introduced. Thus, the new highway plans ensured that 
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Concord and Lincoln maintained their historic charm and socioeconomic exclusivity.155 
The outcome of the battle demonstrates citizen opposition to state-sponsored growth was 
particularly effective in communities that contained residents with a high level of expert 
knowledge. These citizens could point out nuanced deficiencies in the design and had the 
resources to be persistent in fighting the bureaucracy of the state and federal government. 
Yet as the controversy finally subsided, it revealed that it was far more difficult to shift 
this type of activism away from opposing highway construction toward support for 
bringing mass transit into the suburbs.  
 
A New Era in Transportation Policy  
On November 30, 1972, just as controversy over Route 2 began to wane, 
Governor Sargent appeared on television to announce his momentous decision about the 
future of Massachusetts transportation policy. He declared that in order to “right the 
balance of transportation” policy “future investment must concentrate overwhelmingly on 
the improvement of public transportation.” Sargent announced that he would permanently 
stop all highway construction inside Route 128, including the Southwest Expressway, 
and instead focus on increasing public transit in the areas that would have been served by 
new roadways.156 “I have borne in mind the impact of these facilities would have on the 
social, economic and environmental fabric of the region,” he stated, and had come to 
realize “the cost inevitably associated with these facilities would have exceeded their 
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benefits. ” As the most obvious example of this cost-benefit analysis, Sargent cited the 
earlier plan to run an elevated highway directly through Fowl Meadow. This illustration 
indicated how much the efforts of the suburban environmentalist influenced the 
governor’s decision. Sargent canceled $1 billion of expressway funding and received 
widespread praise both locally and nationally as a cutting-edge approach for recognizing 
the environmental concerns at the heart of transportation policy. An administrator for the 
Environmental Protection Agency even declared:  “Sargent is blocking downfield for 
us.”157  
Following his landmark announcement, Sargent made several trips to Washington 
in order to help redirect the nation’s transportation policy as well. Sargent sought, first 
and foremost, to change the distribution of the federal road building funds. Congress had 
established the Federal Highway Trust Fund in 1956 in order to ensure a reliable source 
of financial support for the construction and maintenance of the Interstate Highway 
System. The fund drew its money from a tax levied on gasoline purchases and stipulated 
that money cordoned off in the account could only be used for road construction. Sargent 
became a national champion and lobbyist for this cause of freeing the $4 billion per year 
in the fund from what one reporter dubbed its “straight jacket.”158 The governor’s 
affiliation with the Republican Party and close ties to Secretary of Transportation John 
Volpe made him an effective lobbyist and crucial to convincing the Nixon administration 
to reassess its stance about the nation’s transportation system.159 Sargent stressed in these 
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lobbying outings that “support for mass transportation is coming not only from intercity 
residents. It’s coming from suburbanites as well,” who “write in support of balanced 
transportation, with a heavy emphasis on mass transit.” 160  Members of the Nixon 
administration and Congress both proved “surprisingly receptive” to the cause.161 
Congress eventually passed the Federal Highway Act of 1973, which offered an 80 
percent federal match to state and local funds and authorized urban areas to divert their 
share of interstate highway funds toward the construction of mass transit facilities. The 
Highway Act not only validated Massachusetts’ pioneering transportation policy but also 
included stipulations offered state officials much more flexibility and money in creating 
alternatives to highways.  
 
From Subway to Bikeway 
The loosening of federal highway funds provided Massachusetts the financial 
means to expand and improve the region’s subway service. The state began in earnest to 
replace the routes of the Master Plan with mass transit lines.  In the ensuing decade the 
state oversaw projects to reroute the Orange Line through the proposed site of the 
Southwest Corridor and extend the Red Line southward to Braintree to partially mirror 
the abandoned Southwest corridor and northward past Harvard Square to Alewife Brook 
at end of Route in place of the Route 2 expansion. The station’s position at the nexus of 
Route 2 and Alewife Brook Parkway provided an ideal site for suburban commuters to 
leave their cars at an adjoining parking garage and take public transit downtown, thereby 
upholding a major component of Sargent’s vision for a reoriented system.  
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The BTPR also proposed continuing the route of Red Line past Alewife and through the 
western suburbs to a terminal near the interchange of Route 2 and Route 128. This 
extension would both provide suburban residents an alternative form of travel into Boston 
and enhance access for inner city residents to the employment opportunities in the many 
industries located along the high-tech corridor.162 The BTPR suggested the line could 
follow the existing Right-Of-Way (ROW) of the Boston and Maine’s railroad through 
Arlington to Lexington with stations in Arlington Center, Arlington Heights, and 
Lexington Center ending at Route 128 in Lexington. The cities of Cambridge and 
Somerville enthusiastically supported the plan, but the citizens of Lexington and 
Arlington expressed more reticence. Many of these residents endorsed the idea of the 
expansion but raised concerns about having stations in their communities. Their stance 
led Secretary of Transportation Alan Altshuler to observe that “Every town that does 
accept a transit system wants it to keep on going. They want to terminal somewhere 
else.”163 
On the surface, the proposal for the Red Line extension fulfilled the calls of 
grassroots groups like the Citizens for Balanced Transportation, as it urged for mass 
transit into the suburbs adjacent to Route 2 and Route 128.   Yet the CBT failed to 
marshal its grassroots infrastructure in support of the cause. Although the proposed 
subway line would end in the adjoining town, the CBT opted to remain a locally based 
group, and stayed silent during the controversy.164 In fact soon after the DPW submitted 
an acceptable plan for Route 2, the CBT had dissipated, and its voice was conspicuously 
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absent during the debate about the extension to the Red Line. The CBT’s disbandment 
suggests  its members and their allies remained content with the smaller Route 2 and the 
commuter rail line. These routes, however, made for difficult logistics for lower income 
people trying to gain access to work in the Route 128 area. Moreover, while the 
compromise advanced the group’s anti-sprawl goals, it did little to alleviate the traffic 
problems in Concord. However, most Concord residents accepted this traffic as an 
acceptable trade-off for protection of their community’s aesthetic charm and 
socioeconomic exclusivity.165  
No parallel to the CBT took shape in Lexington and Arlington to fight in favor of 
mass transit. Many citizens, nevertheless, supported the prospect of the Red Line 
extension.  A few of the residents believed the project fulfilled the objectives of the 
modern environmental movement. For instance, longtime liberal activist Nancy Earsy 
dubbed the project “Lexington’s best opportunity to make a real commitment to 
ecological preservation and clean air.”166 Most residents who supported the project, 
however, saw it less as a means to endorse ecological concerns and more to reduce the 
hassles of commuting by automobile or bus, thereby increasing their own quality of life.  
A study conducted by the Lexington Minute-man exposed residents overwhelming 
dissatisfaction with the situation and the fact that most drove into Boston not by choice 
but force because of the unpredictability and slowness of the bus service.167 Automobile 
commuters complained of paying a “high price in frazzled nerves” and one fed up 
resident declared, “I have had it with traffic and better train service would ease my day 
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considerably.” 168 While the vast majority of residents recognized the need to reform the 
current system, many began to voice equal concerns about the prospect of a subway 
terminal in their town center. 
Similar to the battle over the Route 2 expansion, the response of Lexington and 
Arlington residents revealed that the term “quality of life” was open to conflicting 
interpretations. Many people argued that the expansion of the mass transit system posed a 
threat to the very privileges of suburban residency. The negative reaction to the proposal 
for the Red Line extension rested primarily on the anti-growth reasoning that had steadily 
come to define the local agenda of the communities along Route 128. 169 A study of the 
area conducted in the mid-1970s concluded,  “More than anything else suburban 
residents fear that if population continues to grow” then “the character of their 
communities will be lost.”170 In the minds of many local citizens in places like Lexington 
and Arlington, concerns about an influx of newcomers placing a strain on municipal 
services trumped complaints about traffic The comments from local residents upheld this 
observation voicing relentless concern that the project would destroy the “New England 
charm” of their “towns” and make them  “automatically and inexorably become 
urbanized and citified. ”171 
Opponents to the extension also began to couch their anti-growth ideology in the 
more explicit terms of environmental protection. Lexington resident John Lahiff declared 
that extending mass transit would “have a detrimental effect on the environmental and 
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especially population density of our town.”172 Residents like Lahiff inverted the 
environmental reasons that the CBT and allies had adopted about the value of the mass 
transit expansion in order to fight it. Dr. Herbert Meyer, a Lexington conservationist, 
argued the plan would increase noise, air and water pollution, and others suggested it 
would encourage sprawl and thereby deplete open spaces.173 The parallels between this 
reasoning and the type of arguments anti-highway activists used to promote mass transit 
exposed the flexibility of environmentalist logic in these types of battles. At least one 
Lexington resident aimed to point out the contradictions in the anti-growth discourse of 
Meyer and collaborators.  Tom Forstmann warned that the pressures of suburban 
development would continue with or without the Red Line and saw the transit line as a 
means to actually control rather than encourage sprawl. “There is nothing charming about 
our congested and polluted roads,” he declared in order to support his contention that “the 
aims of providing transportation and limiting development” as “fundamentally 
compatible.”174 Fortsmann failed, however, in getting the majority of residents of 
Arlington and Lexington to understand those connections.  
Even more than the battles over open space and the highway extension, the 
reaction to mass transit exposed the racial and class based fears animating the anti-growth 
philosophy of many white suburban homeowners in purportedly liberal places like 
Lexington. Although residents used words such as “charm” and “character,” it was not 
simply the aesthetic beauty of their communities that they saw threatened, but also their 
socioeconomic status and physical safety. Some residents raised fears about  “roving 
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gangs on the transit system invading the calm of the suburban lifestyle” and increasing 
the incidence of crime.175  These comments echoed suburban whites in Atlanta who, as 
Kevin Kruse points out, claimed their opposition to a metropolitan transit system was 
“rooted not in racism, but rather in concrete worries about the influx of criminals would 
surely flow out into the city.”176  Even more terrifying to Lexington residents than 
“roving gangs,” however, was the prospect of low-income people moving into their 
communities because of the subway. A sympathetic state representative summarized the 
attitude of residents in the western suburbs in noticeably racialized terms: “wherever 
rapid transit has gone in other places, people would be fact to follow and many a rural 
area has become a rural jungle.”177  A study committee sponsored by the town of 
Lexington aimed to address the issue head on. It declared: “Most of us are aware, 
although one does not hear it articulated very directly” of the concern that “extension of 
rapid transit service will lead to an influx of lower income or lower class families to the 
town.” The study’s authors promised, nevertheless, that due to the high property values 
and lack of existing apartments in Lexington, unless the town took extremely deliberate 
action to encourage multi-unit development such an outcome would not occur. Instead, 
the increase in transit options, the study argued, would most likely raise local property 
values making Lexington even more economically exclusive.178 Most residents remained 
skeptical. A group of residents in Arlington even formed an organization called the 
Arlington Red Line Action Movement (ALARM) to galvanize grassroots opposition to 
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the proposal. The leaders included MIT economist Vincent A. Fulmer, who reduced the 
movement’s goals to preserving  “quality of life” and preventing “irreversible 
transformation” to the character of the community.179 Transportation official Fred 
Salvucci saw through this rhetoric and publicly accused the group of using “racial fear 
and blatant mistruths” in the campaign against the proposal.180  
The arguments that supporters of the proposal adopted about the metropolitan 
implications of bringing the mass transit line to Route 128 served only to enflame the 
individualist sensibilities of suburban opponents of the plan. The Lexington study 
committee concluded that the plan would have few negative effects on the town, but 
would significantly help the overall region, especially for people who lived or worked 
along Route 128. This logic made some Lexington and Arlington citizens even more 
insistent that they should not have to endure the slightest inconvenience in order to help 
the broader region. “It all comes down to regional interests versus the community,” one 
Lexington woman declared. A fellow community member agreed, lamenting that the 
proposal would make the town a “sacrificial lamb on the alter of regional interests.”181 A 
resident from Arlington embraced the populist role of victim to confront head-on the 
arguments that the town must share responsibility for urban inequality. “Arlington has 
contributed its share to the Metco experiment,” H.H. Seward scoffed, but  “many of 
neighbors seem to feel that Arlington should take on even more of burden.” Seward 
                                                
179 Arlington Says No to MBTA Red Line,” Lexington Minute-Man Supplement, March 10, 1977.  
180 “Transportation Chief Urges Transit Growth,” Lexington Minute-Man, June 2, 1977.  
181 Cheryl Waixel, “Red Line Extension Receives Mixed Reaction at BTPR Hearing,” Lexington Minute-
man, April 19, 1973.  
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urged his fellow taxpayers to oppose the plan in order to “protect the quality of your 
home and investment in Arlington.” 182  
A series of hearings and studies turned the debate around Red Line extension into 
a five year battle. The protracted process showed some of the limitations of the increased 
emphasis on community participation in environmental and transportation policy. 
Although the new procedures aimed to give residents a larger voice and more control 
over policy decisions that affected their communities, in many suburban municipalities, it 
did not lead to more social and spatial equality. In fact, just the opposite occurred. These 
procedures provided residents with another means to undermine efforts to delay or thwart 
policy decisions.  In the case of the Red Line extension, this citizen participation 
effectively killed the project. Embracing the populist tenets of citizen participation, 
ALARM leader John F. Cusack enthusiastically declared of this outcome, “it shows the 
people can beat the machine.”183  A state planner expressed far less enthusiasm. Peter 
Murphy mournfully observed, “You’ll probably never see in your lifetime or mine a 
heavy rail commuter system to Route 128 in Lexington.”184  
Once suburban residents revolted against the plans, the MBTA had to determine a 
use for the Right-of-Way per a bankruptcy court ruling. The MBTA eventually decided to 
accept a proposal from the communities of Lexington, Arlington, Bedford and 
Cambridge to create a bikeway directly along the ROW. 185 The towns suggested that “the 
very attractive” and relatively inexpensive pathway would create little physical or 
                                                
182 H.H. Seward to the Editor, Arlington Advocate, December 9, 1976.  
183 “Arlington Says No to MBTA Red Line.”  
184 Lou Conrad, “MBTA Rail Plan Interred,” Lexington Minute-Man, June 6, 1978.  
185 The town planner in Arlington first conceived of the project in 1974 during discussions of the Red Line 
running underground through the community. He proposed that a linear park or bikeway could go on top of 
the subway route, see John Laidler, “His Dream Was a Road More Traveled, ” Boston Globe, July 6, 2003.  
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environmental impact, provide commuter access from the suburbs to Boston and increase 
the accessibility of the town centers, schools and historic sites of the communities it 
bisected.186 The Minuteman Commuter Bikeway officially opened in 1992. The 11-mile 
long 12 foot wide route runs from Alewife Station---across bridges, alongsides ponds, 
parks, through the town centers of Arlington and Lexington, before ending in the rolling 
pastures of Bedford. The popular path, which closely follows Paul Revere’s historic ride, 
functions primarily as a space of “healthy recreation” for suburban residents not as a 
major commuting artery.187 If the pathway has limited commuter benefits for suburban 
residents, particularly because of unpredictable New England weather patterns, it is a 
woefully ineffective means for inner-city residents to reach jobs concentrated along 
Route 128. The bikeway was never intended to entirely replace the plans for the 
extension of the Red Line, but it still reveals the choices and priorities of many white 
suburban residents. The bikepath ultimately offers these suburban communities many of 
the same benefits of the conservation projects that it traverses:  a means of maintaining 
open space, historic distinctiveness, and socioeconomic exclusivity.  
 
Conclusion  
The diverse alliance of grassroots activists and governmental officials that came 
together around the highway issue succeeded in changing the purview and scope of state 
and national transportation and environmental policy. The remarkable coalition, however, 
                                                
186 Vollmer Associates, MBTA Lexington Branch R.R. Right-of-Way Study, Historical Collection, Rollins 
Library, Arlington, MA.  
187The pathways accessibility for all forms of travel has dispelled this harmonious vision creating has 
created many conflicts between walkers and bikers that local police have dubbed “bikeway rage.” Matt 
Viser, “Rage on the bikeway-Walkers and cyclists clash on Minuteman path,” Boston Globe, July 1, 2007. 
There has been a recent effort to improve the path’s commuter capacity see Ethan Gilsdorf, “Popular Bike 
Trail Gets Even Better,” Boston Globe, June 29, 2008.  
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never achieved a sustained movement to simultaneously reduce dependency on 
automobiles among suburbanites and provide car-less urbanites better access to jobs 
outside of the city. The effort to protect open space and stop highway construction their 
once again proved the effectiveness of suburban liberals to create policy changes and 
ensured that at least rhetorical support for the environment became a basic prerequisite 
for any candidate running for the governor in Massachusetts. It also helped to make a 
concern about the environment a component of the plank of both political parties in 
Massachusetts and other parts of the Northeast. At the same time, this movement 
produced a set of stringent controls on growth that built upon exclusionary zoning 
policies and exacerbated the localist tendencies and individualist and discriminatory 
attitudes about property among the suburban residents in the affluent suburbs along Route 
128. 188 These efforts injected a particular mentality about preserving the “character” of 
their landscapes, that also made places like Concord and Lexington adverse to any form 
of development, including public transit and affordable housing, as a later chapter 
explores. The movement’s emphasis on citizen participation also empowered suburban 
residents in places like Concord, Lexington and Lincoln to believe that they had power to 
change state and federal policy and stop new forms of land development, which the 
battles over affordable housing reveals had progressive and problematic implications.  
 
 
                                                








On January 15, 1972, more than 3,000 Massachusetts citizens participated in a 
caucus designed to unify liberal and peace voters around a single candidate in the 
upcoming presidential race. Organized by the suburban-based groups Political Action for 
Peace (PAX) and Citizens for Participation Politics (CPP), the event demonstrated the 
shared commitment of their members to the principles and practices of participation and 
working through the formal channels of power to end the Vietnam War.  The 
coordinators had adopted as the model for the convention a smaller caucus they had 
staged two years earlier that led directly to the election of liberal priest Father Robert 
Drinan to Congress. They also drew upon the new reforms established by the Democratic 
National Committee to make the nomination process fairer and more transparent. At the 
end of the all-day affair, the participants selected South Dakota Senator George 
McGovern out of a field that included Shirley Chisholm, Eugene McCarthy and Edward 
Muskie. The caucus established locally and nationally the credibility and legitimacy both 
of the McGovern candidacy and the suburban liberals who had organized it as major 
forces.  Following the convention the grassroots suburban-centered movement focused its 
resources and network exclusively on the McGovern campaign. These efforts directly 
contributed to his victory in the state primary in April, his nomination by the Democratic 
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Convention in July and his solitary success in Massachusetts and Washington, DC in the 
November general election.   
In the nearly four decades since the 1972 race, commentators have used the 
imbalanced election results as confirmation of both the decline of postwar liberalism and 
the inherent progressivism of Massachusetts voters.1 These explanations, however, 
naturalize the mythology of Massachusetts and obscure a more complicated story about 
Bay State and national politics and the more complex role of suburban liberals. For the 
suburban volunteers the election results punctuated a decade of grassroots political 
activism for peace. These suburban peace activists drew on the ideas, contacts and tactics 
they had cultivated in earlier mobilization efforts such as the Vietnam Moratorium to 
spearhead key campaigns for liberal antiwar politicians for Congress and the presidency. 
Through these efforts, this grassroots movement not only ensured the reputation of 
Massachusetts as the most liberal state in the nation by the 1972 election but also exerted 
a large and enduring influence on the politics and platform of the national Democratic 
Party.  
This mobilization complicates the declension and ascension narrative frameworks 
that have dominated discussions of the politics of the 1970s and the 1972 election in 
particular. Scholars of postwar politics have traditionally concentrated on the 1968 
presidential election as the breaking point of the New Deal coalition and subsequent 
“unraveling of liberalism.”2 A new generation of scholars has swung the analytic 
pendulum in the other direction and focused on the grassroots mobilization of the New 
                                                
1 For a discussion of this tendency among political observers see Eric Alterman, Why We're Liberals: A 
Political Handbook for Post-Bush America (New York: Penguin Books, 2008), 1-2; Susan Page and Jill 
Lawrence, “Does “Massachusetts liberal' label still matter?,” USA Today, July 25, 2004.  
2 See  Matusow,  Unraveling of America Fraser and Gerstle, Rise and Fall of the New Order.  
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Right, viewing the campaign of Barry Goldwater in 1964 as a starting point and leading 
directly to the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.3 These accounts together treat the 1972 
election as merely the confirmation of liberalism’s demise and the augur of Reagan’s 
monumental victory in 1980.  Bruce Miroff’s The Liberals’ Moment has provided an 
invaluable corrective to these conventional narratives of the 1972 election, persuasively 
arguing that the McGovern campaign helped redefine the contours of the contemporary 
Democratic Party as it transformed its base from blue-collar urban ethnics to issue-
oriented suburbanites.4 In order to draw these important conclusions, however, Miroff 
focuses primarily on the events and activities of McGovern’s national campaign, which 
he characterizes as a classic example of insurgent politics. While the McGovern 
candidacy perhaps constituted a sudden uprising at the national level, among grassroots 
suburban volunteers in Massachusetts, the campaign marked the culmination of a decade 
of intense political activity. This constituency’s imprint on state and national politics 
continued long after the end of the Vietnam War and illuminates that the electoral arena 
constituted the space where the suburban liberal peace movement would ultimately have 
its most lasting state and national influence.  
Though pundits have long described McGovern as the “Goldwater of the Left,” 
the campaign did not lead to a parallel awakening and remaking of liberals and the 
Democratic Party as several scholars have argued Barry Goldwater’s 1964 candidacy 
accomplished for the New Right and the Republican Party. 5 The 1972 election, 
moreover, clearly did not mark the disappearance of suburban liberals or the Democratic 
                                                
3For the best example of this framework see McGirr, Suburban Warriors.  See also, Rick Perlstein, Before 
the Storm; Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (New York: Hill & Wang, 
2001). 
4 Miroff, Liberals’ Moment.  
5 “Front and Center for George McGovern,” Time (May 8, 1972); Miroff, Liberals’ Moment, 6. 
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Party either. Since the McGovern campaign, many suburban liberals in Massachusetts 
have continued to mobilize at the grassroots for candidates and issues that align with their 
political vision and in doing so have helped transform the state’s congressional delegation 
and legislature into the most progressive in the nation. Focusing on this movement also 
reveals the inadequacies of framing the politics of the 1970s solely in terms of the 
presidential elections of 1968, 1972 and 1980. This approach, in particular, fails to 
address other pivotal campaigns at the state and local level in which suburban liberals, 
especially peace activists, played an important role. Indeed, many of the grassroots 
liberals who first became politically active in the suburban antiwar movement came to 
hold key leadership roles in the state and national Democratic Party and related 
organizations and campaigns. Through these various activities suburban liberals have 
become a major constituency and political force within the Democratic Party at the state 
and national levels. The outcome of the 1972 election and the role of Massachusetts in it, 
proved to be not an aberration from mainstream trends, but, rather, a template for the 
future of liberal politics in the United States.  
 
“The Whole Country is Watching” 
The campaign for the passage into state law of the Shea-Wells Act in early 1970 
marked the first effort by the suburban-centered peace movement to channel the energy 
of the Vietnam Moratorium activities, a one day protest that became the largest civil 
demonstration in American history, more directly into policy and political action. 
President Nixon’s call immediately following the October events for the 
“Vietnamization” of the war had dulled the enthusiasm and excitement of the Moratorium 
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and left both suburban activists and their less overtly political neighbors disillusioned and 
doubtful that they could actual influence governmental decisions.  The Act, which called 
into question the constitutionality of the draft and the president’s power to wage war, 
helped renew faith in the possibilities of working within the formal channels of power 
and demonstrated the specific ways in which suburban liberals could be effective in this 
effort. The Act also evoked a considerable national attention and debate and further 
helped solidify the reputation of Massachusetts as the most antiwar state in the country, 
which in and of itself had far-reaching consequences.  
The Shea-Wells Act evolved directly from the affluent Boston suburbs and the 
network of grassroots peace activists. The unconventional legislation originated from 
Reverend John Wells, the popular pastor of the Unitarian Church in Lexington. A native 
Georgian, Korean War veteran, and trained lawyer, Wells had been active in the civil 
rights movement in the South before coming north where he became an early and 
outspoken opponent of the Vietnam War.  In Lexington, Wells took a leading role in the 
local antiwar activities, chairing both the anti-ABM committee and Moratorium planning 
committee. Participating in the well-attended Moratorium rally on the Lexington Battle 
Green moved Wells to remember that “the revolution was fought for the right of people 
to participate—in the decision making process.” 6  He resolved to fulfill this ideal by 
taking action on his long-fermenting idea to introduce legislation testing the president’s 
constitutional power to send soldiers to fight in an undeclared war. The Supreme Court 
had repeatedly refused to hear individuals’ cases testing the President’s war-making 
power, but Wells believed that a challenge by a state government offered the surest way 
                                                
6 John M. Wells, “The Minister’s Story” in The People vs. Presidential War, John Wells, ed. (New York: 
University Press of Cambridge, Mass, 1970), 8-9. 
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to receive judicial review. Soon after the Moratorium, Wells began to work with a local 
law school professor to draft a bill requiring the state Attorney General to represent 
before the Supreme Court Massachusetts soldiers forced to fight in undeclared wars. In 
early December, Wells brought a version of the bill to H. James Shea, a young state 
representative from Newton with a strong record on peace and civil liberties. She agreed 
to sponsor it in the legislature.  
 Shea and Wells realized that in order to get this experimental bill passed they 
needed significant grassroots support and mobilization, especially from the suburban 
peace movement. Shea and Wells had each worked with CPP and PAX on the ABM 
campaign, the Moratorium, and other antiwar activities, and theycontacted the two 
suburban groups for help in this effort. CPP chair John Elder and executive secretary Ray 
Dougan agreed to participate and provide the political resources of their organization. 
Although Elder and Dougan believed that the bill had only a remote chance of passing, 
they, nevertheless, saw the campaign as an opportunity to create a public forum for 
expression of antiwar sentiment, to renew activity after the moratorium, and to show 
concerned citizens that the state legislature could be a “significant political force.”7 PAX 
executive secretary Jane Webb also voiced enthusiasm for the Shea-Wells concept. She 
had first declared opposition to Vietnam intervention at a Voice of Women (VOW) 
meeting in 1964, and after six years of frustration, the bill appeared to be “the golden 
opportunity to channel our hitherto fruitless antiwar efforts into legitimate and effective 
political action that had not been tried before.”8   
                                                
7 John Elder, “Grass Roots Political Action” and Richard Cauchi “Grass Roots Political Action” in The 
People vs. Presidential War, 85-90. 
8 Jane Webb, “Grassroots Political Action” in The People vs. Presidential War, 94. 
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 Shea, Wells and their allies created a strategy that focused on mobilizing support 
leading up to the state Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the bill on February 11, 
1970. Activists with experience at the State House worked with Shea to begin lobbying 
the members of the Judiciary Committee, while the rest of the volunteers focused on 
creating a large turnout for the hearing. 9 The organizers recognized that “a large and 
vocal crowd” would help “illustrate the diversity and strength of this movement” and 
therefore aimed to create a “balanced audience” of housewives, elderly citizens, students, 
and legal experts from across the state. The groups urged their members to come and 
testify at the hearing, selling it as “a chance to discuss the war with elected officials.” The 
suburban chapters of CPP and PAX along with the often overlapping members of Wells’s 
congregation and Shea’s district enthusiastically embraced this call to action. The 
informal coalition distributed flyers, formed telephone trees, spoke at community 
meetings and church gatherings, and contacted local newspapers and talk shows to alert 
fellow suburban residents about both the bill and the public hearing.  Fred King, a 
member of the Newton chapter of the CPP who had met Shea during the local campaign 
for Eugene McCarthy, earned the title of “Johnny Appleseed of the Bill,” as he alone 
printed twenty thousand leaflets about the hearing and encouraged local CPP and PAX 
chapters, universities, and the members of various churches to distribute them through 
their personal and professional social networks.10 
Proving the effectiveness of the CPP and PAX in mobilizing a strong outpouring 
of activism, more than a thousand citizens, mostly from the Route 128 suburbs, appeared 
at the hearing on February 11, 1970. The committee had to relocate to the largest room in 
                                                
9 Citizens for Participation Politics “Facts About CPP,” c. 1970, Box 36, Folder CPP, FWS.  
10 Fred King, “The Battle of the Leaflets” in The People vs.. Presidential War, 147. 
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the State House, which still filled to overflow capacity. Shea carefully orchestrated the 
three hours of testimony that ranged from ministers, Gold Star mothers, and wounded 
veterans to nationally prominent legal scholars such as former Senator Ernest Gruening 
of Alaska and Kansas law professor Lawrence Velvel, who declared that the bill could 
resolve “the far-reaching constitutional issue of our time.” Wells deemed it “an 
outpouring of the desire of the people to make the system work.”11 Committee chairman 
Joseph Ward called the hearing “the most impressive he had seen during his twenty years 
as a legislator.”12 The wide-ranging testimony coupled with additional grassroots 
lobbying convinced the previously skeptical Judiciary Committee to give the bill a 
favorable report. The committee members did, however, require revisions to the language 
of the amateurly drafted bill before its sponsors submitted it for a House vote. Shea 
dubbed the decision a clear “response to this remarkable instance of citizen 
participation.”13  
As the legislation wended through the revision process, CPP, PAX and their 
suburban allies realized that the bill’s passage was not the long shot they once had 
predicted and thereupon intensified mobilizing grassroots support. Mary Ann Seitz, a 
member of Well’s congregation who had helped organize the Moratorium events in 
Lexington the previous October, committed her full energy to the project. She later 
recalled that for her and several other volunteers  “everything else got lost—our home 
lives, our jobs, our work—and we lived the Shea-Wells Bill probably twelve hours a 
                                                
11 Wells, “Minister’s Story,” 12.  
12 King, “The Battles of the Leaflets” 148. 
13 Rep. H. James Shea, Jr. Press Release, March 11, 1970, Box 29, Folder 95, Jack Backman Papers, 
Special Collections, State Library of Massachusetts (hereafter “Backman”).  
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day.”14 The group compiled a list with the home numbers of the members of House and 
Senate and distributed 30,000-40,000 copies of the bill through contacts colleges, high 
schools churches and peace organizations across the state.15 Representative Moe Fry 
received more than five hundred phone calls in three days. Rep. May Newman later 
complained that she had not eaten much during this period because every time she tried 
to prepare a meal the phone rang and the food would burn. Rep. Martin Linsky of 
Brookline called it one of “the most effective and high-caliber lobbying jobs” he had ever 
seen.16  
By the time the bill came to the floor, the movement had made contact with every 
member of the House, urging each of them to allow for the Supreme Court to rule on this 
crucial constitutional question. Suburban activists also filled the House gallery during the 
debate and provided an informal soundtrack of applause and laughter.17  The lobbying 
efforts directly shaped the discussion of the bill on the floor. The representatives in 
support of the bill couched their approval in a combination of constitutional legal 
expertise, sympathetic references to local soldiers fighting in Vietnam and allusions to 
Massachusetts’s long history of bold and principled action.18 The bill, H. 2396, faced a 
large number of detractors including Rep. James Burke of Brockton who called it “a 
piece of ----.”19. These opponents voiced concern that the bill would make the 
Commonwealth  “the laughing stock of the nation” and would encourage draftees to 
move to Massachusetts. In a telling indication of the state’s political climate, none of 
                                                
14 Mary Ann Seitz, “Making the System Work” in The People vs. Presidential War, 124. 
15 Seitz, “Making the System Work,”120; King, “Battle of the Leaflets,” 147-148. 
16 David Lustig, “Getting to the People” in The People vs. Presidential War, 156. 
17 Seitz, “Making the System Work,” 122. 
18 Kenneth D. Campbell, “Bartley Speaks Our for Non-Viet Bill,” Boston Evening Globe, March 12, 1970; 
Robert L. Turner, “War Bill Clears House Test, 116-110,” Boston Globe, March 13, 1970; Kenneth D. 
Campbell, “Many if facing Viet War Bill,” Boston Evening Globe, March 13, 1970.  
19 Kenneth D. Campbell, “Viet War Bill Heads for Senate,” Boston Evening Globe, March 17, 1970.  
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these opponents made any hawkish statements in support of the war or the idea of 
sending more troops to fight.20 After two rounds of debates and votes, the Shea-Wells 
Bill passed in the House by 132-92 and soon after passed in the Senate by 33-6. The 
focus of the campaign then turned to Governor Sargent, who despite previously voicing 
opposition to the war had remained silent about the bill itself.21 As Sargent deliberated, 
the Boston Globe led the efforts to pressure him to pass the experimental law. The paper 
urged in a editorial entitled “The Whole Country is Watching” that Sargent “Let 
Massachusetts once again, as she did in her proudest days, show the nation the way!”22 
The governor bowed to the pressure and signed the bill into law on April 3, 1970.23 
The enactment of Shea-Wells upheld the symbolic reputation of Massachusetts 
the epicenter of antiwar politics. It made Massachusetts, in the words of Harvard Law 
School professor Alan Dershowitz, “the first state to go on record against this atrocious 
war. ”24 The Act provided a model for action across the country. Other states legislatures 
including Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, California 
and Alaska, initiated processes during the spring to take similar action. Senator William 
Fulbright told Wells that the Commonwealth’s action had “awakened the conscience of 
the Congress,” and in late April of 1970 Senators George McGovern and Mark Hatfield 
                                                
20 In the most dramatic moment, House Speaker David Bartley stepped down from the podium to voice his 
own support for the bill declaring that “It is time for the legislative branch of government to reassert itself.” 
He suggested “If the Shea Bill eventually becomes law then we will have done something important not 
only for our own people, but for all of the people of this nation.” Kenneth D. Campbell, “Bartley Speaks 
Out for Non-War Viet Bill,” Boston Evening Globe, March 6, 1970. 
21 “Massachusetts Governor Weighs a Bill Challenging Legality of Vietnam War,” New York Times, March 
29, 1970. 
22 “The Whole Country is Watching,” Boston Globe, April 1, 1970, 
23 Whipple, “The Single Pebble Cast,” 2.  
24 Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?: American Protest Against the War in Vietnam 
1963-1975 (New York: Horizon Books, 1989), 315.  
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introduced similar legislation at the federal level.25 While many politicians used allusions 
to Massachusetts exceptionalism to make the Act appear a historic inevitability, many 
others directly credited the grassroots activists with the success of the legislation. 
Fulbright declared the Act an instance of “democracy in action,” noting that “college 
students, university professors housewives, gold-star mothers, and veterans joined 
together to be politicians in the best sense.”26 The author of the CPP newsletter more 
directly asserted the bill had passed only after “strong constituent lobbying efforts” not 
because of the “innate liberalism” of the Massachusetts Legislature “which each year 
routinely defeats” progressive bills on issues such as birth control and election law 
reform.27 This dig provided perhaps the clearest summary of both the success of the 
grassroots activism and the often-inconsistent liberalism of Massachusetts and its 
legislature.  
As the Attorney General’s office began to develop its argument for the Supreme 
Court during the spring, a series of tragic events provided the Shea-Wells proponents 
with an even clearer moral imperative. The revelation of the United States invasion of 
Cambodia in early May, followed  by the fatal shooting of four students at Kent State, 
awakened citizen protest both nationally and locally. James Shea, who had increased his 
antiwar activism after the passage of his namesake bill, had become deeply troubled and 
disillusioned by both the war and the protest that surrounded it and on May 10th he 
committed suicide. 28 Many prominent state politicians issued statements of tribute and 
grief.  House Speaker David Bartley declared that the death was “tragic, particularly 
                                                
25 Wells, “The Minister’s Story,” 16.   
26 J. William Fulbright, “Foreword” in  The. People vs. Presidential War, xvi.  
27 Citizens for Participation Politics, CPP Newsletter, May 1970, Vol 2. No. 1, Box 6, Folder VI.10, 
CPPAX. 
28 “Final Rites for Rep. Shea Bring Tributes from Nation, and State,” Newton Graphic, May 14, 1970. 
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coming as it does in this time of trouble, for his was a voice speaking on behalf of peace 
among men.”29 On the base of a statute opposite the State House appeared the spray-paint 
obituary: “Shea- He Lives.”30 Soon after the funeral, the state Attorney General formally 
filed the case Massachusetts v. Melvin Laird with the Supreme Court, arguing 
“participation of the United States in the military action in Vietnam is unconstitutional.”31 
In a 6-3 decision the Supreme Court sided with the Department of Defense and refused to 
hear the case.32 Despite the fact that the Shea-Wells Act did not achieve its goal of 
forcing the Court to take action, the successful campaign to enact the law did reveal the 
possibilities of working within the formal channels of power to end the war. “Our 
experience has proved,” Wells declared soon after the bill’s passage, “that the system can 
work if we will work within it.”33 The piece of Massachusetts legislation had its most 
enduring legacy in both shaping public opinion about executive power and led the 
passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973, which stipulated that the president can 
only send U.S. armed forces into action by authorization of Congress.  The legislation 
also provided a model for the suburban peace movement’s future action as it sought to 
focus the growing network of antiwar citizens to influencing the national policy and 
                                                
29 “Shock, Grief Expressed at Solon’s Death,” Newton Graphic, May 14, 1970. 
30 The Boston Globe declared that Shea’s legacy would “be given still more meaning if his work is 
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Times, November 10, 1970. 
33 Wells, “The Minister’s Story,” 16. 
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electoral politics. This approach would ultimately prove more effective and sustainable 




In the late 1960s, suburban liberal peace activists had begun to develop an 
alternative strategy of working within the system to influence U.S. policy on the Vietnam 
War by nominating candidates to Congress. These activists renewed their conviction that 
supporting candidates for Congress who shared their vision of domestic and international 
policy provided an effective means to stop the “nagging issues of the unending war”  and 
“the continued pursuit of topsy-turvy national priorities.”34 Despite the heightened liberal 
and antiwar activity in Massachusetts, moderate Democrats who largely supported the 
direction of U.S. foreign policy continued to dominate its congressional delegation. In 
1968, four of twelve Massachusetts congressional incumbents had run opposed, the worst 
ratio in the nation.  PAX and its collaborator Citizens for Participation Politics decided to 
apply the strategies of grassroots mobilization they had perfected in the Moratorium 
toward the campaigns of liberal challengers. In this effort, Bay State suburban liberal 
activists also drew inspiration and lessons from their involvement in McCarthy’s 
presidential campaign the previous year, the style of which press had deemed “New 
Politics” in contrast to the “old politics” of the Democratic Party “Establishment.”35 
Extending the goals of the McCarthy campaign, veteran activists aimed to use these 
campaigns to reshape the priorities and representatives of the Democratic Party to make 
them both more socially liberal and explicitly antiwar.  
                                                
34 Alvin Levin, Raymond Dougan Letter, February 11, 1970, Box 36, CPPAX.   
35 For more on “New Politics” see Davis, The Emerging Democratic Majority.   
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Michael Harrington’s successful candidacy in the fall of 1969 offered the first 
confirmation of the possibilities of applying a “new politics” approach to congressional 
campaigns. In a special election to represent a traditionally conservative North Shore 
district, Harrington, a 33 year-old openly antiwar liberal state senator, faced William 
Saltonstall, the son of Republican Senator Leverett Saltonstall. CPP, which had emerged 
directly from the suburban-based infrastructure of the McCarthy 1968 presidential 
campaign, spearheaded the drive for Harrington’s victory. The district included the 
previously moderate towns of Reading and North Andover, had become incubators of 
antiwar activity after the Army the previous winter announced plans to put Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) sites in the communities. CPP relied on the contact list it had developed 
in these towns during the ABM campaign to build support for Harrington. In a letter to 
these contacts, CPP praised Harrington as “issue-oriented” and an “early and firm 
opponent of the wasteful and dangerous ABM program.”36 The group prodded voters that 
the election offered a chance “to express your opposition to the ABM at the ballot box” 
and send “a clear signal to the Nixon Administration to take a second look at its 
priorities.” CPP members also staged a district-wide, door-to-door canvass to identify 
potential Harrington supporters and dissatisfied Republicans. Volunteers offered to drive 
or baby-sit for residents so they could go to the polls. Harrington won the September 30 
contest by a clear margin, carrying the city of Lynn along with several traditionally 
Republican suburbs.37 The Boston Globe published a headline declaring “Harrington 
Owes Win to ‘New Politics.’” 38 The election demonstrated not only the effectiveness of 
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CPP and the “new politics” approach to campaigning but also evidence of a strong peace 
vote in Massachusetts, especially in its suburbs.  
The victory of the first successful peace-backed candidate confirmed to the 
activists in CPP and PAX that they had previously failed to recognize congressional races 
as effective means to pressure prominent politicians about the war, expand public 
support, and solidify the grassroots peace movement.39 Thus, in late fall and early winter 
of 1970, the movement shifted its focus to the Third Congressional District, which 71 
year-old Philip Philbin had represented for 27 years. Philbin was a hawkish Democrat 
“party hack” who served as vice-chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.40 
The district had traditionally consisted of small rural and blue-collar towns in the central 
part of the state, but reapportionment in 1967 had dropped two clusters of western towns 
from the district and added the affluent and more liberal Boston suburbs of Newton, 
Concord, Lincoln, Weston along with Watertown and Waltham. In 1968, peace-minded 
candidates Thomas Boylston Adams and Joseph Bradley had challenged Philbin in the 
Democratic primary. The two candidates, nevertheless, split the liberal vote and Philbin 
won with a minority percentage. Liberal activists realized that if two unorganized 
candidates could together get more votes than the incumbent, a better organized and more 
unified campaign could allow for a peace politician win.41 Thus, the suburban-centered 
peace movement sought a way to create a unified front to defeat Philbin in 1970.  
In December 1969, Paul Counihan, the former chair of McCarthy’s Massachusetts 
campaign and the local ABM committee, and later a leading advocate for affordable 
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housing in the suburbs, hosted a meeting at his Concord home of 14 “politically aware” 
district members to discuss a strategy for channeling the antiwar sentiment of the 
Moratorium into electoral politics. “The moratorium’s day was done,” Counihan 
declared. “That’s why we moved over to finding a candidate.” 42 The “very dovish” group 
included Alvin Levin, a lawyer, Lincoln resident and CPP co-founder, and others other 
members of that group as well as representatives from PAX, Voice of Women (VOW) 
and Americans for Democratic Action (ADA).   At the meeting, these activists developed 
the idea of a caucus to bring together liberal voters in the district in support of the 
candidate best capable of defeating Philbin in the Democratic Primary. The organizers 
began to devise the rules and details for the event agreeing that the winner would receive 
financial support and volunteer workers from their groups.  
Levin took charge of organization for the Third District Caucus and began 
recruiting participants and potential candidates. Newton CPP member Arthur S. 
Obermeyer suggested an unusual choice for the position.  As president of a Cambridge-
based chemical research company called Moleculon, which relied on Defense 
Department contracts, he appeared an unlikely peace activist. Obermeyer, nevertheless, 
deeply resented politicians like Philbin who squandered money on needless and 
dangerous programs. He wanted to replace him with a candidate who saw foreign and 
domestic issues in moral terms.43  Thus, he suggested Father Robert Drinan, a Jesuit 
Priest and Dean of Boston College Law School, who had been an outspoken supporter of 
peace, civil rights, and other liberal issues including birth control. Obermeyer approached 
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Drinan about running and the forty-nine-year-old Priest responded “Why not?”44 Drinan 
believed that there was no bar to a “clergyman entering the political process” and said, 
“perhaps now is the time.”  Drinan joined the field that included state representatives 
Gordon Martin, Charles Ohanian, Harrison Chandler Stevens and John Kerry, a  twenty-
six-year-old Vietnam veteran making his first run for political office. 
The caucus took place on Saturday February 21, 1970, at the Concord-Carlisle 
High School auditorium, drawing two thousand citizens and lasting from 9 a.m. to 6:30 
p.m. While the organizers invited all members of the Third Congressional District, most 
of the participants had ties to the suburban peace movement. Political reporter Robert 
Healey dubbed it “one of the most unusual experiments in Massachusetts politics.”45 The 
organizers assigned each city and town a proportionate number of votes according to 
population, which made only 852 of the participants eligible to cast a ballot. During the 
morning, each candidate presented his platform to the assembled audience. Galvanizing 
the peace vote, Drinan told the crowd that the “over-arching issues haunting all 
Americans” included a militaristic society “with an obsession against communism,” a 
complex situation in the Middle East and inflation. 46  Supporters of the various 
candidates then argued over which politician would be best suited to withstand the 
pressures of office and represent the interests of the caucus. After three rounds of ballot-
based elimination voting, the field narrowed to Kerry and Drinan. Before the fourth 
round, Kerry withdrew his name. He left the stage shouting “Let’s Beat Philbin!,” which 
drew a standing ovation from the audience, many of whom believed he had a bright 
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future ahead. Drinan went on to win the unanimous endorsement of the caucus as the 
candidate most likely to beat Philbin in the September primary.  
The experimental caucus and its outcome drew state and national attention, both 
as a symbol of Massachusetts political progressiveness and as an example of the 
effectiveness of participation politics.47  The event underscored the seriousness of 
suburban liberals’ efforts to remake the Democratic Party. A reporter deemed the event 
“the unprecedented revolt of Democratic liberals against the establishment.”48 The 
participants themselves believed that the event marked the continuation of their earlier 
efforts. Jerome Grossman saw the caucus as the direct culmination of three previous 
activities: “The McCarthy organization, the Moratorium organization and the Citizens for 
Participation Politics organization,” which had collectively “opened up the peace 
movement to everyone.”49 Longtime activist Ray Dougan acknowledged the caucus also 
showed the movement’s new commitment to working more directly within the 
conventions of electoral politics. He observed,  “The McCarthy campaign was energy 
without form. Now we are together in a really rational way.”50 The caucus had also not 
deviated from the middle-class white liberal and suburban composition of many of the 
earlier peace and political activities. Many observers raised concerns about how the more 
moderate voters throughout the district would respond to the unusual first-time candidate 
who had the manners of an academic and the wardrobe of a priest. 
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“Our Father Who Art in Congress” 
The effort to secure the nomination for Father Drinan in the Democratic primary 
developed into one of most-well organized campaigns in American political history. It 
built directly on the infrastructure, techniques, and membership of the grassroots peace 
movement, which gave the campaign a suburban-centered ideological and organizational 
orientation. The early participants recruited as campaign manager John Martilla, 29-year-
old Detroit native and recently converted Republican who applied his past experience 
working on grassroots-based political efforts.  In one of his earliest decisions, Martilla 
commissioned a private polling company to conduct a systematic survey of the Third 
District. Drawing on its data, the pollsters from the Oliver Quayle Company instructed,  
“If Father Drinan has to select one major focus of the campaign, it must be the 
suburbs.”51  The consultants stressed that suburban and upper-middle class parts of the 
district appeared most receptive to Drinan's dovish stance and thoughtful demeanor. They 
suggested, therefore, that the campaign focus its energy on suburban-centered activities 
like block parties and coffee-klatches, conduct canvassing in more affluent 
neighborhoods, and abstain completely from going to the more blue-collar areas in the 
district.  
This advice of the pollsters provided Martilla and his staff the basic outline for 
their suburban-centered campaign strategy. Martilla began operating on the belief that 
“one idealistic housewife is better than all the ward heelers you can get.” He set out to 
prove that “You can campaign on principles” and “really battle for people’s minds.”52 In 
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order to do so, the campaign coordinated a district-wide canvass that combined simple 
old politics and new technology with the earlier tactics of the antiwar movement. During 
the summer of 1970, 3,500 Drinan volunteers each went to an average of 25 homes and 
together made direct contact with residents in 41,000 households, about 70-80 percent of 
the voters in the district. This campaign used canvassing to determine the sentiment of 
the residents toward the candidate and then focused on the voters who supported Drinan. 
They rated each voter on a five-point scale from “very favorable” to “negative.” In one of 
the earliest examples of targeted direct mailing, the canvassers entered the information 
from the interviews into a computer and then followed up with phone calls and 
appropriate mailed literature.53 As with the Moratorium, this effort focused primarily on 
galvanizing previously politically uncommitted moderate suburbanites. 
The campaign materials the volunteers distributed further underscore the 
suburban-centered dimension of Drinan’s strategy. These pamphlets placed the candidacy 
in a non-threatening language of conviction, integrity, and respectability that struck at the 
heart of the political culture of the Route 128 suburbs, like Newton and Concord, that 
comprised the district.  One flyer suggested as Drinan’s overriding goal a clear  “desire to 
make the national government more responsive to the legitimate needs of the people and 
to reshape our national priorities.” Several pamphlets presented Drinan as not merely a 
peace candidate, but, rather, an “issue-oriented” politician distributing information with 
his positions on the economy, health care, housing, labor and drugs. Placing the war and 
economy in directly consumer terms, one pamphlet declared: “You’re Fighting the 
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Vietnam War at the Checkout Counter.”54 In the overwhelmingly white and non-urban 
Third District, few if any of these pamphlets had racial minorities as the target audience. 
One particularly provocative piece of literature played directly to suburban anxieties 
about youth by featuring a picture of a white longhaired teenage girl in a skirt sitting on 
her floral bedspread injecting heroin. The image sat above the tagline “If the thought of 
hard drugs in your town makes you feel scared and helpless, maybe it will make you read 
the other side.”55 The backside outlined what Drinan proposed to do about local and 
national drug abuse continuing to place the issue in largely white suburban terms.  
Jerome Grossman coordinated the fundraising for this expensive undertaking, 
relying on a successful combination of his professional acumen and suburban liberal 
contacts. He concentrated on the 2,000 people who had attended the caucus, pressuring 
them to donate repeatedly by reminding them “This isn’t Drinan’s campaign; it’s your 
campaign.”56   While Grossman did receive contributions from some national 
organizations and wealthy donors, he operated on the assumption that small sums were as 
important as bigger ones. In total Grossman sent out requests to 100,000 people, raising  
$125,000 through the donations of 2,200 individuals most of who lived in the district. 
Grossman also encouraged suburban volunteers to solicit money and votes through their 
social networks just as they done for McCarthy and the Moratorium.  Throughout the 
summer and fall suburban residents in Newton, Concord, Watertown and Lexington 
(which was not even in the district) raised money by hosting traditional suburban-style 
events such as a “Drinan Garage Sale,” and several types of parties, including wine and 
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cheese, garden, and “punch and politics” gatherings. The candidate himself attended 
many of these parties using them as a chance to talk with potential voters one-on-one.57 
Grossman later noted that the fundraising experience taught him an important lesson for 
both his peace activism and business management that “giving responsibility and 
increasing participation is the way to build personal satisfaction and productivity.”58  
In the last weeks of the campaign, volunteers raised the level of intensity.  The 
staff secured one Drinan worker for every twenty-five voters, assigning them duties such 
as ward chairmen, canvassers, poll watchers and sign carriers and providing them with 
detailed manuals. The zeal of the middle-class suburban volunteers and their college-aged 
counterparts resembled that of a “moral crusade.”59 Newton residents Harry Crosby and 
his wife took a month off from their professional and familial obligations to work 
overtime for the campaign.60  On primary day, despite rainy conditions, the volunteers 
amassed an unprecedented turnout particularly in suburban precincts. The computer 
information provided town and city coordinators with the names, phone numbers and 
addresses of people most likely to vote for Drinan. Harry Crosby saw that some Newton 
supporters on his list had not gone to the polls, and he dispatched fifty volunteers to go 
out into the pouring rain, track them down, and implore them to vote.   “If there was a 
reasonably liberal housewife at home with her four kids almost anywhere in the district,” 
a Boston Phoenix reporter half-kidded, “someone who would probably vote for Drinan 
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but who would be discouraged by the rain—on election day she was probably called two, 
possibly three times. The Drinan group would provide a babysitter while she voted, and a 
ride both ways.”61  
In the primary, Drinan beat Philbin by a vote of 28,612 to 22,132. The Globe 
deemed it the “political upset of the year.”62  The candidate himself called the victory “a 
miracle,” though he did concede with a wink that he had written his victory speech two 
days earlier.63 Not surprisingly, Drinan’s strongest support came from the district’s 
affluent suburbs.64 He received 69.4 percent of the vote in Newton as opposed to only 29 
percent in the more blue-collar Fitchburg. The low turnout in certain areas was also part 
of the campaign strategy. Based on the advice of the private polling analysts, organizers 
had decided targeting more working-class communities would have brought more votes 
for Philbin and therefore avoided them altogether.65 Further contributing to the upset, the 
incumbent had done little more to campaign than to distribute a few mailings and bus 
posters. 
 In addition to the fact that Drinan was a priest and had run one of the more 
“overtly dovish” campaigns in the country, the primary received national press attention 
for the way it showed a reshaping of the political process. 66  The upset demonstrated the 
importance of congressional primaries as a space for challenging party regulars and 
incumbents. The outcome, therefore, sent a strong message to complacent members of 
Congress that they must fight to maintain their seats. The campaign also exposed benefits 
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of combining old and new political strategies in order to win.  Drinan himself credited his 
victory to the fact that he and his suburban liberal volunteer base “were organized and 
computerized” and “held together right up until the last minute. ”67 The victory ultimately 
confirmed to both outside observers and participants themselves the possibilities and 
power of mobilizing suburban residents to work within the political system.68  
The general election proved an equally important test of the grassroots suburban 
peace movement’s strength. Drinan faced moderate Republican John McGlennon from 
Concord, who also had strong suburban support. Philbin had decided to launch a write-in 
campaign to remain on the ballot, making a tough race that much more difficult.  Rather 
than focusing on his policy plans, the newly energized Philbin instead concentrated on 
attacking Drinan and his supporters. In statements to the media, the party regular 
described the Jesuit priest’s campaign as an effort by “minions of wealth of the New 
Left” and  “ultra-liberal extremists and outsiders. ”69 He further lobbed the accusation 
that “thousands and thousands of dollars have been poured in a golden stream into 
Massachusetts from outside sources to defeat me.”70 Drinan supporters sought to 
challenge these claims. Arthur Obermeyer sent a letter to the Boston Globe strongly 
refuting Philbin’s charge that New York outsiders played a behind-the-scenes hand in the 
Drinan candidacy. He raised the example of the Third District Caucus and stressed that 
he and the other suburban participants “could hardly be called representatives of the New 
Left Outsiders.”71 
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In the weeks leading up to the general election the campaign focused on facing 
head-on the various charges against Drinan. The staff provided volunteers with a set of 
answers to common misconceptions including that the Priest was “a one-issue candidate,” 
a suburbanite who did not understand the concerns of rural parts of the state, and a 
supporter of the Black Panthers and draft evaders.72 The candidate himself also sought to 
turn his religious commitment into a positive feature by dubbing his campaign “a 
manifestation of my priesthood” and claiming that “a priest is a mediator who preaches 
moral values.” He encouraged voters by contending that he did not think that the first 
state to send a Catholic to the White House and an African-American to the Senate would 
shy from the sending a Jesuit to Congress.73  The campaign supplemented these 
statements by replicating its techniques from the primary. Throughout October, the 
campaign coordinated further canvassing, distributed new flyers and ran a series of TV 
ads that all sought to emphasize his credentials and commitment to moral issues. On 
November 3, 1970, Drinan won by a margin of 3,000 votes, earning the lowest 
percentage victory of any congressional candidate in the state.74 The communities of 
Newton, Waltham and Watertown provided 56 percent of his vote and he came close 
behind McGlennon in the affluent suburbs of Lincoln, Concord and Weston.  Though 
Philbin only carried his hometown of working-class Clinton, Drinan continued to have a 
poor showing in the blue-collar areas in central Massachusetts.75 At the election night 
celebration, the children of Newton activist Anita Greenbaum hoisted a hand painted sign 
that read “Our Father Who Art in Congress,” a picture of which the Boston Globe placed 
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on its front-page next to a series of articles heralding the nomination of the first Jesuit 
priest to the U.S. House of Representatives.76 Discussing the historic election, Drinan 
declared simply: “This victory means there is one more person who will wage a war on 
war.” 77 
The 1970 election by no means symbolized a takeover of the Massachusetts 
Democratic Party and U.S. Congress by the suburban-based peace movement.  Two other 
CPP and PAX supported candidates lost their respective races. In a perhaps more 
symbolically troubling development, Louise Day Hicks won the nomination in the district 
that abutted the Third District. The success of Drinan’s race, nevertheless, did mark for 
many in the suburban peace movement the culmination of the efforts that it had begun 
eight years earlier with Stuart Hughes’s symbolic senate campaign. Jerome Grossman 
later drew a direct comparison between Drinan and Hughes as each in his mind 
represented “a model of integrity, a brilliant speaker and a person of conscience.”78 The 
difference in outcome of the candidacies exposed larger changes in the state, national and 
international landscape between 1962 and 1970, as well as the increased effectiveness of 
the grassroots liberal movement to work directly within the political system. Grossman 
declared that the victory served as a “watershed,” proving that “liberals could pull 
themselves together and gather so many people and so many dollars to elect such an 
unlikely candidate” and could take its “moveable feast” to other districts and races. 79  As 
the 1972 election approached, the suburban-based movement hoped to apply the same 
successful grassroots strategy to challenge to Richard Nixon for the presidency.  
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Suburban Doves  
 
While the leadership of PAX and CPP looked toward the presidential race in 
1972, the suburban peace movement remained energized through a variety of less overtly 
electorally-focused campaigns. These efforts helped keep the suburban liberal political 
landscape fertile for the upcoming election. Though not expressly tied to particularly 
candidates, many liberal suburban residents, especially women, became influential in 
shaping both the grassroots opposition to the Vietnam War and the political landscape of 
the Bay State and the nation. The leaders of Voice of Women (VOW) stood at the 
forefront of liberal peace activities, continuing to develop strategies to deploy the racial, 
spatial, class and gender privileges of its largely affluent white suburban membership 
toward the antiwar cause. VOW recognized that the Nixon administration had dismissed 
the struggle for peace “with the lying labels” of “campus bums” and “long-haired freaks.” 
They believed that if the administration would not listen to their children, it should “make 
them hear us!”80 The group, therefore, developed a series of campaigns that 
simultaneously lent the anti-war movement credibility and appealed directly to the 
individualist and symbolic sensibilities of many moderate suburban residents. 
VOW’s activities underscored the consumerist and maternalist underpinnings of 
the organization and the grassroots suburban movement as a whole. In November 1968, 
VOW chairman Rhona Shoul decided to take over the lease of the Newton McCarthy 
Committee Headquarters. VOW turned the storefront into a multi-use space housing both 
its headquarters and a clearinghouse of antiwar information and literature for groups that 
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wanted to reach suburban residents.81 In addition, the group converted part of the office 
into a full-time “Peace Boutique” selling jewelry, homemade arts and crafts, and political 
souvenirs in order to raise money for antiwar organizations and causes. The store became 
an immediate success. The Boutique made $3000 in its first six months and 100-200 
shoppers a day came through its doors during the Christmas rush. At the checkout 
counter, salespeople encouraged shoppers to sign various antiwar petitions and take 
peace-related literature with them. The Peace Boutique quickly emerged as an important 
center for organizing volunteers for the Drinan campaign and other antiwar activities. 
The store also provided a moment of awakening for many of the volunteer salespeople,  
and several of them went on to take full-time staff positions for the peace groups for 
whom they raised money. Many of the members would later recall working at the 
Boutique as one of the high points of their activist careers. 82 
In addition to raising funds for peace at the Boutique, VOW also experimented 
with ways to withhold spending as a means to protest the Vietnam War. By deploying 
their positions as middle-class consumers, VOW members exposed the unique ways in 
which suburban residents, especially women, could contribute to the antiwar cause.  In 
the late 1960s, VOW initiated a boycott of all items made by companies complicit in the 
war effort, including Standard Oil, General Electric, RCA, and ITT, the maker of such 
suburban household staples as Wonder Bread. 83 In partnership with the local chapter of 
the Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom (WILPF), VOW quickly 
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intensified this effort by launching a campaign called “Mourning Tuesday” to stop 
shopping all together once a week.  Through the weekly act, the women symbolically 
refused contributing to the United States economy until the government and took “war 
off its shopping list.” 84  
Many VOW members also tested the privileges of consumer citizenship by 
engaging in forms of tax refusal. Beginning in 1970, the group participated in an 
ambitious initiative entitled “Hang Up on War” that encouraged citizens to withhold the 
10 percent excise tax on their phone bills. The U.S. government had introduced the 
federal excise tax in 1966 as a means to raise funds for the Vietnam War. VOW 
distributed a printed card for participants to include with their monthly bills with a picture 
of Vietnamese children and an explanation that the customer could not “in good 
conscience continue to pay.”85 VOW members took pride in the fact that this action had 
become a nationally burgeoning movement with 18,000 citizens across the country 
participating.86  Several VOW members also announced a refusal to pay either all of their 
taxes or just the projected 69 cents per dollar that went to defense spending. They also 
engaged in routine pickets of the local Internal Revenue Service headquarters. While 
these activities clearly did not make a dent in the defense budget, they did help draw 
attention to the war’s burden on American citizens.  
VOW simultaneously created a series of campaigns whereby participants could 
provide the gendered privileges of motherhood to the antiwar cause. Building upon their 
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involvement in the draft resistance movement, three VOW members conceived of a 
protest project in the spring of 1971 called “Save Our Sons.” The campaign encouraged 
women to send snapshots of sons, nephews and other male relatives to President Nixon at 
the White House along with a form letter that VOW had drafted. The letter presented the 
senders in explicitly maternalist and non-threatening terms as “housewives and mothers” 
who as “students have been organizing protests had “stayed home, done our work and 
kept quiet.” The signers announced, however, that they refused to “pay the price of war 
with the loss of sons any longer.” 87  The project received an instantly positive response. 
Thirty VOW members spent “Mourning Tuesday” distributing 2,000 copies of the letters 
at the Park Street subway station in downtown Boston. The activists convinced 250 
women to sign the letter on the spot. Women in many Boston suburbs, including Newton, 
Norwood, Milton and Quincy established ad hoc committees to gather more signed letters 
and photographs in their communities.  
This grassroots campaign quickly expanded from a state into a national movement 
with Women Strike for Peace chapters across the country joining and sending their 
pictures to the White House. Congresswoman Bella Abzug became a strong supporter of 
the effort and encouraged women to send the mailings directly to her. Upon receiving 
thousands of signed copies, Abzug read the form letter into the Congressional Record in 
April declaring that “these women are 55 percent of the population” who “were 
examining their own rights in the political and social arenas” and coming to recognize 
“the full potential of their political power.”88 The action culminated during the summer 
when a group of activists pasted 50,000 copies of the letter and pictures to bunting and 
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then unfurled it in front of the White House. Nixon refused to meet with these women or 
discuss the matter with the Democratic Congresswomen Abzug, Shirley Chisholm, Patsy 
Mink and Ella Grasso. Despite the scope of the campaign, its limited impact on Nixon 
administration policy frustrated VOW and its suburban members and led many of them 
direct to more direct forms of action.  Throughout 1970 and 1971, VOW members joined 
a series of large protests that occurred in the suburbs of Boston that often led to the arrest 
of participants. These activities underscore both that participation in peace activity among 
local residents remained as strong as ever and that during the early 1970s many major 
Boston-area protests occurred not on the campuses or the Boston Common but in the 
suburbs.89 
The most extreme of these protests brought into sharp focus the ways suburban 
liberals could and did assist the antiwar effort. The 1971 event, sponsored by Vietnam 
Veterans Against the War (VVAW), took place on the Lexington Battle Green, and 
resulted in the largest mass arrest in Bay State history.90 With its new leader John Kerry, 
the Boston Chapter of VVAW had become increasingly active in the early 1970s. A 
month after a successful march in Washington where they camped on the Mall and Kerry 
offered powerful testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the group 
decided to retrace Paul Revere’s ride in reverse. The VVAW planned the three-day march 
over Memorial Day weekend, spending a night each at the Old North Bridge in Concord, 
the Lexington Battle Green, and the Bunker Hill Monument and culminating with a rally 
on Boston Common where they would read the Declaration of Independence. The group 
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aimed to appropriate the symbolism of the American Revolution, echoing earlier antiwar 
and civil rights protests that also took place on these spaces.  
The VVAW hoped to gain support and sympathy from the suburban communities 
through which they would pass. The Lexington CPP chapter had worked in advance with 
the VVAW to help with preparations for the night in the town. The Lexington selectmen, 
however, refused to grant the VVAW a permit to bivouac on the Green because it might 
upset the community, get out of hand, and ruin the grass. The VVAW decided to camp 
anyway and many Lexington residents joined the event in order to show solidarity with 
the veterans and their cause. Longtime peace movement participants like Emily 
Frankovich, Jean Rubenstein, Bonnie Jones and Nancy Earsy participated to prove that 
both suburban people opposed the war and the demonstration was not the product of 
outside agitators.91 At 3 a.m. local police rounded up the 458-person crowd and took 
them by buses to a makeshift jail in the building where the Department of Public Works 
kept its trucks. In the morning police herded the protestors to the Concord District 
Courthouse where the veterans and their suburban supporters pleaded guilty and received 
misdemeanor trespassing charges. Although the VVAW never completed its journey, the 
arrests stirred enough outrage to bring them the media and public attention they had 
sought.  
The event had an even greater impact on the Lexington community, its stance on 
the war, and its commitment to liberal ideals. Although a small minority of citizens 
supported the selectmen, most Lexington residents sided with the demonstrators, 
interpreting the dramatic action as a clear example of the mythological exceptionalism of 
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the community and its revolutionary roots. For local antiwar activists the event did not 
just stir a sense of the town’s progressive distinctiveness, but also revealed the unique 
ways in which white middle-class people could contribute to progressive causes. Like the 
Moratorium, the VVAW protest demonstrated how local action could expand the 
opposition to the war. Bonnie Jones recalled that it was important because “It was a very 
respectable group of people, middle class and older.” She said, “It was in my hometown. 
You are not of a half million people walking in Washington where nobody knows you. 
Your name is the local paper and your neighbors are going to know.”92 
While the VVAW protest revealed the power of suburban residents to legitimize 
the antiwar movement, for activists such as Emily Frankovich it also demonstrated the 
limits of direct action protest. After spending the night in the makeshift jail, Frankovich, 
like many liberal activists, continued to advocate using more formal political channels to 
achieve change. She later remembered learning this lesson most clearly around the same 
time as the VVAW demonstration when she took part in a CPP-sponsored trip to 
Washington to meet with members of the Massachusetts delegation. When she and other 
CPP members got to Senator Edward Brooke’s office, they saw a group of veterans 
waiting outside because they did not have an appointment. The CPP group went right in 
to see Brooke, reinforcing for Frankovich that “If you’re going to make change you have 
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The leaders of CPP and PAX sought to harness the increasing suburban 
opposition to the war and direct it toward the voting booth in the upcoming presidential 
election. The Boston Herald ran a story in late 1971 with the headline “Suburban Doves 
are Taking Anti-War Struggle to the Ballot Box.” The article featured interviews with 
several suburban peace activists who insisted that local residents were still outraged about 
the ongoing war but had begun to abandon “the picket signs for the ballot box.” 94 
Wellesley attorney Paul Jameson observed of his fellow peace-minded residents 
“They’ve marched, they’ve talked that didn’t achieve their goal so now they are going to 
the ballot box.” Jerome Grossman similarly declared,  “The marches and demonstrations 
of previous year were necessary to indicate the vast numbers who were opposed to the 
war. Now what remains to be done is to translate these numbers into political power.”95 
The article confidently predicted that PAX and other groups would use their suburban-
centered connections and tactics to successfully “springboard” antiwar candidates into 
office, looking forward especially to the state’s upcoming presidential primary.  
 Before focusing on the outcome of the presidential election itself, the suburban-
centered peace movement first sought to alter the candidate selection process at the 
national and state levels. The members of the movement shared the outrage of many in 
the Democratic Party that despite the fact that Eugene McCarthy had won more state 
primaries, Hubert Humphrey had still emerged from the 1968 Chicago Convention as the 
favored candidate. After the election, the Democratic National Committee appointed the 
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection to examine reform. The body, 
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better known as the McGovern Commission, mainly sought to help state parties change 
their nominating processes. The members of the Massachusetts peace movement 
contributed to this dialogue by providing testimony when the Commission came to 
Boston in July 1969. Jerome Grossman told the Commission of “the overwhelming need 
for the deepest kind of reform of the party structure both nationally and within 
Massachusetts.” He described that the new system must take note of the shift in the 
Democratic center of gravity from white working-class in South Boston toward suburban 
middle-class residents in places like Newton. “A new electorate is on hand,” Grossman 
warned,  “which is highly-issued oriented, demanding rapid change and non-responsive 
to the ethnic loyalties which have created the sinecures of so many current political 
figures.”96 The Commission took to heart these comments on political realignment 
eventually designing a set of guidelines for state delegate selection designed especially to 
eliminate preferential treatment and promote the fair representation of minority views. 
Most significantly, the body urged that every delegation include racial minorities, 
women, and young people among its ranks. These rules transformed how the Democrats 
selected their presidential nominee and would have wide-reading effects at the state and 
national levels.97  
The McGovern Commission’s findings assisted the Massachusetts peace 
movement’s ongoing effort to reform the state Democratic Party. In 1966, Massachusetts 
had passed a law that made Bay State voters’ choices for delegate non-binding and gave 
the parties the power to determine representation at the national convention. This law 
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effectively allowed the Democratic establishment in Massachusetts to marginalize 
McCarthy and his delegates from the national convention. Between 1968 and 1971, CPP 
had filed annual legislation to abolish the earlier law on the grounds that it prevented 
popular participation and in the belief, in the words of Alvin Levin, that “the people who 
do the voting in the primary should be the people represented in the convention.”98 The 
combination of the McGovern Commission findings and CPP pressure convinced the 
state legislature to re-evaluate the process and eventually passed a law to remove the non-
binding stipulation and abolish the winner-take-all approach. In addition, the 
Massachusetts State Democratic Party voted to essentially remove itself from the 
delegate selection process.99   
The members of the suburban-based peace movement then concentrated on how 
best to enact the procedural changes in order to nominate a candidate capable of defeating 
Richard Nixon. Many activists believed that in 1968 the McCarthy and Kennedy 
campaigns had divided the peace vote and wasted energies and resources fighting each 
other rather than pro-war candidates. 100 In order to avoid repeating that mistake, 
members of the movement decided to build on the success of the Third District Caucus 
and the Drinan campaign and expand the model to a statewide and hopefully national 
scale. A group of PAX and CPP members developed a proposal to hold a presidential 
caucus where participants could select one candidate to endorse in the April 1972 state 
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Democratic Primary. 101 The principles of “participation politics” clearly animated the 
idea. The group believed that “this process of choice by activists at the grassroots will 
release enormous energies and funds, assure the victory of the selected candidate” and 
build “strong political organizations.”102  CPP member John Elder deemed it a means of 
“broadening participation at every stage of the electoral process” and to “restore vitality 
to the principles and practices of self-government.”103  In the official announcement, 
Alvin Levin of CPP recapitulated the mantra of the suburban peace movement since the 
Moratorium declaring, “The time is ripe to translate our community strength into real 
political power.”104   CPP and PAX dispatched members into more than 50 cities and 
towns throughout the Commonwealth to alert citizens about the event and urge them to 
select delegates to attend.  The leaders hoped these meetings would not just increase 
participation, but also forge lasting contacts in these municipalities. The organizers also 
sought to entice candidates to get involved by both promising an endorsement to the 
winners and the mailing lists of the two groups, which amounted to 50,000 names. 
 The idea for the caucus generated many raised eyebrows throughout 
Massachusetts political circles. Democratic party officials refused to endorse the event or 
its selected candidate. Even though the organizers described the project as getting liberals 
together “so a liberal can win this state,” the Massachusetts chapter of Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA) deemed the caucus “inappropriate” and declined to 
participate.105 Several naysayers noted the CPP and PAX’s past experience in and close 
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connection to the McCarthy campaign and believed the caucus served merely a ploy to 
help the former Minnesota Senator win the Massachusetts primary for a second time. 106 
Despite close ties to McCarthy, Grossman and other peace leaders publicly promised to 
remain uncommitted until the caucus participants had selected a winner.107 Organizers 
further defended themselves by citing the success of the Third District Caucus and by 
attacking such critics for not understanding “the prime initiative in politics should flow 
from the grass-roots upward,” rather than from self-styled “leaders” down to the 
people.108  
 Many local civil rights and labor activists, however, sharply criticized the caucus 
organizers for confining their definition of grassroots participation exclusively to middle-
class whites from the suburbs. This criticism underscored the ways in which the 
suburban-centered movement had essentially abandoned efforts of the early 1960s to 
unify the issues of peace and civil rights. Instead, the movement increasingly focused 
exclusively on galvanizing middle-class people against the war and electing candidates 
who felt the same way. Despite its efforts at more inclusiveness, the caucus 
disproportionately benefited middle-class white suburbanites and contributed to a shift in 
the balance of power within the Democratic Party in their favor. Marvin Harrell, 
chairman of the Massachusetts Minority Political Committee, publicly criticized the 
organizers for not including “viable minority input at the planning stages” and for not 
providing a way to present a “slate of minority issues. ”  Harrell declared the caucus a 
case study of “how the system has traditionally excluded minorities from the nuts and 
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bolts of political activity.” 109 In a telling rebuke, Grossman responded that the caucus 
intentionally included “a certain kind of people—peace and reform Democrats---the 
people behind the revolt of 1968 and was “not trying to represent the entire state.”110 This 
comment reflects the viewpoint that had both undergirded the mobilization for 
Moratorium and the McCarthy and Drinan campaigns. By focusing on making antiwar 
issues and candidates acceptable to middle-class white suburban residents, PAX and its 
allies had excluded other parts of the population from participation. The specific yet 
myopic goals and vision of Grossman and the peace movement undoubtedly constrained 
its ability to forge broader coalitions and policy changes.  
Revealing a schism in African-American local politics, other black leaders urged 
members of the community to participate in the caucus. A faction led by Hubert Jones 
and Byron Rushing worked with organizers to get Bay State African-Americans to 
attend. Jones and Rushing hoped to use the caucus to create “an ongoing organizational 
procedure and mechanism capable of effective coalition politics.” In particular, these 
activists realized that if American-Americans wanted to oust Louise Day Hicks from her 
seat in Congress, it would have “to be in alliance with white liberals” and saw the caucus 
as the first step in that process.111 Jones and Rushing, therefore, released a series of radio 
announcements and flyers publicly urging members of the African-American community 
to attend, stressing “Black people cannot willingly absent themselves from any 
potentially important political process.”112 This call would have an unexpected impact on 
the event’s results.  
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More than 3,000 people attended the presidential caucus at Assumption College in 
Worcester on January 15, 1972.113  Bennett Alter of Brookline represented the typical 
participant. He attended because of a sense that the political system provided the last 
resort for stopping the Vietnam War. “My wife and I signed the first ad against the 
Vietnam War in the Times eight years ago,” Alter declared. “If there’s one thing to come 
out of it, it will be good. Everything else has failed.”114 The ballot for the caucus included 
committed Democratic candidates Shirley Chisholm, John Lindsay, George McGovern, 
and Edmund Muskie. The announcement of the event had convinced Eugene McCarthy 
to officially enter the presidential race (though only in the Massachusetts primary) and he 
was the only candidate to speaker before the crowd in Worcester.115 McGovern and 
Chisholm sent proxies, and while Muskie and Lindsay declined to participate in any 
capacity.  
The unexpected results of the all-day balloting illuminated the potential power of 
grassroots political participation. McGovern won with 62 percent, Chisholm received 23 
percent, McCarthy 13 percent and Muskie, Lindsay, and Edward Kennedy split the 
remaining two percent between them. Chisholm’s strong showing was surprising given 
the white, middle-class and peace slant of the event. In the four days before the event, 
however, Jones and Rushing had launched an aggressive mobilization drive to get people 
of color to attend by promising free transportation. These participants voted 
overwhelmingly for Chisholm. Moreover, many white suburban women who had 
intended to vote for McCarthy became drawn to the feminist dimensions of Chisholm’s 
candidacy and changed their minds. In the western suburbs of Lexington, Concord, 
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Lincoln, and Bedford, the female participants divided their support equally between 
Chisholm and McGovern. The results convinced Chisholm to concentrate on 
Massachusetts, a state she had previously planned to bypass. McGovern’s decisive rout of 
McCarthy surprised observers even more.  Many had assumed that McCarthy would 
easily win the nomination, especially since CPP had evolved directly from his 1968 
campaign. Although McCarthy refused to withdraw from the race, the caucus represented 
a very ill omen for his candidacy. It led one pundit to cautiously warn,  “Massachusetts is 
McCarthy’s kind of turf. If he cannot put over his candidacy here among his own kind of 
liberals, he cannot make it anywhere.”116  The results of the caucus did not impel Muskie 
and Lindsey to withdraw from the primary either. Although the Massachusetts caucus did 
not fulfill the organizers’ vision of unifying activists around one candidate, it did provide 
the first illustration that McGovern was a serious candidate.117  
 
The McGovern Campaign 
McGovern’s success at the caucus did not emerge from a fluke, but was the direct 
product of the network of grassroots suburban liberal activists who had already 
converged in support of his candidacy. McGovern had recognized early in his candidacy 
that suburban residents would provide invaluable financial and volunteer support for his 
presidential bid. In the winter of 1971, he had sent out 200,000 letters to grassroots 
contacts across the country, which yielded both a million dollars and many interested 
individuals. 118 In Massachusetts a nucleus of support grew in Lexington, led by Emily 
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Frankovich, who together with fellow residents Harriet Kaufman and Alice Piece 
launched “Massachusetts Citizens for McGovern,” using Piece’s home as a makeshift 
headquarters. Although PAX and CPP had refused to get involved in any campaign until 
after the presidential caucus, activists like Frankovich applied the tactics of suburban 
mobilization those groups had cultivated in their earlier political efforts toward building 
support for McGovern.  The group called contacts they had developed through the 
Moratorium and other activities and encouraged them to “set up an embryonic district 
organization.”119 They distributed leaflets and bumper stickers in support of the candidate 
and also started a newsletter that tracked McGovern’s activities. In October 1971, the 
group along with the Lexington Democratic Club and residents of other suburban 
communities sponsored a fundraiser at the Lexington Armory, at which McGovern 
himself spoke. The crowd of 750 people applauded “thunderously” when McGovern 
promised to end the war and reorder national priorities. Many people in the audience 
offered financial contributions and began to volunteer for the campaign.120 This effort 
inspired residents in Newton and other Route 128 suburbs to establish their own local 
McGovern Committees. After hearing about the caucus, the local groups focused on 
turning out a large vote for McGovern at the Worcester event. By the late fall, 
Frankovich had shifted from the head of Massachusetts for McGovern to state 
fundraising chair. National campaign manager Garry Hart had expressed skepticism 
about the caucus sponsored by PAX and CPP. Frankovich pleaded with him to charter 
buses to “get as many people to the caucus as possible,” stressing, “We can’t afford to 
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lose it.”121 The advice clearly paid off, as these McGovern supporters comprised a large 
segment of the caucus participants.  
After the caucus, CPP and PAX quickly took a leading role in the McGovern 
campaign. Upon receiving the endorsement McGovern received a phone call from Ted 
Kennedy congratulating him because the support of CPP and PAX meant that “you are on 
your way now. That group is hardworking and effective. They will kill themselves for 
you.”122  CPP and PAX supported McGovern not only because they believed he was the 
best candidate, but also because they recognized it would legitimize the caucus and their 
approach to politics. The personalities and philosophies of these groups aligned smoothly 
with the grassroots model the McGovern campaign had established locally and 
nationally.123 The newly fortified Massachusetts staff applied their localized social 
networks and strategies to challenging the predictions of a crushing victory by 
frontrunner Muskie. 124  CPP and PAX encouraged their supporters to apply the 
experience they had gained in “prior campaigns” and from overall “commitment to 
grassroots politics.”125 They sought to build explicitly on the campaign model established 
during Father Drinan’s successful run for Congress two years earlier. During February 
and March 1972, members of PAX and CPP did extensive neighborhood canvassing 
across the state to identify McGovern supporters. The office then entered the information 
into a computer-operated database and followed up with targeted literature about the 
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candidate.126  This well-organized suburban-centered drive, coupled with strong 
opposition to the war among most Massachusetts residents, helped McGovern pass 
Muskie as the clear leader weeks before the actual vote. By early April, polls revealed 
that McGovern had an 11-point lead on Muskie and a 21 percent lead over Humphrey.127    
Massachusetts for McGovern, CPP, and PAX did not prematurely relax and 
instead focused on the races for delegate posts as means to ensure that Muskie did not 
gain the nomination in Miami despite a loss in the primaries.  The groups sought to 
develop district delegate slates for the primary that not only met the Party’s new rules for 
race, gender and age balance but also were “truly representative of the peace and new 
politics constituency.”128 Many members of the suburban liberal peace movement 
themselves ran as McGovern delegates in their respective districts. One such candidate 
was Newton’s Anita Greenbaum, who was a member of both PAX and VOW and had 
been a key volunteer in the Drinan campaign. Greenbaum would have been an extremely 
unlikely and unwilling delegate to the Democratic Convention four years earlier. She had, 
in fact, protested outside the Chicago Convention in 1968. But, like many members of the 
movement, she came to believe that working within the political process provided a better 
means to fight to end the war and improve U.S. social conditions.129 A friend drafted a 
homemade campaign flyer with the message: “ANITA GREENBAUM OF NEWTON, 
NOT YOUR EVERY-DAY HOUSEWIFE,” citing her participation in various peace and 
political activities including a rap sheet of arrests at various Vietnam demonstrations. The 
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flyer jokingly stated, “Just as McGovern’s record speaks for itself so does ANITA’S.130 
She joined with PAX and CPP members such as Jerome Grossman, Alvin Levin and John 
Elders, who also put their names on the delegate ballot.  
CPP and PAX recognized that these delegates would not just deliver McGovern 
the nomination but would also reshape the demography and priorities of the state and 
national Democratic Party. In the week before the primary, the groups devoted their full 
resources and energy to ensuring these homegrown delegates achieved victory. CPP 
distributed leaflets, sample ballots and more than 25,000 copies of brochures 
emphasizing: “The future course of the Democratic Party is also much involved in the 
choice of delegates.” CPP intimated that these diverse slates “could result in a spectacular 
change of the state and national party.”131 PAX made an equally impassioned plea 
encouraging members to stress to ambivalent voters that these delegates were not 
“professional politicians,” but “conscientious citizens from the grassroots who wish to 
revive and democratize the Democratic Party.”132  Shirley Chisholm’s campaign helped 
arouse further grassroots suburban liberal activism and activity in the primary and the 
delegate contest. During March and April, Chisholm came to Massachusetts several 
times, stumping both on Roxbury street corners and cocktail parties in Newton.133 She 
met loud applause in both venues when she announced, “It may take a black woman to 
put our country together.” Mark Solomon, the head of the Newton chapter of CPP and the 
leader of the Newton Chisholm effort, wittily dubbed her “ a dark horse in a gray field of 
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white male candidates.”134 These endorsements and events stirred even more suburban 
liberal support for Chisholm, convincing residents not just to donate money and vote for 
her but also to run as delegates on her behalf.  
The results of the Bay State’s Democratic presidential primary on April 20, 1972, 
demonstrated the effectiveness of the peace movement’s strategy to both ensure 
McGovern’s success and to reshape the state’s political landscape.  McGovern ran away 
with the primary, winning an overwhelming 48 percent of the vote more than twice that 
of second-place Edmund Muskie. Shirley Chisholm took fifth place with six percent of 
the vote. George Wallace’s third place showing constituted the most unexpected result of 
primary. Wallace had campaigned for a grand total of one hour in Massachusetts one day 
before the election, so his surprisingly strong finish especially in Boston’s heavily white 
working-class wards exposed the racial and economic anxieties of many residents. Some 
pundits, however, believed that by exacerbating the anger of many blue collar Democrats 
Wallace actually helped McGovern. The South Dakota senator’s less angry platform of a 
more equitable economic system and an end to the war appealed to voters in Boston, 
which had one of the highest rates of unemployment in the country. The precinct figures 
from the city’s working-class wards, where McGovern beat Muskie by a two-to-one ratio, 
showed that, in the words of one reporter, “George Wallace just warmed up the 
voters.”135 Statewide McGovern did best both in suburban areas where CPP, PAX, and  
other groups had strong bases of support and with younger voters on the state’s many 
college campuses. Globe political columnist Robert Healy observed that the election 
results indicated the rise of a new Democratic coalition comprised of “the young, the 
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suburbanite liberal and the blue collar worker.”136  He predicted this alliance could give 
“Richard Nixon a hard time in November.” McGovern himself stated of the 
Massachusetts primary results: “We are forming a new center (of the Democratic 
Party).”137  
The primary solidified McGovern’s position the leader nationally in the 
Democratic race. Following the crucial victory in Massachusetts, McGovern reached the 
peak of his national popularity. In May 1972, a Gallup poll placed him just seven points 
behind Richard Nixon.138  This success also legitimized the CPP and PAX’s vision and 
approach of getting peace and new politics supporters behind one candidate. CPP 
celebrated the results as a victory “at every level from national to neighborhood” and 
another indication of the effectiveness of its grassroots organizing strategy. CPP boasted 
that “a combination of good local organization and voter interest in the issue” of the war 
proved to be an “irresistible force” and looked with confidence toward the general 
election.139  
The primary results indicated another important way that the suburban-centered 
peace movement had reshaped the local and national political system. The majority of the 
Massachusetts Democratic Party faithful, including Mayor Kevin White, Congressmen 
Tip O’Neil, State Senate President Kevin Harrington and future Governor Michael 
Dukakis, ran as Muskie delegates. The primary loss put them out of contention for seats 
at the Democratic Convention.140 Instead the Bay State delegation consisted of many 
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people who, while certainly not household names in Massachusetts political circles, had 
been long active in suburban liberal organizations.  Jerome Grossman, Helen Rees, Ruth 
Terazghi, John Elder, Alvin Levin, Jean Rubenstein, Jane Trudeau and other members of 
PAX, CPP and VOW all received seats.  Grossman later described the constituency as 
people who “had been handing out leaflets for years without ever receiving any 
goodies.”141 The convention offered these grassroots leaders a long-awaited chance to 
directly influence electoral politics. For Grossman, the nomination marked one of the 
highpoints of his activist career and reinforced his faith that working within the system 
provided the most effective means to both end the war and change the political process. A 
few months later, Grossman also won a much-coveted position as a Massachusetts 
representative on the Democratic National Committee.  His eight-year tenure in the post 
offers another clear illustration of the ways in which Bay State liberal activism had come 
to exert direct influence on national party politics.  
The Massachusetts representation at the 1972 Democratic Convention in Miami 
constituted the most diverse and inclusive delegation the state had every fielded as large 
numbers of women, minorities and young people replaced Democratic regulars. In 
addition to prominent liberals like Father Drinan and John Kenneth Galbraith, the 153 
delegates included Roxbury activist Doris Bunte, Ellen Jackson, the founder of Operation 
Exodus, Ruth Batson, the former director of METCO, Patricia Simon, a Newton Gold 
Star Mother, had become active in antiwar politics who after her son David died, Barbara 
Ackermann, the progressive Mayor of Cambridge, Roberta Benjamin a Belmont resident 
and president of the Boston chapter of the National Organization of Women, and 
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conscientious objector S. Mark Tuller. This diverse Bay State Delegation traveled by 
plane, train, and Volkswagen bus to Miami in July for what was for most their first 
encounter with national party politics. The members had met in May to select an unusual 
slate of officers including Father Drinan as Chairperson, Ruth Batson as Vice-Chair, and 
as Secretary Ron Deiner, a history PhD candidate at Harvard about to take his general 
exams. “The best thing about the week in Miami,” one delegate from a suburb west of 
Boston later enthusiastically asserted, “was being able to do political things day and night 
without your family around telling you what a stupid way to spend your time.”142  The 
comment set the tone for the inexperienced groups’ approach to the entire event.  
Democrat officials recognized that the diverse delegation symbolized the new 
face of the party and placed the Massachusetts group in the front row of the hall. This 
decision proved a misstep.  Despite a conscious effort before the convention to create 
unity among the delegates, the Bay State contingent broke into a fight on the floor before 
the gaze of the television cameras.143 The tension began as some of the most progressive 
members of the delegation gradually recognized certain components of McGovern’s 
platform, particularly on busing, abortion, and party reform, was too conciliatory and 
centrist for their taste. In particular, they opposed McGovern’s statement that he would 
maintain a small force of soldiers in Thailand pending the release of all prisoners of war. 
What bothered the most liberal delegates more than the positions themselves was that 
McGovern and his advisors made the decisions behind closed doors, thus betraying his 
commitment to “new politics.” “This is supposed to be a grass roots campaign,” Barbara 
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Ackermann decried.144  An informal discussion among the Bay State delegates about the 
matter unexpectedly escalated into an unofficial caucus. Leading dissenter Jean 
Rubenstein of Lexington CPP stated, “If you are going to fill a hall with ‘new politics’ 
people, you’ve got to deal with the issues that brought them there.”145   John Elder drafted 
a statement calling for McGovern to confirm his commitment on troop withdrawal, a 
$6500 minimum income, tenants, abortion and gay rights. Elder, Ackerman, Rubenstein, 
Caroline Rees, Carolyn Stauffer and Alvin Levin all signed and urged others to do the 
same. The delegation broke into open disagreement. Just before the balloting this 
contingency threatened revolt and only capitulated after economist and Harvard professor 
John Kenneth Galbraith counseled that nomination night in the front row of the 
convention hall was an inappropriate time and place for a fight.146  
While the dissenting delegates capitulated and continued with the formal 
balloting, this dispute revealed the clear frustrations some grassroots peace activist 
experienced with working within the political system, especially within formal party 
lines. The disagreement also exposed deeper tensions within McGovern supporters and 
the Democratic Party that would continue to haunt both in the future. Several 
Massachusetts delegates as well as their supporters at home emerged from the historic 
convention feeling disillusioned rather than energized. Many participants did emphasize 
the importance of taking part in the “unique experience” of “men and women, blacks and 
whites, and all kinds mixed together. ” For others, however, frustration with the 
McGovern campaign trumped this sense of multicultural euphoria. Roberta Benjamin of 
NOW spent much of the convention engaged in the discussions of the women’s caucus. 
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Upon coming home, she expressed dismay at how the McGovern campaign handled 
many of the issues particularly surrounding women’s rights and stated that it left many of 
women involved with the sentiment: “We will never again be so powerless.”  She 
declared that the McGovern campaign proved it did not want to work to “play new 
politics with old political styles.” Jane Trudeau, a delegate from Lexington, deemed the 
McGovern organization “really out of touch with the people they’re dealing with. Their 
politics are not my politics.”147 McGovern’s campaign in the Bay State and nationally 
flagged considerably following the convention especially after vice-presidential nominee 
Thomas Eagleton unceremoniously relinquished the post after the press uncovered his 
history of psychiatric instability. The controversy lasted for three weeks and constituted, 
in the words of Bruce Miroff,  “the greatest campaign fiasco in modern times” and 
severely harmed McGovern’s campaign and reputation. 148 The event directly benefited 
President Nixon and bolstered his efforts to discredit both McGovern specifically and 
liberals generally.  
Following the convention, CPP and PAX and their liberal grassroots allies began 
to focus more of their attention on the upcoming congressional races. This decision 
stemmed both from a frustration with the centrist shift of the McGovern campaign and a 
sense that even if he won he would get little done with a conservative-dominated 
Congress.149 Most importantly, these suburban activists continued to believe that 
reshaping the Massachusetts congressional delegation provided an important way to 
implement their political vision. Another round of redistricting had placed Newton and 
Brookline in the newly drawn Fourth District and pitted Father Drinan against Martin 
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Linsky, a popular liberal Republican state representative with whom he shared a base. 
Jerome Grossman and other Drinan supporters actively contributed to the liberal priest’s 
difficult re-election fight.  Admiring his work and leadership in the VVAW protest the 
previous year, many Lexington residents had also gotten involved in John Kerry’s 
attempt to win in the Fifth District that included their town as well as many of more 
deindustrialized former mill towns nearby. In other parts of the state, residents joined in 
the campaigns of incumbent Michael Harrington and newcomers Garry Studds and 
Hubert Jones, the social worker and activist who had encouraged African-American 
participation in the caucus.  
The McGovern campaign experimented with a variety of tactics to recapture the 
energy of liberal voters.150 Although they never re-created the excitement of the primary, 
Bay State suburban liberals did increase their organizational intensity in the final months 
of the campaign. Affiliates of the McGovern campaign convinced more than 200,000 
people to register between August 19 and October 17, 1972, PAX encouraged its 
members to get involved in the registration effort aware that the new voters would not 
only help McGovern but also the other “new politics” congressional candidates.151 The 
presidential campaign also distributed “street-hawker kits” consisting of McGovern 
buttons, bumper stickers, t-shirts, and literature as a way to make the campaign more 
visible and to raise funds. PAX supplemented the project by suggesting that its suburban 
members devote time “street hawking” on local sidewalks, shopping centers and other 
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public places.152 With the help of convention delegate Helen Rees, the campaign also 
arranged a day of fundraising activities throughout the suburbs on October 11 that 
included wine and cheese parties in Wayland, Winchester, Medway and Rockport, flea 
markets in Groton and New Bedford, a Greek dance in Natick, a bike-a-thon in 
Worcester, a poker party in Holden and an “in absentia” auction of the Nixon 
Administration in Lincoln.153 
The Route 128 suburbs generally, and Lexington in particular, remained a center 
of McGovern campaign activity.  While the campaign headquarters had moved to Boston 
well before the April primary, the financial and direct mail operations offices remained in 
Lexington due to the town’s success in the initial fundraising drive. Throughout the fall, 
volunteers relied upon their social networks in Lexington and the surrounding 
communities to raise funds using such tactics as phone-banking and potlucks.154   Bay 
State suburbanites also enthusiastically responded to the McGovern campaign’s direct-
mail solicitations by sending in small donations. The mailings alone yielded between 
$20-25 million and McGovern’s list of donors included 600,000 names. Through these 
combined efforts, fundraising remained the strongest part of the campaign locally and 
nationally throughout the fall.155  
Suburban residents did not lessen their activity even when pollsters began to 
predict that McGovern would easily carry Massachusetts. The McGovern campaign 
continued to sponsor neighborhood canvassing and identify even more potential voters. 
During the final week of October hundreds of volunteers in Lexington visited homes to 
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campaign for McGovern and John Kerry, carrying with them position papers from both 
candidates. In addition, residents helped with phone banking and envelope-licking at the 
town McGovern headquarters to solicit votes at the local, state and national level.156 In 
the final weeks, a few thousand particularly dedicated volunteers left Massachusetts to 
offer their services to the McGovern outfits in the other parts of the country. In response 
to this effort, McGovern sent a letter to the hundreds of grassroots volunteers, declaring: 
“Historians of the future may write whole chapters about the extraordinary part played by 
people like you in this 1972 Presidential Campaign.”157 
The campaign in Massachusetts also remained vibrant due to the strength of the 
state Democratic Party. Following the Miami Convention, McGovern’s staff sought to 
repair the rift created during the caucus and primary between its supporters and state 
Democratic regulars. The campaign staged a “unity breakfast” in August and received 
endorsements and pledges of help from major operators including Ted Kennedy, Tip 
O’Neil, Charlie Flaherty, and Louise Day Hicks. In the fall, the state party mobilized its 
own grassroots network of local committees and district supporters in campaign activities 
such as voter registration, fundraising, and canvassing.158  Kennedy also mobilized his 
own popularity and that of his family behind the candidate and did a great deal of last 
minute campaigning invigorating party loyalists.159 The national McGovern campaign 
had focused the majority of its attention in other parts of the country and the combined 
efforts of party politicians and suburban grassroots volunteers filled the leadership void. 
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Polls in the weeks leading up to the election placed McGovern with a solid ten-point lead 
over Nixon, by far his best numbers in the country.160  
On Election Day, McGovern won the Bay State with a decisive 54.8 percent of 
the vote. Other than the District of Columbia, however, Massachusetts was the only state 
President Nixon did not capture. Although most predictions had placed Nixon with a 
strong lead, few predicted the lopsided results. The fact that it was the first time in 
American history such an electoral outcome had occurred did not embarrass most 
Massachusetts residents, but, rather, solidified their sense of the state’s exceptionalism. 
New York Times journalist J. Anthony Lukas visited Massachusetts a few weeks after the 
election and observed that it was “obsessed with its singularity.”  Residents across the 
political and socioeconomic spectrum articulated pride in the ways in which the vote set 
them apart from the rest of the nation. These boosters ranged from John Kenneth 
Galbraith, who gleefully announced, “Invariably the country has been out of step with 
Massachusetts,” to Boston beer delivery man Marty Kelly, who gruffly surmised, “The 
other 49 states are all wrong.” 161 The Boston Globe featured a cartoon of Nixon with 
gardening shears in one hand and a 49-star flag in the other.162 Globe columnist Fred 
Pillsbury kidded that the election might help the tourist industry as people would “go to 
Massachusetts this vacation and look at the liberals.” 163 Buttons and bumper stickers 
reading “Massachusetts—We’d Rather Be Right,” “The Lone Star State,” “The One and 
Only,” and “Don’t Blame Me—I’m from Massachusetts” circulated on lapels and cars 
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across the Commonwealth, further inscribing this sense of distinctiveness into the public 
consciousness. These articulations of Massachusetts singularity also laid  the foundation 
for the embrace of the “ blue state” mystique that came into vogue at the beginning of the 
21st century.  
 The progressive enlightenment of the Massachusetts electorate, however, did not 
fully explain the results and, in fact, obscured other equally important factors. Many 
observers quickly dismissed the Massachusetts’s aberrant vote as the product of the 
state’s more than 300,000 college-aged residents.  It was true that the youth in 
Massachusetts did vote in large numbers, but a sizable percentage of these students voted 
absentee in other states. Moreover, the 95,000 young people who voted in state clearly 
did not by themselves explain the 220,000-vote margin in favor of McGovern.  Still, the 
students who sported McGovern buttons to class throughout the fall may have had an 
indirect effect on the overall tally. “They created a presence for McGovern that simply 
didn’t exist in most states,” Michael Dukakis observed of the college students. “You 
looked around and you really felt McGovern was going to win.”164 Other causes, 
however, provided more important lessons about the local and national political 
landscape.  
A closer examination of the election results reveals the limits to Nixon’s supposed 
white ethnic strategy in the Bay State and perhaps nationally. Just as in the primary, blue-
collar voters favored McGovern due to a combination of party loyalty and frustration 
about the war and economy. All twenty-two wards in Boston, including the white ethnic 
strongholds in South Boston and the North End, voted for McGovern.  Representing the 
attitudes of many of his working class white ethnic counterparts, William Ellis, a Mission 
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Hill laborer, declared, “I’ve been a Democrat all my life…why should I change now?” 
Voicing clear dislike of the Nixon administration as a reason for his support of 
McGovern, Sam Del Bene of the largely Italian North End simply stated,  “I don’t like 
Tricky Dick.”165 This constituency, moreover, found appealing McGovern’s populist 
message of change and promise to end the war. Placing the blue collar vote in the Bay 
State in exceptionalist overtones, state Democratic Chairman Charles Flaherty posited, 
“People are much more aware” in the Bay State and “look beyond the headlines and the 
TV. They went beyond the two men to the issues.”166 The fact that the Nixon campaign 
all but abandoned Massachusetts during his first term and the election clearly 
compounded this commitment to the Democratic Party and anger at the president’s 
leadership. Neither Nixon nor Spiro Agnew campaigned in Massachusetts because they 
recognized it was McGovern’s strongest state, where they had lost it by a  2-1 margin in 
1968.167 Republican officeholders did little to pick up the slack. Moderate Republicans 
Governor Francis Sargent and Senator Edward Brooke showed little public enthusiasm 
for Nixon, which may have contributed to the lukewarm Republican turnout. 
The strength of the suburban liberal activist infrastructure provided the most 
convincing explanation for McGovern’s success in the Bay State. For these groups the 
elections results evidenced the culmination of a decade-long struggle to create political 
change. The so-called “dean” of the “Massachusetts Movement,” Jerome Grossman, 
declared the peace movement’s “10-year crusade” represented the single most important 
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factor in McGovern’s victory.168 The movement’s electoral and educational campaigns, 
from the McCarthy and Drinan campaigns to the Moratorium, had prepared local 
residents for McGovern’s antiwar message.  The canvassing and fundraising in both the 
primary and the general election built upon these earlier efforts and had helped make 
McGovern a well-known and well-liked candidate. In both the primary and general 
elections, McGovern received his strongest support in the Boston suburbs, especially 
liberal strongholds like Newton, Lexington and Brookline as well as more moderate 
communities. Examining the importance of the antiwar suburban activists in the election 
results, Lukas observed that the Massachusetts peace movement was not the largest in the 
country but that its impact went far beyond membership numbers because it constituted 
the “strongest, most effective, such force of anywhere in the United States.”  Grossman 
explained to Lukas that in the 1950s Massachusetts was the most “hawkish state in the 
nation,” but “we helped change all that. We made peace the single-most important issue 
here and we made the politicians take us seriously. Nobody’s frigging around with us 
anymore.”169 Although undoubtedly self-serving, Grossman’s comment confirms that the 
1972 vote symbolized the success not failure of the suburban-centered peace movement’s 
vision.  
The state legislature and congressional races provide even clearer testimony of the 
success of the suburban-based grassroots strategy. Candidates Barney Frank and Lois 
Pines enhanced the liberal reputation of the Massachusetts legislature when they won 
their respective races for state representative. CPP and PAX-backed candidates Drinan 
and Harrington as well as newcomers Garry Studds and Joseph Moakley, all captured 
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seats in the Congress. Although John Kerry lost his race in the heavily industrialized and 
working-class Fifth District, he did win overwhelmingly in Lexington. At least one 
observer, nevertheless, believed that the loss was less because of his stance on peace and 
more because blue-collar residents distrusted his “slick, preppy style.”170 These results 
actually put Massachusetts more in step with the voting patterns of the rest of the country. 
Unlike other presidential landslides, a sweep of the U.S. Congress did not coincide with 
Nixon’s win.  Democrats retained strong majorities in both chambers of Congress and 
actually gained seats in the Senate, which showed the persistent strength of liberals not 
just in the Bay State but in other parts of the country, too.  
Writing in the aftermath of the 1972 election, national political strategist Lanny 
Davis argued in Emerging Democratic Majority that the results in the Bay State 
represented not a sign of the Party’s failure but actually a blueprint for subsequent action. 
He confidently declared,  “Massachusetts is a prototype of the new coalition of blue-
collars, blacks and New Politics activists of which the Democratic Party is capable across 
the nation.”171 Davis effectively outlined the eventual composition of the Democratic 
Party both in the Bay State and the nation in the years following the 1972 election.  
 
Conclusion 
The 1972 election marked the zenith of the suburban peace movement in 
Massachusetts, but by no means the start of a decline of the political activism of its 
participants. Immediately following the November vote, CPP and PAX decided to merge 
into a single organization. Recognizing the similarities in their respective activities, they 
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decided that joining together would strengthen the “new politics” mission by reducing 
overlap in projects, money, and volunteers.172 Reflecting their shared commitment to the 
ideals of  “new politics,” the groups selected as the name for the new joint organization 
Citizens for Participation in Political Action or CPPAX.173 Throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, CPPAX stood at the forefront of central state issues and policy controversies, 
including public transportation, alternative energy, the busing crisis, women’s rights, 
welfare, and taxes. The group also continued to concentrate heavily on the issues of peace 
and nuclear arms even after the eventual winding down of the Vietnam War.174 As 
CPPAX adopted a wider mandate, many of the individual members began to take on a 
narrower focus. Some activists returned to the issue of anti-nuclear power that had led 
them to peace politics in the first place but which the attention to the Vietnam War had 
eclipsed.  Many members took leading roles in opposition to the use of nuclear energy 
and weapons, becoming involved in the Clamshell Alliance and the Nuclear Freeze, 
thereby placing both Massachusetts and its national representatives at the forefront of the 
“No Nukes” campaigns.175  
The suburban peace movement had its largest and most lasting impact on state 
and national electoral politics. The activities of CPPAX and other grassroots liberal 
organizations helped ensure that the Massachusetts congressional delegation remained 
the most liberal in the nation. In addition to Father Drinan, who served in the House until 
1980, CPPAX and its collaborators played a central role in the election of 
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Representatives Barney Frank, Edward Markey, Martin Meehan and Senators Ted 
Kennedy, Paul Tsongas, and John Kerry. These liberal politicians led the Democratic 
Party to reject its Cold War anti-communists roots and supported and sponsored 
legislation that promoted the suburban liberal peace agenda of opposition to excessive 
military weapons buildups and overseas interventions, as well as support of multilateral 
solutions. In the span of a few decades, the Hughes campaigners who began as outliers 
within the Democratic Party through their unflagging commitment to working within the 
system came to shape and animate its center. Political writer E.J. Dionne contended in his 
seminal 1991 work Why Americans Hate Politics that the “radicals” of the Hughes 
campaign now comprise “the Massachusetts mainstream and help define liberalism” both 
in the Bay State and the nation.176  
Through its relentless political efforts, these middle-class liberal activists have 
helped make the Democratic Party more attuned to suburban-centered issues, agendas 
and voters. Since the 1970s, the Democratic Party has become more progressive on issues 
such as racial, gender and sexual equality, more environmentally minded and more 
internationalist in the arena of foreign policy. Likewise, Jerome Grossman and his 
longtime collaborators came to take central leadership positions in the state and national 
Democratic Party structure. Yet, this transformation had both progressive and 
problematic implications.  The suburban-centered tactics of these activists forged a new 
political base for liberal political candidates, yet one comprised primarily of white 
middle-class people with priorities that have increasingly excluded lower-income voters 
and racial minorities from its frame of focus. Moreover, the poll returns in the 1972 
election and other key votes have emboldened Massachusetts residents’ exceptionalist 
                                                
176 Dionne, Why Americans Hate Politics, 48, 123.  
 
416 
view of both suburban liberal identity and the state’s political landscape. As the 
subsequent chapters reveal, both suburban liberalism and Massachusetts politics since the 
McGovern campaign have become far more complicated, contradictory and moderate 







Chapter 7:  
Liberalism Stops At Your Driveway 
  
Introduction 
 “I have always thought of my community to be the bastion of suburban 
liberalism,” lamented a Newton resident in 1970, “However the recent controversy over 
the Newton Community Development Foundation have shown my assumptions to be 
mistaken.”1 The commentator, Frederick Andelman, was referring to the vicious battle 
that engulfed the largely white, upper middle-class, and purportedly progressive suburb. 
The clash occurred after a local interfaith organization called the Newton Community 
Development Foundation attempted to build a scattered development of 500 units spread 
across ten sites around the city. During the 1960s, Newton had garnered a national 
reputation for its progressiveness.  Newsweek deemed the town a  “seedbed for liberal 
causes, from vigorous antiwar activity to exuberant civil rights activity.” 2 The 
community also served as a key force in the campaigns of such liberal politicians as 
Eugene McCarthy, Father Robert Drinan and later George McGovern. Reacting to the 
suburb’s identity of liberal distinctiveness, the chairman of the affordable housing 
initiative had confidently declared, “If Newton can’t do it, who on earth can?” The 
answer to this exceptionalist question soon became clear as the efforts to build the mixed-
income project developed into a protracted nine-year controversy. The ensuing battle 
would sharply divide the community and test the boundaries of suburban liberalism. As 
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one local resident aptly characterized the situation:  “I guess it’s true that liberalism stops 
at your own driveway.”3  
In the late 1960s, many experts, politicians, and activists across the nation joined 
the concerned residents of Newton in recognizing that the suburbs represented the next 
frontier in the ongoing struggle to create racial equality. After the legislative victories of 
the mainstream Civil Rights Movement in 1964 and 1965, a series of riots, combined 
with the nation’s increasing suburban demographic shift toward the suburbs, prompted 
many observers to view residential segregation as the root cause of the related problems 
of urban poverty and school segregation. The National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders’ Kerner Report in 1968 sounded an urgent call for the nation to overcome the 
patterns of racial and spatial inequality and sparked a three-pronged assault at the federal, 
state, and local levels, which sought to challenge the structures of suburban exclusionary 
zoning though mixed income housing initiatives. By the beginning of the 1970s, several 
observers dubbed this “battle over the suburbs” as “the major domestic social and 
political battle of the decade ahead.” 4  The attempts to build mixed-income housing 
triggered massive grassroots opposition among white middle-class residents in 
subdivisions throughout the nation. 5  By the end of the decade few, however, initiatives 
succeeded and the “battle” quickly faded from the national spotlight.  
The Boston suburbs stood on the front lines of this national “battle.” 
Massachusetts had enhanced its liberal image in 1969 when its legislature passed Chapter 
774, or “the Anti-Snob Zoning Act.”   The statute distinguished Massachusetts as the first 
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state to try to curb the exclusionary zoning practices of suburban municipalities. By and 
large, however, the efforts to challenge the structures of racial and spatial segregation in 
the Bay State still failed.  The controversies that erupted in the traditionally liberal 
strongholds of Newton, Concord, and Lexington provide a means to explore the 
multifaceted factors that contributed to this difficulty. By interweaving the stories of 
Concord, Lexington, and Newton, this chapter challenges several assumptions about the 
reaction to affordable housing in the suburbs and offers new insights into the dialectic 
relationship between government policy and grassroots activism, the potential and the 
constraints of state laws regulating both racial discrimination and land use, the tensions 
and divisions within suburban political culture, and the possibilities and limits of 
liberalism.  
Most accounts of the battles to challenge the structures of suburban exclusion 
have overlooked the controversies that erupted in liberal communities. Instead, scholars 
have focused on the federal government, in particular Housing and Urban Development 
Secretary George Romney’s failed attempt to overcome these patterns of racial and 
spatial inequality in the late 1960s and early 1970s.6 This chapter reveals that initiatives 
to construct units in the suburbs emerged not simply from a top-down federal government 
mandate but also came from bottom-up mobilization by local liberal citizens constructing 
what Charles M. Haar and Charles M. Iatridis have termed “public policy at the 
                                                
6 The works of social scientists Christopher Bonastia and Charles Lamb provide important insight into the 
concerted efforts of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and its secretary George Romney 
efforts to open up the suburbs. These studies focus on the ways in which Richard Nixon effectively 
squandered this moment of opportunity by promoting a fierce opposition to government-imposed 
integration. See, Christopher Bonastia, Knocking on the Door: The Federal Government’s Attempt to 
Desegregate the Suburbs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Charles M. Lamb, Housing 
Segregation in Suburban America Since 1960 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). For two 
books that have gone beyond the purview of the federal government, see Danielson, The Politics of 
Exclusion; David L. Kirp, John P. Sawyer and Larry Rosenthal, Our Town: Race, Housing and the Soul of 
Suburbia (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997).  
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grassroots.”7 As an outgrowth of metropolitan Boston’s fair housing movement, residents 
in several Route 128 suburbs took the calls of the Kerner Commission seriously and their 
actions reveal the vibrant grassroots suburban liberal activism present well into the late 
1960s and early 1970s.  These residents played an important role in lobbying for the 
passage and enforcement of the Anti-Snob Zoning Act. They also led action to construct 
affordable housing within their communities, developing plans and strategies rooted in a 
middle-class individualist sensibility and suburban-centered aesthetic.  
The grassroots affordable housing advocates, however, confronted another 
collection of locally based activists who relied on both the delay mechanisms of the Anti-
Snob Zoning Act and anti-growth and open space clauses of new environmental laws to 
permanently thwart or significantly downscale the projects. This form of opposition and 
activism had its roots in the suburban environmental movement discussed in Chapter 5. 
In the decades after World War II, this initiative arose in many of the area’s most affluent 
suburbs, including Concord and Lexington. The movement’s leaders aimed to preserve 
open space and to combat sprawl and its consequences, especially in their own 
communities. Suburban environmentalists, like the affordable housing advocates, also 
worked directly through the channels of state government. This effort contributed directly 
to the passage of many new pieces of environmental protection legislation, such as the 
innovative Massachusetts Wetland Protection Act, which gave municipal conservation 
commissions far greater control over local planning decisions. In the early 1970s, a study 
sponsored by the national Council on Environmental Quality cited the Anti-Snob Zoning 
Act as one example of the type of innovative state law that had produced a “Quiet 
Revolution in Land Use Control.” By enhancing state oversight of land use patterns, the 
                                                
7 Haar and Iatridis, Housing the Poor in Suburbia, 11-17.  
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report boldly argued, the Act had contributed to silent overthrow of the “ancien regime.”8 
As another facet of this quiet overthrow the authors touted the Massachusetts Wetland 
Protection Act.  
The battles to build low-income housing in Newton, Lexington and particularly 
Concord, however, reveals the limits to the glorious environmental revolution as the 
conflict placed the purposes and stipulations of the Anti-Snob Zoning and Wetland 
Protection Acts into direct competition. These controversies demonstrate that the new 
state laws did not unify, but rather severed, the links and commonalities between the civil 
rights and environmental drives to challenge suburban land use patterns. More broadly, 
the battles pitted two important liberal issues and constituencies directly against each 
other. On the surface, these fights over affordable housing seemingly exposed both the 
contradictory NIMBY worldview and practices within the nation’s most liberal suburbs 
and the ways in which residents used environmentalism to advance an exclusionary 
political agenda. This conventional interpretation, however, falls short in two important 
ways. First, it dismisses the genuine commitment of many suburban residents to the 
causes of open space and environmental protection. Second, this explanation erases the 
contributions of the liberal activists in these communities, who were, in fact, deeply 
committed to reducing metropolitan segregation.  
These battles offer new perspective on the limits of suburban liberalism to 
challenge structural segregation. The individualist and localist strategies that grassroots 
liberals adopted to achieve their vision of equity were undoubtedly successful in 
campaigns of progressive candidates like George McGovern and policies such as the 
                                                
8  Fred P. Bosselman and David L. Callies The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control (Washington, DC: 
United States Council on Environmental Quality, 1971). 
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Racial Imbalance Act and the Metropolitan Council for Educational Opportunity 
(METCO). This form of activism proved unable to challenge suburban political culture’s 
dominant sensibility of market-based individualism and racial and class exclusivity. 
These battles, therefore, also reveal the strain of property values conservatism that existed 
even in supposed bastions of liberalism such as Newton, Concord, and Lexington. 
Despite the fact that many white middle-class residents in these communities supported 
candidates, laws, and policies that embodied abstract liberal ideals, many such residents 
simultaneously demonstrated a patent unwillingness to take more tangible steps toward 
accepting responsibility for the problems and solutions of spatial segregation. By the 
mid-1970s, such retrenchment led grassroots affordable housing advocates to either 
significantly scale back or discard altogether plans for mixed-income developments in 
their communities. The eventual abandonment of this campaign did not just ensure non-
diverse housing stock outside the city, but also solidified class exclusivity as a natural 
feature of both the suburban landscape and grassroots liberalism.  
 
Kerner Report at the Grassroots  
 The release of the Kerner Report by the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders in the late winter of 1968 markedly changed the national dialogue concerning 
racial and spatial segregation. The commission, appointed in the aftermath of the Detroit 
and Newark riots, famously warned, “We are rapidly becoming two societies, one black, 
and the other white, separate and unequal.” The Report outlined the roots of this racial 
segregation, urging white Americans to take responsibility for their role in creating and 
maintaining these patterns of structural inequality. The text ominously cautioned:  “To 
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continue with our present policies is to make permanent the division in our country into 
two societies: one largely Negro and poor, located in central cities; the other, 
predominately white and affluent located in the suburbs.”9 The majority of Americans 
and their elected officials would willfully ignore such powerful warnings.10 The report, 
nevertheless, sparked an immediate discussion of the need to challenge these patterns of 
racial and spatial segregation by increasing the housing opportunities for people of color 
and the poor outside of central cities. While the more famous 1968 Fair Housing Act did 
not address explicitly these findings, the Housing and Urban Development Act passed 
that same year called on the federal government to increase and diversify housing 
opportunities in the suburbs. 11 When George Romney assumed the position as Secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development in 1969, he built upon these developments and made 
reducing the barriers of suburban exclusion a top priority.  
 The Kerner Report’s clarion call motivated grassroots activists affiliated with the 
Massachusetts Federation for Fair Housing and Equal Rights.  By the late 1960s, the 
suburban civil rights network had lost the energy and cohesive membership that had 
defined its work on fair housing and school desegregation.12 Shifts of the focus and 
philosophy within the national and civil rights movement, coupled with the growing 
                                                
9  United States National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Report of the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: New York Times, Co., 1968), 2.  
10 For a longer discussion of the willful repudiation of the Kerner Report by many white middle-class 
Americans and politicians especially Richard Nixon see Lassiter, Silent Majority.  
11 The President’s Task Force of Suburban Problems had asserted any federal programs that contributed to 
making  “the suburbs separated, pockets of privilege…encourage and perpetuate injustice and 
discrimination.” United States President’s Commission on Urban Housing, A Decent Home (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), quoted in Daniels, the Politics of Exclusion, 80. The 
legislation’s Section 236 program offered mortgage payment subsidies to non-profit and limited dividend 
developers with the twin goals of helping moderate income families who had previously fallen outside the 
federal government’s public housing programs and expanding the stock of affordable housing in suburban 
communities. 
12 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights noted that by the mid-1960s “many of these groups lost much of 
their cohesion and largely dissolved.” See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Route 128, 57.   
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interest of suburban liberals in environmental and antiwar activism, contributed to this 
period of decline. The president of the Lexington Civil Rights Committee anxiously 
observed in the fall of 1967, “White middle class (predominately liberal) suburbia has 
begun to think of itself as somewhat superfluous to the current struggle.”13 The release of 
the Kerner Report, compounded by the assassination of Martin Luther King in the spring 
of 1968, re-energized suburban concern with the plight of African-Americans in 
Boston.14 The Federation immediately urged its local chapters to initiate “aggressive 
programs” to implement the recommendations of the Kerner Report.15  
In response to these demands for action, residents in several communities along 
Route 128 reignited a discussion of how they could help alleviate the problems of spatial 
and racial discrimination. Concerned citizens in Brookline, Newton, Lexington, Concord, 
Lincoln and elsewhere sponsored town-wide study groups or forums that one local 
reporter deemed an articulation of the “Kerner Report at the Grass Roots.”16 In Concord, 
residents staged a neighborhood coffee series called “Opportunity for Action.”17 
Brookline went further, creating an official Committee on Urban Responsibility and 
Lexington soon followed that model, establishing a Committee on Suburban 
Responsibility to examine “what bearing our community has on the ability of the 
metropolitan area as whole to meet the needs of the impoverished and minority-group 
                                                
13 Irving Kenneth Zola, “Will Anyone Listen,” Lexington Minute-Man Supplement, November 23, 1967. 
14 U.S Commission on Civil Rights Route 128, 56-57. 
15 Citizens Housing and Planning Association, “Federation Instructs Suburban Chapters,” CHPA Letter 
Vol. 2 No.3, Box 16. Folder 9. Massachusetts Institute of Technology  Planning Office Records AC 205, 
Institute Archives and Special Collections, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (hereafter: “MIT”).  
16 Carolyn Kaplan,  “Kerner Report at Grass Roots,” Brookline Chronicle-Citizen, May 23, 1968; Carolyn 
Kaplan, “Town-Wide Task Force Urged for ‘Action Now,’” Brookline Chronicle-Citizen, May 30, 1968; 
“Newton to Examine Suburban Challenge, Newton Graphic, May 29, 1968; “WLPF Actively Works for 
Understanding of the Ghettos,” Concord Journal, March 28, 1968. 
17 “Heat from the Audience But None from the Furnace,” Concord Journal, February 4, 1971. 
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citizens who are largely concentrated in the central city.” 18 The discussion of these 
various grassroots initiatives quickly honed in on the question of low and moderate 
housing. Leading the way, Newton residents aimed to put these ideas directly into 
practice.  
 
“No Ordinary Suburb”  
 
Newton stood at the vanguard of the suburban grassroots effort to build affordable 
housing in Massachusetts. The city had long taken prided in its image as a citadel of 
liberalism, even embracing the marketing slogan: “No Ordinary Suburb.”19 Although 98 
percent white, the 90,000 person population was more ethnically and religiously 
heterogeneous than most Boston suburbs.20 Its patchwork geography of fourteen villages 
made it an ideal site to absorb low and moderate-income residents. Despite its social and 
physical heterogeneity, the vast majority of Newton’s housing stock contained expensive 
single-family homes and most of its population was in the highest income brackets. Like 
most suburbs, Newton relied heavily on property taxes for its annual expenditures and 
that rate had increased rapidly between 1967 and 1970, making it significantly higher 
than any of its neighboring communities.21 In the postwar period, Newton, like many 
Route 128 suburbs, had enacted stringent zoning controls that emphasized sizable lots 
and limited the amount of multi-family units in the city. Although these policies did 
enable Newton to preserve its prewar reputation as the “Garden City,” they led to a rapid 
                                                
18 “Group Proposes Formation of Responsibility Comm.” Lexington Minute-Man, June 13, 1968; 
“Responsibility Committee to Begin Work by July 1,” Lexington Minute-Man, June 20, 1968.  
19 Charles Haar and Demetrius Iatridius observed, “Of all Boston suburban communities, Newton best 
embodies the progressive tradition of America.” Haar and Iatridis, Housing the Poor in Suburbia, 25.   
20 See Haar and Iatridis,Housing the Poor in Suburbia, 28-31.  
21 Newton increased its tax rate, per $1,000 of assessed value from $76.20 in 1967 to $113.000 in 1970 and 
$139.60 in 1972. Newton had a rate almost three times higher than Concord, Stoughton, Canton according 
to Haar and Iatridis, Housing the Poor in Suburbia, 25.   
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decrease in the number of lower and even middle-income families living in the 
community.22  
The tumultuous events in the spring of 1968 impelled many Newton residents to 
make the expansion of low-income housing a top priority. In early June, several religious 
and civic groups sponsored a conference “to define ‘accurately’ and ‘clearly’ the role of 
the suburb in regard to urban ills in America,” which broached the topic of mixed-income 
housing.23 Responding to this conference, twenty-two local ministers, priests and rabbis 
decided to establish a foundation with the mission of increasing the number of moderate 
and low-income families in Newton. Calling itself the Newton Community Development 
Foundation (NCDF), the non-profit and grassroots-centered organization would serve as 
developer of a federally funded scattered-site development of five hundred apartment 
units spread throughout ten of the city’s villages.24 The interfaith group elected a board of 
directors comprised of businessmen, lawyers, architects, and other white-collar workers 
with experience in local politics who sought to apply their professional expertise toward 
the cause. Robert Casselman, a former MIT faculty member with experience in state and 
local government, agreed to act as chairman of the board. In the summer of 1969, the 
group opened an office and hired attorney and Newton native Marc Slotnick as its 
executive director. 
                                                
22 Fearing that the loss of this demographic would negatively alter the character of the suburb, the alderman 
had established special subcommittee in 1967 to examine the problem. This committees recommended that 
the town construct 200 units “in small numbers of scattered sites to preclude the creation of low income 
ghettos” and to align with village-based geography of Newton.  
Newton Planning Department, Low-Moderate Income Housing Study An Element of the Comprehensive 
Plan, Newton, Massachusetts, September 1968, Newton Collection, Newton Public Library, Newton, MA 
(hereafter “NC”).  
23 “Newton to Examine Suburban Challenge,” Newton Graphic, May 29, 1968.  
24 “Churchmen Create Newton Foundation,” Newton Graphic, July 11, 1968.   
 
427 
The NCDF plan for scattered site housing embodied the suburban liberal belief in 
individualist remedies to structural problems. Explaining the short and long terms goals 
of the organization, Robert Casselman stressed in an interview that that plan was not 
intended as the sole solution to metropolitan Boston’s housing or urban crisis.  “508 new 
units can’t even solve Newton problems,” he conceded, but “if Newton can pull it off, 
then 20 other suburbs can do it too. That’s 10,000 units. And that begins to cut into the 
metropolitan problem, which the suburbs have to help solve.” 25 The fundraising and 
publicity efforts of the organization illustrate the grassroots and localized dimension of 
the endeavor. The NCDF appeals frequently emphasized the exceptionalist identity of the 
community and even borrowed the slogan “Newton…No Ordinary Suburb” for the title 
of informational brochures. The NCDF simultaneously stressed the metropolitan and 
national importance of the initiative.  The group’s members never failed to mention that 
the NCDF represented the first suburban organization in the nation to undertake a 
comprehensive low-density scattered-site project. They often noted that communities in 
Boston and around the country would watch the project closely and suggested that this 
“model suburban solution” marked “the beginning of a trend toward finding solutions to 
the nation’s housing crisis.”26 This exceptionalist pitch worked. By the spring of 1970, 
the NCDF received endorsements and donations from more than 600 families and 30 
religious, civic, and business groups in Newton.27  
The actual blueprints for the project further underscore the localized and suburban 
centric underpinnings of NCDF’s vision. The low-density and scattered site approach was 
                                                
25 Winthrop P. Baker, Jim Lightfoot, “Action on the Suburban Housing Front,” WBZ TV and Radio, April 
17, 1970, Box 4, Folder 3, PMR. 
26 Newton Community Development Foundation, “Housing for families of moderate and low income in 
Newton,” 1969, Box 4, Folder 3, PMR.  
27 “Major Housing Plan Filed Here,” Newton Graphic, April 16, 1970.  
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a conscious departure from the modernist public housing structures erected in Boston and 
other urban centers immediately following World War II.  Instead, the designs aligned 
with a specifically suburban aesthetic. The two-story wood-frames houses of the NCDF 
plan sought to blend into the existing built and natural topography of Newton. The plan 
included many trees and every site had over 40 percent of the land reserved for open 
space in order to complement the suburb’s reputation as the Garden City. Demonstrating 
its commitment to a nuclear family ideal, the design contained large playgrounds and 
community rooms ideal for residents to host Boy Scout troop meetings and organize 
daycare centers. The NCDF presented the potential inhabitants in explicitly non-
threatening and race-neutral terms. It emphasized that increasing the low-income housing 
options would enable Newton to maintain a “cross section of population” who provided a 
sense of “vitality” to the community.28 Building upon this paean to diversity, the 
organization painted a sympathetic and racially and gender-conservative portrait of the 
people in need of moderate-income housing. The NCDF aimed to recruit young Newton 
natives who could not afford to bring their own children up in the town, city employees 
who provided mail and sanitation services, and local senior citizens looking to downsize. 
The units ranged in size from one to four bedrooms as a means to ensure a mixture of 
young families and single elderly residents. An aside about wanting to recruit some 
METCO families represented the singular racially-coded reference in the proposal. 
Throughout its visual appeals, the NCDF chose pictures and drawing of white children 
                                                




swimming or playing, reflecting its effort to erase the racialized stigma affixed to the 
concept of low-income housing.29   
The locally-based organization expected concerns that these active youngsters 
would overcrowd the city’s education system and thus used apartment size and bedroom 
numbers as a means to limit the of children at each site and corresponding schools.30 The 
NCDF planned to set the rent for the units at 25 percent of a family’s income, which it 
predicted would range from $120 to $170 per month, thus keeping the potential 
inhabitants well above the state poverty line.31 Anticipating fears about school 
overcrowding and its financial side effects, the NCDF devised a strategy that departed 
from their suburban civil rights forbearers.  Suburban fair housing advocates in the early 
1960s had frequently invoked imagery of the heteronormative nuclear family to 
emphasize the middle-class and respectable dimensions of the potential residents. These 
allusions show that moderate-income housing advocates recognized that in the context of 
their project, the idea of “family” raised associations to the discourse of black single 
mothers that had emerged in the popular consciousness in the mid-1960s.32 NCDF 
advocates increasingly described the potential inhabitants as “young marrieds” and 
“couples” as an implicit assurance that these beneficiaries would not overburden the 
school system or tax rate of Newton. 
Despite the NCDF’s efforts to diffuse anxiety, the release of their plan in the 
spring of 1970 ignited fierce and vigorous resistance throughout the community. 
                                                
29 Newton Community Development Foundation, “Newton…No Ordinary Suburb.” 
30 FHA regulations stated that no more than two children could operate one bedroom and that children of 
the opposite sex had to have separate rooms.  
31 Newton Community Development Foundation, “Housing for families of moderate and low income in 
Newton.” 
32 For more about the discourse surrounding welfare mothers see for example Feldstein, Motherhood in 
Black and White.  
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Opposition erupted first and most intensely in the Oak Hill section, a squarely middle-
class postwar development. Oak Hill residents immediately circulated petitions against 
any rezoning of the neighborhood from single-family subdivisions to multi-unit 
dwellings. Robert Stiller organized and led this grassroots resistance. Stiller, who had 
moved from the working-class Boston neighborhood of Mattapan, saw the detached-
home-filled Garden City as a refuge and sought to protect the community from the 
encroachment of apartments and the influx of “urban ghetto blacks” that he contended 
would inevitability populate them. He explicitly disagreed with the notion that the 
suburbs should create housing opportunities for urban African-Americans, arguing that 
“Newton owes nothing more to the city of Boston” and “people should have the freedom 
to choose their neighbor.” 33  Stiller recruited residents from other neighborhoods 
throughout the city to form the Newton Land Use and Civic Association (NLUCA). The 
seemingly innocuously named group quickly began holding meetings, canvassing 
neighbors, and printing pamphlets in order to build support for their oppositional cause, 
directly mirroring the strategies of the NCDF.  
Just as the effectiveness of the NCDF built on its homegrown familiarity with the 
dynamics of Newton’s political culture, so, too, did the NLUCA use its grassroots 
perspective to aggravate resistance to the plan. In its first pamphlet, the group crafted a 
discourse of fiscal anxieties and suburban victimization that would define their campaign. 
The flier “Have You Heard What’s Happening in Newton?” focused primarily on mixed-
income housing’s threat to the community’s most sacred issues: the rising tax rate and the 
                                                
33 Haar and Iatridis, Housing the Poor in Suburbia, 78.  
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quality of its schools.34 NLUCA contended that the scatter site proposal would 
“overload” and hamper “Newton’s ability to maintain its excellent school system,” by 
potentially upsetting the favorable 25-to-1 student-teacher ratio. Furthermore, NLUCA 
estimated that the new residents would require an additional annual outlay of $1 million 
for educational and other city services such as trash collection, snow plowing, and fire 
and police protection. For emphasis, NLUCA borrowed the campaign rhetoric of Richard 
Nixon charging, “The ‘silent majority’ of Newton must speak up. This may be our last 
chance to save the ‘Garden City.’”35 
In May 1970, seven hundred residents representing every village signed a petition 
that gave six reasons why they supported the NCDF.  The next week NLUCA countered 
this effort by announcing that it had gathered more than nine thousand signatures for a 
statement opposing the development.36 Newton residents on both sides flooded the local 
weekly newspaper with a profusion of passionately worded letters, revealing the wide 
range of potentially divisive issues encompassed by the controversy. As support and 
opposition broadened beyond NCDF and NLUCA to include the entire city, the proposed 
projects pitted the community’s two booster slogans, “No Ordinary Suburb” and “The 
Garden City,” into direct conflict. In addition to exposing larger schisms within the 
political, social and racial attitudes of Newton citizens, the issue of low-income housing 
also illuminated the broad spectrum of definitions of suburban responsibility that existed 
within the community.  
                                                
34 Newton Land Use and Civic Association, “Have you heard what’s happening in Newton???,” c. 1970, 
Box 4, Folder 11, PMR.  
35 Newton Land Use and Civic Association, “Have you heard what’s happening in Newton???” 
36 “Newton Citizens Give Six Reasons Why They Support The Newton Community Development 
Foundation,” Newton Graphic, May 21, 1970; “Civic Group Obtains 9000 Signatures Opposing NCDF,” 
Newton Graphic, May 28, 1970.  
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Many of the self-identified members of Newton’s “Silent Majority” extended and 
refined NLUCA’s discourse of suburban victimization, articulating a form of homeowner 
populism rooted in a set of class privilege and race-based entitlements. 37 A group of 
abutters to the Walnut Street site claimed the NCDF project created “unfairness to 
homeowners in this neighborhood” who “invested their money and bought their homes in 
a single residence area feeling that they could depend on the well-established and strictly 
maintained zoning laws of the City of Newton.”38  Other residents shared this sense of 
outrage that the plan might challenge the sacred status of the community’s zoning 
policies, claiming, “These laws are the only shield a home buyer has to protect the value 
of his property” and that they had served as the main factor that led them to purchase a 
home in “The Garden City.” 39 Several white Newtonites, like Robert Stiller, couched 
their opposition in the individualist mythology of their own upward mobility.40 Sydney 
Brunell of Oak Park warned that public housing “could turn into malignant tumors that 
destroy the neighborhoods,” using his own childhood in Boston as the source of his 
expertise and basis of his feeling of reverse discrimination. “It is a sad commentary on 
the religious, civic and political leaders of Newton,” Brunell asserted,  “when the welfare 
and interests of the industrious people who contribute so heavily to make the community 
what it is, are totally ignored.”41  
Some citizens adopted a discourse of middle-class resentment that combined this 
sense of victimization with a frustration about Newton’s liberal political culture. Invoking 
                                                
37 For on this discourse of middle class privilege see Lassiter, Silent Majority, 148-174.   
38 “Open Letter from One Area Presents Housing Argument,” Newton Graphic, April 30, 1970.  
39 Mr.& Mrs. Jason Tonkongy to the Editor, Newton Graphic, May 21, 1970.  
40 For more on the uses of these individualist narratives see Lassiter, Silent Majority and Kirp, Dwyer and 
Rosenthal, Our Town, 8.  
41 Sidney Brunell to the Editor, Newton Graphic, May 7, 1970.  
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the social and economic cognitive geography of metropolitan Boston, one anonymous 
resident asked in reference to the suburb’s tony neighbors, “Do you see Weston and 
Wellesley getting involved in anything like this? They are keeping their skirts clean.”42 
Other letter writers directed their class-based ire toward “snobbish” and “uppity” NCDF 
supporters, asserting that the  “Silent Majority of Newton should rise and voice their 
protest before the city is given away by well-intentioned, but misdirected liberal do-
gooders.”43 Despite the fact that the NCDF proposal spread across almost every 
neighborhood, many opponents believed that more moderate-priced portions of the city 
would disproportionately bear the burden while the richer neighborhoods remained 
exempted. “You don’t see any NCDF members upset because they put sites next to their 
homes,” one abutter complained. “They all live in big expensive homes and are trying to 
ruin the neighborhoods of people like me, who have worked hard to be able to live in a 
moderate but comfortable home in Newton.”44 One anonymous citizen agreed, asserting, 
“It’s so easy for Newton’s wealthy people who live in spacious residential 
neighborhoods… to clear their conscience with financial aid to N.C.D.F., just as long as 
it isn’t in their backyard.”45 This anger at the seemingly misguided attitudes of suburban 
liberals echoed the sentiments of many Boston residents embroiled in the ongoing battle 
over school desegregation.46  
Other Newton citizens placed their opinion of the NCDF project in a different 
spatial logic. This brand of suburban isolationism endorsed low-income housing in 
                                                
42 A Worried Citizen of Newton (Name Withheld) to the Editor, Newton Graphic, April 30, 1970. 
43 A Newtonville Resident to the Editor, Newton Graphic, May 28, 1970; Haar and Iatridis, Housing the 
Poor in Suburbia, 82. 
44 Haar and Iatridius, Housing the Poor in Suburbia, 82.  
45 Anonymous to the Editor, Newton Graphic, July 16, 1970. 
46 See for example, Formisano, Boston Against Busing, 178-179.  
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principle but believed that the program should be “committed to Newton residents first 
and foremost.”47 This attitude reflected the difference that many citizens drew between 
“deserving” beneficiaries of the housing, such as elderly and moderate-income white 
Newton natives, and “undeserving” African-American outsiders. This distinction rested 
on a spatial and racial ideology that naturalized Newton natives as white and newcomers 
as poor black émigrés from the Roxbury ghetto. This attitude overlooked both the fact 
that NCDF had intended for the majority of the units to house moderate-income families 
and that most poor African-American families in Boston, even those receiving 
government assistance, could not or did not want to move to Newton.   The racial fears 
embodied in this reaction against low-income housing in particular exacerbated concerns 
about the potential harm of black children to both the community’s prided school system 
and already high tax rate. Many citizens clearly drew a connection between the concept 
of potential residents of the housing developments and the image of the poor single black 
mother toting multiple school-age children.  According to Mr. and Mrs. Bernard Gitlin, 
new students could “only result in overcrowding and more tax dollars.” The city, they 
warned,  “cannot allow our tax rate to soar ad infinitum. ”48 
In addition to igniting these fiscally-based fears, the NCDF proposal also 
mobilized the community’s self-identified liberal citizens to provide an alternative 
version of suburban-centered politics. Many supporters believed the community had to 
take responsibility for the problems of racial and spatial inequality. “We are fortunate to 
be able to live in this fine community—with good schools, grass trees, etc,” one couple 
wrote. “It is simple logic to extend these benefits to people less fortunate than 
                                                
47 “NCDF Policy Sound,” Newton Graphic, May 14, 1970; A Worried Citizen of Newton (Name Withheld) 
to the Editor, Newton Graphic.  
48 Mr. and Mrs. Bernard Gitlin to the Editor, Newton Graphic, May 28, 1970.  
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ourselves.”49 Mr. and Mrs. Winsor, active members of the state chapter of Americans for 
Democratic Action, declared, “We don’t wish to live in a community which only the 
well-heeled can afford and which erects restrictive zoning barriers to keep out others.”50 
Mrs. Lawrence Little, who had just moved to Newton, explained that her family had 
decided to live there because of “its closeness to Boston, fine school system, its 
reputation for being a strong-hold of liberal thinking and acting and heterogenic make-
up.” For these same reasons Newton “must take responsibility of breaking through the 
low-cost housing hang-up.” Newton, she stressed, “cannot be an island, ignoring the 
problems of surrounding communities.”51  
Upholding the centrality of quality education to the political culture of Newton, 
many NCDF sympathizers believed the project would not hurt, but rather, enhance, the 
community’s schools. These supporters built upon the argument that METCO founders 
had adopted to rally suburban participation by stressing the ways in which racially and 
socioeconomically integrated classrooms benefited white middle-class children. Like the 
suburban liberal architects of METCO, these proponents inverted claims of disadvantage 
and victimization to suggest that excluding low-income students would hurt Newton 
children’s chances of succeeding in a multiracial world. Martin and Honora Kaplan, for 
example, argued that rejecting the NCDF plan would “cheat our children twice—once in 
their education, and again in the foreclosure of relationships and awareness which are a 
priceless aspect of education (in the broadest sense).”52 Likewise, Donald Arnestine, a 
professor of education at Boston University, warned, “Unless the children of Newton are 
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to grow up as narrow and insensitive as many of their parents, we had better give them a 
chance to have other kids around them, to play with and go to school with, who are 
different from them.”53 Some residents acknowledged that the “Metco program has been 
a feeble step in the direction of teaching this lesson,” and mixed-income housing 
provided a better means of bringing Newton’s youth into contact with children from 
different backgrounds.54  
The support for the NCDF proposal punctuated the ways in which the plan 
complemented the basic tenets of suburban liberalism and Newton exceptionalism. 
Citizens gushed that the “work of the Newton Community Development Foundation 
makes us proud to live here.”55 The attitudes of these NCDF supporters also show the 
scattered-site plan for low-density townhouses appealed to the aesthetic sensibility of 
certain suburban residents. One married couple declared, “The scattered site concept is 
imaginative and realistic” and confidently predicted that it would avoid the “adverse 
social and economic effects on the surrounding community and on the project itself 
which so often characterize massive single-site housing developments. ” 56 Many 
residents also approved of the ways in which the grassroots-based initiative privileged the 
home rule and localist dimensions of suburban political ideology. Stephen Adelson 
extolled it as  “Newton’s solution to Newton’s own problem.” He suggested that 
complying with the NCDF plan was a better alternative than enduring “ some massive 
project enforced upon it by the State or Federal Government.”57  Many residents noted 
approvingly that the federal not local government would underwrite the project. Like the 
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METCO program, the NCDF plan also aligned with the priorities of many suburban 
liberals who subscribed in principle to low-income housing or voluntary integration but 
remained reluctant to use local taxes to finance these causes.  
The letters and statements showed a sharply divided community and created the 
context for city-mandated public hearings on the NCDF sites. More than 1,000 people 
turned out for the first hearing where NCDF and NLUCA and their respective supporters 
reiterated their respective positions to the city alderman.  The discussion lasted until 1:45 
a.m.58 At another meeting that went until 3 a.m., the booing, hissing and catcalls reached 
such a high pitch that the aldermen had to remind the audience it was not a baseball 
game.59 Following these contentious hearings, the officials took no immediate action, but 
instead elected to use the summer to ruminate on rezoning the sites. During this period of 
deliberation, the case reached the national stage. George Romney, Secretary of Housing 
and Urban Development and a proponent of increasing affordable housing in the suburbs, 
praised the NCDF plan as the type of “rational” and “responsible” approach to the 
problem that he advocated. In an open letter to the mayor, Romney claimed, “I look at 
this proposal as not merely an experiment for Newton, but as one having significance 
throughout the state and the nation.”60 Despite Romney’s endorsement, the aldermen 
remained unconvinced. As the summer of 1970 drew to a close, the town officials voted 
against rezoning the ten sites. Although chastened, the NCDF did not abandon the 
proposal and looked to the newly enacted Massachusetts zoning appeals law as another 
avenue through which to realize their vision for affordable housing in Newton.  
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The Anti-Snob Zoning Act 
While residents in Newton acted locally to enhance the availability of low and 
moderate-income housing outside of Boston, the Massachusetts state government was 
also tackling the issue. Throughout the 1960s Massachusetts had passed a series of 
landmark fair housing laws.  None of these acts, however, had successfully reduced the 
problems of suburban racial and economic exclusion by much. The limitations of these 
policies stemmed from the fact that the laws had not granted the state oversight over local 
zoning ordinances. Although the issue of the need for state oversight first appeared in the 
1930s, fears of opposition by local residents and officials had led the Massachusetts 
legislature to consistently reject these demands for reform.61 By 1969, however, Bay 
State policymakers had agreed that the shortage of low- and moderate income housing in 
metropolitan Boston and the inextricably connected issues of racial and spatial 
segregation constituted the central social problems of the decade. 
In direct response to the calls for action as a result of the Kerner Report and the 
King assassination, legislators submitted five bills in 1969 intended to provide state 
control over local zoning laws. These various proposals suggested setting a 15,000-foot 
maximum lot size, requiring at least 15 percent of a city or town to be zoned for 
apartments, establishing special districts within lower-density communities, and 
exempting all subsidized housing from local restrictions. The Joint Committee of Urban 
Affairs, which oversaw housing, zoning and redevelopment issues, spent the winter and 
spring evaluating these various proposals. The committee eventually concluded, however, 
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that none provided a realistic or politically possible solution. 62  Committee member Sen. 
Martin Linsky, a liberal Republican from Brookline, understood both the necessity of the 
law and the extent of most suburban residents’ resistance to limiting local zoning powers. 
He predicted that suburban communities firmly invested in the concept of home rule 
would thwart any state encroachment on this power by creating their own plans for low-
income housing in their respective communities. Like the founders of the METCO 
program, Linsky identified and sought to exploit a basic tenet of suburban liberal thinking 
that favored voluntary “indigenous” solutions rather than top-down remedies to social 
problems. He decided, therefore, to form a subcommittee to draft a compromise bill that 
would at the very least stimulate public discussion of suburban responsibility for urban 
problems.63  
To help refashion the zoning legislation, Linsky turned to Boston’s liberal 
grassroots housing movement. In early April, he contacted longtime suburban housing 
activist Helen LeVine, who proved instrumental in the passage of state fair housing laws 
and the Racial Imbalance Act. LeVine had resigned from her leadership position at the 
Massachusetts Federation for Fair Housing for Equal Rights to work as the legislative 
coordinator for a legal services organization called the Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute (MLRI). LeVine recruited one of the group’s young lawyers to help Linsky and 
his committee redraft the legislation. Linsky and the MLRI lawyer eventually formulated 
the Zoning Appeals Bill, the linchpin of which was a two-step administrative process. 
First, in communities where such dwellings comprised less than ten percent of the total 
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number of units the proposed statute provided a mechanism for low-income housing 
developers to appeal local zoning, building, public health, and subdivision control 
regulations. Second, it vested the power to override local decisions in a state-appointed 
special committee operating under the Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs. 
The drafters took painstaking efforts to make the law able to withstand the objections of 
local communities making its provisions somewhat vague and confusing.64 In order to 
clarify its intent, the Committee submitted a report alongside the bill which explained that 
it believed these measures provided the “least interference with the power of a 
community to plan for its future” while still preventing towns from “unreasonably 
obstruct[ing] the construction of a limited amount of adequate low cost housing.” 65 This 
report reaffirmed Linsky’s overarching hope that the legislation would ultimately 
encourage municipalities “to establish such conditions on such housing which will be 
consistent with local needs.”66  
The press, nevertheless, interpreted the potential implications of the law 
differently. On April 29, 1969, the proposed legislation became a front-page feature in 
the Boston Globe.  In the lead paragraph, reporter Robert Turner declared, “Apartments 
housing thousands of low and middle-income families will soon spring up in Boston’s 
plushest suburbs if the Legislature’s Urban Affairs Committee has its way.”67  As Turner 
explained it, the bill would require every community in the state to allow construction of 
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low and moderate-income developments on 1 percent of its “buildable property” each 
year until 5 percent of the community contained such housing. Turner extrapolated that 
one-acre zoning laws could not prevent such developments and thereby predicted that 
“wealthy towns like Dover and Weston, which have large-lot zoning and low population 
density, could experience a population explosion of 50 percent or more in a few years.”68 
A reporter for the Boston Herald echoed this assessment predicting that the impact of the 
law would be “fantastic” and could “trigger” the construction of moderate cost housing 
“everywhere” and “generate an exodus from the teeming urban and ghetto areas.” 69  
Throughout the summer of 1969, the press continued to play a key discursive role 
in shaping public perception of the legislation.  Many reporters appropriated the 
colloquial catch-phrase of “snob zoning” which had become a common description of 
exclusionary zoning in their discussion of the bill. The Herald challenged “suburban 
snobbishness,” and the Globe contended that “snob zoning” had no “proper place in a 
democratic society.”70  Soon the Zoning Appeals legislation earned the indelible title as 
the “Anti-Snob Zoning Bill.” This “snob zoning” terminology compounded the feelings 
of resentment and victimization of many suburbanites who disliked both the label of 
snobbishness and the implications of the Zoning Appeals Bill.  The press also presented a 
distorted image of the suburban response to the bill.  The area newspapers only printed 
letters from suburban opponents to the bill such as Robert Clarke of Belmont, who called 
it “perverted social engineering with a vengeance. ” 71  Likewise, reporters only solicited 
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negative comments from suburban officials and failed to seek commentary from 
members of organizations like the NCDF.72 
In fact, many suburban residents supported and even lobbied for the legislation.  
Helen LeVine led this grassroots mobilization. She relied on the contacts, networks and 
tactics she had established during previous civil rights law campaigns, recruiting to the 
cause thirty-five church, and civic organizations such as the Federation for Fair Housing 
and Equal Rights, Americans for Democratic Action, and Citizens for Participation 
Politics, all of which had sizable suburban constituencies. The activities of these anti-
snob zoning proponents illustrate once again the effectiveness of grassroots suburban 
liberals to work within the channels of formal government to create legislation that 
aligned with their vision of racial and spatial equality. By 1969 the suburban civil rights 
network did not boast the same numerical strength as in its earlier campaigns for fair 
housing measures, but it still contributed significantly, encouraging members and their 
contacts to pressure their local officials and representatives to support the legislation.   
LeVine and her collaborators circulated a question and answer sheet directly designed to 
assuage the anxieties of suburbanites, which they also sent to members of the state 
legislature and the governor.73 The leaflet sought to remove the racialized stigma 
associated with the issue of low-income housing.  It promised that the bill would not 
create an influx of poor blacks into their neighborhoods, describing the potential 
beneficiaries rather as “local municipal employees, police, fireman, teachers, young 
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couples and returning Vietnam veterans.”74 In addition, it stressed that the new laws 
would neither affect property values, tax rates, and the “character” of communities, nor 
would they violate home rule.  
LeVine recognized the importance of building cross-racial support for the law and 
sought to solicit participation from the area’s African-American community. African-
American organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) and the United Front rejected LeVine’s outreach attempts. 
Representatives of the Urban League told her that the bill “does not go far enough” and 
was “too middle class to deserve their support.”75 After this rebuff, the politically-savvy 
suburban activists abandoned their active pursuit of support of such organizations for fear 
of making their proposal into a “black bill.”76 The unwillingness of African-American 
leaders to join in a coalition with white suburbanites to support low-income housing 
provides insight into not only the priorities and agendas of the local civil rights 
movement but also the contours of the Anti-Snob Zoning Bill. By the late 1960s, most 
African-American activists remained more invested in community empowerment and 
black economic development than in gaining a foothold in suburbia. This emphasis 
demonstrated the ways in which the zoning restriction law, as well as the cause of 
affordable housing outside of the city more generally, represented a distinctly white 
suburban liberal remedy to the problem of racial and spatial segregation.  
The proponents of the Anti-Snob Zoning Bill, nevertheless, discovered unlikely 
allies among a group of Boston’s white state representatives. These urban legislators 
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proved crucial to the legislation’s eventual passage. This unusual support from 
traditionally racially conservative Boston legislators derived less from their newfound 
sympathy for the plight of poor African-Americans and more because they recognized the 
bill as an opportunity to “punish the do-gooder suburbanites” for their support of the 
Racial Imbalance Act four years earlier. Suburban politicians and their constituents had 
served as the primary supporters of the legislation aimed at reducing segregation in 
public schools despite (or more likely because of) the fact that it did not affect their 
districts. The urban politicians’ statements in support of the zoning bill dripped with a 
discourse of class and geographic-based resentment. Ignoring the grassroots suburban 
activists who lobbied for the zoning measure, State Senator William Bulger of South 
Boston combatively noted the absence at the State House of “those busloads of women 
from suburbia” who failed “to make their voices heard on legislation which represents an 
honest-to-goodness attempt to really do something about the problem which they were so 
concerned with when they zeroed in on the racial imbalance law.”77  
Liberal politicians like Martin Linsky initially balked at cooperating with 
legislators like Bulger with whom they usually disagreed. However, Linsky recognized 
the Zoning Appeals Law’s success depended on such endorsements and embraced these 
“strange bedfellows.”78 The support for the school integration and zoning restriction 
measures therefore roughly inverted along spatial and partisan lines with suburban 
liberals as the only bloc to support both measures.79  After many rounds of debate, this  
“unusual coalition of liberals and urban conservatives” successfully overcame the strong 
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opposition of many moderate and conservative suburban representatives and led the 
Zoning Appeals Bill to passage. 80 On August 23, 1969, Governor Francis Sargent signed 
into law Chapter 774 of 40B, unofficially called the “Anti-Snob Zoning Act.”81  
The Anti-Snob Zoning Act earned Massachusetts the status as the first state to 
pass legislation directly targeted at spatial discrimination, an impressive accomplishment 
given the suburban slant of the Commonwealth’s population and legislature. As the 
Racial Imbalance Act had done four years earlier, Chapter 774 enhanced the Bay’s 
State’s liberal image and reputation for innovative legislation. However, also like the 
Racial Imbalance Act, the law had more symbolic than statutory power. To make the 
measure politically palatable, the drafters sought to preserve local zoning control and 
limit the state government’s role. The law, therefore, lacked requirements for 
construction of affordable housing (as New Jersey would enact under court order a few 
years later) and set quotas for units in terms of minimums not maximums. The two-step 
administrative procedure injected methods of delay that, as the chapter later discusses, 
thwarted subsidized development and benefited suburban governments. Concord, the first 
community that sought to test its power, most clearly exposed the possibilities and limits 
of both Chapter 774 and suburban liberals to challenge the structures of racial and spatial 
segregation.  
 
An Affordable Utopia 
The idea of building a mixed-income development in Concord predated the 
passage of the Anti-Snob Zoning Act. The community had a longstanding reputation of 
dedication to issues of racial tolerance dating back to its days as the epicenter of the 
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Transcendentalism in the 19th century and more recently apparent in its participation in 
the fair housing movement and METCO program. As in Newton, the combination of the 
Kerner Report and the King assassination in the spring of 1968 motivated a group of 
Concord residents to try to build a small moderate-income housing development as a 
means to extend the community’s commitment to racial equality.82 These efforts came in 
direct conflict with Concord’s focus on open space and environmentalism, which long 
served as unifying principles of the town’s identity and political agenda. This prolonged 
controversy between advocates of spatial integration and environmentalism exposed a 
fundamental tension both within the exceptionalist identity of Concord and the ideology 
of suburban liberalism. The battle also brought into sharp focus the problems with the 
state’s procedure for challenging the structures of suburban exclusion.  
The effort to build affordable housing in Concord arose directly out of the 
grassroots and exceptionalist dimensions of suburban liberalism. In the late spring of 
1968, a group of fourteen married couples from the town’s Conantum section sent a letter 
to their neighbors proposing that the community sponsor a “venture in integrated ‘garden 
apartment’ housing” either within the development or another site in Concord.83 The 
letter senders, including Jim and Diane Craig, Paul Counihan and Carl Koch, noted that 
although “all the Boston suburbs” had considered similar projects “as a result of hundred 
discussions of race and urban problems, and the concern of thousands of conscientious, 
articulate and active citizens—nothing yet has been done.” However, the group 
suggested,  “Conantum may be better situated with the practicalities of this thing than any 
                                                
82 Martin A. Linsky and Robert L. Turner, “Snob-Zoning Law Gets Acid Test in Concord,” Boston Globe, 
February 18, 1973.  
83 Craigs et al to Conantum Residents, June 25 1968, Records of the Concord Home Owning Corporation, 
Concord Special Collections, Concord Free Public Library, Concord, MA, unprocessed collection, 
(hereafter: “CHOC”).  
 
447 
other sub-community in the Boston area (in the country, for that matter).” The letter 
referred to the neighborhood’s longstanding reputation for liberal minded residents and a 
high concentration of academics affiliated with the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology.  Following their initial letter, the group staged coffee klatches and 
distributed a questionnaire in order to gauge the views of their fellow residents.  
The responses to this inquiry provide an important window into suburban liberal 
attitudes about racial and spatial discrimination and reveal the spectrum of opinion even 
within this purportedly progressive and somewhat utopian community. Some residents 
were in favor, noting, “More than other national issue, I feel substantial low cost housing 
in the suburbs is mandatory—for both white and black” and  “White racism in the United 
States calls for strong measures and real sacrifice.” 84 Others, however, adopted a view of 
racial integration that rested on an ideology of class exclusivity. They would be willing to 
invite “qualified black lawyers” and their families “who could afford it” to move in, but 
opposed building any units for the specific purpose of including at low-income minority 
renters who “could not survive economically out here.” One Conantum inhabitant called 
the plan “forced integration”; another said, “I am uneasy playing God,” and suggested 
“approaching this in a matter reminiscent of the Harvard Business School rather than 
group therapy.” Ultimately, however, the responding Conantum residents 
overwhelmingly rejected the original proposal, yet the majority of those who replied to 
the inquiry said that they would support and even donate money to a project within the 
town of Concord as a whole rather than Conantum specifically. 
The original proponents of the Conantum project did not abandon their vision of 
integrated housing and decided to extend their campaign beyond the boundaries of the 
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quasi-utopian development. During the summer of 1968, the Conantum contingent joined 
force with members of the local fair housing committee to form the Moderate Income 
Housing for Concord Committee. The committee, which “believed that community life is 
enriched by diversity,” pledged to “broaden the range of housing costs in Concord and to 
persuade people of varied incomes to move to the town.”85 The committee thoroughly 
surveyed the available land in Concord to identify a suitable site for an apartment 
development. This quest proved quixotic, since Concord’s stringent zoning regulations 
and open space agenda left only twenty-nine acres of land (.025 of the total zoned land) 
available for multi-unit development. Moreover, these remaining eligible parcels had 
either water problems or unwilling sellers.86  
The Moderate Income Housing Committee, therefore, shifted its focus away from 
new construction, and instead devised a strategy that identified properties for sale in 
Concord, purchasing these homes and then reselling them to low-income black and white 
families from Boston. This tactic built directly on the techniques of the suburban fair 
housing movement, but with a more specific class-based focus. The committee in 1969 
formed the Concord Home Owning Corporation (CHOC) as a subset, so that it could use 
money from loans taken by its officers and private donations to purchase two homes.87  
The first house quickly resold to a Roxbury family with a child in the METCO program 
in Concord and a father employed in the town. The second property, however, remained 
unsold, showing the drawbacks of its Trojan-Horse approach and forcing the group to 
search for another strategy. Two important developments led the CHOC back to its 
original vision of new construction. First, Chapter 774 went into effect that fall and the 
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group believed the new law would help them surmount Concord’s rigid zoning statutes. 
Second, a number of residents with professional expertise in land use law and real estate 
development joined the CHOC executive committee. This new board included attorney 
and leading McCarthy supporter Paul Counihan, attorney John Clymer, MIT Electrical 
Engineering Professor Richard Thornton, Arthur D. Little executive Elliott Wilbur, and 
Assistant Dean at Boston University School of Law John Wilson.88 As its new president, 
the CHOC elected Conantum inhabitant James Craig, who had twenty years of 
experience in commercial real estate, developing hotels and motels as Vice President of 
the Hotel Corporation of America and later as the President of the Boston Waterfront 
Development Corporation. Like his fellow board members, Craig sought to apply his 
professional knowledge directly to the endeavor. 
 The newly-reenergized CHOC soon found interested sellers of a 5.5 acre plot on 
Sudbury Road near the town center. Close to retail stores, local schools and the commuter 
rail station, the site appeared an ideal location for a multi-family development. Water and 
soil conditions on the property, however, did create one serious obstacle. In 1960, the 
Town Meeting had denied a prior plan to place apartments on the site citing unsuitability 
for building.89 The Town of Concord had, in fact, offered in April 1969 to buy the 
property for park and recreational purposes. The Wheelers, one of Concord’s oldest 
families who had owned the property since the seventeenth century, had rejected the offer 
because they believed the site should help diversify the town’s housing stock. 90 Given its 
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controversial history, CHOC enlisted members with backgrounds in engineering and 
municipal politics to conduct feasibility studies of the property. These local engineers 
concluded the site suitable for construction. The group then proceeded with plans to 
create an affordable housing development on the plot.   
The CHOC design reflected its efforts to make the project uphold Concord’s 
physical and philosophical identity. The low-density plan created by Carl Koch’s 
architectural firm adhered to and aimed to accentuate Concord’s commitment to open 
space. The design envisioned a 50-60-unit development with 1-4 bedroom townhouses 
with clapboard frames, pitched roofs, and patios, in clusters around large landscaped 
courtyards. Emphasizing the towns “country environment” in the design, the CHOC 
board members, like their counterparts in Newton, remained committed to making the 
physical structure and inhabitants of the project integrate into the existing community.91 
Board members Margaret Cooper, Diane Clymer, and Mary Wilinsky also provided input 
to the architects about ways to make the design adaptable to families. Their suggestions 
revealed that the specifically gendered division of labor of many postwar homes extended 
into grassroots suburban activism as well. The women based their idea on their own 
marital and child-rearing experiences, or as Margaret Cooper termed it, time spent caring 
for children while  “living in an inexpensive apartment during my husband’s graduate 
school days. ”92 They recommended that setting kitchen appliances within four steps of 
each other and dark patterns for the floor tile to hide dirt.  The women also emphasized 
the importance of open space, suggesting particular types of shrubs, and proposing that 
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some of the land at the edge of the development could be used for vegetable and flower 
gardens.  These recommendations reinforce the suburban-centric underpinnings of the 
CHOC membership and mission.  
With their blueprints, CHOC then turned to the recently launched Massachusetts 
Housing Financing Agency (MHFA) in order to secure financial support and the status as 
a qualified developer.  Many observers had hailed the establishment 1966 by the state 
legislature of independent of the MHFA as an independent public authority to issue low-
interest loans through tax-exempt bonds to non-profit and limited-dividend private 
developers for the construction of housing for low and moderate income people. 
Questions about the constitutionality of the endeavor had prevented the institution from 
opening its doors until 1968.93 The MHFA, nevertheless, quickly made up for lost time 
after the legislature raised its bonding ceiling from $50 to 500 million in January 1970.94 
Just six months later, the agency had committed $400 million to developers and had 
earned a reputation as a far more flexible and less complicated form of financing than the 
comparable FHA program.95  The CHOC proposal requested MHFA money for a 
demonstration project intended to prove “that quality housing can be provided to reverse 
trends of income level stratification in towns such as Concord.”96  Unlike NCDF, which 
sought to downplay its goals of racial integration, CHOC explicitly stated its aim for a 
“substantial portion” of the units to be for  “people living in the center city, particularly 
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Blacks from the Roxbury ghetto area.” 97  CHOC noted that Concord had actively 
participated in METCO and they hoped that to make arrangements so that many of the 
children in the program and their families could move to town. CHOC, like NCDF, also 
hoped to attract people “who work but do not live in Concord,” older people with reduced 
income, and newlyweds with “modest resources.” The MHFA approved the 
organization’s proposal in May 1970, with the requirement that 25 percent or 15 units be 
set aside explicitly for low-income families. CHOC never hid its intent to follow the 
process laid out by the Anti-Snob Zoning Act, but it did try sought to follow “chapter 774 
in a friendly way.”98 It did so by both making its plan align with the aesthetic and social 
ideals of the suburb and keeping local officials and the property’s abutters apprised of its 
intentions.99  
These efforts did not diffuse opposition from the residents of the South Meadows 
neighborhood adjacent to the site. Unlike the controversies in other towns where 
opponents offered a wide range of reasons for resistance to moderate-income 
development, these Concord citizens centered primarily on just one issue: flooding.100 
These abutters believed that the five-acre plot sat on the watershed of Swamp Brook and 
opposed the development on the theory that the property exhibited the characteristics of 
an inland wetland. Reaching back into the annals of town history, these residents 
frequently cited the fact that in 1694 Concord had required Joshua Wheeler to sign a 
pledge agreeing to repay any damages incurred by damning Swamp Brook on his 
property and suggested that the potential for damage had worsened over the course of 300 
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years. The South Meadow residents claimed that they already had overworked sump 
pumps and believed that the additional construction would flood their basements and 
their backyards. 101 
These abutters quickly extended their campaign beyond the Wheeler property to 
reflect a genuine concern for larger environmental issues, especially wetland protection 
and open space preservation.102 The South Meadow residents adopted the name Swamp 
Brook Preservation Association (SBPA) and had as their logo a picture of a hand-drawn 
turtle, which conjoined the concern about flooded basements with an explicitly ecological 
appeal. Edith Sisson, who lived down the road from the Wheeler land, taught natural 
history, ecology and other science courses at the Massachusetts Audubon Society, led this 
effort. She provided SBPA a level of scientific expertise unusual for the typical 
neighborhood association.  Using information from U.S. Soil Conservation Agency and 
hand-drawn maps to support these claims, the residents showed that like CHOC, they 
relied on their own professional knowledge to make their case.103 In their pamphlets and 
statements, the group repeatedly emphasized “wetlands have been encroached upon at a 
rate of about 1% a year in Massachusetts.”104 Such facts helped SBPA create a discourse 
that fused fears about their own property with a genuine concern for the issue of wetland 
protection.  By adopting an ecological rather than strictly exclusionary emphasis, the 
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SBPA increasingly shifted the discussion surrounding CHOC’s proposals away from 
racial and spatial segregation towards wetland preservation. 
 Concord’s explicit investment in its environmental identity and distinctiveness 
made SBPA’s campaign particularly powerful. The Concord Board of Appeals held a 
public hearing on January 28, 1971 devoted to the CHOC proposal, which offered further 
evidence of the effectiveness of SBPA’s advocates and arguments. Few of the residents 
from South Meadow who spoke in opposition to the proposal challenged the need for 
low-cost housing in Concord, but sought to emphasize the need for a shift in location of 
such a project. Prior to the hearing SBPA had circulated a pamphlet that succinctly 
summarized the groups’ position. It asked, “Are there not other more suitable sites in 
Concord for high density development?”105 This question suggested a convenient lack of 
familiarity with Concord’s stringent zoning bylaws. In a letter to the Concord Journal the 
week of the hearing, Angela Finneran scoffed at the idea that “now under the sacred 
banner of ‘low-income housing’” the town would allow construction on “marginal land” 
and suggested that it “reflects an unusual degree of mental incompetence and borders on 
the ridiculous.”106  
At the hearing, residents took a far less outspoken stance to ask essentially the 
same question. “I hope that after the issue of this hearing are over,” SBPA leader Edith 
Sisson told the Board of Appeals, “Town officials and boards and Town citizens will give 
serious and constructive consideration to problems of housing in our Town.”107At the 
hearing Charles Holt used personal anecdotes to describe the area’s poor drainage, 
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testified that CHOC “had the right idea,” but had picked the wrong site.108 The members 
of this grassroots campaign took no affirmative steps to assist CHOC find an alternative 
site for their project further raising doubts about their motives. James Craig aptly 
observed that for many residents consciously or unconsciously “garden apartments means 
urbanization, urbanization means crime and dope and change and tax rate. Yet all those 
gut feelings can get behind any semi-legitimate issue like schools and water and make 
that issue awfully powerful.”109  In Concord, which rested its identity so heavily on its 
natural landscape, these arguments were especially potent.  
SBPA’s pleas successfully persuaded the Board of Appeals to unanimously reject 
CHOC’s rezoning petition in April 1971, on the grounds that granting a permit “would 
not be consistent with local needs, as it could be detrimental to the health and safety of 
the residents of the Town.” 110 The decision did not deter, but, rather, galvanized CHOC. 
Following the ruling, the group decided to shift their fight away from Concord and 
toward the structures of state government. With its heavy concentration of lawyers and 
liberals, the membership shared a faith in using legal procedures to uphold the 
constitutionality of the statute and sought to put that belief into practice. Paul Clymer and 
Paul Counihan, two members of the Board, even served as CHOC’s counsel in its appeal 
to the state’s Housing Appeals Committee (HAC). 111  In November 1971, HAC 
announced that the Concord Board of Appeals had been “unreasonable” and directed it to 
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issue a permit to CHOC.112 The decision marked the first successful invocation of 
Chapter 774 by a non-profit group.113 The Concord Board of Selectman, nevertheless, 
immediately voted to further test Chapter 774’s administrative mechanisms by appealing 
the HAC ruling in state superior court.114  Even before HAC announced its ruling, Jack 
Clymer and James Craig had met with representatives of the Newton Community 
Development Foundation, the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Citizens Housing and 
Planning Association and the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights to discuss a shared 
strategy for the inevitable testing of Chapter 774 in the courts.115  At the meeting, the 
participants acknowledged that the Concord case provided an ideal way to strengthen the 
mandate of the Anti-Snob Zoning Act through the sanction of the highest court in 
Massachusetts.  Thus, when the Selectman announced the vote, CHOC readily accepted it 
as a challenge to continue its fight.116 
 
A .000 Batting Average 
By the time that Concord had opted to appeal the HAC decision, many observers 
had begun to question the effectiveness of Chapter 774. The provision had produced no 
physical units of housing in its first three years of existence. Louise Day Hicks smugly 
noted in the winter of 1970, “Not a single spade of dirt has been dug yet to implement the 
new law.”117 A year later this fact was still true.  Boston Globe reporter Anthony Yudis 
observed that the national press and HUD officials often praised the law as  “pacesetter” 
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and “imaginative” model for other states.118 In an article entitled  “Anti-Snob Zoning 
Batting Big .000,” Yudis, however, contended that these favorable endorsements of 
Massachusetts as a “forward-thinking state” obscured both the limitations of the law, 
especially its mechanisms for delay, and the fact that prior to the Concord case it had not 
led to any local overrides.119 The statute placed the burden of launching the appeal on the 
developer, and few wanted to take the financial risk. The appeals period provided no 
return on the investment and defeat in court would amount to a financial loss, which most 
non-profit and limited-dividend developers could not afford. CHOC represented one of 
the few suburban non-profits to show, according to Anthony Yudis,  “the expertise” and 
financial and psychic “staying power” to sustain this process. 120 Many state legislators 
recognized these deficiencies and proposed a variety of amendments to clarify and 
strengthen the original law. None of these provisions, however, passed.121  
The legislators, nevertheless, did not receive the sole blame for the limits of the 
law’s effectiveness.  Suburban residents themselves had thwarted the efforts to increase 
the state and national housing supply by “building their own modern drawbridges to keep 
out their fellow Americans.” 122 Many predicted that the only solution to this problem 
would be for the courts to intervene and strike down local zoning rights and privileges. 
Martin Linsky, the bill’s progenitor, responded to skeptics by clarifying the Anti-Snob 
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Zoning Act’s legislative history and intent. “We never saw Chapter 774 as a miracle cure 
to the critical housing shortage,” Linsky stated. “We wanted to make it clear to suburban 
communities that that their land use allocations were not sacred, nor in a vacuum, and the 
legislature is taking a deep interest in their decision.”123 He suggested that the law had 
acted as a “catalyst” for local initiatives, particularly because many communities such as 
Lexington, Winchester, Needham, Hanover, Arlington and many more misunderstood the 
law’s provisions and, fearing a top-down intervention, decided to implement their own 
programs.124  Linsky and other proponents recognized these local efforts as an example of 
the Act’s inadvertent success in addressing the problems of suburban exclusion.  Most of 
these towns’ projects, however, concentrated on housing for their elderly and actually 
constituted an effort to skirt the goal of economically and racially diversifying the 
suburbs.125  
The controversy that erupted in Lexington exposed both the limitations of the 
Anti-Snob Zoning Act and the unwillingness of many suburban residents to accept 
responsibility for the problems of structural inequality especially the exclusionary zoning 
policies of their own towns. Lexington had served as a pacesetter in the grassroots 
suburban response to racial and spatial segregation. Since its inception in 1968, the 
Lexington Committee on Suburban Responsibility had urged the community to build 
affordable housing.126 The passage of Chapter 774 quickened the pace of action. The 
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members of the town Planning Board resented the implications of the zoning law and 
believed that solutions should be created by municipalities rather than by state-imposed 
solutions.127 This response fulfilled not only Martin Linsky’s predictions but also the 
basic tenets of suburban liberal political culture that favored voluntary rather than top-
down remedies.  
In the winter of 1970, Lexington town officials developed a subsidized housing 
program that fused Lexington’s perception of its liberal commitment to spatial and racial 
equality with a firm commitment to home rule and local land control. It used the ratio 
embedded in Chapter 774 to conclude that Lexington needed to build more than 850 
subsidized units over a period of five years to meet a goal of 950 subsidized units or 
approximately 10 percent of all housing stock.128 The Planning Board adopted as a 
corollary policy the support of  “no apartment proposal which does not include the mixed 
income feature.”129 Extending this commitment to challenging suburban exclusion, the 
Town Meeting approved an addition to Lexington’s zoning bylaws for a residential 
district called “RH Housing,” in which 40 percent of the units had to be subsidized for 
low and moderate-income residents.  “All the suburbs are in the same boat, one way or 
another they will have to build housing,” Planning Director Alexander Zaleski explained. 
“With the RH Zoning we are simply trying to preserve for the town of Lexington some 
control over its future development and destiny.”130  
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With its new program, Lexington appeared primed to fulfill both its affordable 
housing goals and its heritage as the “Cradle of Liberty.” The new zoning policy did not 
immediately translate into moderate cost housing and instead had the reverse effect. The 
RH by-law stipulated that the Town Meeting had to approve the re-zoning of a specific 
site to RH by a two-thirdsvote. The Town Meeting rejected rezoning land for the 
community’s first two proposals to construct affordable housing, including one proposed 
by the Town Planning Board itself.131 In 1971, the Town Meeting finally did approve a 
third RH petition, which was far more limited and skewed more toward moderate-income 
elderly residents than the previous proposal. The Center Village project called for 106 
units of housing—27 low-income and 79 moderate income—financed by the MHFA and 
situated on 8.4 acres on Bedford Street.132 Predictably, homeowners in the neighborhood 
adjacent to the proposed project decried the vote and immediately formulated an 
aggressive opposition campaign. Like their counterparts in Newton, Concord, and other 
neighboring suburbs, these Lexington citizens framed their resistance in the mundane 
issues of water drainage, traffic and the problems of high-density developments in single-
family neighborhoods rather than articulating more racially motivated anxieties.  The 
developer’s attorney Frank Conroy pierced through this seemingly race-neutral discourse. 
“The word subsidy is scaring people,” Conroy observed. “People feel their taxes are too 
high. They think that subsidized housing is going to cost them money.”133 This 
interpretation captured the myopic viewpoint of white middle-class homeowners who 
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couched their opposition in terms of suburban innocence conveniently, ignoring the ways 
in which the federal government had subsidized their home purchases as well. 
 In a bold move, these Lexington abutters circulated a petition that demanded a 
town-wide referendum asking if citizens upheld the Town Meeting vote.134 The group 
received 1188 signatures in just two days.135 While the letters in the town’s newspaper 
suggested a sharp split in residents’ attitudes toward the proposal, the final results 
revealed that that the difference of opinion did not run all that deep. Rainy conditions did 
not deter 15, 317 people from the polls who voted two-to-one to overrule the Town 
Meeting’s approval of the proposal.136 The outcome also all but assured the demise of the 
RH zoning concept and called into question future efforts to bring affordable housing to 
Lexington. The implications of the referendum extended beyond fate of the specific 
project or even the town of Lexington to the future of affordable housing in the suburbs 
in general. News of the vote quickly spread throughout Boston’s metropolitan ring as 
observers sought to make sense of its meaning.137 The Globe editorial staff dubbed the 
referendum “unquestionably important as a bellwether of suburban thinking.” 138 
Observers did not just focus on the outcome of the Lexington referendum because of the 
town’s historic reputation as the “Cradle of Liberty,” but also because the vote came just 
a week after the United States Supreme Court had delivered a serious setback to the cause 
of suburban integration.  
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In James v. Valtierra, the Court upheld California’s constitutional provision that 
local voters approve by referenda all public housing projects, endorsing the use of such 
votes as a “a procedure for democratic decision-making” and adopted a very narrow 
interpretation of the equal protection clause that excluded zoning and other exclusionary 
practices from its purview.139 This decision constitutionally sanctioned the results of the 
Lexington vote.140 Valtierra also inscribed Richard Nixon’s attitudes toward suburban 
integration into law. Like his stance on the heated issue of school desegregation, Nixon 
had supported the idea of integration but vehemently rejected the methods required to 
create it.141 His position aligned directly with the outlook of many residents of Lexington, 
Concord and Newton who eschewed blatant racial discrimination but accepted and even 
naturalized economic discrimination. In 1970, Nixon had clarified this distinction 
between racial and economic equality, affirming that  “Open cities, open suburbs, open 
neighborhoods are a right for every American. Yet, he opposed “using Federal power, 
Federal coercion, or Federal money to force economic integration.”142 The Valtierra 
decision emboldened Nixon to become even more entrenched in his opposition to 
government involvement in overcoming the barriers of suburban exclusion. In June 1971, 
he released an 8,000-word “Statement of Equal Housing Opportunity,” which endorsed 
local control over land use, advocated a limited role for the federal government, and 
encouraged suburbs to “provide fair, open and adequate housing” on a voluntary basis.143 
The outcome of the Lexington referendum and the reaction to low-income housing 
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proposals in its neighboring communities foreshadowed the impossibility of such a 
solution to the problems of spatial segregation.  
By announcing a moratorium on the production of all new federally funded 
housing projects in January 1973, Nixon symbolically and materially constrained further 
the efforts to build affordable housing in the suburbs of Massachusetts and elsewhere the 
nation. In addition to providing a new justification for suburban residents to oppose local 
projects, the announcements further circumscribed the plans of non-profit developers 
who relied on FHA funding. The moratorium also put new pressures on the 
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, which scrambled to fill “the federal vacuum.”144 
Between 1968 and 1972, MHFA had underwritten the construction of six thousand units 
in the Bay State suburbs. Most of this housing became occupied by elderly and lower 
income families from the immediate area and did not have a significant impact on 
reducing the more systemic problems of metropolitan racial and economic segregation. 
Yet MFHA still represented the most successful state agency in the nation at providing 
affordable housing in the suburbs. 145 Since Nixon’s announcement had coincided with a 
national economic recession, it became difficult for the agency to serve as “the only game 
in town.” Government-funded production in all parts of the state, including the suburbs, 
therefore, took a self-described “nose-dive” after 1973.146  
The combination of these local, federal, and legislative circumstances led low-
income housing advocates to see the state courts as their last and best means through 
which to challenge the structures of suburban exclusion. In March 1973, the 
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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court confirmed this assessment when it upheld the 
constitutionality of Chapter 774 in a joint decision involving Concord Home Owning 
Corporation’s petition and an appeal raised by the town of Hanover involving a proposal 
to build 88 units for the elderly. 147 In a 67-page unanimous ruling, the state’s highest 
court confirmed that Chapter 774 did not violate home rule and affirmed the power of 
Housing Appeals Committee to override local exclusionary practices.148 While 
undoubtedly a victory for CHOC, the verdict’s impact reached far beyond Concord by 
potentially paving the way for thousands of units proposed and pending under the 
umbrella of Chapter 774.149 Along with the landmark Mount Laurel case in New Jersey, 
the case confirmed to housing activists that state courts provided the best hope for 
attacking suburban segregation.150 By 1975, however, HAC had overruled twenty-two of 
the twenty-four local zoning cases that had come before it, but most of the losing parties 
had opted to appeal the decisions in state courts further postponing construction. Only 
two of those projects had actually broken ground and the total number of Chapter 774 
units had barely broken the 600 benchmark.151 The continued sagas in Newton, 
Lexington and Concord further demonstrate both the possibilities and limitations of state 
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courts to induce municipalities to create affordable housing and the inability of activists 
in these communities to develop a coordinated attack on the structures of suburban 
exclusion.   
The residents of Lexington became experts at the Chapter 774 appeals process 
and their efforts suggest that the procedural mechanisms embedded in the statute served 
not to ease, but, rather, to delay construction. Undeterred by the outcome of the town’s 
referendum, two religious organizations sought to construct mixed-income housing in 
Lexington in the early 1970s.  The Lexington Interfaith Housing Corporation, a joint 
venture of the Commission on Suburban Responsibility and the Council of Churches, 
proposed the first project.  The Board of Appeals rejected the Interfaith’s petition on the 
basis that its was not functionally designed for children. The HAC overturned that ruling 
in August 1973.152  The Town of Lexington decided to appeal to Massachusetts Superior 
Court, which in a one sentence opinion upheld the HAC decision in the fall of 1974.153  
Construction began on the six-unit Interfaith Apartments three years after the initial 
proposal date and the limited project constituted the Lexington’s first effort to fulfill the 
ambitious subsidized housing quota outlined in its 1970 plan.  
As Interfaith remained entangled in the appeals process, the Archdiocese of 
Boston decided to use a portion of St. Brigid Church’s property to build its own 16-unit 
mixed-income development.154 The Archdiocese Planning Office for Urban Affairs 
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submitted a proposal for a MHFA-underwritten 16-townhouse project of mostly 
moderate-income units.155  The town meeting and local Board of Appeals failed to 
approve the proposal on the grounds that it did not meet the “local needs” clause of 
Chapter 774. The Archdiocese decided to turn to the state.156 In a repeat of the situation 
the year earlier, both the HAC and the Superior Court ruled in favor of the Archdiocese. 
The Zoning Board of Appeals eventually issued a permit for construction for the project 
called Pine Grove Village in 1975. The twenty-two units that resulted from the combined 
efforts of Interfaith and the Archdiocese hardly seemed worth the significant time, 
resources, and legal fees that both of these organizations had expended in its endeavor 
and still left the town far short of meeting its affordable housing quota. 157   
The Newton Community Development Foundation’s continued quest for its 
scattered site project reinforced that the legal route to affordable housing encouraged 
tactics of delay. Following its defeat in 1970, NCDF recognized that an appeal under the 
Chapter 774 law represented the only way to keep their project alive.158  In May 1971, the 
NCDF submitted a petition for a modified plan, now funded by the MHFA instead of the 
federal government, that reduced the number of sites from six to ten and the number of 
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units from 508 to 367.159 In its revised proposal, the NCDF showed its recognition of the 
fiscal concerns of Newton residents including a new section demonstrating the negligible 
impact of the development on property tax rates and per pupil costs.  But just as the 
NDCF had revised its strategy, so too had its adversary.  The Newton Civic Land Use 
Committee shifted its energy away from mobilizing grassroots opposition and towards 
countering the plan with the tools and mechanisms of law. In a flyer entitled “Who Shall 
Rule Out Destiny?,” NCLUA announced it was “fully prepared to use all legal means 
available to prevent encroachment of NCDF in the city of Newton.” 160 When the Board 
of Alderman again rejected the NCDF’s proposal in the summer of 1971 and the non-
profit appealed the case to the state Housing Appeals Committee, NLUCA had the 
chance to fulfill this promise.  
NLUCA used the hearings required by HAC to put the case into “slow-motion” 
and thereby exhaust the NCDF’s financial resources and options on the properties. 
Between August 1971 and October 1972, HAC held forty-two hearings in the Newton 
case. NCDF presented its entire argument that the project was “consistent with local 
needs” within the first hearing, calling only one witness. Roger Cohen, an attorney 
representing six abutters and serving the interests of NLUCA, filibustered the appeal by 
calling an endless list of witnesses that included local firefighters, police officers, school 
officials and housewives. Cohen himself, however, did most of the talking. Included in 
his hours of pontificating, he described how one site would break up the ethnic character 
of predominately Italian neighborhood where “in their yards they grow grapevines from 
which they make wine” and residents “sit on the their lawns, listen to operatic music, 
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drink wine and play bocci.”161 Cohen’s flamboyant tactics led one member of HAC to 
declare, “The theater has been deprived of a considerable talent.” Another panelist stated, 
“We have seen the most ingenious legal maneuvers to circumvent” the law.162 Cohen 
defended his tactics not as stalling, but as trying to ensure that HAC interpret the law 
“correctly.” His technique, however, earned national media attention and served as 
warning to other states trying to implement laws similar to Chapter 774.163  
The prolonged hearings process frustrated the patience and financial resources of 
NCDF. “The whole purpose,” Marc Slotnick observed of his opponents, is “to wear us 
down so we’ll run out of time and money.”164 The NLUCA strategy worked.  In the fall 
of 1972, the NCDF abandoned five of its six sites and underwent a period of self-
reflection and considered disbanding.165  The board ultimately resolved to persist in its 
efforts but decided to overhaul its image and approach by withdrawing its appeal with 
HAC and focusing its resources on developing its remaining site on Hamlet Street. In 
order to do so, NCDF reached a complicated “marriage of convenience” agreement with 
the developer of a proposed luxury apartment building on adjacent property in order to 
finance the 50-townhouse project.166 In 1974, six years after the NCDF had formed, the 
Board of Alderman approved the Hamlet plans, which became the first low and 
moderate-income development built in Newton. Yet the celebration of this 
                                                
161 Liz Roman Gallese, “Suburban Stall: Housing for the Poor Blocked Despite Curb on ‘Snob Zoning’ 
Laws,” Wall Street Journal, October 17, 1972.  
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165 During this period of reflection, the board considered that it had failed to produce a single unit of 
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Newton Graphic, February 7, 1974; Haar and Iatridis, Housing the Poor in Suburbia, 128-131.  
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accomplishment remained relatively muted. The single site represented a token solution 
to the problem of low-income housing and paled in comparison to the ambitious initial 
plans of the organization. NCDF did, nevertheless, succeed in initiating a discussion 
about the need for low-income housing in Newton and easing the path for developers 
with more moderate plans for units for elderly residents.167 The outcome of the Newton 
saga, nevertheless, demonstrated the problems of invoking the appeals process with its 
built-in forms of delay as a means to overcome suburban grassroots opposition to low-
income housing.  
 
Open Space vs. Open Suburbs  
The next chapter in the battle over the Wheeler Property in Concord brought the 
limitations within the anti-snob appeals process into even sharper relief and underlined 
the ways in which environmental laws and politics provided further impediments to the 
construction of affordable housing. The project had endured a sustained challenge from 
abutting environmentalists and underwent another round of legal appeals only this time 
under the guise of the Massachusetts wetland protection laws.  The next series of 
hearings in 1973 and 1974 exposed the ways in which the state’s purportedly progressive 
environmental protection policies directly contributed to the delay and eventual 
prevention of grassroots efforts to challenge suburban exclusion. The confrontation also 
exposed a basic weakness in both the Anti-Snob Zoning and Wetlands Acts.  Despite 
their emphasis on countering the practices of suburban exclusion and preserving 
environmental resources, the laws never truly forced the residents of Concord and other 
affluent communities to grapple with the ways in which their stringent zoning policies 
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had made a probable wetland the only land available for an affordable housing 
development. Instead, these laws and their appeals process left the local affordable 
housing activists and environmentalists to fight one another.  
The Concord Home Owning Corporation had celebrated the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court’s 1973 ruling as a “sign-post decision” both for their group and 
for proponents of low-income housing in the suburbs throughout the state.168 The ruling, 
however, did not automatically usher in the construction of CHOC’s development on the 
Wheeler property. Even with its sanction from the state’s highest court, CHOC still had 
to follow the environmental regulations for building on potential wetlands. In 1965, the 
state legislature had passed the Hatch Act, which required a developer considering 
projects involving the dredging or filling of inland wetlands to apply for a permit from 
the state.  A 1972 amendment had shifted the responsibility of evaluating Hatch Act 
applications away from the Massachusetts Department of Natural Resources and towards 
local conservation commissions. Although many observers had hailed this revision, the 
case in Concord illuminates both the benefits and constraints of the inland wetland 
protection policy’s new emphasis on local control. The process outlined in the procedures 
of the environmental law provided the members of the Swamp Brook Preservation 
Association with an alternative means of preventing the CHOC project in order to protect 
the interests of the South Meadow neighborhood and the wetlands of the state.169  
When CHOC filed its Hatch Act application and request for a hearing, SBPA 
immediately launched into action to persuade the Concord Natural Resources 
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Commission (NRC) to take its side in the fight. In making a case against the 
development, SBPA appealed explicitly to the home rule inclinations of local officials, 
trying to arouse fears that state agencies and courts had undermined their authority. “It is 
obvious,” Edith Sisson contended in a letter to the Commission, that “state officials can 
scarcely be as well acquainted with local environmental problems as local officials.” She 
asserted that “One could have hardly expect members of the State Department of 
Community Affairs or a Judge of the State Superior Court to have well qualified 
backgrounds in drainage problems!”170 CHOC directly countered these localist claims by 
maintaining that even if a judge may not possess expertise on water problems, the 
consultants the group had hired did. The organization reiterated the case it had presented 
at the Board of Appeals hearings two years earlier about the suitability of the land for 
development.  CHOC contended that cleaning out the brook and adjoining ditches of 
accumulated silt and debris would not only make the plot acceptable for construction, but 
also beneficial to abutters suffering from flooded basements and inoperable septic 
systems.171  
The Hatch Act hearings revealed the limitations of using environmental 
discussions as a space for addressing issues of racial and spatial segregation. The 
technical focus on runoff, silt and water levels, excluded many residents from the 
discussion. This emphasis also pushed the conversation even further away from a 
meaningful debate about the issues of suburban responsibility and structural inequality 
that had initiated the CHOC project five years earlier. The lack of public support for the 
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proposal or CHOC at the hearings, moreover, brought into sharp relief larger shifts within 
the political culture of Concord and the surrounding suburbs in the early 1970s. In a study 
of the problems and politics of suburban exclusion, scholar Michael Danielson contended 
that across the nation affordable housing advocates “faced increasingly severe 
competition for and support from the environmental movement” within its “‘natural’ 
constituency of better-educated affluent suburbanites.”172 Environmental concern had 
long served as a foundational feature of Concord identity, but in the 1970s that 
commitment had undoubtedly intensified and made most residents hesitant about 
development of any kind.  Compounding the problem, Concord also no longer boasted 
the same type of organized grassroots fair housing movement that had motivated the 
town’s participation in many of the central civil rights campaigns of the 1960s. By the 
early 1970s, the Concord committee, like most other suburban civil rights groups, had 
“lost their cohesion or dissolved.” 173 Likewise, many of the local liberally oriented 
churches, which had served as another important source of support on social justice 
issues, experienced both internal tensions and declining memberships, which also 
contributed to the lack of outspoken response within the community in support of 
CHOC.174 
                                                
172 Danielson, Politics of Exclusion, 126.  
173 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Route 128, 57.  
174 For instance, the Trinity Episcopal Church in Concord roughly went from a membership of 2000 to 500 
over the course of the 1970s. Rev. David Barney later stated  “most large New England mainline parishes 
or congregations - mainline is Presbyterian, Congregationalist, Methodist and Episcopal, most 
congregations of large size in New England lost from 2/3 to 3/4 of their membership in those decades.” 
Rev. David Barney, interviewed by Renee Garrelick,  February 22, 2001 (Concord Oral History Program , 
(http://www.concordlibrary.org/scollect/Fin_Aids/OralHistories.htm last accessed March 15, 2010).  
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 When the Concord NRC released its Order of Conditions for the Wheeler 
property in early 1974, it demonstrated further that the town’s firm environmental ideals 
trumped a dedication to promoting socioeconomic diversity. The Wetland Protection Act 
did not grant NRC the legal authority to flatly deny CHOC the right to build, so instead 
the Commission issued a set of twenty-three conditions with which the nonprofit group 
had to comply before breaking ground.175  CHOC believed that the requirements for 
specific data and alterations surpassed the NRC’s authority. It decided to invoke the 
override clause in the Wetland Act and appealed the decision to the State Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) on the grounds that the 23 conditions exceeded the measures 
outlined the Inland Protection Act so patently that it represented a “deliberate effort to 
frustrate the entire project.”176  DNR agreed to hear the case.  
The four sessions of DNR hearings in the early summer of 1974 centered around a 
highly technical discussion of dredging and draining that further obscured the issue of 
affordable housing at the heart of the case.177  SBPA joined the appeal as interveners 
asking for a denial of development on the Wheeler property. Edith Sisson served as the 
group’s representative and examiner.  Despite no advanced training in engineering, 
hydrology or judicial proceedings, Sisson’s involvement in the fight to preserve Swamp 
Brook afforded her expert status. Most of her presentation addressed the ecological 
features of the site, not the merits of CHOC’s project or purpose. She did voice strong 
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objection to affordable housing initiatives receiving any special scrutiny stating there was 
no extenuating circumstance “that should cause MHFA sponsored construction to have 
any lesser (or greater) impact on the environment than other construction.”178  DNR 
agreed with Sisson’s argument, denying CHOC’s application on the grounds that the 
organization had failed to demonstrate that its development would take the proper 
protections against flooding.179 The decision issued a major blow to CHOC. The group 
confronted severe financial difficulties, having exhausted its loans financing its legal 
case, and eventually decided to dissolve and abandon its quest to challenge Concord’s 
structures of exclusion.180 The outcome exposed that despite the fact that it was less 
deliberate than the stalling strategy of the lawyers in Newton, the delays imposed by the 
environmental hearings process in Concord brought roughly the same outcome. 
 At least one local resident could not ignore the coincidence of the DNR decision, 
the disbanding of CHOC and the busing crisis raging on the streets of Boston during the 
fall of 1974. In a letter to the Concord Journal, A.K. Lewis wrote, “Let’s put all 
euphemisms aside” and “admit that Concord had denied an effort to allow black families 
to move in the community,” which “leaves us free at breakfast time to shake our head 
over newspaper reports of South Boston and deplore all bigotry.” Lewis asked that 
residents take “time to look in the mirror” and ask “How much of this injury and 
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maiming, in history’s long light, will belong to us?”181 Few town members took Lewis’s 
call for self-reflection seriously and Concord continued to prove that it privileged open 
space to open suburbs and socioeconomic diversity. Throughout the 1970s, the town 
meeting generously allocated funds to land preservation.182 In 1977, the Town Meeting 
approved an article to purchase the Wheeler Property for $29,000 to “preserve and 
enhance Concord’s rural character” and continue its commitment to wetland 
protection.183 The acquisition of the Wheeler site and other plots of open space 
undoubtedly enhanced the attractiveness of Concord, yet at the same time it further 
heightened the barriers to bringing affordable housing to the community.  
 
Conclusion: The Road to Segregation 
If the Kerner Report offered one bookend to the Massachusetts suburban 
affordable housing experiment, then publication by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
of Route 128: Boston’s Road to Segregation provided the other. Published in 1975, at the 
height of the mandatory desegregation of the Boston Public Schools, the Civil Rights 
Commission’s report interpreted the busing crisis as the direct result of the failure of 
suburban municipalities to take the warnings of the Kerner Commission seriously. 
Boston’s Road to Segregation forcefully disproved the optimistic predictions of 
academics in the late 1960s “that greater racial integration would occur” in the nation’s 
suburbs.184 Using statistical evidence and expert testimony, the report demonstrated that 
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residential segregation and discrimination in metropolitan Boston had actually intensified 
during the 1960s. The authors placed the major blame for this pattern on the exclusionary 
zoning practices and put to rest any question that resistance to affordable housing 
constituted anything less than a clear form of racial discrimination. The Commission 
assailed Chapter 774 suggesting that through tactics such as building housing for the 
elderly only, the law “stimulate [d] suburban communities with new strategies for 
circumventing racial inclusion.”185 Despite its criticism of the law, the report recognized 
that the only chance for rectifying the problems of suburban exclusion rested in increased 
state regulation.186  The Commissioners warned, “Unless the state acts swiftly, forcefully 
and effectively, suburban residential patterns are likely to be firmly established in a 
manner which cannot be changed for generations.”187 State officials and white suburban 
residents largely ignored the recommendations and this dire prediction became a reality.  
The Boston Globe reaffirmed in 1989 the findings of the Civil Rights Commission 
in a series of articles to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Anti-Snob Zoning 
Act.  The articles revealed that 20 years after its passage, only 28 of 351 communities had 
fulfilled the statute’s 10 percent benchmark and most of these were cities like Boston, 
Worcester and Springfield. 188 Despite the fact that the state shared the honor of having 
the most expensive housing in the nation, the majority of its wealthiest towns had failed 
to build even a single low-income unit. These suburbs continued to assert  “herculean 
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efforts” to challenge any plan to bring mixed-income housing to their communities. 189 
Newton and Lexington both sought to transcend the controversy that had dominated local 
politics for protracted periods. In the late 1970s, both communities enacted inclusionary 
zoning policies, which led each town to build a limited number of affordable housing 
units primarily to serve elderly white residents. These projects provided only token 
solutions to the twin problems of racial segregation and suburban exclusion and did little 
to change the predominately white and middle-class demographic of both communities.  
The experiments with constructing mixed-income housing in Concord, Lexington 
and Newton prove that not every suburbanite opposed the concept of living in a 
socioeconomically diverse community. Many residents fought hard to force their 
neighbors to accept responsibility for the problems of racial and spatial inequality, but 
these efforts fell drastically short. The affordable housing effort never sparked any 
serious discussion of the ways in which stringent zoning laws made questionable sites 
like the Wheeler Property in Concord the only plots available for multi-family 
developments. Nor did it lead these affordable housing proponents and environmentalists 
to recognize that their common enemy of unregulated growth had created the lack of both 
open space and socioeconomic diversity in the suburbs. This limited solution has also 
helped further enshrine class segregation as an accepted and guiding principle of the 
agenda of both political parties as well as federal housing policy. 190  
Like the fair housing movement and the METCO program, affordable housing 
advocates reveal another important example of the ways in which suburban liberals 
provided largely individualist and symbolic solutions to the structural problems. These 
                                                
189 Canellos, “After 20 Years, Anti-Snob Zoning Found Ineffective.”  
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activists did succeed in building a small number of units in a few suburbs, just as they 
had brought a handful of African-American families and students in earlier endeavors, 
but they failed to alter the structures of exclusion and inequality in any significant way. 
Ultimately, the battle over affordable housing provides an especially poignant example of 
the ways the ideology of suburban liberalism has more constricted than assisted the 
ongoing efforts to create meaningful social equality. These possibility and constraints in 
suburban liberals’ ability to accept responsibility for the consequences of structural 
segregation came into equally sharp focus during the busing crisis, which is discussed in 









In 1975, Newton resident Marjorie Arons wrote an editorial in the local 
newspaper asking:  “Where are Liberals Going?”1 “It was easier during the Vietnam 
War—you were either for it or against,” Arons observed, but in the economic recession 
of the 1970s, “pocketbook concerns conflict with their just goals of a just society and 
equal distribution of available resources.” In Newton, which carried one of the highest 
property tax rates in the nation, many residents made their priorities clear. “Belt-
tightening seems to have choked off this spirit of altruism, even of equity,” Arons 
complained. “The community is uptight. We dig a moat.” The community’s wavering 
commitment to the Metropolitan Council of Educational Opportunity (METCO), the one-
way, voluntary and state-funded integration program during the Boston busing crisis, 
captured the changing outlook at which Aron’s question aimed. The battle that ensued in 
Newton to preserve the program exposed the fundamental dilemma at the heart of 
suburban liberalism between fiscal concerns and a commitment to racial and spatial 
equality.  
Throughout the postwar period the issue of quality education shaped both the 
housing choices and political agenda of a majority of white suburbanites in 
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Massachusetts and across the nation.2 Defense of parental autonomy and class and race 
privilege played central roles in galvanizing suburban backlash to school desegregation in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Certainly not all suburban residents viewed racial integration 
programs like METCO as a threat to their children’s education, with many supporting 
one-way integration programs like METCO. This vision of metropolitan integration, 
however, remained firmly rooted in a suburban-centered ideology that interpreted racial 
discrimination in terms of personal prejudice rather than structural inequality.  
Despite an apparent commitment to the ideals of racial equality, many residents in 
traditionally liberal communities like Newton clung to a political outlook of middle-class 
entitlements and market-based individualism. The individualist and consumer-based 
worldview led its adherents to see racial harmony largely in market-based terms. Thus, 
they could support one-way, voluntary programs like METCO, which offered the 
perceived benefits of educational equity without the inconveniences or financial 
sacrifices of a more systemic fully metropolitan solution. This interpretation of consumer 
rights allowed many suburbanites to believe they were entitled to the perceived 
educational benefits of METCO without spending local tax dollars to attain it. The 
residents in these communities, therefore, supported integration in theory but voiced 
reluctance to accept any remedy that would potentially affect their property values and 
tax rates or force them to send their own children into the inner city. 
By the time of the mandatory desegregation of the Boston Public Schools in 1974, 
the nationally recognized METCO program had already placed 2,600 students in more 
than 30 communities, including 345 in Newton alone. The busing crisis provided an 
important moment of opportunity for expanding the small program. Amidst the confusion 
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caused by court-ordered busing, many suburban liberals promoted the expansion of 
METCO as a middle ground between the proposals of comprehensive metropolitan 
integration and the violent resistance of the antibusing movement. In response to this call, 
Newton and other suburban communities sought either to get involved for the first time in 
the voluntary integration initiative or to increase the number of students currently 
transported to their towns. The Massachusetts government, however, was in the midst of 
fiscal crisis and announced it could not afford to finance this rise in participation. Instead, 
it requested that suburban towns accept limited financial responsibility to keep the 
program going. Many residents strongly refused, and some began to oppose the 
initiative’s premise outright. The struggles to preserve the program in Newton and 
elsewhere that took shape against the backdrop of urban busing crisis and the national 
recession revealed the clear limits of suburban liberalism to foster a sense of collective 
responsibility for the problems of structural inequality that the busing crisis itself 
reflected.  
 Despite the voluminous literature on the Boston busing crisis, most accounts 
provide little or no discussion of suburban liberals or METCO.  These works focus 
primarily on white working class resistance to mandatory desegregation.3 In an effort to 
treat the politically alienated white working-class neighborhood defenders with 
seriousness and sympathy, these scholars have effectively taken at face value the 
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“antibusers” depictions of  “suburban liberals” like Wellesley resident Federal Judge W. 
Arthur Garrity, as the primary culprits in the controversy without examining fully their 
role in the desegregation dilemma. 4 These accounts tend to give METCO and the issue 
of voluntary metropolitan integration only a passing reference and overlook the funding 
controversies in places like Newton even though they remained front-page news 
throughout the era of court-ordered busing. 5 A set of civil rights scholars have criticized 
these works for treating white resistance as the only story of the Boston busing crisis and 
marginalizing the black community as passive victims. As an important corrective they 
have concentrated on years of grassroots activism by urban African-Americans for 
educational equality that culminated in the class action suit of a group of black parents 
against the Boston Public Schools.6 These revised accounts, however, also focus 
primarily on the strategies of residents within the city and thereby also overlook the 
suburbs and the politics surrounding voluntary busing during the desegregation era. 
Placing white suburban residents and METCO at the center rather than periphery of the 
story of the busing crisis challenges these standard narratives. It demonstrates that 
ordinary white suburban residents were not passive bystanders but played fundamental 
roles in shaping both the remedies and political legacy of the school desegregation 
controversy.  
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 The efforts to preserve METCO expose the vibrant strains of political moderation 
and conservatism that existed even in such supposed bastions of liberalism as Newton. 
The combination of historians’ emphasis on reactionary populists and dismissive 
depictions of liberals outside of Boston have together obscured the prevalence of a 
fiscally moderate suburban worldview that transcended party lines. The battles over the 
future of METCO reveal the more complex spectrum of political ideologies that operated 
in suburban settings. Untangling the motivations for many residents’ reservations about 
METCO and the idea of metropolitan integration as a whole provides a more nuanced 
understanding of liberalism and conservatism and their relationship to one another. It 
illustrates how, as much as any election, the issues of quality education and taxpayer 
rights in the suburbs came to shape the political landscape of the 1970s. These battles 
also reinforce the constraints that this suburban-centered emphasis on fiscal and racial 
moderation placed upon grassroots liberal activism. As with the largely unsuccessful 
quest to build affordable housing in the suburbs, the battles over METCO highlight 
grassroots liberal activists’ limited effectiveness at challenging or changing the dominant 
suburban sensibility of market-based individualism, pocketbook politics, and  racial and 
class exclusivity.  
 The implications of these forms of fiscal conservatism extend beyond the 
budgetary battles of 1975 and 1976. The refusal of many suburban residents to accept 
even limited financial responsibility for the problem of school desegregation had far-
reaching consequences. This fiscally moderate stance permanently ended the discussion 
about more comprehensive metropolitan integration programs in and around Boston and 
seriously constrained the quest for educational equity nationally. The struggles over 
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METCO also crystallized a language and outlook of taxpayer rights among suburban 
residents across the political spectrum.  This fiscally moderate agenda culminated in 1980 
in the successful suburban-driven ballot initiative for Proposition 2 ½ that placed a cap on 
property taxes and, by extension, state and local government spending discussed in 
chapter 10.  
This controversy did not spell the demise of METCO or suburban liberalism,  as 
many commentators either feared or celebrated. The outcome of the protracted struggle 
underscores the ways in which the pragmatic strategy of white liberal activists to pursue 
their agenda had repercussions at the metropolian, state and national levels. Both during 
and after the busing crisis, the black and white leadership of METCO warned supporters 
and detractors that the program offered very limited relief to the much more complex 
problems of school desegregation and that its success actually rested on the small number 
of students it transported into the suburbs. Examining the institutional and ideological 
limits to METCO, therefore, provides a way of understanding how and why programs 
rooted in the individualist principles of suburban liberalism have persisted but have failed  
to ever fully address the enduring dilemmas of structural inequality in Massachusetts and 
nationwide.  
 
Send Wellesley’s Children to Roxbury Schools 
From the moment the ink dried on the Racial Imbalance Act (RIA) in 1965, the 
Boston School Committee engaged in a standoff with the State Board of Education. 
Although the law sought to provide the state oversight over the desegregation of the 
Boston Public Schools, the School Committee willfully evaded the demands for the 
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implementation of such a policy though various forms of delay that actually increased the 
rate of racial segregation.7 By 1971, Boston had sixty-seven racially imbalanced 
(meaning more than half non-white) schools as opposed to forty-six in 1965 and more 
than 4,000 white students attended schools with no children of color.8 Frustrated by these 
evasive tactics, the state Board of Education used its legal power to cut off state funds to 
the School Committee. Encouraged by the perennial mandate of white Boston voters, 
however, the Committee members became even more intransigent, leading the state and 
activists to find other avenues to challenge them.9  
The RIA not only prevented more forceful state action but also made the 
desegregation proponents in Massachusetts slower to turn to the courts than in many 
other major urban areas. The combination of the persistent refusal of the Committee and 
the success of desegregation cases in other parts of the country, however, led civil rights 
groups to pursue the issue in both state and federal courts. A series of rulings between 
1967 and 1973 by the state’s Supreme Judicial Court had upheld the constitutionality of 
the RIA. These decisions brought the School Committee ever closer to compliance, but 
the body continued to resist. In 1972, the local chapter of the NAACP also filed a class-
action suit in U.S. District Court on behalf of fifteen black Boston parents, claiming that 
schools officials had intentionally maintained a segregated school system and thereby 
denied black children equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Judge W. 
                                                
7  Harvard Center for Law and Education, A Study of the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act, 214. In its 
most extreme maneuver, the committee encouraged the use of the “open enrollment policy” originally 
intended to allow black students to enroll in primarily white schools to enable white students to transfer 
from schools in black or transitional other sections of the city.  
8  Harvard Center for Law and Education, A Study of the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act, i.   
9  Ross and Berg, I Respectfully Disagree, 4-5. 
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Arthur Garrity deliberated on his decision in Morgan v. Hennigan for over two years 
creating a period of increased uncertainty.  
While Garrity mulled over the evidence, members of the School Committee and 
their grassroots supporters launched a campaign to convince the Massachusetts 
legislature to repeal the Racial Imbalance Act altogether. As the NAACP and other 
groups focused their energies on the federal case, METCO filled a vacuum, since 
repealing the RIA would remove the legal footing on which the program’s existence and 
funding rested. This campaign underscored that the program’s organizational structure, 
combining white suburbanites and African-Americans from Boston, made it particularly 
effective for pressuring the state legislature.10  These lobbying activities brought METCO 
both desired and undesired attention as it thrust the program and the concept of 
metropolitan integration closer to the center of the desegregation drama.  
The conversation surrounding the future of the Racial Imbalance Act abruptly 
ended on June 21, 1974, when Judge Garrity announced his long awaited decision in the 
federal court case. In Morgan v. Hennigan, Garrity flatly rejected the School 
Committee’s argument that residential segregation, not their policies, had created racial 
imbalance. He ruled the Boston school authorities had “knowingly carried out a 
systematic program of segregation affecting all the city’s students, teachers, and school 
facilities and had intentionally brought about or maintained a dual school system. ” He 
declared, “The entire school system of Boston is unconstitutionally segregated.”11 The 
152-page opinion was at least five times the length of the rulings concerning other cities, 
which Garrity had done purposely both to prevent reversal on appeal and to overwhelm 
                                                
10 METCO, EXECUTIVE BOARD MINUTES, February 26, 1970, Box 5, Folder 26, METCO. 
11 Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F.Supp. 410 (D.Mass.1974).  
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the busing opposition through a preponderance of evidence.12  The Supreme Court 
decisions in Swann v. Mecklenberg and Keyes v. Denver gave Garrity firm legal footing 
to make his ruling, but more importantly he had spent two years parsing out the 
intricacies of the Boston school’s placement policies. He found that Boston officials had 
used busing, facility construction, district lines and feeder patterns to maintain a 
segregated system and that their hiring practices had discriminated against black 
applicants for teaching and administrative positions.13 While he acknowledged that 
residential segregation did exist in Boston, he did not believe it had influenced the 
deliberate actions of the School Committee, nor did the committee appear to uniformly 
uphold the “neighborhood school” policy, which Garrity deemed  “have amounted to a 
policy at all policy at all.”14 It turned out that the tactics of the School Committee to 
avoid compliance with the Racial Imbalance Act provided Garrity with even clearer 
evidence of its willful “intent” to segregate. 
Garrity focused his attention more on confirming the existence of the School 
Committee’s segregationist policies than in coming up with an effective remedy. With 
only three months until the start of the school year, he decided to implement as Phase I of 
the desegregation remedy a plan already developed by the State Board of Education, 
which called for the busing of 17,000 to 18,000 students. The arbitrarily drawn plan 
matched Roxbury and South Boston High Schools, which would prove to have disastrous 
                                                
12 Legally this strategy worked. Six months later the US Court of Appeals ruled, “in light of the ample 
factual record and the precedents of the Supreme Court, we do no see how the court could have reached 
any other decision.” Lukas, Common Ground, 238-239.  
13 Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F.Supp. 473. 
14 Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F.Supp. 473.  
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consequences.15  From the first day of school in September 1974 onward, some city 
neighborhoods became engulfed in violence.  Mobs of whites sought to prevent 
implementation of the court order through a combination of bricks and slurs. The 
Governor eventually called in the National Guard, but it did little to quell the violence. 
The showdown lasted for two years,  climaxing with the infamous photograph of the 
white students chasing an African-American man in a business suit with an American 
flag, which symbolically sealed Boston’s reputation as “the most racist city in 
America.”16 The images of the confrontations transmitted across the country became a 
flashpoint of attitudes about racial equality. Some interpreted the conflict as evidence of 
the pervasiveness of white working-class racism, some as the problems of elite suburban 
liberal social engineers like Garrity trying to impose their vision onto poor whites and 
blacks. For others it called into question long-held regional distinctions about the 
supposed backwardness of the South and the enlightenment of the North.  
Writers like Ronald Formisano and J. Anthony Lukas have illuminated the classed 
dimensions of the busing incident by the ways in which spectacled, Harvard-educated 
and suburban-dwelling federal judge Arthur Garrity became the tangible face for a larger 
confluence of anger, frustration and class-based resentments of the opponents to the court 
order. 17 In the years following his decision Garrity received thousands of letters, which 
demonstrated the range of frustration that Bostonians felt over the desegregation order. 
                                                
15 The architect of the state plan, Charles Glenn, described that the its drawing was “largely mechanical.” 
He explained,  “We simply took a large map and started moving across the city in a big arc from northwest 
to southeast, dividing it into districts so that each school would include the right proportions of black and 
white kids.” Lukas, Common Ground, 239.   
16 For more about this incident and its meanings, see Louis P. Masur, The Soiling of Old Glory: The Story 
of a Photograph That Shocked America (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2008).   
17  For more about Garrity see Lukas, Common Ground 222-251, Formisano, Boston Against Busing, 66-
87. These authors sympathize strongly with this antipathy toward Garrity and other officials, suggesting 
that the federal court orders assured the burden of integration fell on the poor of both races.  
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These pieces of correspondence, in particular, document the sense of spatial inequity 
driving much of antibusing movement’s anger.  Many ordinary citizens sent letters 
simply addressed to “Judge Garrity, Wellesley” or to his actual home address of 40 
Radcliffe Road, demonstrating how much the jurist’s hometown became a part of 
descriptors that both the media and the anti-busing leadership used to present Garrity and 
his decision. 18 Opponents of busing frequently invoked a list of exclusive suburbs with 
Wellesley usually at the top. For instance, an angry Boston student wrote to Garrity, 
“Why should I be discriminated against just because I live in South Boston and not in 
Newton or Wesley (sic) or Acton or any other rich suburban town.”19 Drawing further 
attention to the judge’s choice of residency, the leading anti-busing group, Restore Our 
Alienated Rights  (ROAR), staged several protests at Garrity’s home following the court 
order.  The largest of these trips took place one Friday night in early October when entire 
families from various parts of Boston joined a motorcade from the city to Wellesley with 
the signs “Put Garrity on a Bus” attached to their cars. 20 Almost 3,000 demonstrators 
filled the street outside the judge’s white colonial house, singing “Here We Go Southie,” 
“We Want Garrity,” and reciting a mock pledge of allegiance accusing the judge of 
providing “liberty and justice for none.” Further emphasizing the themes of patriotism, 
democracy and freedom, a young man waved a large American flag at the line of 
Wellesley Police officers standing on Garrity’s front lawn. A small group of 
demonstrators tried to reach the judge’s home on a Saturday night a few weeks later, but 
                                                
18 Garrity meticulously organized and saved all of these letter, which he preserved in chronological order as 
part of the W. Arthur, Garrity Jr. Papers on the Boston Schools Desegregation Case, Archives and Special 
Collections, Department, Healey Library, University of Massachusetts-Boston (hereafter “JG”). Judge 
Garrity stipulated that only a single initial of the authors could be published.  
19 Someone who just wants to be EQUAL to W. Arthur Garrity, September 9, 1974, Box 49, Folder 4, JG.  
20  Tom Mulligan, “Wellesley Protest,” South Middlesex News, October 5, 1974.  
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police stopped them at the Wellesley line.21 These trips undoubtedly helped the 
antibusing activists draw attention to spatial inequities embedded in the desegregation 
order. The protests solidified Wellesley into a key coordinate point in the antibusers’ 
cognitive cartography of metropolitan’s Boston economic privilege.  
 Opponents of the court order also relied on economic geography to point out that 
Garrity and prominent liberal politicians’ own children remained exempted from the 
decision and its consequences because they lived in the suburbs or went to private 
schools. Many citizens placed their anger about the spatial contradictions of Garrity’s 
order in explicitly racially-coded imagery.  An angry Bostonian even affixed the 
handwritten headline “Send Wellesley’s Children to Roxbury Schools” to a newspaper 
clipping about a black man with a gun robbing a white woman and sent it to Garrity’s 
home address.22 Other white Boston residents framed their outrage and resentment that 
Garrity and his neighbors did not have to bear the burden of desegregation in terms of 
class injustice rather than racial antipathy.  “You live in the suburbs,” an East Boston 
mother chastised Garrity, “It would be wonderful if children from South Boston, Hyde 
Park, Roxbury, East Boston, and the rest of the City could go to nice suburban 
schools…like your kids did, and the children of Senator Kennedy and Senator Brooke 
and Governor Sargent. ”23  
For many more middle-class whites, the excemption of these politicians from the 
consequences of court-ordered busing embodied their increased frustration about a loss of 
                                                
21 “Anti-busing protest march draws suburbs, politicians,” South Middlesex News, October 29, 1974.   
22 “Life and Death Drama,” September, 1974, JG. Fear of crime was a common theme in the letters to 
Garrity (Formisano, Boston Against Busing, 184-187). 
23  Formisano Boston Against Busing, 178. The anti-busers launched a similar attack on the Boston Globe, 
since it strongly supported desegregation even though most of its staff, including Chief Editor Thomas 
Winship lived in the suburbs and the paper had a growing reputation for a “suburban orientation.” Lukas, 
Common Ground, 473-508; Formisano, Boston Against Busing, 156-157. 
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individual choice and control over their children’s education.24 An enraged white Boston 
resident observed that parental choice had become “reserved now for Brookline and 
Dover,” which were the respective hometowns of Michael Dukakis and Francis Sargent, 
the two candidates in the 1974 gubernatorial race. 25 Public figures like Garrity, Sargent 
and Dukakis clearly provided a convenient synecdoche for the white antibusers’ 
resentments about suburban liberals as a whole. A creative city resident sent an imagined 
letter of apology from Garrity to South Boston for singling them out in the desegregation 
order, declaring, “What was a more segregative act than my own and thousands like me 
who chose to reside in Wellesley and other racially isolated places?” The letter went on 
to decry, “Our action was a rather cheap way of showing our liberalism.”26 Opponents on 
all points of the political spectrum had lobbed dismissive comments against suburban 
liberals for years, but none had the staying power of the statements of these South Boston 
protestors. Garrity’s naïve surprise at the reaction to his order also, as Lukas has 
suggested, symbolized liberals’ lack of understanding of the social and structural 
complexities of the city and further reinforced a sense of the spatial and political 
disjunction between blue-collar city dwellers and white middle-class suburban 
professionals.  
Busing opponents found the METCO program another effective image for 
pointing out the inequities of both the court order and suburban liberal exclusivity. In 
opposing the program, many ordinary white citizens assumed a discourse of victimization 
                                                
24  Formisano points out that many middle-class whites in places like West Roxbury saw the issue of busing 
in more individualist and upwardly mobile terms and voiced concerns about their own children’s education 
than in the more populist terms of lower-income residents of South Boston and Charlestown who sought to 
defend their neighborhoods. Formisano, Boston Against Busing, 133-137. 
25  “Wellesley Garrity,” September 1974, Box 49, Folder 4, JG.  




and inequality that subverted both the rights-based language and themes of civil rights 
movement and New Deal liberalism.27 Johanne Tallent of South Boston chafed against 
the fact that her tax dollars financed a program that she “couldn’t use if I wanted to, 
because of my color.”28 Other white parents invoked ideas of reverse discrimination to 
challenge the race-based admissions policy of the program. “METCO busses black 
children to suburban schools which are supposed to have a better educational system,” 
one white Boston parent complained, “Yet if I am dissatisfied with the Boston 
educational system, I am being discriminated because of my white race and do not have 
the same right to bus the child to that suburban school.”29  
Conservative journalist Dick Sennott and antibusing Boston School Committee 
member John Kerrigan helped their supporters draw the connections between the 
program and the contradictions in the suburban liberal attitudes. 30  In his widely 
circulated column, Sennott often denounced “suburban liberals” for telling he and other 
white Bostonians “what ‘racists’ we are because we object to forced busing. And they go 
home to their Newtons, their Wellesleys…. where a select few minority kids come out 
and spend six hours in their schools but are forbidden to live there.”31 Kerrigan also 
attacked suburban residents who cited METCO as an example of their commitment and 
involvement to problems of the city and frequently dubbed the program a “perfect 
                                                
27  For example a Roslindale couple who called themselves “United States citizens, lifetime residents of 
Boston, homeowners in Roslindale, hardworking taxpayers and parents” wrote to Garrity that they would 
like our tax money spent for quality education and teachers and not for buses, fuel, police and helicopters 
and motorcycles around our homes and community constantly.” T and M to Judge Garrity, October 8, 
1974, Box 49, Folder 6, JG. For more on the ways that white urban residents appropriated the ideology of 
the Civil Rights Movement and the New Deal, see Sugrue, Origins, 209-229.  
28  Johanne Tallent to Editor, Boston Herald American, September 23, 1976.  
29 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN, September 23, 1974, Box 49, Folder 5, JG.  
30 Formisano, Boston Against Busing, 56.  
31 Formisano, Boston Against Busing, 189-190. 
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example of tokenism.”  32 Even before Garrity’s ruling, Kerrigan had sought to push the 
limits of this “tokenism” by submitting legislation for a ten-fold expansion of METCO 
that would transport 19,000 black students to all of the 85 towns within 20 miles of 
Boston, placing an average of 224 students in each community. He believed his plan 
provided a strong counterpoint to the ideals of “cocktail party liberals who have damned 
us from one end of the Commonwealth,…who sit comfortably in their lily white 
communities with their lily white schools.”33  
The white antibusers were not only Boston residents to invoke the METCO 
program in order to point out the inequities of the busing order. For many members of the 
city’s black community,  the program reinforced their limited options. Thousands of 
minority parents tried to put their children in METCO before and after Phase I began, but 
the program was only equipped to take a few hundred new students each year.  In 
September 1974, Garrity received a poignant handwritten request for reassignment from 
an African-American girl sent to South Boston High under the court order.   The girl 
explained that she and nine siblings were so scared they had only gone to school twice 
and instead that he put them in METCO.  “I know a girl who goes with Medco to suburb 
and she is gonna go to college cause they teach you a lot and no one is a scared to go to 
school, ” she implored. “I rely want to go to good school where there is good kid and I 
will be able to get a good education, so we don’t have to be called poor anymore.”  She 
asked that Judge Garrity send her, her siblings and other black students assigned to 
schools in South Boston to the suburbs because “We could all learn more and be friends 
                                                
32Boston School Committee, Proceedings of the School Committee, January 15, 1974, Proceedings of the 
School Committee of the City of Boston, 1974, (City of Boston, Administrative Services Printing Section, 
1976).  
33Boston School Committee, Proceedings of the School Committee, January 15, 1974.  
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cause the people in better neighborhoods like us better.  They would not try to kill us or 
anything like that.”34 These desperate pleas from white and black Boston residents helped 
position METCO and the issues of metropolitan integration and suburban exclusivity at 
the center of the ongoing debate surrounding desegregation.  
 
Metropolitanization 
The focus on the violence of the busing crisis has obscured the centrality of 
metropolitan integration and the METCO program specifically during the desegregation 
era. In fact,  “metropolitanization” was a key word in Boston residents' lexicon of busing-
based terminology.  Since the early 1960s, progressive social scientists had contended 
that a two-way busing program between Boston and its surrounding suburbs offered the 
best remedy to the intertwined problems of school and housing segregation. Advocates of 
metropolitan integration had repeatedly stressed that the compact geography of Greater 
Boston made it ideal for two-way busing. For instance, Roxbury and Brookline are less 
than two miles apart. Indeed, several of the white suburban liberal architects of METCO 
had initially envisioned the one-way program as but the first step toward comprehensive 
metropolitan integration. By 1974, the state’s most powerful officials, including 
Governor Francis Sargent, future Governor Michael Dukakis, and Mayor Kevin White, 
had joined these calls for a significant expansion of METCO as an alternative to the 
compulsory integration of the Boston Public Schools. These politicians each suggested 
significantly more modest increases than John Kerrigan’s bold call for involving 19,000 
                                                
34 Anonymous to Judge Garrity, September 1974, Box 49, Folder 5, JG. 
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students and used a much more moderate language that placed an emphasis on individual 
choice rather than force to frame the necessity of a metropolitan solution. 35  
During the fall of 1974, with the protests raging outside South Boston High 
School and tarnishing the progressive image of city, several officials and academics 
renewed their campaign to involve the suburbs in Phase II of Garrity’s remedy. Many 
ordinary Boston residents joined in, demanding, “Upper and Middle class should be 
included in busing plans.”36 “The whole idea of metropolitanization would be great,” 
Garrity publicly responded to these suggestions, “if there was a constitutional way to do 
it.”37 Just weeks after Morgan was announced, the Supreme Court voted 5-4 in Milliken 
v. Bradley to overturn a federal court consolidation decree demanding that the suburbs of 
Detroit, not just the city proper, be held responsible for remedying segregation and 
therefore be included in school integration plans. The Court limited the desegregation 
                                                
35 In 1973 White issued a position paper called  “Achieving Equal Education in Boston” that called for 
equalizing state aid to schools, building magnet schools to attract suburbanites, and significantly expanding 
the student body and the funding of METCO, which was part of his recognition that “not the separation of 
races inside the city, but the separation of classes in and outside the city” that produced educational 
inequality. Mayor Kevin White, “Achieving Equal Education in Boston,” April 10, 1973, Box 4, FWS. 
Lupo, Liberty’s Chosen Home, 159-161. In May, 1974, Governor Sargent suggested that instead of 
mandatory two-way busing, the state adopt a “freedom of choice” plan for minority children by doubling 
the size of METCO from 1,900 to 4,000 students, increasing the budget of program, creating magnet 
schools and giving black parents the option of either an imbalanced neighborhood school or an integrated 
school elsewhere in the city. “Sargent’s Televised message on the Racial Imbalance Act,” Boston Globe, 
May 11, 1974. His opponent in the upcoming Governor race, Dukakis proposed dividing the city into a 
dozen equally populated community districts of 60,000 people each along “historical, geographical and 
natural boundaries.” In order to further the goal of offering integrated learning also suggested the expansion 
of METCO. See, Michael S. Dukakis, “Statement on Racial Imbalance and the Boston Schools,” May 14, 
1974 Box 20, Folder 649, Jack Backman Papers, Special Collections, State Library of Massachusetts 
(hereafter “Backman”). 
36  D to Judge Garrity, October 16, 1974, Box 49, Folder 8, JG. 
37 Garrity stressed the patent difficulty of proving the deliberate discrimination of the suburbs since Detroit 
had a higher percentage of school segregation than Boston, with a 73 percent as opposed to 32 percent 
black student population, and the Court still had not accepted a metropolitan remedy, see Alan Eisner, 
“NAACP Lawyer Doubtful About Suburban Busing,” Boston Herald-American, October 18, 1974. Many 
experts stressed the difficulty of finding such a solution in part because the state’s anti-snob zoning law 
would make it virtually impossible to fulfill a test of deliberate discrimination. Thomas Pettigrew 
speculated most suburban communities could deflect charges of a segregated school system by asserting 
they abided by Chapter 774; see James G. Colbert, “Anti-snob zoning law may prevent forced busing to 
suburbs,” Brookline Ledger, November 8, 1974.  
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remedy to the city of Detroit due to the absence of evidence that suburban policies were 
deliberately discriminatory. 38 Milliken effectively thwarted future attempts at the court-
ordered consolidation of city and suburban districts across the country, but it still left 
open the use of voluntary metropolitan integration programs like METCO. Garrity had 
clearly read the Milliken ruling closely and saw that while the Supreme Court had not 
entirely shut the door to metropolitan remedies, it had made most options extremely 
legally tenuous. He chided Mayor White and other politicians that “To talk about 
Milliken v. Bradley as if it holds some real prospect of involving the suburbs is not fair 
to the people of Boston.” 39 During the exchange, Garrity indicated that he would not 
require full-scale metropolitan integration in his final desegregation order, but that he 
would probably recommend the expansion of METCO and other voluntary integration 
programs as a means to bridge the political and social divisions between Boston and the 
suburbs.40 This suggestion actually revived, in the words of the Herald American, 
“dormant hopes that metropolitanization might still exist as an alternative to ease the 
tensions which have crippled the city.”41  
In spite of Garrity’s stern warnings, the Boston School Committee continued its 
effort to make METCO a centerpiece of the next phase of the desegregation process.42 
                                                
38 Lassiter, Silent Majority, 314-315. 
39 Muriel Cohen, “Garrity Asks For Bus Plan Involving the Suburbs,” Boston Globe, October 16, 1974.  
40 “Garrity Broadens Final Plan Options,” Boston Globe, October 17, 1974; Muriel Cohen, “Metco 
expansion—the choice is up to the suburbs,” Boston Globe, October 28, 1974.  Judge Garrity ultimately 
decided not to make METCO or metropolitan integration a major component of his Phase II order that he 
released in the spring of 1975. In fact, METCO’s lawyer carefully read the entire decision and found only 
one reference to the program in footnote related to handbook distributed to Boston parents. The Reference 
read: “Footnote 3: METCO EdCo or similar programs shall not be offered as options, but the booklet shall 
inform readers of the nature of such programs and shall provide an opportunity for the parent or student to 
request further information about the programs.” See, Mark A. Michelson to Stephen E. Shaw, May 16, 
1975, Box 29, Folder 2, METCO.  
41 “A Second Chance,” Boston Herald American, November 1, 1974.  
42 Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the School Committee had tried to use METCO in its court and 
state mandated compliance with the Racial Imbalance Act. See for example, Nina McCain, “Murphy bill 
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During the winter of 1974-1975,  Committee member Kathleen Sullivan led the 
campaign to expand METCO into a more widespread metropolitan integration plan. The 
daughter of the owner of the New England Patriots, Sullivan had developed a reputation 
as the most moderate and pragmatic member of the committee.43 Even though Sullivan 
aimed to distance herself from reactionary populists like Kerrigan and Louise Day Hicks, 
her invocation of a metropolitan solution built on the antibusing community’s 
resentments of the suburbs and the exclusivity of the METCO program. She collaborated 
with Representative Michael Daly on a bill for a one-way busing program based on the 
METCO model that would require all communities within a twenty-mile radius of the 
city with an above average household income to open 10 percent of their school seats to 
inner-city children both black and white. Sullivan believed the plan would ease the 
burden of desegregation on Boston and provide urban parents more choice over where 
their children went to school.44 Similar to METCO, the legislation rested on the notion 
that the state would underwrite the proposal and, like Kerrigan’s plan, would provide 
close to 20,000 spaces for Boston students in suburban districts. Unlike Kerrigan’s plan 
or METCO, however, Sullivan and Daly suggested transporting students on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                            
would expand ‘Metco’ concept,” Boston Globe August 20, 1971. For instance, in 1971, the committee 
suggested assigning 3,899 Boston students of color to 71 school systems within thirty miles of Boston and 
that an equal number of white suburban students be transported to the Boston schools. Education 
Commissioner Neil Sullivan had surmised,  “If some of this same boldness and vision could be applied to 
the Schools of Boston, racial imbalance could be eliminated with the speed which was intended.” See, 
Statement of Commissioner Neil V. Sullivan to the Board of Education, June 22nd, 1971 on Racial 
Imbalance in Boston, Box 37, Folder 1209, FH. 
43  Kathleen Sullivan consciously sought to distance herself from the inflammatory rhetoric and tactics of 
John Kerrigan and Louise Day Hicks by repeatedly stating that while she disagreed with Garrity’s orders, 
she believed that the Committee had a responsibility to follow and implement the law, Formisano, Boston 
Against Busing, 61. “Suburbs Asked to Share More Seats.” Boston Globe, September 19, 1975; Rosemary 
O’Leary, “Parks hits ‘missionary role’ for suburban schools,” Belmont Citizen, May 15, 1975.  
44 Alen Jehlen, “Kathleen Sullivan Unafraid to Speak Mind,” Patriot Ledger, May 15, 1975.  
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economic class rather than race. Estimates suggested the initiative would cost around 
$20 million in state funds. 45 
In early January 1975, Sullivan went before the METCO Executive Committee to 
seek support for the legislation. On its face, the proposal appeared to complement the 
basic ideals of the program, and she expected METCO’s endorsement. The leaders of 
METCO, nevertheless, rebuffed her plan.46 The organization had consistently and 
publicly objected to the various proposals to use METCO as a solution to the Boston 
desegregation dilemma, interpreting such proposals regardless if they came from 
Sullivan, Kerrigan or Sargent, as attempts to circumvent “intra city desegregation.”47 
Even before the Morgan decision, the METCO leaders had voiced fears that the program  
would become an “escape hatch” for the Boston School Committee. In 1974, the 
organization released a statement announcing that while it hoped “ the lessons of 
METCO” could be applied in the resolution of the larger question of integration, it did 
not want for the program to be “the primary mechanism through which system-wide 
integration can be accomplished.” As Garrity deliberated over his remedy order, the 
METCO representatives specifically told him they hoped the program could serve as 
model for developing an integration plan and would gladly offer their services to the 
                                                
45  “Metropolitan school bill could cost $20 million,” Boston Globe, January 23, 1975.  
46 METCO, Executive Committee Minutes, January 20, 1975, Box 6, Folder 56, METCO; METCO, Press 
Release, March 5, 1975, Box 32, Folder 11, METCO. 
47  METCO, Annual Report 1973-1974 to the Board of Directors; Jean McGuire to Mr. John Taylor, 
January 21, 1974, Box 12, Folder 22, METCO; This stance was consistent with the position many of 
Boston’s leading black activists who had consistently argued against remedies like the Daly-Sullivan Bill 
because they put the burden of desegregation on black children and diverted money and resources to the 
suburbs, See for instance, Otto and Muriel Snowden, Ellen Jackson to Hon. Walter J. Boverini, Hon. 
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Court, but as a private organization. It was “not equipped or prepared” to be the major 
part of the long-term solution for the problem of systemic school segregation. 48  
The METCO leaders’ response to the Daly-Sullivan Bill revealed their larger 
concerns about the programs survival during the flux and uncertainty caused by the 
busing crisis. The sharp rejection of significant expansion by METCO officials, however, 
also revealed how the program’s individualist ideology and limited scope had shaped its 
institutional contours. Executive Director Jean McGuire and the other leaders of the 
program firmly believed that METCO’s two-pronged mission of providing quality 
educational opportunities for African-American students and limited racial integration 
could only be successful when it transported a small number of students into the suburbs 
on a voluntary basis. The organization was also convinced both that its unique structure 
of city-suburban governmental cooperation and funding process with the state 
government essentially paying METCO, Inc. for its services only worked on a small 
scale. 49  
The METCO staff, moreover, feared that the Daly-Sullivan bill’s call for large-
scale expansion would spark strong suburban backlash against the program and thereby 
heighten, not ease, metropolitan tensions. To quell the potential anxieties of suburban 
residents, METCO officials adopted a language that combined the therapeutic ideas of 
racial liberalism with consumer-based terminology of taxpayer rights in order to speak 
out against the bill. In its statements, the organization aimed to redefine  
“metropolitanization” within the public debate as “sharing resources” rather than 
“desegregation.” This clarification extended METCO’s ongoing efforts to convince white 
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suburban parents that METCO had quantifiable benefits for their children. In a position 
paper outlining its objections to Daly-Sullivan, the program defined itself as a “ model 
for voluntary urban-suburban cooperation,” which served as an “enriching factor in the 
fabric of racially and culturally isolated suburban communities” in a way that was 
“effective in cost and quality.” 50  
METCO leaders’ statements about the class-based components of the Daly-
Sullivan proposal also reveal key elements of the ideology and institutional structure of 
the program.  Since its founding METCO had maintained a delicate balance between a 
largely white suburban-based board and a mostly Boston-based minority staff.   Many of 
the African-American staff members had never articulated a deep-rooted commitment to 
the goal of integration, but, rather, saw the program primarily as a means to advance the 
educational opportunities of a select group of minority children. Jean McGuire, who 
became Executive Director in 1973, clearly promoted this mission, which shaped her 
reaction to the Daly-Sullivan Bill. The daughter of an Episcopal Minister and life-long 
resident of Roxbury, McGuire had personal knowledge of the Boston Public Schools and 
METCO as a former teacher in the city and parent of two children in the program.51 
McGuire understood that the program’s survival partially depended on presenting a 
positive and sympathetic image of African-Americans to white suburbanites.  Drawing on 
the basic ideals of racial uplift, McGuire frequently stressed certain modes of behavior 
for the participants and went to great lengths to ensure that the students involved 
represented an economic cross-section of Boston’s African-American population. 
McGuire and others saw the inclusion of middle-class children as a way to disrupt white 
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suburbanites’ assumptions that all African-Americans were poor, uneducated and lived in 
public housing.  52 They feared that transporting only poor children, as suggested by 
Sullivan and Daly, would thwart this longstanding agenda.53 The stance of METCO and 
its supporters shows the leaders’ skill at navigating the shoals of suburban class and racial 
anxieties. By dismissing the class components of the Daly-Sullivan bill and defining its 
mission explicitly in terms of race, however, the METCO leaders and their sympathizers 
ultimately reified the racial liberal principles of the program and ensured that a more 
serious conversation about the causes and consequences of structural segregation did not 
take place. 
During the late winter of 1975, the leaders of METCO launched a grassroots 
campaign “to mobilize the necessary political support to kill the Daly-Sullivan measure” 
and “maintain the integrity of [the] program.”54 In order to do so, the program relied on 
its extensive network of supporters within the suburbs and the urban black community to 
build political pressure against the bill. The METCO central office distributed a series of 
pamphlets, press releases and policy papers both on its school buses and to suburban 
chapters of the League of Women Voters, civil liberties groups, and liberal organizations. 
The literature contended that Daly-Sullivan could cost up $60 million, take 25 percent of 
students from the city and remove decision-making power from the people most directly 
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affected by busing.  Drawing further distinctions between the program and the proposed 
bill, METCO staffers like Kathy Jones deemed Daly-Sullivan “not an educational 
program; it’s just busing.”55 METCO’s campaign successfully shifted the political tide 
against the Daly-Sullivan Bill. In late April, the Massachusetts state legislature soundly 
defeated the bill with suburban representatives voting almost unanimously against it. In 
the aftermath, Kathleen Sullivan credited METCO’s opposition campaign with bringing 
about the defeat of her proposal. Embracing the language and imagery of her more 
reactionary colleagues, she bitterly noted that METCO had convinced “hypocritical” 
suburban liberals to vote against the bill in order to preserve the size of the “token 
program.”56  
 
 “Hiding in their Suburban Beds” 
Sullivan was not the only person to call into question the “hypocritical” silence of 
suburban liberals voices on the busing issue. Antibusers like John Kerrigan frequently 
charged that “suburban coat-tail party liberals” would not want to get their “lily white 
suburban hands soiled” by getting involved in the desegregation of the city’s schools. 
Mayor Kevin White referred to them as “psalm-singing hypocrites.”57 Supporters of the 
court order also joined in this attack on the inaction of suburban liberals. A reporter in 
Weston asked why, with the situation so dire in Boston, “the so-called liberals” of 
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Weston were “hiding in their suburban beds with the covers pulled tightly around their 
heads.”58  
Suburban liberals were not, however, as silent or paralyzed as these depictions 
may have suggested. Throughout the fall of 1974, liberal activists throughout the Route 
128 suburbs met to discuss ways to help alleviate the situation in the city.59 For instance, 
Herbert and Helene LeVine, the leaders of a variety of suburban grassroots campaigns 
related to fair housing and civil rights, hosted a brunch at their Newton home for 
members of the Americans for Democratic Action to develop a strategy for suburban 
support. Likewise, Citizens for Participation in Political Action (CPPAX), which had 
over 2500 members, most of whom resided in the suburbs, became particularly active in 
seeking to create an appropriate and effective response and staged rallies and meetings. 
Some progressive suburbanites suggested that the network of activists must force their 
fellow citizens to recognize they “belong to the white noose which surrounds and partly 
strangles our central cities” by advocating for the “metropolitanization of schools and the 
sharing of finance in order to achieve full equality.”60 Yet these committed activists 
found it difficult to build serious support for such an idea among even those suburban 
residents who wanted to end racial segregation in the Boston school system.  
Liberal activists, therefore, decided that advocating for the expansion for METCO 
would serve as a more popular way to get their fellow residents to demonstrate their 
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desire to help reduce the problems in Boston. Adding more METCO students to their 
school systems offered suburbanites in traditionally liberal communities a chance to 
chart a middle ground between the reactionary populism of the antibusing movement and 
the suggestions of a full-scale metropolitan remedy. Despite the fact that by 1974 
METCO boasted the involvement of over 30 suburbs, the majority of the students 
attended school in fewer than half of the participating municipalities, with by far the 
largest enrollments in the historically liberal suburbs around Route 128. The rates of 
participation closely correlated with the geography of political liberalism and economic 
affluence. Newton hosted 350 students, Lexington 280, Brookline 245, Wellesley and 
Weston 161 each, Framingham 144 and Lincoln 120, which remained the largest 
concentrations of METCO children in any communities.61  
In the fall of 1974, grassroots liberals initiated a campaign to increase 
participation in METCO in their own communities and throughout metropolitan Boston. 
One suburban mother declared,  “Metco is a token solution, one that leaves thousands of 
children behind.” Yet she contended it would give a few students an opportunity that 
“very likely will be lost otherwise.”62 Amy Lamson of Newton suggested that adding 
more METCO students “poses no threat to the largely advantaged residents of Newton” 
and should be welcomed as an opportunity to take positive action in line with their social 
consciences.”63 Jean Bartlett also advocated that Newton accept many more METCO 
students by contending that the program was as beneficial for suburban children as for 
Boston students. She bemoaned how Newton students suffered from the problems of 
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“isolation and insulation” and suggested “If there were more opportunity to go to school 
with Boston children our children would be better prepared to participate in the world in 
which they live.”64 
The calls for increased participation in METCO quickly extended beyond 
concentrated groups of grassroots liberal activists in traditionally affluent and liberal 
places like Newton and Lexington to moderate suburban residents in more politically 
conservative and middle-class communities.  Several opinion polls revealed that 
suburban residents across Greater Boston and the political spectrum supported solutions 
like METCO as long they did not have to pay, busing went one way, and only involved 
the placement of a few minority students in each classroom.65 Unlike the antibusers in 
places like South Boston, many white suburbanites saw METCO not as a threat, but, 
rather, a means to maintain their neighborhood schools. Suburbs throughout Boston’s 
ring had experienced severe enrollment declines in the early 1970s, and many believed 
that filling empty seats with minority students from Boston would provide a means to 
keep local schools open and funded.66 Residents who advocated this politically and 
racially moderate compromise, therefore, seemed more against the closing of their 
neighborhood elementary schools than having black students in the same classrooms as 
their children.  
Many state officials also saw METCO as a potential middle ground in the 
desegregation debate and endorsed the grassroots campaign. During the fall of 1974, 
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State Education Commissioner Gregory Anrig publicly urged suburban school 
committees to open seats for METCO students, which he promised the state would 
subsidize. He announced that over $1.5 million of the state’s $5.3 million appropriation 
for the program remained unused, which could pay for a thousand more children to get 
involved. “All we need is a commitment to open the seats,” he stated. 67 Anrig saw this 
drive as a means to alleviate the situation in Boston through limited voluntary action 
rather through a comprehensive compulsory mandate. He even issued a veiled threat to 
suburban communities that failure to get involved in METCO at this juncture might result 
in mandatory metropolitan integration in the future. Anrig’s tactic mirrored other state 
officials who, as discussed in the previous chapter, tried to use the Anti-Snob Zoning Act 
to threaten suburban communities to build their own affordable housing for fear of a 
government-imposed remedy.  In the case of METCO, this strategy proved initially 
successful as many residents favored the voluntary action of individual suburban 
communities over a sweeping mandatory decree by state government.  
The combination of grassroots initiatives and government encouragement led 
seven new communities, including Burlington, Norwood, and Woburn, to join the 
program. Lexington, Sudbury, Newton, and Wellesley opened dozens more seats to 
METCO children. Many other suburbs made inquiries about joining in the future.68 This 
increased interest placed the leadership of METCO in a complicated position. “The 
support for the Metropolitan Council is stronger than ever,” Jean McGuire declared in the 
1974-1975 annual report. Yet she conceded that this attention had put a “tremendous 
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burden” on the program. 69 During the 1974-1975 school year, the towns seeking to join 
or increase their participation created a profusion of work for the staff and stretched the 
program’s operational capacities to their limits.   McGuire complained in the annual 
report that “Money, time and effort in responding to the requests from new communities 
strained the existing budget and adversely affected support of the ongoing program.”70  
At the same time, many more African-American families sought to find ways to get their 
children out of Boston’s literally explosive learning environment, so the waitlist of 
applicants had grown to 6,000, each one of whom the staff had to interview. The situation 
reinforced to McGuire and others that METCO functioned successfully only when it 
could focus energy and resources on a small number of students, and therefore the 
program should and could not provide the mechanism for comprehensive metropolitan 
integration.  
 
The Belt Tightens  
The interest in METCO also placed serious strains on the program’s sources of 
funding. The busing crisis coincided with a national recession, which put the state of 
Massachusetts in fiscal crisis. When the Massachusetts government  allocated a $5.3 
million dollar budget for METCO for the 1975-1976 school year, did not take into 
consideration the increase in participation or the fact that many more communities would 
no longer charge a reduced tuition fee. A 1974 amendment had changed the language of 
the enabling statute of METCO to allow school districts to request “the full cost per pupil 
                                                
69  METCO, Annual Report to Board of Directors, 1974-1975, Box 1 Folder 11, METCO.  
70  METCO, Annual Report to Board of Directors, 1974-1975. 
 
508 
education of each child.”71 The State Department of Education sent a letter to 
participating communities urging that despite this policy change, they continue their 
long-standing practice of charging a reduced fee.72 Few communities paid this warning 
any heed. Even though student enrollments had steadily dropped, inflation had kept the 
school budgets of many communities rising each year, which had placed significant 
burdens on the local tax rates. 73 The rate of inflation also led to escalating costs 
especially around transportation, and increased the per-pupil costs of METCO. Thus, 26 
of the 36 participating towns in 1975 decided to take advantage of this change in 
language to request additional or full tuition reimbursement. In a particularly extreme 
example, Belmont, an upper-middle class suburb west of Boston, raised its rate from 
$792 per METCO child in 1974-1975 to $1257 for the 1975-1976 school year.74  
The budget requests that the State Board of Education received in late August 
were, in the words of METCO Associate Director Stephen Shaw, “at a level and 
magnitude unprecedented in the nine-year history of the program.” 75 Governor Michael 
Dukakis, who had defeated Francis Sargent the previous November, was the former state 
representative from Brookline and a longtime METCO booster. Yet he had made fiscal 
moderation the center plank of his first year in office and therefore announced that he 
would refuse to grant the full $6.2 million dollars the Board of Education estimated these 
additional reimbursement requests would cost. With the first day of school rapidly 
approaching, the state once again implored suburban communities to be more flexible in 
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their reimbursement requests. Education Secretary Paul Parks and Commissioner Anrig 
both sent pleas to all participating communities asking that they reassess their funding 
levels and try to make at least a 10 percent reduction in their budgets. Parks stated that he 
was “not insensitive to the fiscal pressure which you also face” and asked simply that 
towns “tighten their belts and absorb the 10 percent cut until we are out of our present 
financial crisis.” 76  Charles Glenn, the long-serving Director of the Bureau of Equal 
Educational Opportunity, also tried to spark a sense of collective responsibility. He 
presented the situation in mathematical terms, suggesting that if every town agreed to the 
10 percent cut, METCO could replace the 107 students who graduated and add 400 more 
Boston participants to the program. These entreaties had little effect. Several suburban 
communities offered a very conditional support of METCO, announcing that without 100 
percent reimbursement they would no longer honor their commitment to enroll METCO 
students.77 METCO staffer Stephen Shaw predicted that such action would “wreak havoc 
on the educational plans of hundreds of parents and children” in the short run.  He 
predicted that the “long-range effect would be a regressive public policy, further isolating 
Black from White, and urban and suburban populations.”78  
These short and long-term implications convinced Governor Dukakis to make an 
appeal to the state legislature to provide the necessary supplemental funds. That body 
also refused to furnish the money needed to keep the program going in several towns. 79 
A Boston Globe editorial captured many observers objections to the decision by pointing 
out the “pathetic irony” that the state was spending millions to forcibly desegregate the 
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Boston schools at the same time it denied “financial lifeblood” to many whites and blacks 
who had “enthusiastically” embraced integration through METCO.80 The funding crisis 
extended into a two-month stalemate.81 A large number of METCO students remained 
out of school because several towns would not allow their attendance until the state 
assured full funding.82 Director Jean McGuire did not hide her anger at Dukakis and other 
state officials. “Last year because the Commissioner of Education…and Dukakis asked 
us, we went all over explaining METCO,” she stated bitterly, “We’ve been made fools. 
We went out and got a lot of people to support us and now we have to tell them there’s 
going to be no program.”83 The state and suburban school systems finally reached a 
compromise in mid-November 1975, when the Massachusetts government agreed to fund 
90 percent of  METCO’s requested budget. This solution, nevertheless, left many 
communities with both thousands less in funding than they had requested and with 
mounting doubts about the viability of the program’s future.84  
 
The Entering Wedge 
The funding crisis exposed even larger tensions within the Route 128 suburbs 
over METCO specifically and metropolitan integration in general. While many moderate 
and conservative suburbanites had offered little vocal or organized opposition to METCO 
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in its first decade of operation, the fears of metropolitan integration coupled with new 
fiscal worries due to the recession produced a rippling backlash against the program. 
Conservative politicians and commentators like Avi Nelson fanned the flames of outrage, 
warning that the program was only the “entering wedge” to bring thousand more inner-
city children into the suburbs.85 The Daly-Sullivan Bill, with its call for 20,000 students 
to enroll in suburban schools, compounded this opposition to metropolitan integration as 
a whole and METCO in particular. During the 1974 and 1975 school year, more than two 
dozen grassroots suburban groups emerged with the shared goal of preventing 
metropolitan integration and the expansion of METCO. The groups’ titles all included the 
words “Citizens” and “Responsible’” though their acronyms had slight variation based on 
the names of the towns they represented.  By the spring of 1975, these grassroots 
antibusing forces united to coordinate their opposition. They formed the umbrella 
organization Suburbs United (SUN) with a membership base that extended into 30 
communities. The coalition converted a small yellow house in the southern middle-class 
suburb of Dedham into a makeshift headquarters where American flags and strategy 
maps covered the floral wallpaper. One reporter could not help but note the irony that 
these suburban residents were “banding together so that in the future they can stay 
apart.”86  
Many observers initially dismissed the opposition movement as an extension of 
the reactionary populism displayed by working-class whites on the streets of South 
Boston. Communities with strong SUN affiliates, such as Dedham, Quincy, Beverly and 
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Randolph, had established reputations for social conservatism and had experienced a 
steady increase in migration of blue-collar Irish- and Italian-Americans from Boston over 
the previous decade. 87 Although SUN did form an alliance with ROAR, several SUN 
affiliates sought to distance themselves from the Boston-based groups. These 
suburbanites stressed they were not “Archie Bunker-style bigots” and instead sought to 
show that their conservatism was far more colorblind.88  Moreover, where ROAR often 
invoked metropolitan integration as a means to agitate against the injustice of Garrity’s 
court order, metropolitanization was the primary target of the SUN campaign. In the 
minds of many SUN members, full-scale metropolitan integration constituted a violation 
of both their parental autonomy and class and race privilege. Several SUN members 
asserted that they did not mind if their children had classes with black children, but they 
opposed any kind of busing because it violated their rights as middle-class parents and 
suburban taxpayers to full freedom of choice in decisions about their children’s 
education. Carole Stacinski, a mother of five who led the opposition to metropolitan 
integration in Dedham, explained, “If you start losing one of your freedoms, that’s the 
beginning of the end.”89 In order to avoid that “anti-democratic nightmare,” Stacinski and 
her collaborators successfully prevented the Dedham School Committee from accepting a 
handful of METCO students into the system. Several other middle-class communities 
took similar action over the course of the 1974-1975 school year, either rejecting 
participatio outright or refusing to add more children into their systems.90 In the town of 
Middleton, the anti-busing group CRAM actually spread rumors that METCO students in 
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other towns had robbed and raped local residents. These longstanding racist tropes 
successfully thwarted the community’s participation in the program.91 
As the anti-busing movement extended beyond lower middle-class conservative 
communities and into upper-middle class areas with large liberal contingents such as 
Brookline, Concord, Lexington, Newton, Belmont, and Winchester, it forced many 
observers to rethink their assumptions about the root causes of suburban antipathy to 
metropolitan integration. The battle that ensued in Winchester emerged as a powerful 
symbol of the complicated and divided attitudes of suburban residents toward voluntary 
metropolitan integration. The Winchester School Committee had made two previous 
attempts to join METCO in the late 1960s, both of which met intense opposition.92 Thus, 
while most of the neighboring towns had developed stable programs in the first decade of 
METCO, Winchester had remained uninvolved. However, the community had always 
contained a solid base of liberal residents and School Committee members who believed 
strongly in the ideals of METCO. These sympathizers encouraged Winchester to become 
one of the first communities to answer Commissioner Anrig’s call for action in the fall of 
1974 and proposed including 20 or 30 METCO students in the Winchester School 
System. “Winchester is one of the very few towns of its size and location that doesn’t 
have METCO,” School Committee chairmen Stephen Parkhurst explained. “That leads us 
to believe we should reconsider the issue.”93 He also declared “I see Metco as a way to 
avoid forced busing.”94 Many residents enthusiastically supported participation, dubbing 
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METCO “long overdue” and recognizing the program as a means to enhance the 
educational opportunities of white students in the community, fulfill its responsibility to 
Boston, and avoid involvement in a forced two-way busing scheme in the future.95 
 It soon became clear that the Winchester School Committee had misguided 
optimism that the town’s attitude toward voluntary integration had changed considerably 
over the previous seven years.  Resident Arthur Hewis, who had led earlier attacks on the 
program, remained at forefront of the opposition. He and other residents decided to form 
Citizens for Responsible Education in Winchester (CREW), which eventually became 
affiliated with both ROAR and SUN. The group interpreted the mandatory component of 
the Daly-Sullivan Bill as an indication that METCO was merely “cover” for the eventual 
creation of a metropolitan school system.96 For many members of CREW and their 
sympathizers, nevertheless, METCO constituted a concrete target on which to pin larger 
and more abstract frustrations about the soaring tax rates, the perceived decline in the 
quality of public education and loss of control over local decisions. In its public 
statements and literature, CREW fused these fiscal and racial worries, warning that 
METCO would adversely affect the local tax rate, bring unqualified black teachers into 
the system, and make black studies courses mandatory.97 The group directly challenged 
the School Committee’s assurances that the program would not create any additional 
costs and would not lead to full-scale metropolitan integration. In one pamphlet the group 
used distorted information to contend that METCO cost taxpayers in Brookline $490,228 
                                                
95 See for example Carol Fielke to Editor, Winchester Star, November 21, 1974 ; Carolyn Roundey to 
Editor, Winchester Star, November 28, 1974 ; Catherine Fallon, “Town Needs Diversity,” Winchester Star, 
December 5, 1974.  
96 Arthur J. Hewis, Jr. to Editor, Winchester Star, November 21, 1974.  
97  “Nothing to Fear from METCO,” Winchester Star, January 23, 1975.  
 
515 
per year.98 CREW also predicted that the program would lead to compulsory 
metropolitan integration in the future, which it illustrated in one flyer that featured a 
drawing of “school busing” as a runaway train with steam spelling out “METCO” about 
to roll over a group of horrified and helpless Winchester citizens lying on the tracks.99  
Clearly internalizing these messages, Vincent Carroli warned in the local paper, “Metco 
will not come ‘free’ to Winchester because the true cost to our community is hidden 
behind a smoke screen. One would be most naïve to believe that METCO would not lead 
to a metropolitan school system.”100 When the Town Meeting voted 114-73 for 
participation in METCO after seven hours of debate in late January, CREW immediately 
initiated a drive for a town-wide referendum on the decision.  
The opponents of voluntary integration meanwhile confronted another group of 
residents who strongly supported METCO and the principles of suburban liberalism more 
broadly. The arguments that Winchester citizens adopted to defend METCO 
demonstrated that like CREW they believed that suburban residency entitled them to 
quality education for their children, but they had different interpretations of what that 
meant. These advocates stressed that “cultural deprivation is a two-way street” and that 
bringing METCO to Winchester would “broaden and make more flexible the attitudes of 
our children who will have to make their way on an increasingly small and pluralistic 
planet where whites and blacks must show they can get along equally and equitably.”101 
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Speaking as a “Winchester parent,” Faith Waltman upheld the ideals of racial liberal 
individualism, imploring that classroom time with students of color would “have more 
impact than all thousands of words I could shower on my six-year old about racial 
understanding.”102 Proponents of the program directly countered CREW’s statements by 
emphasizing the voluntary dimensions and lack of financial expenditure of METCO and 
downplaying it as a very limited solution to the more systemic problem of school 
segregation. These arguments made but a little dent. In early March 1975,  61 percent of 
voters in the referendum opposed bringing METCO to Winchester. Only one of six 
precincts voted in favor of the proposal.103 The outcome of the vote confirmed wider 
fears that METCO would not survive if left up to voters rather than the school 
committees in most participating communities. State Representative Barney Frank 
skeptically observed of the vote, “If we held referendum in METCO towns today, only 
about three would be left.”104  
The Winchester School Committee opted to stand its ground and use its official 
authority to overrule the referendum and continue with plans to invite forty-five METCO 
students to enroll in their system. This decision received widespread media attention and 
praise. The Boston Globe devoted an editorial to the stance, stating that other suburbs 
“would do well, both for themselves and the city that sustains them, if they considered 
the wisdom of the Winchester School Committee.”105  This publicity did not lead CREW 
to give up its fight. Instead, the group initiated legal action to oust the entire School 
Committee from office. In an act of solidarity with CREW, ROAR and SUN staged a 
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rally in Winchester in April with 400 participants who came along Route 128 by 
motorcade. After gathering for a rally in the town center, the participants drove with 
horns blaring to the homes of the School Committee members. ROAR recreated the 
protests it had staged outside the house of Judge Garrity the previous fall by standing on 
the Winchester officials’ front lawns, delivering speeches, chants and songs. 106 These 
actions, nevertheless, discredited rather than expanded CREW’s legitimacy for 
Winchester. citizens.107 Many residents interpreted the protest as a threat to the 
community’s reputation of respectability and reasonableness and thereby strongly 
objected to the brand of reactionary populism promoted by ROAR and its allies.  The 
neighbors of School Committee member Richard Pharo released a statement declaring 
that they were “both supporters and opponents of Metco,” but all believed in school 
committee member’s “legal and constitutional right to vote as his conscience dictates on 
this or any other issue without fear or threats of harassment from within or outside of 
Winchester.”108 These moderate suburbanites clearly believed that civility and 
compliance with the law outweighed their objections to voluntary integration and thus 
sought to create a middle ground and find a reasonable solution to the controversy.  
The funding crisis, not the CREW campaign, eventually prevented Winchester 
from joining METCO, which proves the importance of fiscal moderation, not political 
extremism, in shaping attitudes of most middle-class suburbanites in the Boston area.   
By the summer of 1975, the Winchester School Committee realized that it could not 
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continue to stand firm against CREW and maintain the support of local residents without 
the guarantee of full state funding. During the last week of August, the Committee made 
desperate pleas to Dukakis and Parks to assure Winchester the $110,000 subsidy it 
needed to participate. School Committee member Catherine Fallon described the lengths 
that Winchester supporters had gone to fight for the program and observed that it was 
“poor public policy to cut back on this program just when new and influential towns are 
joining METCO for the first time, giving it new breadth.” 109 These warnings went to no 
avail. When the state failed to promise the money, the Winchester School Committee 
rescinded its earlier decision to accept 45 children into its system, just a few days before 
the start of the school year.110  Winchester, therefore, to this day, remains one of few 
suburban communities in metropolitan Boston not to participate in METCO.  
Few participants or observers failed to recognize the symbolic meaning of the 
Winchester decision, and it became an example of the consequences of the fiscal fight. 
Dukakis invoked the case in his quest to fund METCO and the Boston Globe bemoaned, 
“Winchester is a particularly poignant victim of the budget-paring.”111 Its victimized 
status aside, the outcome in Winchester underscored the unwillingness of suburban 
residents to bear even a minor financial burden to help ease the problems of racial and 
spatial inequality and to allow fewer than 50 children from Boston to attend school in 
their district. Globe Columnist Mike Barnicle questioned what role racial fears played in 
the fiscal conservatism of suburban residents willing to fight tooth and nail against the 
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introduction of a handful of students into the school system at a minimal cost. “How 
many halls were filled in Winchester the day Congress voted to bail out Lockheed with a 
billion dollar loan?” Barnicle asked rhetorically.“ Why is it that people get more upset at 
METCO than they do at the Pentagon?” Jean McGuire also underscored the racial 
selectiveness of many white suburbanites’ fiscal anxiety. “You talk about a town’s school 
budget and one person shows up,” she pessimistically stated. “Have a meeting about 
METCO and the hall is full of people.” 112  The racial contradictions in white middle-
class residents’ market-based worldview came into even sharper focus in Newton, the 
purported epicenter of suburban liberalism.  
 
VOICE 
 Newton long had a dual reputation for containing both a liberal population and 
excellent schools. Since World War II, Newton consistently maintained the highest per-
pupil expenditures in the state and spent over $50 million on school construction. By the 
early 1970s, education consumed 48 percent of the overall city budget, by far the biggest 
item. Newton had also initiated many progressive curricular innovations in the 1960s, 
including METCO.113 McGuire had dubbed Newton’s METCO program “a showpiece 
for the country,” praising it for being the biggest, the most successful in hiring staff 
members of color, and the most innovative in making curricular changes to incorporate 
more attention to African-American life and history.114 At the height of the busing crisis, 
the Newton School Committee decided to take the lead once again and agreed to accept 
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one hundred more METCO students in January 1975, and to gradually expand its 
involvement over the next few years until the suburb achieved a 9.4 percent minority 
student population.115 By the following year, however, the community had begun to 
demonstrate a different attitude toward the program. In 1975, the School Committee 
voted to add fifty additional METCO students. Yet, it refused to answer the state’s 
request to reduce its tuition so that more students could participate in the program and 
instead increased the amount of its reimbursement to $675,000. This decision reflected 
the swift sea change in Newton’s political climate provoked in large part by the economic 
downturn.116 While there had been few objections to cost of education in the affluent 
days of the 1960s, the recession caused Newton residents from across the political 
spectrum to shift their attitudes. Many residents viewed school funding as the main 
culprit for Newton’s highest tax rate.  
In the spring of 1975, a group of citizens came together to form a grassroots group 
called VOICE with the goal of curbing the “excessive spending” of Newton’s local 
government, especially the “spendthrift” and “out of touch with reality” school 
committee.117 The group of “politically moderate people of all parties” believed that 
unless school funding came under control, “the city of Newton would become a place 
where few could afford to live.” 118 VOICE’s stated goals consisted of creating “high-
quality education for our children within the constraints of a reasonable tax burden,” a 
curricular focus on basic skills, and a preservation of neighborhood schools. These goals 
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appealed to residents like Howard Passman who declared,  “I pay the taxes, but my voice 
has never been heard.”119 VOICE stood firmly behind the lone conservative on the school 
committee, Alvin Mandell, a Raytheon engineer and New Deal Democrat turned staunch 
Republican, who advocated a “back to basics approach.”120 Yet, VOICE realized that in 
order to achieve its goals it would have to gain full control of the School Committee and 
Board of Alderman. Thus it directed its grassroots energy toward the upcoming local 
election. The formation of VOICE created more concern within Newton’s liberal 
contingent  “than almost any development in recent years,” and one activist dubbed the 
community as “under siege.”121 Several existing liberal groups, including local chapters 
of the Americans for Democratic Action, the American Civil Liberties Union, the 
National Organization of Women, and Citizens for Participation in Political Action, 
established a coalition called “Campaign for ’75” in order to consolidate support behind 
more progressive-leaning incumbents.122  
Throughout the fight between the two factions, candidates, voters and observers 
distinguished the two groups using the polarized terminology of “liberal” and 
“conservative,” thus magnifying their political and ideological differences.123 These 
labels did not always  fall neatly on the conventional political spectrum. VOICE founders 
repeatedly emphasized that the group was “non-partisan” and consisted of “Democrats, 
Republicans and Independents.”  Vice-Chairman Kenneth Hartford stressed that 
membership consisted of  “people who classify themselves from conservative to liberal” 
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but who shared a belief in “Fiscal Responsibility.”124 Even VOICE opponent Stephen 
Crosby observed that several of the VOICE members were “flexible politically and have 
worked for liberal causes.”125 These characterizations underscore that the fight over the 
future of the school committee transcended traditional partisan categories and addressed 
deeper ideological differences about the privileges and responsibilities of suburban 
residency.  
VOICE’s stance had more in common with the grassroots opposition to affordable 
housing that took shape in Newton than with ROAR and urban-based antibusing groups. 
In fact, VOICE had many literal and figurative overlaps with the movement that had 
emerged in opposition to the efforts of Newton Community Development Foundation 
(NCDF) to build scattered-site mixed income housing in the suburb a few years earlier. 
Robert Stiller, the leader of the grassroots resistance movement in the earlier campaign, 
became a VOICE-backed candidate for alderman, Roger Cohen, the lawyer who 
successfully frustrated the NCDF’s plans though creative delay tactics, was one of the 
group’s choices for the School Committee. These candidates sought to galvanize the 
same anger among Newton residents that had led to the significant scale-back of the 
moderate-income development. In order to arouse grassroots anxiety, Cohen made anti-
metropolitanization a central feature of his candidacy. He declared that metropolitan 
integration proposals showed “ a total lack of concern about the plight of the taxpayers of 
Newton and such an attitude cannot be tolerated.” He stressed that the School Committee 
must “cope with the problems of the City of Newton, not the problems of Boston.”126 
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Such statements motivated SUN to embrace the Newton School Committee race as an 
opportunity to make deeper inroads in the suburb.  The anti-busing group distributed a 
pamphlet that attempted to enflame the fiscal concerns of Newton residents declaring, 
“The state-funded METCO program further erodes community policymaking while 
forcing additional financial burdens on the taxpayers.”127 This propagandistic literature 
helped SUN build support for candidates like Cohen and Michael LeConti, the self-
described “father of five children, homeowner taxpayer and citizen of Newton,” who 
opposed METCO on the grounds that “It is about time that the people who pay the bills 
have some say on how it should be spent.”128 
The VOICE campaign reinforced the success of ad hoc grassroots opposition 
groups at influencing local battles. On election day, VOICE candidates Cohen, LeConti, 
Paul Ash and Edward Prince defeated four incumbents, including the chairman and vice-
chairman, to create with Alvin Mandell and Henry Delicata a clear conservative majority 
on the School Committee. It was the first time in 24 years that an incumbent had lost in a 
Newton school committee election. Only one self-identified liberal candidate, Honora 
Kaplan, achieved victory.  Few observers failed to interpret election results as a clear 
shift in the political climate of the suburb, especially since VOICE candidates also faired 
well in the Board of Aldermen races. After winning by a large margin, Robert Cohen 
later declared, “All of a sudden it was an advantage to be labeled a conservative.”129 The 
election represented a wider trend of a growing conservative and consumerist approach to 
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the public school system had begun to take hold throughout metropolitan Boston. 130 “For 
a long time there was a feeling of trust for educators,” Robert Fobert, the longtime 
superintendent of the Lexington schools observed. “Now what schools are doing is 
adopting a more consumer advocate posture—a kind of Nader approach to education.”131 
Unlike Ralph Nader and his followers, however, this new grassroots politics assumed a 
far more fiscally moderate bent.  
 
Ragweed in the Garden City  
The first issue to truly demonstrate the new era of fiscally and politically 
conservative school governance in Newton involved another voluntary metropolitan 
integration program. The fight that unfolded in early 1976 over a program called 
Metropairways, operated by the Metropolitan Planning Project (MPP), provides an 
important lens through which to understand both the community’s fractured attitude on 
METCO as well as the continuities and changes in the contours of its political culture. 
MPP had begun in 1973 through a grant from the federal government’s 1972 Emergency 
School Aid Act for the development of metropolitan programs in urban areas. The project 
constituted a separate entity from METCO though they had largely overlapping boards. 
MPP also shared METCO’s racially liberal premise that individual interaction led to 
tolerance and equality. Unlike METCO, MPP had emphasized remedies that involved 
two-way rather than one-way voluntary transportation of students. In order to encourage 
students of all backgrounds to “participate in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic learning 
experience,” MPP used its $980,000 federal grant to sponsor 56 programs that brought 
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students from Boston and the surrounding suburbs together in educational endeavors on 
topics such as African-American history, Chinese and Spanish culture and language, 
theatre and fine arts.132 Newton served as one of MPP’s inaugural partners and had 
participated in the early initiatives in 1974 and 1975, including taking part in the 
Metropathways project where high school students from both the suburb and Boston 
explored the ecology, geography and history of the Charles River.133   
 In the winter of 1976 MPP developed an additional program called 
Metropairways, for younger students that matched five suburban elementary schools with 
five in the city. The plan included pairing 125 students at the Angier School in the Waban 
neighborhood of Newton with the same number of children from the David A. Ellis 
School in Roxbury to meet about ten times for two hours between mid-March and June, 
alternating between the two schools and at third sites such as the Museum of Science.134  
The program was to be entirely voluntary, giving parents the option to allow their 
children to participate in the program. The planners promised that the Ellis School was in 
a “stable neighborhood” with no problems of physical safety for the children and also 
assured that the program would last only for a year and there were “no strings attached” 
for a future commitment to metropolitan education.135 The proposal received 
overwhelming support from teachers, administrators, and parents at the Angier School. 
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For the fiscally conservative members of the School Committee, however, 
Metropairways represented a threat to the three pillars of their shared governing 
philosophy:  basic education, local control, and taxpayer accountability. Member Edward 
Prince immediately denounced the program as a clear diversion of Newton’s educational 
efforts by seeking to effect social change rather than teaching children basic skills and 
knowledge. He and his fellow Committee members interpreted MPP’s broad mission of 
“eliminat[ing] racial and ethnic isolation in Greater Boston” as a dangerous first step 
toward mandatory metropolitan integration. Robert Cohen provocatively declared, “The 
ultimate goal of the Metropolitan Planning Project is metropolitanization—that is the 
broad issue and this is a block on which that it is to be built.”136 Fusing fears about loss of 
local control with claims of taxpayer rights, Alvin Mandell ignored assurances that the 
program would be entirely federally financed and declared, “Am I going to pay Newton 
taxes to have some of my children educated in some other part of the Greater Boston 
School District?”137  
The school committee’s stance provoked residents fears about comprehensive 
metropolitan integration. When Angier principal Roland Barth staged a meeting for 
parents about the MPP program, half of the audience did not have children enrolled in the 
Angier School and came from other Newton neighborhoods in order to raise objections 
that program would lead to metropolitanization. These citizens largely placed their 
opposition in color-blind terms, emphasizing that they had no problem with their children 
attending school with African-American children but did not want them to take buses into 
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Roxbury. 138 The objections revealed many residents’ highly racialized anxiety about 
urban crime and drugs and the overall dangers of the city, which partially explains why 
most Newton residents voiced at least rhetorical support for METCO’s one-way 
integration, while the idea of sending white suburban children into Roxbury through 
Metropairways evoked strong objections. Globe columnist Mike Barnicle mocked the 
hypocrisy of this position by observing that  “You would of thought the children were 
being bused to Angola.”  139 “I certainly wouldn’t want to accuse anyone of being a 
racist,” observed Angier principal Roland Barth, adopting a more diplomatic spatial 
logic, “but if we were planning the program with an elementary school in Wellesley, I 
don’t think you would have seen the same sort of concern about not enough basic 
education. There’s a hell of a lot of fear of the unknown.”140 Placing the program in 
explicitly racial individualist terms, he declared, “It is the presence of these black kids 
that make the program educationally important. Many Angier children know no Black 
people; this isolation perpetuates stereotypes.”141 
Many Newton residents agreed with Barth’s interpretation of the benefits of  
Metropairways. In defense of the initiative, several Newton parents offered an alternative 
vision of quality education and taxpayer entitlements than that of the conservative School 
Committee members and their supporters. Like the advocates for METCO in Winchester, 
these Metropairways supporters did not focus on the issues of structural inequality or 
even the circumscribed opportunities for African-American children but, instead, stressed 
that not participating in integrated educational opportunities compromised both the 
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education of their children and their rights of citizenship.142 Globe columnist Carole 
Surkin, whose daughter was in the fifth grade at the Angier school, brought this view of 
the controversy into the sharpest focus in one of her weekly pieces. Using loaded 
terminology, she declared that “the rising tide of racism in the community” threatened to 
“deprive” her daughter of an important innovative educational opportunity.143  This 
statement revealed that Surkin saw the program less as means to remedy the problem of 
structural inequality and rather within the framework of suburban privilege to enhance 
the quality of her child’s education. “What about us in a democracy?” she asked in 
reference to herself and her suburban liberal peers. Continuing to explain her sense of 
liberal victimhood, Surkin stressed that she and her husband had moved to Newton 
because its schools “were so progressive,” but that they had now begun to consider 
moving away.  Surkin’s comments underscored that quality education did not just define 
the housing choices and political agenda of the members of groups like SUN and VOICE, 
but many suburban liberals as well. Concerns about property values and tax rates also 
influenced liberal residents’ opposition to the School Committee’s action. “It is the 
reputation for great schools that attract people to Newton and strengthens its real estate 
market, ” reporter Dan Ahern observed. Surkin’s threat of moving confirmed Ahern’s 
fears that the school committee’s actions could both damage this image and “depress real 
estate values, push up the tax rate and throw heavier burdens on the budget-minded 
fears.”144  
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When the Newton School Committee held a special meeting about the 
Metropairways proposal on March 8, 1976, most of the 400-person crowd that assembled 
shared Surkin’s liberal indignation and concern. School superintendent Aaron Fink made 
an emotional plea that revealed his interpretation of the purpose of public education. 
Fink, who also served on the Board of the MPP, firmly believed that cultural and human 
enrichment programs contributed to the “overall education of the child.”   In response to 
anti-liberal denunciations from School Committee members and a series of anonymous 
phone calls, Fink declared, “They are damn right! I am a social engineer—but there are 
engineers who build bridges and there are those who build walls.”145 Even Fink’s 
warnings that not participating in a voluntary plan might lead to a mandatory court ruling 
down the road failed to persuade the School Committee. At the end of this emotional 
session, the body voted 6-3 not to participate in Metropairways. The following day, the 
Globe featured a picture of Superintendent Fink with his head in his hands and Katherine 
Jones, the Newton METCO coordinator, in a similar pose, a physical sign of her concerns 
about the vote’s implications for that program too.   
The response to the vote immediately transcended Newton’s municipal 
boundaries. State Representative and longtime community activist Mel King of Roxbury 
denounced the decision on the floor of the Massachusetts legislature, saying it sent the 
message “Put the niggers back in their place, we’ve done too much for the them.”146 The 
Boston Globe featured a series of articles and editorials on the situation that discussed the 
implications of the School Committee’s action. Erik Van Loon, one of the lawyers who 
had represented African-American parents in the Morgan case, damningly predicted that 
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if an attorney in the future wanted to make an argument “that the suburbs should be 
involved because they had contributed to the segregation of the Boston public schools, 
they might be able to use the Newton decision…as one little piece of the puzzle.”147 This 
case did not come pass. Yet, the School Committee’s vote and the attention it received 
did lead Newton to undergo a collective identity crisis and to question the liberal 
exceptionalism of the community and the cutting-edge quality and reputation of its 
schools. Many citizens publicly declared that the vote had made them “saddened” and 
“ashamed” and proved the amount of “Ragweed in the Garden City.”148 Just weeks after 
the vote, Betty Klauber suggested the School Committee’s action “creates a bad image 
for the city of Newton, and real estate brokers report some people already deciding not to 
buy here. ”149   
These statements, like the outrage that surrounded the NCDF plan defeat, still 
operated within an understanding that Newton did, in fact, have a culture of 
distinctiveness. A coalition of local liberal residents fused the discourses of racial 
liberalism, Newton exceptionalism and suburban privileges, proclaiming that the 
rejection of participation “undermined the rights of parents to…choose racially integrated 
programs” and in doing so, “put the label of bigotry upon a city which has thrived and 
prospered for its enlightenment and commitment to humane values.”150 Many residents 
voiced more individualized anxieties about the future of education in the suburb, heeding 
the warning of former chairman of the School Committee Manuel Beckworth that “one of 
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the outstanding public school systems in the United States is in danger of alarming 
retrogression.”151 
The situation received considerable outside attention precisely because it forced 
liberal residents in Newton and elsewhere to confront these issues. Few observers failed 
to invoke Newton’s progressive reputation in interpreting the implications of the 
decision, using such descriptors as “a bastion for liberal thinking, whether in politics or 
education.”152 The Boston Globe dubbed it “ironic” that this rejection  “should happen in 
Newton, which has always had a reputation for its progressivism.”153 Fearing what this 
vote indicated about the community’s stance on METCO, the Globe editorial staff 
suggested, “If such efforts on a voluntary basis are rejected, one wonders what solutions 
to the programs of racial separation are left.”154 The increasing uncertainty over the 
METCO budget brought these observations about the limits of suburban liberalism in 
Newton and metropolitan Boston as a whole into sharp relief.  
 
The Budget Crisis 
The fiscal crisis in Massachusetts worsened by the month during the mid-
1970s.155 Despite the earlier standoff, Governor Dukakis continued to see METCO as one 
place he could impose budgetary restraint. In the winter of 1976, Dukakis proposed to the 
legislature a $5.48 million budget for METCO’s operation in the upcoming school year, 
which was more than $1.5 million less than the Department of Education had 
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recommended. He also announced a stricter set of guidelines for participating suburbs to 
ensure that no community either made a profit on the program or allocated the state funds 
toward reducing local taxes. Dukakis stated he understood “well the pressures that local 
supporters are under, and at the same time, I would hope that suburbanites will recognize 
the severe fiscal constraints under which we have been operating for the past sixteen 
months.”156 Most suburban communities were once again not as sympathetic as Dukakis 
had hoped. Following the announcement, headlines began to appear on the front pages of 
area newspapers with such warnings as “Suburbs Cooling to Metco as Funds Fade,”  
“METCO, Money and Race” and “Is METCO effort dying in the suburbs?”157 The 
persistent turmoil in Boston and the fears of metropolitanization it had spawned 
undoubtedly had contributed to this “cooling.” The budget situation, nevertheless, played 
a more pivotal role in shifting the discussion away from whether METCO could provide 
the infrastructure for a metropolitan remedy to whether the program could survive at all.  
Many supporters of metropolitan integration stressed that suburban residents used 
fiscal anxieties to cover for larger racial hostilities about two-way and even one-way 
integration.158 A school board member in the nearly all-white, exclusive suburb of 
Cohasset asserted, “People aren’t going to say: ‘Get the God damned niggers out of there. 
But they feel that way.”159 For most suburban residents, however, race and economics 
failed to operate in such neatly contained categories and the ambivalence about METCO 
reflected the way these anxieties had converged in a discourse of suburban entitlements 
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and taxpayer rights. Lee Berube of Beverly explicitly stated that she opposed METCO for 
economic, not racial, reasons. She explained that she was “against it only because of the 
economic conditions of today. Things are bad enough. Why make them worse?”160 If the 
state permanently reneged on its funding commitment because of the “present financial 
crunch,” Berube feared that the suburbs would have to pick up the funding of the 
program. “I don’t mind helping people if I felt I was financially able to do it,” Berube 
stated,  “but if I can’t help my own, how can I possibly help anyone else?” Demonstrating 
the power of these fiscal arguments in driving resistance to METCO, by 1976 SUN had 
shifted its attack on the program from a race-conscious resistance to integration to a race-
neutral defense of taxpayers’ rights and priorities. SUN President Clara Hewis of 
Winchester declared that it was an “asinine, waste of money to use tax revenues for 
METCO especially when the governor is dropping people off general relief.”161 
Some commentators interpreted this fiscally moderate reaction to METCO as a 
signal of a larger suburban political realignment. “Increasing financial difficulties and 
growing suburban conservatism,” the Boston Globe editorialized, “may be just the one 
two punch necessary to knock METCO out of the suburbs in the next decade.”162 Those 
who construed the hostility to METCO as sign of increased suburban conservatism failed 
to acknowledge that these sentiments constituted not a break, but, rather, a continuation 
in suburban attitudes about the program. Since its inception, support for the initiative by 
residents from across the suburban political spectrum had rested on the fact that METCO 
participation did not require the outlay of local tax dollars. The boundaries of this 
commitment had not before been tested since the state had always provided adequate 
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funding and most suburban communities had operated in the black throughout the late 
1960s and early 1970s.  
Lincoln, which had the largest percentage of METCO students, a reputation for 
liberal politics, and one of highest per-capita incomes in the state and country, offered a 
clear example of the dilemma. David Livingston, a local school official, aptly 
summarized the situation. “So far it’s been a simple issue: Do you believe in integrated 
education?” Livingston explained. “But if the commonwealth reduces the level of funds 
so I have to say: Do you believe in integrated education enough to invest local funds to 
continue the program. That’s a very different story.”163 Lincoln residents made clear on 
which side they stood. Following Dukakis’s announcement, the community voted to 
accept fewer students and reduce support services. In response to the decision in Lincoln 
and elsewhere Dr. William Herbert of the Massachusetts Teachers Association astutely 
remarked, “In good times it is easy to be liberal. Prejudices are overcome to a certain 
extent, but when money is tight, people become frightened.”164  
Several surrounding communities decided to make similar reductions. In 
Framingham, the fiscally moderate school committee voted in the spring of 1976 to cut 
its METCO support staff from ten to six, and to refuse to pay its fee to METCO, Inc. for 
its services. The superintendent tried to tell the committee and its supporters that it was 
not METCO that created financial problems for the community stating,  “If we eliminated 
the program tomorrow, we wouldn’t buy one less pencil, one less ream of paper, use any 
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less electricity. In elementary schools there are not more than one or two Metco kids.” 165 
Though his comment illustrates the limited impact the program had in Framingham, it did 
little to assuage the conviction of the school committee. ‘I don’t think I should vote to 
carry the inner city load,” explained the School Committee chairman about his attitude 
toward metropolitan integration. “I’m sorry their system isn’t as good as ours, but there’s 
nothing I can do about it.”166 
METCO leaders publicly placed the blame for the fiscal problems directly on the 
steps of the State House rather than on suburbs like Lincoln and Framingham. 167 These 
officials saw the Governor’s sharp budget reduction as a ploy to transfer the tax burden 
for the program from the state to the local level. In response, the politically savvy 
METCO leadership appealed directly to suburban residents’ racial and economic 
concerns in order to convince them to pressure the state to increase the allocation. In a 
“question and answer format” leaflet circulated in the suburbs in the spring of 1976, 
METCO promised the program was not “the first step toward metropolitanism” but was 
“one-way,” “urban-to-suburban,” and “voluntary.”168 Additionally, the strategically-
worded document attempted to assuage taxpayer concerns by emphasizing that its cost 
placed no “financial drain on local real estate tax base,” and, it fact, took many steps to 
ensure that it was “one of the most cost effective programs in the public sector” and “one 
of the best bargains in education.” 169 Along with these appeals, METCO dispatched its 
urban and suburban participants and sympathizers to encourage Governor Dukakis, 
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Education Commissioner Paul Parks, and members of the state legislature to increase the 
budget allocation.170  
Dukakis and his administration did not heed the pleas to alter the proposed budget 
and instead further intensified their critique of the suburbs. Paul Parks supported his 
boss’s stance, arguing that the decision of many suburban districts to scale back their 
commitment to “equal educational opportunity” was in “no way related to fiscal or 
funding problems,” but, rather,  “a practice of social retrenchment.” He cited the 
Metropairways vote in Newton as the clearest example to support this argument. 171 
Dukakis went even further in his criticism. He publicly declared that in most towns 
METCO students merely filled empty seats, thus making it unfair and selfish for officials 
to request full tuition. He provocatively told a group of Dorchester residents that these 
demands for full-funding represented another way the suburbs were “failing the core 
city.”172  “Brookline, Newton, and Weston won’t get full funding,” he announced in the 
spring of 1976. “It’s not costing those communities $1,400 or $1,500 to put a child in an 
empty seat.”173 The choice of towns that Dukakis used to create a cognitive cartography 
of suburban privilege was not random. The three communities he selected, including his 
hometown of Brookline, all had reputations for liberal politics, good schools, and large 
upper-middle-class populations, and thereby the list appeared an effort to build support 
among urban-based voters.  
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No Ordinary Suburb?  
Dukakis’s accusations pushed the already volatile Newton School Committee 
over the edge. Upon hearing of the Governor’s remarks, Newton School Committee 
Chairman Alvin Mandell issued a public letter to Dukakis. He pointedly disagreed with 
the Governor’s claim that adding a few METCO pupils to a class would come at no cost 
to towns like Newton. Relying on a paternalistic and euphemistic view of the aptitude of 
inner-city youth, Mandell contended that these “underachieving” students required more 
tutoring, in-class teachers and “more of the assets of the system than the resident 
students.”174 He thereby inverted Dukakis’s accusation to suggest Newton actually lost 
money by participating in the program. Mandell also countered the claim that the suburbs 
must increase their responsibility to the city, declaring that places like Brookline, Weston 
and Newton actually paid far more in taxes to the state and federal governments than they 
received back in services. Mandell concluded the message by asking the Governor: 
“Under these circumstances do you expect the METCO program to survive your 
projected funding?” Mandell’s own answer to this seeming rhetorical question was, it 
seemed, no.  
Newton school officials calculated that Dukakis’s proposed $5.9 million METCO 
budget would provide the suburb $256,000 but would still leave it $82,000 short of its 
requested reimbursement. The Newton School Committee thus realized that it could 
either scale back the budget or take the required $80,000 from the city’s general tax fund. 
The prospect that local taxes would supplement METCO’s funding outraged many local 
residents and their fiscally moderate elected officials. On June 28, 1976, the committee 
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staged a contentious seven-hour meeting on the issue that at one point involved police 
intervention to remove frustrated spectators from the room. At the end of the lengthy 
session, the committee voted 5-4 to cut the METCO budget by $82,000. METCO 
officials stressed that they would not send students into the community without the 
support services that the cut eliminated. Superintendent Fink, therefore, dubbed the action 
“tantamount to killing the program.”175  
The Newton School Committee’s vote revealed the widening fault lines over 
METCO and the larger political, racial and economic issues it embodied. The program’s 
supporters immediately challenged the committee’s action. Some defenders of the 
program supplemented well-worn arguments about METCO’s dual benefits for both 
black and white children. Others opted to appropriate the language and logic of fiscal 
moderation of their opponents. These advocates argued that by removing the 350 
METCO students Newton would lose the $256,000 in state funding that supplemented 
both the program and other educational services in the suburb. Hubie Jones, a member of 
Black Citizens of Newton, declared that METCO was “definitely an economic benefit to 
Newton—without it the tax rates would go up.”176 Reinforcing that the city’s tax rate 
concerned residents on both sides of the city’s political divide, an editorial in the liberal 
citizen-run Newton Times declared, “Taxes in Newton are high and no one wants them 
higher. However, dropping Metco is not the way to save money.”177 Even members of 
Newton’s now vocal politically moderate wing agreed. In an anonymous letter to the 
Newton Times, one resident relied on a shorthand imagery of suburban progressive 
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politics to prove that she was “not a liberal.”178 “I never voted for George McGovern or 
Father Drinan, ” she said, and she had even agreed with School Committee’s stance on 
the Metropairways program. The METCO vote, nevertheless, appalled her because 
“Metco kids are part of our school. They are my daughter’s friends. Good lord, there are 
only about a dozen of them at the Burr School.” The Committee’s actions had led to her 
rethink her basic political values. She suddenly felt guilt for “being white,” “being from 
Newton,” and having voted for a “group of dangerous buffoons who are using my 
children as political pawns.”179  “That’s the most upsetting thing,” she decried. “This 
school committee is turning me into a liberal!”  
With the city’s political culture in a state of disorientation, Mayor Theodore Mann 
called a special School Committee meeting on July 7 in order to reopen the issue and 
urge the members reconsider their vote. Five of the nine School Committee members 
deliberately missed the session, explaining that the blame for the cuts lay with the state’s 
failure to fully fund METCO.  Mayor Mann interpreted their refusal to attend as a form 
of “boycotting.” The session did draw 250 Newton residents and representatives from 
many Newton grassroots liberal organizations. Members of the League of Women 
Voters, Newton Coalition for New Politics, Black Citizens of Newton, and Newton 
Teachers Association read statements defending the program and denouncing the 
committee’s action.180 METCO officials, parents and Newton committee members also 
testified. Director Jean McGuire adopted a commonly invoked imagery of spatial 
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isolation, warning the suburban community, “If you build walls, remember: they keep 
you in, as well as keeping us out.”181 
 The special meeting illustrated that the concern over the vote’s impact had 
reverberated into the chambers of federal and state government. At the session, Mann 
read a letter from Senator Edward Brooke and Congressmen Robert Drinan and Michael 
Harrington urging reconsideration of the issue, dubbing the vote “the darkening of the 
one of few bright spots in Boston’s recent educational history.” Placing the decision in 
terms of a somewhat mythological past, they declared that Newton had “a history of 
generosity and recognition of social responsibility and to retreat now would now only 
serve to enhance the isolation of and despair of those in Boston’s inner city 
communities.”182  A group of state officials and politicians appeared in person at the 
meeting and also put the negative impact of the vote within a wider political and social 
context. Invoking the community’s exceptionalist identity, Commissioner Paul Parks 
declared, “It was Newton citizens who took to the front lines in carrying METCO to a 
reality.” Parks thus warned,  “If this city turns its back, you have contributed to the 
destruction of the whole Metco program. Town after town will step forward and do the 
same thing.”183 State Senator Jack Backman agreed, stating, “My colleagues will look to 
Newton for leadership (and may take more drastic action). I assure you that the 
ramifications will go far beyond $80,000.”184 These officials clearly found invoking the 
exceptionalism of  Newton a convenient trope through which to express outrage at the 
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decision and its broader implications about the future of both voluntary integration and 
suburban liberalism. 
In his own remarks, Mayor Mann also expressed consternation about the damage 
to the city’s progressive image. He declared, “What bothers me is that others perceive the 
city of Newton as racist, when the majority of people here are all for METCO.”185  The 
Mayor perhaps failed to recognize that such Newtonites’ support for METCO came with 
a fiscally conservative disclaimer. Voicing the sentiment of many of her neighbors, Joyce 
Morrissey Beatty dubbed METCO “a very valid program” but also applauded the School 
Committee’s cuts. 186 Beatty believed “taxpayers’ dollars” sat at the heart of the issue and 
therefore contended that to have “Newton supplement the program is not very realistic 
and pedantic to say the least,” especially “when people are already overburdened.” 
George Poirer used a similar argument of fiscal conservatism and taxpayer rights to voice 
his support of the School Committee’s stance.   “As a parent, taxpayer, and lifelong 
resident of Newton who is faced with a tax bill of $2,000 on my modest six-room home,” 
he declared, “I vigorously protest the attempt to use my tax dollar to make up for the 
state-created deficit in the METCO program.”187 The school committee for its part 
continued to invoke Beatty and Poirer and other members of Newton’s so-called Silent 
Majority in explaining the committee members’ position.  Chairman Mandell publicly 
contended, “I am sincerely and honestly trying to protect the Newton taxpayer.” Mandell 
feared that if the suburb replaced the shortfall it would set a dangerous precedent and 
“Newton will be asked to pick up more and more of what should be the state’s 
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responsibility.”188 He urged for the state to restore the funding so that “Newton may 
continue its’ service to the 350 youngsters in the largest Metco program in the State.”189  
The controversy inescapably placed the 350 METCO students in the middle of the 
crossfire. Many of these children had been students in the Newton schools since 
kindergarten and feared that the decision compromised their short- and long-term 
educational opportunities. Liza Paige, a METCO student stated, “If they shut down the 
program, I think that would upset me more than anything.”  While the School 
Committee’s decision “shocked and upset” her, Paige was not completely surprised since 
“the whole busing situation has definitely hardened attitudes against Metco.” 190  Another 
Boston student, Linda Silva, who worried the vote placed her plans to attend Dartmouth 
and then medical school in jeopardy, believed it was “purely money” that influenced the 
decision.   Ellen Woodward, a recent black graduate scheduled to enroll at Wellesley 
College, in the fall disagreed, denouncing the vote as “racism, pure and simple.” Many 
white students also voiced concerns about the future of the program. White junior Ellen 
Sasahara noted that despite the fact she never got to know any METCO students 
personally, she would “really miss not seeing them around” if the program was 
dismantled.  “There were two in my art class and they had a very happy go-lucky 
attitude,” she observed. 191 Sasahara’s comments inadvertently made the committee’s 
stance appear that much more extreme by underlining METCO’s limited impact on the 
Newton schools.  
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With the 1976-1977 school year about to start, METCO staffers and supporters 
felt increasing despair about the program’s future in Newton and the broader 
metropolitan region.192 Finally, Dukakis made a slight concession. He announced he 
would raise his request for METCO funding from  $5.4 million to $5.9 million. The state 
Ways and Means Committee made a counter-offer of  $5.75 million, which still left the 
program with $150,000 less than the previous year and did not cover the money needed 
to ensure that the Newton programs remained in operation. With the deadline fast 
approaching, Dukakis finally capitulated and announced that he would transfer $150,000 
from his  $4 million “unforeseen emergency” fund to the METCO account.193 The 
Governor gave the Department of Education instructions to distribute the last-minute 
windfall to all towns with more than a hundred students in their systems. Newton, 
however, received by far the largest allocation since it was the only community where the 
continuation of the program depended on the additional money.194 The additional 
$47,000 in state funding did not completely compensate for the community’s $82,000 
budget shortfall, but it did allow for the restoration of its necessary operational services. 
The school committee unanimously approved a revised budget for METCO just before 
the first day of school. 
While many Newton residents and officials let out a sigh of relief at the end of 
this game of brinkmanship, others continued to worry about the impact of the situation on 
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both the METCO students and the community’s progressive standing. Evelyn Kaye 
worried, “You can’t wash away the impression that’s been given that METCO wasn’t 
wanted in Newton” and “that no one really cares about the black children unless there’s 
money to pay for them.”195 When a national civic organization named Newton an “All-
American City” in the fall, at least one resident felt some unease. A citizen noted in a 
local paper,  “It seems ironic that a well-earned honor comes in a year when Newton’s 
liberal and fraternal reputation has been blemished, when some of its people seem to be 
building bridges not walls.”196 Invoking the community’s “liberal tradition,” the author 
hoped that the “flush of pride from this new honor will remind them that Newton has 
more than enough resources to share.” In the aftermath of the controversy, many local 
residents worked hard to erase the tarnish to Newton’s enlightened reputation and its 
limited participation in METCO remains a key component of that effort.  
 
Conclusion 
In September 1976, Ian Menzies, who covered the suburbs for the Globe, like 
many others interpreted the controversy in Newton as a sign that the future of METCO 
stood at a crossroads. “Times have changed,” he conceded. “These are not the mid-60s, 
the years of the inter-racial freedom marches and the Great Society, when suburbia was 
gung-ho for liberal causes.”197  Menzies believed that the program’s future was uncertain, 
but not doomed.  “What suburbia really has to decide,” Menzies insisted, “is whether the 
rationale that first made it support the program still exists---that white students benefit 
from METCO integration as much as black. If the answer to this question is as it should 
                                                
195 Evelyn Kaye, “METCO in Newton…a Family’s Views,” Boston Globe, August 30, 1976.  
196  “If All America Were Like Newton,” October 17, 1976, Box 57, Folder 11, METCO.  
197  Menzies, “Is METCO effort dying in the suburbs?”  
 
545 
be…. then suburbia has to fight for growth funding for METCO.” 198 In the three decades 
since Menzies posed this question, suburban residents have repeatedly responded both 
yes and no. Members of participating communities have consistently reaffirmed their 
shared commitment to voluntary integration in the aftermath of the funding controversy. 
These suburbanites have also continued to voice a firm belief that they should not have to 
expend any tax dollars for it, which has prevented the growth of the program beyond its 
size in 1976. The funding fights of the 1970s ultimately enabled suburban communities to 
set the parameters of the program’s limited operation.  
The Newton METCO program remains the largest in metropolitan Boston 
although it has not grown substantially since 1976 and remains fully subsidized by the 
state. In 2008, the community received $2.83 million in state funds for 415 students, by 
far the most of any participating community. Newton and other municipalities use 
roughly the same language to endorse the value of the program as they have since the 
1960s. Newton school superintendent Jeffrey Young asserted in 2007,  “Metco helps the 
Newton schools look and feel more like the diverse society that our kids are going to 
have to function in as citizens and leaders…It's about enriching our lives.”199 This 
response reveals that individualist ideals of suburban liberalism continue to provide both 
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Chapter 9:  




In April 1975, fifty white working-class women from the urban anti-busing group 
Restore Our Alienated Rights (ROAR) disrupted a rally in support of the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) at Boston’s historic Fanueil Hall. Sponsored by several area feminist 
organizations, the gathering was part of a longer struggle to attach an amendment to the 
state constitution articulating the broad and largely symbolic notion of equal rights for 
women. The sponsors had assumed this event would be a relatively staid affair made up 
only of members of their organizations and supporters of the ideals of the amendment. 
The protesters interrupted these plans.  The members of ROAR represented a broader 
coalition of antibusers and pro-lifers who saw the ERA, like mandatory integration and 
legalization of abortion, as a  direct threat to their religious, political and social beliefs. 
Carrying signs declaring,  “Feminists Do Not Represent the American Majority,” and 
“ERA will destroy the family” and chanting “Stop ERA,” the protestors ensured that the 
event’s program did not proceed. Even the intervention of the Boston police failed to 
quell the crowd. A custodian at Fanueil Hall, which had served as a space for free speech 
since before the American Revolution, remarked, “We never had anything like this 
before.”1 To see the ROAR members at a feminist-sponsored rally proved equally 
unprecedented.  
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In response to the anti-ERA movement, the members of the Boston area chapter 
of the National Organization of Women (NOW) and its allies formulated an aggressive 
strategy for passage of the amendment. Building directly upon the suburban networks and 
tactics established by both mainstream feminism and suburban liberalism, they created an 
extremely well organized grassroots-focused movement that involved over 5,000 
volunteers in almost a hundred cities and towns throughout the state.  These efforts 
convinced Massachusetts voters to endorse the state ERA by an overwhelming majority 
in the 1976 election. The vote served as the highpoint of suburban-centered feminism in 
Massachusetts. In contrast to the difficult and ongoing battle over the federal ERA at the 
national level, the successful campaign solidified Massachusetts’s position as a leader on 
the issue of equal rights for women. It also helped restore its reputation as the most 
liberal state in the nation, a title that the busing crisis had undoubtedly tarnished. The 
battle for female equality, nevertheless, remained far from over. Just three years later, a 
newly elected conservative governor, Edward King, signed into law the most restrictive 
antiabortion statute in the country and put the state’s progressive image in crisis once 
again.  
Feminism’s legal victories and setbacks prove an invaluable way of examining 
the continuity and changes in both suburban liberalism and Massachusetts politics during 
the 1970s. The evolution of mainstream feminism in Massachusetts disrupts the popular 
and scholarly assumption that the 1970s represented the nadir of liberal politics in Boston 
or the United States and instead exposes the vitality of the movement. During this decade, 
second-wave feminism achieved arguably its greatest triumphs and broadest 
constituency,  winning a series of legal, social and cultural advancements for women. 
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Political historians have tended to bracket these accomplishments into an aside and focus 
instead on the decline of the liberal coalition and the economic problems and racial 
backlash that accompanied it.2 This chapter challenges the artificial divisions that this 
declension framework has created between liberalism and feminism and material and 
cultural issues. By treating liberalism and feminism not as separate, but rather mutually 
constitutive, it reveals how this overlap not only contributed to the success of both 
movements, but also exacerbated class, racial and spatial inequalities in the physical and 
political landscape of metropolitan Boston and the nation.  
Exploring the influence of suburban liberalism on the mainstream feminist 
movement in Massachusetts also recasts the standard version of postwar white female 
activism. Many of the white suburban women active in fair housing, peace and other 
liberal causes played an important role in shaping the contours of mainstream feminism. 
The journeys of these women between various forms of activism reveals the continuities 
between grassroots suburban liberal activism and the emergence of mainstream feminism 
that earlier narratives of second-wave feminism have overlooked. 3  It also shows that 
suburban spaces served as an important incubator for female activism. By 1971, even 
                                                
2 Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds The Rise and Fall of the New Order, 1930-1980, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1989) offers an example of this tendency. The collection focuses 
overwhelmingly on liberal decline and mentions feminism only once and in relation to radical politics. For 
new scholarship that provides a more complex view of the political landscape in the 1970s see Bruce J. 
Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, eds. Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). Although the collection focuses primarily on 
conservatism, it does acknowledge and demonstrate the persistent influence of liberalism and feminism 
both socially and politically.  
3The first generations of scholarship on this issue have tended to focus primarily on the literal and 
figurative journey of young white middle-class college students whose participation in the Civil Rights and 
New Left movements provided an avenue through which to reject traditional gender, class and racial norms 
and served as the ideological foundations of the feminist movement. Sara Evans, Personal Politics:  The 
Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1979); Ruth Rosen, The World Split Open: How the Modern Women's Movement Changed America (New 
York: Viking, 2000). See also Susan M.  Hartmann, From Margin to Mainstream: American Women and 
Politics Since 1960 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989); Alice Echols, Daring to Be Bad: Radical 
Feminism in America, 1967-1975 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). 
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Betty Friedan suggested that suburban female political activism could transform the 
dimensions of politics and society. Friedan concluded that “the suburban population is 
becoming the decisive one in the United States” and thus female activism was “surely the 
key to the new politics of suburbia.”4  
 The women who became involved in Boston NOW and related groups injected 
the feminist movement with the suburban liberal political strategy and ideology rooted in 
ideas of middle-class respectability and privilege. The women upheld the grassroots 
liberal commitment to working within the formal channels of government and mobilizing 
widespread support among middle-class suburban residents in order to advance their 
cause.  The suburban liberal fair housing and civil rights movement directly influenced 
mainstream feminism’s commitment to ideals of equality of opportunity, freedom of 
choice, and interpretation of discrimination in terms of personal prejudice rather than 
structural inequality. 5 The struggles for the ERA and the right to abortion, therefore, 
exposed the ways in which the Massachusetts feminist movement reinvigorated the forms 
of class entitlement at the heart of the suburban liberal interpretation of equality and 
freedom of choice. These suburban-centered campaigns adopted a language and ideology 
of class-blindness that strengthened the forms of economic discrimination entrenched in 
both the feminist movement and the social landscape of Massachusetts.  
The debate surrounding the legalization of abortion brings into clearest focus 
suburban liberalism and feminism’s circumscribed ability to address the problems of 
                                                
4 Betty Friedan, “The Next Step: Women’s Participation—Human Liberation,” Opening Remarks to the 
Organizing Conference of the National Women’s Political Caucus, Washington, DC, July 10, 1971, Box 6, 
Folder 202, Boston N.O.W. Records, Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in 
America, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University (hereafter: “NOW-Boston”).  
5 In Motherhood in Black and White Ruth Feldstein argues a dialectical relationship between racial 
progressivism and gender conservatism animated postwar liberalism. I argue that suburban-oriented 
feminists in Massachusetts in the 1970s, inverted that paradigm by adopting ideology and political strategy 
of  “gender liberalism” that resulted in heightened forms of racial and class inequality.  
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structural inequality. The legalization of abortion has often symbolized one of the 
greatest accomplishments of second-wave feminism. In the late 1970s, abortion rights 
activists, nevertheless, confronted a state and national effort to circumscribe the 
availability of abortion to low-income women that proved its limits. This use of public 
funds to pay for the abortions of welfare recipients attracted the state’s most socially 
conservative politicians and their constituencies. Many of these grassroots Catholic 
conservatives had first become politically awakened during opposition to the mandatory 
desegregation of the Boston public schools. This controversy illustrates  the fusion of 
cultural and material concerns and the more complicated context and legacy of the 
Boston busing crisis. These debates over women’s rights in the 1970s also exposed the 
role that religion, particularly Catholicism, played in making liberalism an unstable 
category of political belief and identity in Massachusetts during the 1970s. 
 Feminist activists, led by NOW and another suburban-centered organization, 
Massachusetts Organization for Repeal of Abortion Laws (MORAL), engaged in a 
lengthy and emotional battle to oppose the circumscription on abortion rights, which they 
eventually lost. After this failed attempt to challenge the race and class discrimination 
embedded in these new state and federal abortion laws, Massachusetts feminists adopted 
a successful strategy in the late 1970 that focused on mobilizing white middle-class 
citizens into a single-issue constituency. In order to appeal to this suburban liberal base, 
these activists formulated a class-blind language of choice that presented abortion as a 
form of middle-class privilege not as a fundamental right to all women.6 The positive 
response to this mobilization convinced both the national abortion rights movement and 
                                                
6 This point builds upon the argument in Rickie Solinger, Beggars and Choosers: How the Politics of 
Choice Shapes the Politics of Abortion, Welfare in the United States (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001).  
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the Democratic Party to adopt similar tactics. This Massachusetts-based model has 
subsequently enabled middle-class liberals and their state and national elected 
representatives to embrace the symbolic ideals of the pro-choice movement without 
having to commit to economic and social policies that ensure equal reproductive rights.  
 
No One Home to Answer the Phone 
Throughout the postwar period the suburbs of Boston contained a vibrant network 
of grassroots liberal organizations devoted to issues such as civil rights, peace and 
environmentalism, and women stood at the forefront of this movement.  The white 
middle-class suburban women who led these groups strategically deployed gender norms, 
social structures, and strong political and social associations of motherhood to advance 
liberal causes. Bonnie Jones of Lexington, who in the 1960s was a leader in the local 
chapters of the both the Massachusetts Federation for Fair Housing and the antiwar group 
Citizens for Participation Politics (CPP), later observed that though the groups included a 
lot of men, “women did most of the work” and “ the real energy and enthusiasm for a lot 
of this stuff came from women.”7 She recalled that during the sixties, she and the other 
“women in town were, by and large, not working.” Jones and other Lexington women 
“were home with their kids putting a lot of energy into political activity. Probably 
because it interested them and probably because they had the time available.”8 In the 
early 1970s, Jones, nevertheless, returned to school to pursue her masters degree in social 
work, started a consciousness raising group, and become president of the local chapter of 
the NOW, which afforded her less time to devote to these civil rights and antiwar causes.  
                                                
7 Jones Interview.  
8 Jones Interview. 
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Jones’s career represented a broader trend of suburban liberal female activists 
who opted to enter the workforce, return to school, or join the nascent feminist movement 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The thousands of individual decisions of these women 
had a powerful collective consequence for the effectiveness of suburban liberal 
organizations in metropolitan Boston. “Voluntarism wasn’t enough for most of us,” 
observed Anita Greenbaum, a longtime member of the peace group Voice of Women 
(VOW) and several other liberal political causes. She asked, however,  “But if everyone 
is doing paid work, who will do the volunteer work?” Fellow VOW member Sue 
Berkeley observed that while the suburban-based peace and civil rights movements had 
depended on “housewives in the suburbs” to gain support by the mid-1970s, “You don’t 
find women at home to answer the phone anymore.”9 The shift of female members away 
from volunteering and into the paid workforce served as a key factor in the eventual 
disbanding of both VOW and the Fair Housing Federation.  
Many of these suburban women saw their careers as a continuation of their social 
activism. Drawing a comparison between VOW and her job as a social worker, Joan 
Kunitz declared, “I’m still doing essentially the same thing, using my energy to better the 
human condition.”10  Several members of the peace movement shared Kunitz’s 
perspective, launching or reviving careers as social workers or teachers. Many other 
female activists pursued careers in local or state government in order to further cultivate 
their interest in working within the political system to create change. Lexington resident 
Nancy Earsy recalled that when she first came to the town in the early 1960s,  the League 
of Women Voters, the Fair Housing Federation, and CPP provided “intellectual 
                                                
9  Lucy Caldwell-Stair, “Peace Workers active 15 years later,” Newton Times, December 15, 1976.   
10 Susan Auerbach, “Peace Warriors Break Rank,” Newton Times, July 30, 1975.   
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satisfaction and a kind of career” she had missed out on by choosing to stay home with 
her children. By the late 1960s, with their kids grown and left home, gave these women 
the time and flexibility to revive dormant career plans. These volunteer activities sparked 
her interest in policymaking, and she enrolled in Northeastern Law School in order to 
launch a career in state government. 11 So many of her fellow citizens followed Earsy’s 
path that Lexington’s weekly newspaper launched a bi-monthly column with profiles of 
women, many of whom had experiences in the League and other liberal groups, who had 
decided in their thirties and forties to return to school or work.12 In Lexington alone, by 
1973, 36.6 percent of married women and 41.1 percent of all women had joined the labor 
force, up from 22.1 percent in 1960.13 Several other Route 128 suburbs experienced a 
similar percentage increase of women going to work.  
 Personal fulfillment alone did not lead these women into the paid workforce. By 
the early 1970s, the combination of economic recession and inflation meant families, 
even upper middle-class ones, could no longer survive on a single salary. 14 Former VOW 
President Rhona Shoul, who became a social worker at a Newton junior high, explained 
that in the “affluent sixties” women could afford to volunteer whereas factors like the 
recession in the 1970s and the cost of college tuition forced many women into the labor 
market for “practical reasons.”15 A significant number of women in Boston’s liberal 
suburbs, in line with the national trend, got divorced during this period, which also 
                                                
11 “Women’s World at WORC,” Minute-Man Supplement, November 15, 1973.  
12 See Women’s World at WORC in Minute-Man Supplement beginning September 29, 1972. Barbara 
Smith Silvers, “Lexington Woman Shows She Can Get Education While Raising Family, ”Minute-Man 
Supplement, February 1, 1973; “Lexington Woman on School Com. Balances Many Responsibilities,” 
Minute-Man Supplement, October 11, 1973; “Woman’s World at WORC, ”Minute-Man Supplement, 
November 11, 1973; Anne Arsenault, “Women’s World at WORC,” Minute-Man Supplement, November 
29, 1973. 
13 “More Working Wives in Lexington, ” Lexington Minute-Man, August 22, 1973.  
14 Matthew D. Lassiter, “Inventing Family Values” in Rightward Bound, 14-15.  
15 Auerbach, “Peace Warriors Break Rank.”  
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contributed to the rise of suburban women entering the workforce. These new 
responsibilities meant that many of these women had less time to perform grassroots 
volunteering duties.16 
The rise of the female liberation movement in the late 1960s also encouraged 
many women not only to go to work but also to join feminist organizations. The personal 
friendships forged in the planning meetings and envelope-licking sessions of groups like 
VOW and the Fair Housing Federation served as the foundations of feminist activism in 
the suburbs.17 In turning toward feminism, veterans of the fair housing, civil rights, and 
antiwar movement extended suburban liberalism’s ideology of equal opportunity and 
individual rights. Many of these upper-middle-class women saw a direct correlation 
between the sense of inequality they had aimed to combat through the fair housing and 
civil rights and the issues of sex discrimination. Yet while the white suburban women 
often voiced an abstract outrage at the injustice of racial segregation, they usually had 
more personal experience with gender-based discrimination in school and the workplace. 
Thus, they turned to feminism as means to bring full equality of opportunity for 
themselves and their daughters.18 Commenting on the influence of the suburban activism 
of the 1960s on the rise of feminism, Bonnie Jones later observed, “It was no accident 
that the Women’s movement came out of that same period.”19  
                                                
16 To commemorate the 30th Reunion  of Voice of Women-New England, a group of members sent out 
questionnaires entitled “30 years later: Voice of Women Reunion” to members of the organization, many of 
the women describe how they divorced in the early 1970s and then pursued employment, Box 1, Folder 51, 
VOW.  For instance Hilda Schwartz stated that after her divorce and re-entry into the workforce, she 
continued to give moral and financial support to liberal causes and candidates, she no longer had the time to 
perform everyday volunteer activities.  
17 Auerbach, “Peace Warriors Break Rank.” 
18 See the Boston NOW, Membership Applications c. 1970-1972, Box 5, Folder 167, Box 5, Folder 169, 
NOW-Boston.  
19 Jones Interview. 
 
555 
In 1973, Bonnie Jones, by then writing master’s thesis in social work, co-authored 
an analysis of the demographics of female liberation participation using the members of 
the Lexington chapter of NOW as the sample.20 The results revealed how and why these 
mainstream feminism flourished in Route 128 suburbs like Lexington that had an existing 
commitment to liberal activism. The study found that the women in the group were 
almost uniformly upper-income, highly educated, married to engineers or other 
professionals and politically liberal. In response to questions intended to determine the 
respondent’s “degree of liberalism,” the members showed unanimous support for ecology 
and civil rights issues, strong endorsement of the Black Power movement and amnesty 
for draft resisters, and less enthusiasm for the construction low-income housing in the 
suburbs and busing for integration. 21  These women voiced overwhelming support for 
working within the political system as a means to create change especially on issues of 
sexual discrimination, which underscores why so many suburban liberals opted to join 
NOW.22  
 
Changing Lives By Changing Laws 
The existing national group NOW provided a fitting outlet for the continuation of 
grassroots suburban liberal grassroots activism. NOW’s promotion of legal and 
individualist solutions to the structural problem of gender inequality dovetailed the core 
beliefs of suburban liberalism. A group of prominent women led by Betty Friedan had 
first begun NOW in 1966 with the goal of creating a “feminist civil rights 
                                                
20 Jane Hilburt Davis, Margaret Dickerman, Bonnie Jones, Patience Sampson, “A Study of Women's 
Liberation in a Suburban Community: Distinguishing Characteristics of Joiners of the Women's Liberation 
Movement” (Master’s Thesis, Boston University, 1974).  
21 Davis, et al. “A Study of Women's Liberation in a Suburban Community.”  
22 Davis, et al. “A Study of Women's Liberation in a Suburban Community.”  
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organization.”23 NOW quickly gained a reputation as the feminist organization most 
committed to working through the established channels of political power to create 
female equality. Yet, it remained primarily focused on the federal government. A group 
of “ professional women and well-meaning liberals” in Boston began a chapter in 1969 to 
pursue this mission at the local level. Similar to the stance of the Fair Housing 
Federation, Political Action for Peace, and Citizens for Participation Politics, NOW 
articulated a belief “that gradual, rational change within the system is the only sane way 
of bringing about our goals and democratizing our country even further. ”24  This 
platform attracted women like longtime liberal activist Emily Frankovich, who saw NOW 
as a way to create political and economic equality through public policy.25  
By building its membership base from the well-established network of grassroots 
liberal activists concentrated in the Route 128 suburbs, NOW fast emerged as the largest 
and most politically visible feminist group in the Boston area. 26  In just two years, the 
group also became the second largest and most politically active chapter of NOW in the 
country. The national headquarters dubbed it both the “Boston Brain Trust,” because of 
the intellectual resources of the membership, and the “cyclone chapter, ” because of its 
rapid growth from 100 to 500 and eventually 800 members in a matter of months.27 From 
the outset, the founders of NOW understood that its success depended upon presenting 
itself as a counterpart to existing Boston-based female liberation organizations like Bread 
and Roses and Female Liberation, which had younger and more radical membership 
                                                
23 For more on the founding of NOW see, Rosen, A World Split Open, 74-93.  
24 Jane [Pollack] to Betsy [Elizabeth Hogan], August 7, 1970, Box 1, Folder 15, NOW-Boston.  
25 Boston NOW, Membership Applications c. 1970-1972.  
26 Barbara Burgess, “Women’s Liberation Movement in Boston,” October 1970, Box 2, Folder 62, NOW-
Boston.  
27 Eastern Massachusetts NOW Newsletter, January 1971, Box 11, National Organization for Women 
Chapter Newsletter Collection (hereafter “NOW-Newsletters”). 
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bases. 28 Those groups had made previous attempts to cultivate the feminist impulses of 
suburban women by encouraging housewives to reject their lifestyles. “We must reach 
housewives because they are the most oppressed members of society,” one Female 
Liberation member explained. 29  Some of the early members of NOW had first attended 
meetings of groups Bread and Roses, but became alienated by its radical approach.30 
These suburban women preferred NOW to Bread and Roses because of its  “civil rights” 
philosophy and commitment “to achieving its goals within the existing system.” 31  
NOW’s agenda and activities embodied the middle-class and suburban-centered 
subjectivity of its members. Like the fair housing movement, NOW’s activities and 
mission concentrated on a class-blind ideal of equal opportunity and individual rights 
offering primarily individualist and symbolic solutions to the structural problem of the 
social and economic disadvantages of women. Its practices, therefore, disproportionately 
benefited white middle-class married women and often focused on helping a handful of 
people rather than attempting large-scale structural interventions. Among its early notable 
achievements, the chapter organized “Project Harvard” to challenge sex discrimination in 
the hiring and treatment of faculty at the university. In addition, NOW published a 
booklet on “liberated housework” that featured ways for married couples to free 
themselves from the assumption that housekeeping remained the sole domain of women. 
The booklet stressed,  “Housekeeping chores have no sex,” and offered suggestions on 
                                                
28 Diane White, “Liberation movement seeks to build self-respect, ” Boston Globe, February 23, 1970; 
Barbara Burgess, “Women’s Liberation Movement in Boston,” October 1970, Box 2, Folder 62, NOW-
Boston.  
29 White, “Liberation Movement Building in Strength.” 
30 Elizabeth W. Hogan to Jane Pollack, Nancy Valliant, Barbara Zilber, August 5, 1970, Box 1, Folder 15, 
NOW-Boston.  
31 NOW North Shore Unit Minutes, May 26, 1970, Box 19, Folder 683, NOW-Boston.  
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alternative ways of arranging daily tasks such as shoe-shining, bed making, and ironing.32 
This pamphlet underscored the ways in which liberal feminists interpreted transforming 
the dynamics of individual relationships as an important way of creating gender equality. 
NOW,  however, focused primarily on securing the passage of state laws, 
upholding the organization’s central belief that working within political structures 
provided the most effective means to gain equality for women. In order to learn how “to 
use the political machinery to promote the interests of women” and “evolve into a 
politically effective entity,” NOW turned to contacts in local liberal organizations. A 
lobbyist from the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute sponsored “practical aspects of 
getting bills passed.” CPP also became “very enthusiastic” about NOW’s interest in 
lobbying and gave the group advice about tactics. The Massachusetts legislative session 
in 1971 alone brought the passage of laws banning discrimination in public 
accommodations, housing, credit and public education due directly to the work of NOW.  
The same year Jane Pollack observed, “we have made a difference in this state because 
we’ve put several hundred letters on desks of senators and in addition they have a large 
volume of phone calls, telegrams and messages.”33 The responsiveness of politicians to 
NOW’s large and politically active membership dispersed throughout a variety of 
communities confirmed the success of suburban-based organizations at working within  
the political system. Former president Carol Kountz later summarized the group’s 
philosophy and plan of action: “We can make a difference in women’s lives by changing 
laws.”34  
                                                
32 NOW, “Liberated Housekeeping Questionnaire To Help Other Couples, ” No Date, Box 13, Folder 449, 
NOW-Boston.  
33 Maloney “The Who Who’s of Women’s Liberation.”  
34 Eastern Massachusetts NOW Chapter, Newsletter, June 1972, Box 11, NOW-Newsletters.  
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NOW also believed that its image of middle-class respectability provided an 
effective lobbying tool. State representative Ann Gannett applauded the techniques of 
NOW, noting that the women were “well informed, well-dressed and they weren’t 
aggressive or annoying.”35 Like the fair housing and antiwar activists, NOW leaders 
viewed their suburban middle class foundations as an important way to make feminism 
appear less threatening and more acceptable to the mainstream public. “We were a very 
feisty group,” Roberta Benjamin later explained, “but we had to make women’s issues 
look legitimate and respectable.”36 In speeches and interviews, therefore, the leaders of 
NOW established the images of “bra-burning warrior woman” and “man-hating lesbian” 
as foils from which they repeatedly set themselves apart. Dispelling the assumption that 
most feminists eschewed domesticity and family for a career, the leaders never failed to 
mention that NOW counted many housewives among its ranks. These spokespeople also 
countered the assumption that NOW sought to eradicate traditional gender roles and 
instead stressed its desire to make the nuclear family healthier and more equitable.37  
The leaders believed these deployments of suburban privilege and political 
moderation would provide improved opportunities for women of every race, class, sexual 
orientation and political persuasion. Roberta Benjamin defended NOW’s moderate 
image, declaring that its ambitious aims meant “we have to play it safe.”38 Boston NOW 
president Pat Caplan stated her belief in 1971 that the organization’s wider contribution 
“may well be our so-called elitist middle-class orientation. We are educated, resourceful; 
                                                
35 Eastern Massachusetts NOW Chapter, Newsletter, September 1972, Box 11, NOW-Newsletters.  
36 Boston NOW News April 1975, Box 11, NOW-Newsletters.  
37 For instance, in speech to the mostly male Lawrence Chamber of Commerce Jane Pollack subverted the 
postwar psychological theory of “mother blaming” to suggest to that if men assumed more parental 
responsibility it would produce more mentally healthy children (Mary Beth Connolly, “Lib’s Obstacle: 
Women, ”Lawrence Eagle-Tribune, May 25, 1971).  
38 NOW Quits the N.E. Lib coalition,” Boston Globe, April 13, 1971; Boston NOW News, April 1975. 
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some of us even have money. Many of us have had the time to learn a lot and to get to 
know the people who run things.” She suggested that the organization could use its 
connections with the “establishment” on behalf of less powerful groups such as  “women 
on welfare,” “black women,” “gay women” and “women in prison.”39 Although Caplan 
stressed that “these women” needed “to know that our resources are at their disposal,” 
this approach served to further alienate the organization from ideologically, economically 
and racially diverse groups. The image of suburban middle-class respectability drew 
criticism from other NOW members who believed that it hurt more than helped both its 
internal workings and larger mission. Founding member Pat Gold sent an internal letter 
chiding “the middle-class, academic, overeducated women in their safe suburbs” who 
“don’t give a damn about the feelings, thoughts, life styles, etc. of other women in the 
organization” and remained committing to protecting the image of NOW “at all costs.”40 
A 1972 Boston Globe article about then president Pat Caplan and her family 
brought these tensions into sharpest focus.  The Globe’s controversial article called “ The 
Unmarrying of Pat and Alan” used the deterioration of the Caplans’ marriage as a model 
of the ways feminism had led many couples to separate and develop unconventional 
custody arrangements.41 The political awakening of Caplan followed the basic narrative 
of the Feminine Mystique. “The trees and grass and clean air are great for the kids, but I 
was bored,” Caplan recalled about her move to Wellesley from Cambridge and life as a 
housewife.  “I would drive around town in my station wagon and see all these other 
women driving around in their station wagons.” She contemplated that she had always 
been a “private feminist” and found NOW to be the “logical outlet” for her nascent 
                                                
39 Eastern Massachusetts NOW Chapter, Newsletters, January1972, Box 11, NOW-Newsletters.  
40 Patricia Gold to Roberta Benjamin, March 7, 1971, Box 2, Folder 59, NOW-Boston.  
41 Ellen Goodman, “The Unmarrying of Pat and Alan, ”Boston Globe, February 27, 1972.  
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commitment to women’s rights and frustration with suburban life.42 Caplan rose in the 
ranks of NOW, serving first as the editor of its monthly newspaper and then president in 
1971. The experience led Caplan to reevaluate her life, her relationship to husband Alan, 
and her earlier articulation of the importance of NOW’s middle-class norms.  
Just a year after the Wellesley paper had featured Caplan with long hair, wearing 
a skirt and blouse and smiling with her small children against a wallpapered backdrop, 
the Globe offered a different image. The controversial article accompanied a picture of 
the former debutante with short hair and dressed in pants and a turtleneck lying on a 
mattress of the floor of the Cambridge apartment she shared with the bearded proprietor 
of a nearby hammock store. Caplan had relinquished primary custody of her four children 
to Alan who had gone through his own transformation as a result of the separation. He 
decided to resign from his job at his family business to work as a lawyer at a community 
action agency and moved with his children from Wellesley to a single family-house in 
Cambridge. 
The suburban country-club members’ metamorphosis into self-realized hippies in 
a matter of months offered an extreme model of the ways the therapeutic messages of 
second-wave feminism had helped many white middle-class couples reassess marriage 
and gender roles. In the article both Pat and Alan Caplan spoke candidly about their 
separation and the role of Pat’s activism and self-realization in the decision.  “I credit the 
women’s movement with the whole thing,” Pat declared. “ I might have been like so 
many other people who are dragging around hating their husband.”43 Alan shared this 
view voicing support for Caplan’s activities and emphasizing that the couple was closer 
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and more honest after their separation. The Caplans’ candid assessment of their marriage 
and re-assigning responsibility appeared to fulfill the urging of NOW to produce more 
equitable familial relationships. 
 The majority of NOW’s executive board, nevertheless, believed the article 
threatened the organization’s focus on middle-class respectability. Several board 
members feared the article implied that NOW encouraged women to abscond parental 
duties. They feared this assumption would hurt the image of suburban normalcy that the 
organization had worked tirelessly to develop. Many members of the board did not want 
Caplan to continue to speak for the organization and successfully pressured to her to 
relinquish the post as president. In her formal letter of resignation, Caplan called into 
question “NOW’s middle-class values” and voiced her hope that the incident would 
encourage a  “careful re-examination of NOW’s purpose. ”44 The Board ultimately 
decided not take up Caplan’s call for rethinking the implications of its strategy but 
instead to enhance its suburban-centered and middle-class dimensions. 
In the early 1970s, NOW leaders decided to expand physically and ideologically 
the suburban dimensions of the organization.45 The members of the Boston chapter 
established a number of affiliates in their own suburban towns, including Action, 
Lexington, Newton, and several North and South Shore suburbs, in order to meet the 
demands of women who could not travel into the city for weekly meetings.46  The 
suburban chapters made it easier for white middle-class women to participate in NOW, 
but at the same time this reorientation made the organization even more homogenous and 
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inaccessible to less affluent women who lived in the city. The suburban expansion further 
normalized an upper-middle-class worldview into NOW’s membership, outlook and 
agenda that would have both expansive and limiting consequences. 
 
Women Make Policy Not Coffee 
By the early 1970s NOW and the mainstream feminist movement had also gained 
increased access to traditional political power lines. Governor Francis Sergeant’s decision 
to create a Governor’s Commission on the Status of Women (GCSW) in 1971 illustrated 
one important example of the effectiveness of NOW’s campaign to work within the 
formal channels for legal equality. Sargent intended for the GCSW to make 
recommendations to the Governor to ensure  “women actually obtain the equal rights 
they deserve.”47 The 35-member GCSW included several members of NOW and other 
suburban-centered organizations, underscoring its grassroots liberal underpinnings. The 
Commission ultimately achieved more success in its symbolic commitment to equality of 
opportunity than in creating material improvements in the lives of the majority of Bay 
State women. Member Betty Taymor, nevertheless, remained supportive of the broader 
purpose of the commission and the ways in which it validated the importance of working 
within the system. “The fact that there was a governmental body whose exclusive 
purpose was to serve women,” Taymor later observed, “legitimized the goals and 
demands of the movement.”48 The creation of the Massachusetts Women’s Political 
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Caucus (MWPC) in 1971 further formalized the feminist movement’s political agenda.49 
Its slogan, “Women make policy not coffee,” succinctly captured its goals.50 In addition, 
the creation of both the GCSW and MWPC helped to set the stage for the campaign 
surrounding the Equal Rights Amendment, which would mark the climax of this political 
recognition of women’s rights.  
The five-year campaign for the state Equal Rights Amendment served as the 
highpoint of the Massachusetts movement, building directly on the political gains, 
middle-class membership, and individualist ideology of mainstream feminism. The idea 
of a federal ERA dated to the immediate aftermath of suffrage, but the U.S. Congress had 
consistently defeated it.51 Labor feminists and working-class women had also objected to 
the law because they worried it would destroy the privileges of protective legislative and 
it provoked long lasting tensions within the movement.52 Upon its formation, the national 
NOW had made passage of the amendment a top priority. Although the federal 
government had by that time enacted a series of laws to promote sex equality, including 
Title VII, NOW and its allies believed the ERA contained both additional protection and 
important symbolism. The mainstream movement, now with the support of labor women, 
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started the process for passage of the amendment and received a more promising 
response from politicians. In 1972, Congress finally passed the Equal Rights 
Amendment. Just a few months later, by a vote of 205-7, Massachusetts became the 20th 
state to ratify the ERA. The quick change of attitude by local and national politicians 
demonstrated the legislature’s growing acceptance of women’s equality and recognition 
that the amendment would not make radical changes to law or society. The national 
momentum for passage, nevertheless, halted in the remaining states needed for 
ratification and a lengthy and heated struggle ensued.53  
With the future of the federal amendment in doubt, Boston NOW decided to 
submit a virtually identical Equal Rights Amendment to the state constitution. The group 
had first aimed to convince Massachusetts to adopt an ERA in 1971, but when the 
national movement made rapid progress, Boston NOW had abandoned the issue and 
turned to the federal battle. 54 In 1973, NOW revived the quest to insert the sentence 
“Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed 
or national origin” into Article I of the state constitution and change the clause “all men 
are born free and equal” to “all persons are born free and equal.”55 NOW activists 
believed that whether or not the federal amendment passed, the state statute would at 
least serve as “a symbolic gesture” and at most provide women “with a legal handle” to 
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challenge discriminatory laws and practices. 56  It was, however, a bureaucratically 
tedious task to change the state constitution. Massachusetts law stipulated an amendment 
had to pass two separately elected bodies by a majority vote and then be placed on the 
ballot for ratification. The amendment easily cleared the first hurdle as the state 
legislative bill passed almost unanimously and with little debate in August 1973. After 
this painless victory, NOW and its allies in the MWPC and GCSW remained confident 
that the ERA would sail through and put the issue on the back burner for the two years 
between the first and second constitutional conventions.  
The rally at Fanueil Hall represented one of the few lobbying activities that pro-
ERA forces planned in preparation for the second constitutional convention vote slated 
for May 1975.  The relatively tame program of speeches and inspirational music never 
began because of urban women of ROAR’s disruption. ROAR aimed its opposition less 
at the ERA itself than at the GCSW, which had repeatedly refused to acknowledge 
mandatory busing as a women’s issue. A few months earlier, eighty members of ROAR 
disrupted the proceedings of a GCSW meeting by breaking into song. Chairmen Ann 
Blackham had tried to restore order. “The commission has no mandate to get involved in 
busing,” she chided. “Now please you are our guests here and if you don’t behave, I will 
have to ask you to leave.” The reprimand inflamed leader Pixie Palladino’s antipathy for 
suburban liberal elites. Gesturing toward the commission, whose members came mostly 
from the affluent suburbs of Belmont, Newton Wellesley and Winchester, she had 
quickly shot back, “You’re our guests. This is our City Hall. No bunch of ladies from the 
suburbs is going to kick the women of Boston out of their own City Hall.”57  Most of the 
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anti-busing groups had shown almost an indifference to women’s issues prior to this 
conflict. However, the dismissive treatment by the members of the GSCW had awakened 
a sense that feminists were just another example of middle-class liberals using the 
government to encroach on the Boston residents’ way of life.  
The mainstream feminists demonstrated a more ambivalent relationship to the 
women of the anti-busing movement. While serving in the U.S. Congress, Louise Day 
Hicks had sought membership in the Boston NOW. The leaders of the NOW had met 
with Hicks, where she called herself a feminist and pointed out that she had voted in 
favor of the federal ERA.58 However, the group refused to let her join because of her 
history of racism and her  anti-abortion position. Some NOW members did expressed 
sympathy with the antibusers. The GCSW’s refusal to acknowledge busing as a women’s 
issues highlighted the largely suburban liberal members’ dismissal of ROAR’s claims to 
the same maternalist strategy and symbolism that many of them had used to campaign for 
civil rights, peace, and female equality. After the confrontation at the GCSW meeting, 
NOW member Jennifer Davis interpreted the event as a sign that “the busing issues has 
succeeded, where feminist groups have consistently failed, in politicizing the lower-
income, less-educated women.” She urged NOW to think about changing its priorities. 
“Only by becoming involved in those issues like busing, battered women or welfare, 
which have meaning to more than an elite minority,” Davis asserted, “will NOW become 
truly an organization for all women.”59 The leaders of NOW continued to ignore such 
recommendations and made no plans to make the organization or its ERA campaign 
extend beyond its white middle-class liberal base.  
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ROAR discovered a different set of allies among the state’s growing grassroots 
pro-life movement. These activists believed the ERA would both increase the 
accessibility of abortion and destroy traditional family norms.  Maxine Tremaine of 
Newton, a leader of the anti-abortion group Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), had 
formed an organization with the broad name Women for Constitutional Government and 
the specific purpose of opposing the amendment. Tremaine and her followers appeared at 
the Fanueil Hall event wielding signs stating the “ERA will destroy the home” and 
“feminists do not represent the American majority,” next to placards reading “Busing 
Stinks.” Further demonstrating the conflation of the anti-abortion and anti-busing 
campaigns inside the Hall the chants of “Stop ERA” had quickly morphed into the song 
“Southie is My Home Town.”60 This strong showing by the opposition caught the pro-
ERA forces off guard and revealed that NOW and the GSCW had drastically 
underestimated the political strength of the anti-busers and their anti-ERA allies.  
This power became even clearer in the developments at the State House. The 
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Rep. Michael Flaherty, was one of the few state 
politicians who had voted against both the state and federal ERAs. The grassroots 
opposition reinvigorated his own campaign against the amendment. He called a private 
meeting of the Judiciary Committee in mid-April,  where they voted to give the ERA an 
unfavorable report. Representative Barney Frank warned NOW leaders that the 
consensus view among the legislature was that the ERA “had no chance of winning in the 
second constitutional convention.”61  In response to this dire prediction, Benjamin 
convinced NOW to stage an emergency meeting of Boston area women’s and liberal 
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groups including the League of Women Voters, the Governor’s Commission on the 
Status of Women, the Massachusetts Women’s Political Caucus, Citizens for 
Participation in Political Action and Americans for Democratic Action. These supporters 
of the amendment decided to form a group called the Massachusetts Equal Rights 
Amendment Coalition to launch an intensive three-week lobbying effort to ensure that the 
measure passed the constitutional convention. The groups applied both the tactics and 
suburban network they had cultivated in countless other grassroots lobbying campaigns, 
issuing an urgent call to their members to phone, write and visit state representatives and 
send letters to local newspapers endorsing the ERA.62  
The coalition hoped to simultaneously use the grassroots lobbying campaign to 
“combat” rumors and misinformation rapidly circulated by the opposition. 
Representatives of the group emphasized the state ERA would not affect abortion, the 
school busing issue, maternity leave policies, or bathrooms. The campaign also clarified 
that the state amendment would impact neither social security benefits nor the military 
draft, both of which were federal issues. Instead supporters placed the ERA in non-
threatening and liberal individualist terms, stressing it would provide women with the 
right to “choose how she lives her life,” be it as “homemaker, teacher, businesswomen, 
construction worker,” and would insure “their rights and the freedom to live as they 
wish.”63 In an effort to further defuse the inflammatory claims of the opposition, the 
coalition emphasized the symbolic importance of the amendment not just for women, but 
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for all Bay State residents declaring that supporting it would help citizens “live up to the 
state’s ideals of freedom and equality.” 
The coalition also made the potential dangers of the opposition, particularly its 
ties to the national Stop ERA movement, a key component of the emergency campaign.   
When conservative firebrand Phyllis Schlafly flew into Boston a week before the vote, it 
legitimated these warnings. Through her relentless campaign against the ERA, the Illinois 
activist had become a household name by the mid-1970s. In Boston, she staged a press 
conference, appeared on TV, and delivered a speech to the members of Women for 
Constitutional Government. Schlafly deemed the ERA “the opening wedge to the 
destruction of the American family” and issued a sweeping warning that it would force 
the courts to validate homosexual marriages, strip churches of tax exemptions if they 
refused to ordain women, and stop states from regulating abortion.64 ERA supporters like 
Ann Lewis of the MWPC sought to diffuse these charges by asking the legislators, 
“Whose constituent is Phyllis Schlafly?” 65 
The state legislators received hundreds of letters and cards from their actual 
constituents during the three-week blitz urging support for the ERA. The Coalition 
leaders relied on the relationships they had established working on other liberal and 
feminist causes to conduct personal lobbying. When meeting with legislators, the 
Coalition members clarified that the politicians’ decision only covered whether or not the 
Amendment should reach their constituents and was not the final word on the ERA.66 The 
female members of the legislature assisted in this lobbying drive.  On the day of the vote, 
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the female members of the legislature arrived at the State House armed with carnations 
that they pinned to the lapels of their male colleagues in an effort to make the issue 
appear even more “non-threatening.”67 The debate on the floor quickly became less about 
the merits of ERA and more about the issues of the opposition movement, particularly 
busing and abortion. One observer half-kidded that the discussion made the ERA appear 
as a law to create “forced busing across school boundaries to have abortions.”68 These 
arguments failed to persuade the majority of the representatives and the ERA passed the 
constitutional convention by a wide margin, transforming it into Question 1 on the 1976 
election ballot. Roberta Benjamin emphasized the symbolic meaning of the vote as much 
as the practical concerns, candidly observing, “if we lost as basic a fight as this, the 
credibility of the whole women’s movement would be lost.”69  
 
Eyeshadow and the ERA  
In the aftermath of the Convention, Roberta Benjamin, Ann Kendall (a member of 
the GSCW) and Carolyn Schneider of NOW sought to continue momentum they had 
cultivated in the emergency campaign for the passage of the referendum in November 
1976. These women and their allies established a more formal organization called the 
Committee to Ratify the Massachusetts State Equal Rights Amendment, with Kendall as 
the chair. The main decision-makers for the Committee consisted largely of women like 
Benjamin and Schneider who had organized the Boston Chapter of NOW in the early 
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seventies and continued to play a leading role in the organization.70 The combination of the 
controversy and the defeat of the state ERA initiatives in New Jersey and New York led 
them to brace for a difficult fight. The organizers recognized that complacency and 
overconfidence had played a central role in New Jersey and New York and decided to 
avoid that fate by preparing one of the most highly organized grassroots campaigns for a 
referendum in Massachusetts political history. The group decided to model the effort on 
an electoral campaign, but supporting an issue rather than a candidate. The leaders even 
hired local political operative Rosemary Sansone as the campaign manager who to 
oversee task forces on education, outreach, organization, fundraising, and media 
relations. 
 The Committee to Ratify’s emphasis on grassroots organizing especially among 
middle-class residents demonstrated the persistent vibrancy of activism for liberal causes 
in the suburbs. During the first six months of 1976, the campaign enlisted 26 coordinators 
who oversaw the formation of committees in 100 towns across the state with the largest 
concentration in the Route 128 suburbs near Boston. The recruiting and fundraising 
activities of the local committees underscored the campaign’s heavy reliance on 
suburban-based sensibilities and social networks. The grassroots volunteers sponsored 
sales of household items and t-shirts with the Amendment written on the front, wine and 
cheese parties, sock hops, and clambakes. One town provided the answer to the question 
“Can one support the ERA and still wear eyeshadow?” by holding a series of makeup 
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parties to raise funds for the campaign. 71 A group of housewives launched a project 
called “Dial a Day for the ERA,” where supporters pledged to call one friend every day 
to help sway the vote. Through these efforts, the ERA campaign raised $50,000 and 
recruited over 5,000 volunteers and many more non-active supporters. 
The Committee to Ratify took other steps to emulate a political campaign. The 
coordinators ran all-day training sessions that roughly half of these 5,000 volunteers 
attended, where they learned about the legal implications of the law.72 Roberta Benjamin, 
then a law student at Harvard, obtained the six-inch printout copy of all the 
Massachusetts statutes affecting women. She distilled the information into a 39-page 
booklet that she handed out at the training sessions.73 These efforts ensured that the 
grassroots volunteers remained both well organized and well informed. In the place of a 
campaign bus or “whistle-stop tour” the Committee to Ratify sent an  “ERA 
Truthmobile” around the state to shopping plazas and parking lots where volunteers 
aboard answered questions and passed out information emblazoned with the campaign 
slogan “The ERA sounds simple and it is.” 74 In one of its most effective moves, the 
organizers replaced the candidate stump speech with a bureau of speakers trained by the 
Committee to deliver a prepared set of talking points. Throughout the year, more than 
seventy-five speakers drove across the state presenting the necessity of the ERA to local 
groups such as women’s clubs, religious congregations, and political organizations.  
In these forums, the speakers aimed to make the ERA appear as moderate and 
non-elitist as possible. In addition to dressing conservatively in skirts and jewelry as 
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mandated by the campaign, the spokespeople highlighted more the abstract rather than 
actual effects of the ERA. Jacqueline Basha, the press secretary for the Committee, called 
the measure “primarily a symbolic gesture toward women that reflects the way we live 
today.”75 These speakers also presented the ERA not as the demand of a specific set of 
rights, but a means to increase the choices for women. These statements emphasized the 
class-blind ideal that the amendment would not force women into careers but rather 
increase their “choice” and “opportunity.” Ann Kendall emphasized this argument rooted 
in class and racial privilege, stating, “It’s a matter of simple justice that both men and 
women should have choices and, in fact, can have choices.”76  Lisa Noble of the GCSW 
publicly defined the ERA’s most important outcome as the fact that  “women will have a 
choice they can decide themselves what they want to be and do in their own lives…and 
find fulfillment.”77 In addition to building a broad base of support, this language laid the 
discursive groundwork for later arguments about the necessity of keeping abortion legal 
and built on civil rights freedom of choice rhetoric.  
The Committee to Ratify, like NOW, recognized the benefits of presenting the 
issue and its supporters through signifiers of middle-class respectability. Sansone and her 
staff therefore made a “strenuous effort” to involve married suburban parents, especially 
men, in the campaign as a way deflect the charges that radical lesbian feminists 
controlled the effort.78 In reality, a spectrum of experience and viewpoints propelled 
Massachusetts residents to join the cause. Several of the volunteers became interested 
through their affiliations with local chapters of the NOW and the LWV, both of which 
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made the passage of the ERA a top priority. Others had no previous political experience 
but shared a broad notion of rights and equality rooted in the basic ideology of suburban 
liberalism. Many of the volunteers, experienced and novice alike, approached the issue 
through a lens of familial and parental concern. Several supporters articulated a fear that 
the absence of the ERA would put their own daughters at a disadvantage. For instance, 
suburban mother Judy Meredith saw the ERA as a way to enhance the enforcement of 
laws to combat sex discrimination in the public schools.79 One suburban man became 
involved for the less policy-minded worry that his two college-aged daughters faced 
unfair handicaps despite his financial and emotional commitment to their education. 
Lexington couple Hilary and Stan Harris adopted a therapeutic language of sensitive 
child-rearing and gender liberalism declaring that the ERA might not “be of immediate 
benefit” to most adults because “established attitudes “change slowly” and “the posture 
of prejudice ha [d] an awesome inertia.” However, for their children it would help “create 
an atmosphere of equality of opportunity on the outside,” which parents like the Harrises 
had “already created on the inside.”80  
The campaign’s explicit downplaying of the feminist roots of the amendment also 
attracted the support of many moderate Massachusetts residents. The lessons of the 
earlier ERA fights in Massachusetts and other states showed that the viability of the cause 
depended on people who did not necessarily support feminism or legalized abortion, but 
did endorse the broad ideas of civil rights and individual liberties. A poll conducted by 
the Boston Herald in March 1976 confirmed this hunch. The poll showed that while more 
than 80 percent of women strongly rejected the feminist label roughly the same fraction 
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supported the ERA and many of the other basic goals of the feminist movement.81 Nancy 
Adler, the Committee’s Lexington coordinator, further encapsulated this view. She 
declared she would have doubted the prophecy if someone told her she would be leading 
the charge for the ERA. Adler explained that she “never identified herself as a ‘women’s 
libber’ or ‘feminist’” and still had a problem with those terms. Yet, she believed the ERA 
“was not an issue for feminists alone—it is one of great importance to all women, men 
and children.” She explained her leadership role in the campaign emerged from her 
strong belief “in justice and equality, ” and her sense that the law fulfilled the basic ideals 
and values of the nation.82  
These statements reflected the movement’s conscious decision to place the ERA 
in the less threatening language of individual civil rights rather than the potentially more 
polarizing framework of feminism.83 ERA supporters also emphasize its universal 
entitlements and aimed to avoid the language of special privileges and identity politics 
that made the issues of the affirmative action and busing so controversial. Upholding this 
idea, one local coordinator declared, “The ERA isn’t just for feminists. Citizens of all 
sexes and colors will benefit from it.”84 Painting the issue in even broader strokes, 
Marline Hirsch, a suburban housewife from Longmeadow who had never before been 
politically active, declared, “I just couldn’t believe that anybody could oppose 
equality.”85 This language of individual rights and morality appealed to the same type of 
suburban moderate who had embraced the class-blind and individualist arguments of the 
fair housing movement a decade earlier. In fact, a probable beneficiary of that movement, 
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Bill Ramsey, an African-American MIT educated engineer, became a tireless supporter 
of the amendment. He spent his weekends going door-to-door through his Newton 
neighborhood passing out literature and speaking to his predominantly white neighbors. 
Ramsey interpreted the ERA as  “more than a ‘women’s law’ but “a commitment, a 
statement by the Commonwealth that it will protect all our rights.”86 The African-
American suburbanite proved an ideal poster child for the Committee to Ratify’s 
persistent message of the ERA’s civil rights ideals. Ramsey, nevertheless, was also one of 
the few people of color to take up the issue. Despite the fact that the language of the 
proposed amendment did officially include the category of race, the largely white middle-
class Committee to Ratify made no attempt to build an alliance with local black 
community activists, feminists of color, or welfare rights groups. This decision 
underscored its selective embrace of the civil rights cause.  
 
Stop ERA 
 As the Committee to Ratify spread its message throughout the state, the 
opposition mobilized a less organized, but more rhetorically polarizing campaign against 
the amendment. This grassroots effort received a great deal of support from the leaders of 
the national Stop ERA committee, who recognized the symbolic importance of defeating 
the amendment in the purportedly most liberal state in the nation.  Phyllis Schlafly staged 
frequent appearances in Boston where she continued to intentionally confuse the federal 
and state versions of the ERA. The Massachusetts chapter simultaneously aimed to 
anchor the issue in other local concerns particularly busing and abortion. Agnes Smith, 
co-chair of the local Stop ERA Committee, was also a member of ROAR, the John Birch 
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Society, and George Wallace’s American Party. The combined platform of these 
organizations provided the ideological underpinnings of Smith’s argument that ERA 
would destroy the traditional family, would take away the right of a woman to be 
supported by her husband, and constituted a clear example of a “governmental intrusion” 
on individual rights.87  
The Stop ERA forces aimed to conflate the amendment and feminism with a 
much broader set of fears about liberalism and its promotion of both mandatory 
integration and the legalization of abortion. In order to tap into the existing antipathy of 
its base, these leaders depicted the supporters of the ERA, in the words of Alan Lupo, “as 
suburban middle-class liberals with little to lose.”88 As the confrontations with the 
Governor’s Commission at City Hall and Fanueil Hall previewed, ROAR’s largely 
working-class and female base already felt victimized by high taxes, the economic 
recession, and the poor education of their children. They perceived feminism and the 
ERA not as the opportunity to gain new entitlements, but, rather, as an attack on their 
right to a traditional nuclear family. Tapping into these existing fears, the Stop ERA 
campaign produced literature presenting the Amendment as a “lawyer’s dream” that 
would create a “gender-free society” where women were to be “liberated” from 
“responsibilities of their homes and families.”89  
The members of ROAR, however, were not the only Bay State residents to 
experience anxieties that liberalism, feminism, and the ERA represented an attack on the 
nuclear family. The movement also grew in clusters of suburbs on both the North and 
South Shore, attracting residents through existing affiliations to anti-abortion groups and 
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other politically conservative organizations including the John Birch Society and Eagle 
Forum.90 Several of the key leaders of the Stop ERA campaign emerged from coffee 
klatches on quiet tree-lined suburban streets, not from the working-class protests outside 
South Boston High School. These activists provoked larger questions about the definition 
of women’s rights activism and suburban liberalism. For instance, Stop ERA leader Ann 
Connors of Hingham had a resume that read more like a leader of the pro-ERA 
movement than that of Agnes Smith and her supporters. A former member of the LWV 
and the GCSW, the suburbanite herself admitted, “I’m really considered very liberal by 
most of my friends.” She had begun to lose that status when her opposition to the LWV’s 
support of “liberalized abortion laws” had led her to resign from organization and join 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life. She opposed the ERA on the grounds that it would 
encourage abortion and take away the “‘ideology’ that ‘protects’ women as wives and 
mothers.”91  
Margaret Mahoney, another leader of Stop-ERA, also claimed the title of 
suburban liberal.  A 43-year old lawyer from Winchester, Mahoney resented that people 
thought she was affiliated with ROAR or the John Birch Society. Unlike these “right-
wing conservatives,” Mahoney defined herself as liberal on most causes. She had voted 
for George McGovern, supported gun control and civil rights, and opposed exclusionary 
zoning laws that excluded low income and minority families from moving to places like 
Winchester. She did, however, fiercely object to claims of gender inequality.92 “It is 
utterly ludicrous to believe that women are a minority like blacks. Women are 51 percent 
                                                
90 Mueller and Dimieri, “Structure of Belief Systems,” 667. 
91 Judy Foreman, “To her, gaining rights isn’t worth losing advantages,” Boston Globe, March 24, 1976.  
92 Manli Ho, “Atty. Mahoney’s breathless race against the ERA,” Boston Globe, October 10, 1976.  
 
580 
of the population,” she told a cheering crowd at an anti-ERA luncheon.93 She relied on 
her professional expertise to fortify her case and attack the legal arguments presented by 
her feminist opponents. Mahoney suggested that the 14th Amendment and other anti-
discrimination laws gave women all the protection they needed in the labor market 
without threatening the traditional family structure.94 In a clear example of meritocratic 
individualism, Mahoney also pointed to her own professional success as evidence for 
lack of necessity for the ERA.  
Although Mahoney and Connor came from different class and geographic 
vantages as Smith and the majority of ROAR members, the Stop ERA almost 
unanimously shared religious ties to the Catholic Church. The leaders and the rank of file 
of the opposition movement all had affiliations to organized religion and emphasized the 
importance of religion in their lives. Religious affiliation and faith was a common 
characteristic among ERA opponents nationally. However, the predominance of 
Catholics differentiated the movement in Massachusetts from its counterparts in the 
South and Midwest, who were primarily conservative Protestants .95 Clearly not all of the 
state’s 40 percent Roman Catholic population shared this view of the ERA. Anne Arsnault 
a Concord resident and member of the GSCW stated her Catholic upbringing had 
instilled in her a commitment to equality and rejected any links between the ERA and 
abortion.96  Likewise, Medfield resident Anne Kraus declared that she supported the 
MCFL’s stance on abortion, but strongly disagreed with its position on the ERA. These 
opponents to the ERA, nevertheless, highlighted the ways in which religion, particularly 
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Catholicism, made liberalism an unstable category of political belief and identity in 
Massachusetts during these debates over women’s rights in the 1970s.   
The arguments of the Stop ERA forces failed to thwart the well-organized 
momentum of the proponents. By the fall, the appearance of the pro-ERA slogan on 
bumper stickers, T-shirts, and bracelets on children and adults throughout the state 
revealed the pervasive support for the amendment. In a more scientific gauge of public 
sentiment, a Boston Globe readers poll revealed a 9-1 margin in favor of the referendum, 
and another opinion survey showed that 75 percent of Bay State planned to vote yes on 
Question 1.97 The state ERA also maintained widespread bipartisan political support with 
endorsements from Governor Dukakis, Senators Brooke and Kennedy and presidential 
candidates Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford.  Despite this clear support, the Committee to 
Ratify did not ease up, recognizing that both complacency and a late surge from the 
opposition could tip the vote in the other direction. The leaders looked to the lesson of the 
New York ERA drive where a poll released one week before the election predicted 80 
percent of the state would support the referendum, but the opposition had staged a last 
minute attack that successfully defeated the adoption of the amendment. Throughout the 
fall, the Committee kept its organizational engine at full steam, calling on grassroots 
volunteers to host coffees and teas, speak to supermarket shoppers, address envelopes and 
make phone calls every day.98 The national importance of a potential loss further 
motivated the campaign to press on. “The lines are draw here.” Kendall asserted. “If the 
Massachusetts amendment goes down we can kiss the federal ERA goodbye. They know 
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it and we know it.”99 The Committee to Ratify emphasized the national symbolism 
particularly in light of the results of 1972 presidential election. Kendall declared, “We are 
now the bellwether state. We may not think of ourselves as liberal, but that is how we are 
seen.”100  
 Massachusetts resoundingly bucked New York and New Jersey’s precedent of last 
minute ERA defeat . In the election, 61 percent of the voters endorsed the amendment 
and it won by almost 2-1 in Route 128 suburbs like Lexington that had large chapters of 
the Committee to Ratify. The referendum helped Massachusetts “buck” the national trend 
of low turnout in the 1976 presidential election. In fact, most liberal political activists 
during the fall had opted to focus their energy on the referendum campaign rather than 
Jimmy Carter’s presidential bid.101 Several observers immediately interpreted the support 
for the ERA as a sign of the intrinsic liberalism of the Massachusetts electorate. This 
exceptionalist explanation overlooked two important factors. First, the Massachusetts 
voters in 1976 did not support liberal issues or candidates across the board. Progressive-
leaning referenda related to handgun use, flat electric rates and a graduated income tax all 
lost heavily. Though Carter won overwhelmingly most pundits believed this outcome 
offered confirmation of the state’s persistent loyalty to the Democratic Party more than 
an embodiment of its liberalism.  Second, it obscures the importance of the Committee to 
Ratify’s well-organized grassroots campaign in gaining the passage of the ERA.102  
Campaign manager Rosemary Sansone credited volunteers with the victory, declaring 
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that they had made “the theory and concept of grass roots campaigning work like I’ve 
never seen it work before.”103  
The campaign provided yet another example of suburban liberals ability to 
achieve success by working directly within the political system. This approach, 
nevertheless, also revealed certain organizational and ideological drawbacks. By opting 
to construct a broad-based campaign rooted in the ideology of suburban liberalism, the 
movement had focused more on the symbolic and individualist meanings rather than 
material and collective purposes of the amendment. This tactic clearly had many 
pragmatic benefits. Yet, by downplaying the law as merely symbolic, and enabling 
volunteers and voters to support the ERA without endorsing the broader feminist 
movement, the Committee leaders failed to instill in many of its supporters a permanent 
support for feminist issues and causes. In the immediate aftermath of the win, Sansone 
and the other Committee members tried to transform the 5,000 volunteers “bitten by the 
political bug” into a long-term organization committed to grassroots activism and 
political lobbying.104 A few stalwarts did remain involved in order to ensure proper 
implementation of the law, but the committee failed to maintain the strength and 
momentum of the ERA drive and eventually disbanded after a few years. In some ways, 
this effort made the mainstream feminist movement weaker rather than stronger, despite 
the referendum’s victory. The year and a half campaign demanded a great deal of  
resources and energy and made the movement less able to address other important issues 
and concerns, such as publicly subsidized childcare, welfare, and access to abortion. 
Moreover, the campaign’s discourse of equality of opportunity shifted the strategy and 
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ideology of suburban feminism even further away from rights-based claims and toward a 
focus on choice that increased middle-class privilege and entitlements. The ERA, 
therefore, failed to produce meaningful material changes for the lives of many women 
and in some ways exacerbated racial and economic inequality in metropolitan Boston, as 
the abortion debate shows.  
 
Abortion Politics  
The battle to keep abortion legal illuminated that the Supreme Court’s 1973 Roe 
v. Wade decision had not just failed to end the national controversy about abortion, but, in 
fact, made it more contested than ever. The issue of abortion further exposed both the 
socially conservative dimensions of Bay State politics and mainstream feminism and 
suburban liberals limited ability to achieve meaningful gender, economic, or racial 
equality. The issues of birth control and abortion had remained a top priority for Boston 
NOW’s lobbyists during the organization’s early years. Despite the state’s liberal 
reputation, the combination of its’ Puritan legacy and large Catholic population had 
produced a longstanding collection of restrictions on birth control and abortion.105 
Although nearby states such as New York had legalized abortion, Massachusetts 
remained firmly committed to upholding its ban. In the early 1970s, NOW collaborated 
closely with another suburban-based group called Massachusetts Organization for Repeal 
of Abortion Laws (MORAL) in order to counter the lack of legislative action on the issue 
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and to educate the public about the need to lift the ban on the procedure. The Supreme 
Court’s legalization of abortion in 1973 thwarted this drive, but the activities laid an 
important foundation for later reproductive rights campaigns.  
In the aftermath of the Roe decision, activism surrounding reproductive rights had 
remained limited as most women relished the security that they now could attain a legal 
and inexpensive abortion. NOW had shifted its lobbying attention to other issues such as 
education, employment discrimination and the state ERA. MORAL had decided to focus 
largely at the federal level, launching the Constitutional Defense Project. The 
organization’s work with the Massachusetts congressional delegation earned the 
commendation of the president of the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) 
who praised MORAL as a “model for other groups around the country” and “one of the 
strongest arms in the movement” surmising “If we had a ‘MORAL’ in every state, 
victory in this battle would be assured.”106 While MORAL basked in this praise, at the 
state level a powerful grassroots pro-life movement took shape with significant political 
support that put in serious jeopardy the right to an abortion in the Bay State.  
The ERA battle offered a glimpse of the power of the pro-life movement in 
Massachusetts, which had gathered strength following the Roe v. Wade decision and 
gradually transformed the state into a national epicenter of anti-abortion sentiment. 
Newton, which had long maintained a reputation as the area’s most liberal suburb, served 
as the location for the headquarters of Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the largest and 
most powerful anti-abortion organization. The base of this group came largely from the 
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middle and upper-income suburbs on or near Route 12, such as Newton, Hingham, 
Needham and Wayland, that had also served as strongholds of support the ERA and other 
progressive causes.107 The MCFL, like their liberal opponents adopted a strategy of 
mobilizing pro-life supporters at the grassroots to work directly within the formal 
channels to make abortion illegal. The group sponsored rallies, printed lobbying material, 
and worked for state legislation to prohibit abortion. By 1977 MCFL boasted 100 
chapters, a mailing list of 90,000, a full-time lobbyist, and a 24-hour hot line that reached 
over 18,000 callers to inform members of legislation pending on Beacon Hill.108 
Borrowing a tactic implemented by the pro-ERA movement, the MCFL trained members 
to become “well-informed and articulate” speakers to spread the “prolife message” to 
church groups, civic organizations, and schools across the state.109   During the 1977 
legislative session alone, the group filed six bills and testified seventeen times at public 
hearings opposing abortion.  
The success of the MCFL’s political efforts and ability to mobilize a large 
grassroots constituency drew comparisons to the suburban-centered peace movement, 
which during the 1960s had transformed state and national politics. One reporter 
declared, “The anti-abortion lobby in this state is a vast persistent grassroots network, a 
one-issue constituency that will vote for or against a political candidate solely for his or 
her stand on abortion.” 110 As part of this one-issue crusade, in the late 1970s, the MCFL 
turned its attention to the issue of publicly funded abortion and led a campaign 
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throughout the metropolitan region that exacerbated racial and economic discrimination, 
political polarization, and ideas about suburban taxpayer privilege.  
 
Life Isn’t Fair 
The case of Kenneth Edelin first set the terms for the controversy surrounding 
publicly-financed abortion by exposing the racial, economic and political undertones of 
the issue and the pro-life movement’s power in Massachusetts. In 1974, Edelin, the first 
African-American chief resident in obstetrics at Boston City Hospital (BCH), was 
charged with manslaughter for allegedly causing the death of a 24-week-old black male 
fetus during a legal abortion. The issue went far beyond Edelin or the operation and 
directly into the racial and spatial dynamics of metropolitan Boston. BCH, the city’s 
primary public hospital, sat on the border of the South End and Roxbury, two of the 
neighborhoods in the city with the highest percentage of low-income and minority 
residents. For decades, Boston’s nationally recognized medical schools had used the 
BCH as a laboratory for teaching and research. In the summer of 1973, the New England 
Journal of Medicine published an article that gave details of a fetal research project 
carried out by two doctors at BCH on 33 pregnant women who had abortions between 
1971 and 1972. In the aftermath of the Roe decision, the MCFL along with the area’s 
leading conservative Catholic politicians had explored a variety of ways to limit and 
prohibit abortion procedures and the article gave them the ammunition they needed. Rep. 
Ray Flynn, a Democratic Catholic outspoken opponent to mandatory busing and the 
ERA, led this mission. Flynn convinced his anti-busing ally Albert “Dapper” O’Neil a 
member of the City Council and chair of its Committee on Health and Hospitals to hold 
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public hearings on abortion and research practices at city-financed hospitals.111 The one-
sided roster of speakers at the hearings included representatives of MCFL and the 
Catholic Church. Flynn also testified to the council members “the people of the City of 
Boston do not want their tax dollars used for abortions and inhumane fetus experiments” 
and warning that city had gone from a center of advanced medicine to the “abortion 
capital of the nation.”112  
Following the hearings, the Council called on the District Attorney to launch a 
criminal investigation of practices at BCH.113 This extensive inquiry revealed two fetuses 
at the city morgue including the one from the hysterotomy Edelin had performed on a 17-
year-old 20-24 week pregnant African-American woman when a saline abortion had 
failed.  After conducting an autopsy, city officials contended that the fetus could have 
lived and called Edelin before a grand jury. Edelin, a Columbia-trained doctor who had 
committed his life to serving under-resourced communities, maintained that he had 
performed standard medical procedure and insisted that the fetus was dead on delivery. 
The grand jury, nevertheless, indicted him for manslaughter.114  
 As Edelin headed to trial, his case became national news and stirred immediate 
outrage, exposing the multifaceted dimensions of the controversy. Members of the local 
and national medical communities voiced strong public opposition to Edelin’s 
indictment, interpreting the legal action as a violation of a physician’s right to practice 
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sound judgment. A group of local doctors launched the Edelin Defense Fund hosting 
meetings and cocktail parties throughout the Route 128 suburbs that provided the 
gynecologist a chance to tell his side of the story and raise funds for his legal fees. 115 
These appearances helped to stimulate discussion among liberally inclined suburban 
residents about the impending trial specifically and abortion rights more generally. The 
case also drew the attention of feminists groups from across the ideological, economic, 
and geographic spectrum. NOW issued a statement sympathizing with Edelin and 
declaring that the case had implications for all women as it “jeopardize[d] their 
precarious freedom to determine the course of their own lives, without state 
interference.”116  More radical organizations including the national black feminist group 
the Combahee River Collective emphasized the clear class and racial dimensions of the 
case and its potential consequences. One left-leaning feminist organization in Cambridge 
drew a direct line between the Edelin and the “school busing issue” as attempts by city 
and state politicians “to keep people’s minds off the real issues, of the morality of the 
eight percent unemployment rate, the unequal distribution of wealth in this country, lack 
of decent health care for all” and the “countless instances of discrimination against 
women and minorities in this land of opportunity.”117 
The case coincided directly with the mandatory desegregation of the Boston 
Public Schools, which punctuated the racial undertones of the indictment. For the 
members of the black community, it seemed more than a coincidence that the city had 
pursued charges against a black doctor at a public hospital rather than at one of Boston’s 
many private institutions that served wealthier white women.  The attack on Edelin 
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specifically and patients at BCH more generally offered another clear example of Boston 
officials’ history of discrimination against African-Americans. The sense of inequity and 
racism became even further pronounced when in response to the pressure of the case, 
BCH decided to forbid abortions except in medical or psychiatric emergencies. Since 
BCH was one of the only places in Boston where those who could not afford to pay a fee 
could legally end unwanted pregnancies, the policy added another burden onto the lives 
of poor women in the city.  
The trial itself embodied the basic racial inequities of the city’s political system. 
Edelin confronted an all white, mostly male, Catholic jury, an Irish Catholic judge, and a 
prosecutor who was vocally anti-abortion.118 Prosecutor Newman Flanagan called as his 
first expert witness Dr. Mildred Jefferson, an African-American general surgeon who was 
a leading pro-life activist and would later serve as the president of the National 
Committee for Life.119 Her credibility as a medical expert in this particularly case was 
questionable since she was not trained as a gynecologist, had never performed an 
abortion, and had made it her life’s work to protect unborn fetuses. Yet her racial and 
gender identity provided a strategic way for the prosecution to diffuse charges of sexism 
and racism.  Jefferson led off a string of white male pro-life medical experts. In his own 
testimony, Edelin established his medical expertise as an obstetrician, not abortionist. He 
explained that he disliked performing abortions but believed them necessary in certain 
circumstances.120  
Although the trial aimed to address the issue left open and unresolved by Roe v. 
Wade of when life began left, it was ultimately a manslaughter case, not one testing the 
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constitutionality of abortion. The crux of the six-week trial, therefore, focused on the 
question of whether or not the fetus had emerged from the womb dead or alive.121 The 
prosecution and defense gave conflicting narratives on both the facts and the question of 
when a fetus becomes a human life. Their choice of language underlined their implicit 
stances on these issues. The prosecution used more humanizing words like “baby” and 
child,” while the defense elected the medically based term “fetus.” Despite the fact that 
the prosecution presented no witness able to establish that the aborted fetus was viable or 
born alive, the jury found Edelin guilty of manslaughter, and he received a sentence of 
one-year probation, which the judge stayed pending the defense’s immediate appeal to 
the Supreme Judicial Court.122  
The conviction of an African-American by an all-white jury shared the front page 
with stories about the continued resistance to the desegregation of the Boston Public 
Schools and solidified the city’s reputation as one of the racist places in the country. The 
verdict also received national attention as a “setback for abortion,” as one headline in 
Time succinctly stated.123 The outcome of the trial stirred outrage as local abortion rights 
supporters saw Edelin as “one of Boston’s first victims of an organized, powerful, 
massively funded campaign against a women’s right to choose abortion.”124 In a series of 
rallies in the months following the verdict, the community came together to prove the 
strength and breadth of support for Edelin, embracing the theme: “Defend Dr. Edelin, 
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Defend Abortion Rights.”125 The Supreme Judicial Court unanimously overturned the 
conviction the following year, and Edelin went one to have a distinguished career as 
chairman of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Boston University and the 
national president of Planned Parenthood.126 The case, nevertheless, had much broader 
and long-lasting repercussions. The conviction led several cities including Detroit, 
Pittsburgh, Nashville, and New York to place strict restrictions on the availability of 
second trimester abortions.127 Many experts warned that these decisions had the harshest 
impact on poor teenagers, like the woman at the center of the Edelin case, who tended to 
delay abortions the longest.128 The situation also created further polarization and 
antagonism between racial groups in the city and its pro-life and pro-choice communities. 
The facts surrounding the Edelin case embodied a broader national effort to 
transform abortion from a universal right into a consumer privilege for those middle-class 
women who could afford it by essentially restricting the procedure for poor women who 
could not. During the mid-1970s, members of the U.S. Congress had repeatedly 
introduced legislation to restrict public funding for abortion thereby essentially cutting 
off the service for welfare recipients.129 The effort finally succeeded in 1976 with the 
passage of the Hyde Amendment, named for its author Illinois Republican Henry Hyde, 
which prohibited the use of federal money to pay for or encourage abortions.130 Abortion 
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rights champions did manage to slightly soften the effect of the amendment through a 
rewording offered by Massachusetts Senator Edward Brooke that excluded instances of 
rape, incest and medical necessity. Just a month after the compromise bill passed, the 
Secretary of Health Education and Welfare announced the end of Medicaid funds for 
“unnecessary” abortions. Adding insult to injury, when asked to comment on the fact that 
these measures appeared a clear instance of economic inequity, President Jimmy Carter 
stated “there are many things in life that are not fair, that wealthy people can afford and 
poor people can’t.”131 The Supreme Court codified this consumer-based attitude into law 
with a set of rulings announced in June 1977 determining that states had no constitutional 
obligation to provide public funding for action.132 In sharply worded dissents, Harry 
Blackmun compared the Court’s decision to Marie Antoinette’s decree “let them eat 
cake,” and Thurgood Marshall predicted it would “relegate millions of people to poverty 
and despair.”133 
The Supreme Court rulings opened an important door for politicians throughout 
the country to increase the attack on reproductive rights and implement Hyde 
Amendment-style policy at the state level. The day after the Supreme Court announced 
its decision, pro-life advocates Reps. Ray Flynn and Charles Doyle submitted a bill to 
prohibit Massachusetts from spending any state funds on abortions for Medicaid 
recipients.134 In the Bay State, welfare recipients had the opportunity to receive state 
funding, albeit heavily federally subsidized, for both “elective” and “therapeutic” 
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abortions. The proposed statute limiting the right to an abortion raised immediate 
opposition from several state officials including State Welfare Commissioner Alexander 
Sharp.  Governor Michael Dukakis, a vocal abortion rights supporter, also denounced the 
bill and promised to veto it or any other attempt to limit publicly funded procedure.135 He 
pledged that the state would pick up the costs incurred as the federal government 
withdrew financial support for the procedures.  
 The Doyle-Flynn bill also stirred a strong reaction from abortion rights and 
feminist activists who viewed the legislation as a threat to all women, not just to welfare 
recipients. MORAL and NOW decided the bill’s opponents needed “a grassroots network 
as dedicated, effective and well-funded as the anti-abortion network.”136  The 
organizations, therefore, created a coalition called Mass. Citizens for Choice of female 
activist and civil liberties organizations such as CPPAX, LWV, Planned Parenthood, and 
the ACLU  with the immediate goal of killing the bill.  The coalition developed a strategy 
that that used a combination of newspapers articles, word-of-mouth, and the existing 
membership networks of the affiliated groups to match the lobbying capabilities of the 
pro-life movement.137 The Boston Chapter of NOW became particularly active in this 
effort, recognizing that its large pro-abortion rights membership dispersed throughout the 
region would be an invaluable important asset in placing constituent pressure onto state 
politicians.138  
The campaign marked one of the first times that mainstream feminists had 
addressed head-on an issue of class and racial inequality. However, the leaders of the 
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campaign opted to address the issues through a language and imagery that set the 
members of the coalition apart from the low-income population primarily affected by 
these discriminatory policies. Pulling on the sympathies of potential white middle-class 
supporters, NOW depicted the victims of the law in drastic terms, predicting that the bill 
would force 12,000 welfare abortion recipients either to receive unsafe, non-medical 
abortions or “to bear unwanted children into a world of poverty and rejection.” The 
coalition’s spokesperson declared “we will not allow poor women, the most vulnerable 
link in our society, to bear the brunt of discrimination.”139   In the same pieces of 
literature and press conferences, the leaders also aimed to obscure the issue of class 
discrimination by couching the issue in a consumer-laden vocabulary of choice that 
directly appealed to the interests of its white middle-class constituency.  NOW sent out a 
flyer alerting members “DON’T BE COMPLACENT! WE COULD EASILY LOOSE 
THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE. ”140 These warnings demonstrated the acknowledgement by 
the campaign leaders that they would have more success galvanizing white middle-class 
women to take action addressing the universal components rather than race and class 
specific dimensions of the legislation.  
The Doyle-Flynn bill led another group of Boston-area women to organize an ad 
hoc organization called the Abortion Action Coalition (AAC). Led by activist Leslie 
Cagan, the more left-leaning organization included several women with experience in the 
medical and human service professions and made an effort to recruit welfare recipients as 
well. The AAC focused primarily on race and class inequality embedded in the issue of 
publicly financed abortion, dubbing the bill as well as the Hyde Amendment and the 
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Supreme Court decisions as “nothing but sexist and racist attacks on poor people.”141 The 
AAC viewed these attempts as part of a broader effort to thwart the gains of the social 
revolutions of the 1960s led by “the same people” who “just change their hats and their 
names.” They included in this category “the anti-ERA Phyllis Schlafleys, the anti-busing 
ROAR Louise Day Hickes, the anti-gay Anita Bryants.”142 Interpreting Doyle-Flynn as 
an attempt to divide women and the feminist cause along race and class lines, the AAC 
aimed to develop “a unified struggle” to combat the anti-abortion forces and defend the 
right to control reproductive choices.143 In order to do, the group organized a series of 
rallies outside the State House to demonstrate the strong opposition to the bill.144  
 The Ways and Means Committee hearings on the Doyle-Flynn bill, held in late 
July 1977, demonstrated the speed with which both proponents and opponents had 
mobilized support and arguments to enhance their respective positions. The hearing room 
and halls of the State House overflowed, and large rallies staged by both sides filled the 
streets outside the building. The testimony itself focused primarily on the class and racial 
dimensions of the proposed law. Ray Flynn sought to deflect charges that the legislation 
discriminated against the poor. The day before the hearing, Flynn had announced that the 
bill would include all publicly funded abortions, including the thousands of state 
employees covered by Massachusetts group insurance plans. 145 The announcement drew 
immediate outrage from the employees as a violation of their union contracts.  At the 
hearing, however, Flynn spoke in vaguer terms, discussing the need to eliminate “the root 
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causes of poverty” rather than “the innocent victims of abortion.”146 In addition to 
dubbing abortion “the most horrible holocaust in the history of the world,” Charles Doyle 
appropriated a quote from “the great civil rights leader” Jesse Jackson calling 
government-sponsored procedures “genocide against black people.”147  
The opponents to the bill countered these claims. Several of the speakers 
reiterated an earlier statement by liberal Sen. Jack Backman, who had dubbed the bill 
“one more step by the government in a war against the poor.” He had noted that middle 
and upper-income women with insurance coverage and the ability to pay received 88 
percent of the abortions in the state, and that it cost Massachusetts less than $20 per 
Medicaid-funded procedure.148  Sen. Bill Owens highlighted the contradictions in the fact 
that anti-abortion figures like Flynn and Doyle fiercely opposed supplying contraceptive 
information and welfare payments to the same women seeking abortions.149 The biggest 
coup occurred with the testimony of exonerated physician Kenneth Edelin who received 
enthusiastic cheers from the crowd outside as he entered the building. He ignored Doyle 
and Flynn’s promises of class fairness and stated the legislation’s impact would fall 
overwhelmingly on poor black women. Relying on his medical experience, he predicted 
the bill’s passage would lead to a flooding of hospitals with victims of botched or self-
induced abortions.150 The emotionally charged testimony helped to set the terms of the 
debate and motivated both  proponents and opponents to intensify their respective  
lobbying efforts.  
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The anti-abortion activists, who had come out in full force at the hearing complete 
with plastic dolls and chants, recognized the bill as an important foot in the door for their 
broader campaign to make abortion illegal. Outlining a supposedly equal opportunity 
strategy, MCFL chairman John McNulty declared, “the pro-lifers don’t want to lose 
momentum. Our objective is to deny everyone, rich or poor.”151  The group relied on 
contacts within the state’s large Catholic community in order to maintain this energy. The 
state’s Catholic newspapers all offered editorials in favor of Doyle-Flynn, and the 
Diocese urged parish priests to devote homilies to the theme “Respect Life” emphasizing 
the necessity of the legislation.152 Catholic leaders throughout the state distributed 
literature and delivered sermons aimed to encourage grassroots lobbying and helped 
develop arguments that would appeal to the predominantly Catholic legislature.  
The proponents also appropriated the taxpayers concerns of middle-class 
suburbanites in order to further solidify support for the bill. The MCFL adopted a 
multifaceted argument that simultaneously raised “objections to the use of tax funds to 
destroy unborn children” and stressed that “human life should not have a price tag.”153 
The letters pro-life supporters sent to the State House as part of the lobbying effort 
underscore this fusion of moral opposition with taxpayer victimization.  In letters to Sen. 
Jack Backman, constituents like Katherine Keefe of Newton stressed that it “was wrong 
to give tax dollars to the poor so they can kill their unwanted babies,” Stella Demmons 
declared “it is outrageous that taxpayer money should pay the bill for abortions,” and 
Josephine Di Gregorio stated the unfairness to “tax people who are struggling to support 
their own families” and “impose upon them the further burden which may have 
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psychological effects of helping them to pay for something which their conscience 
violently opposes.”154 One Medfield resident’s objection to the use of tax dollars to fund 
abortion rested on a “moral objection to the destruction of innocent life,” which he 
maintained differed in no way from his feeling “about the use of my money to subsidize 
the massacre of innocent Vietnamese at My Lai.”155 Embracing a discourse of 
compassionate conservatism, Newton resident Jane Crimlisk declared she would “rather 
see my tax dollars being spent to help poor people get jobs and get ahead rather than 
having tax dollars spent on eliminating from society.” Yet belying this sense of concern, 
she offered a clear moral condemnation of the poor women at the center of the debate, 
declaring, “it would be far more effective if individuals began taking personal 
responsibility for their actions—maybe this would eliminate unwanted pregnancy.”156 
These letters punctuate the inextricable links in the minds of many suburban residents 
between concerns about taxes, homeownership, and abortion.  
Recognizing the power of white middle-class voters to persuade legislators, Mass. 
Choice also placed middle-class residents and concerns at the center of its campaign. 
These forces took up the call of Rep. Lois Pines of Newton at the Ways and Means 
hearing, who stated that the Flynn-Doyle bill was “but an opening skirmish in the battle 
by anti-abortionists to deny all women the right to freedom of choice.”157 The organizers 
understood that the majority of people who received abortions were not welfare recipients 
but middle and upper income women.  They sought, therefore, to make the campaign 
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appeal to this constituency through a broad language of individual rights that submerged 
the race and class differences.  “Every women in this commonwealth, whether she be rich 
poor, or middle-class,” Pines warned her constituents, “stands to lose her constitutional 
right to an abortion if this insidious legislation should pass.”158 Reinforcing the 
consumerist logic of these choice-based arguments, Massachusetts Consumer Affairs 
director Christine Sullivan called the campaign “what all of us are saying is that a woman 
should have a choice.”159  
The coalition appropriated an economically conscious argument of fiscal 
conservatism in order to strengthen support among white middle-class suburban 
homeowners. This approach provided suburban residents with a way to oppose the bill 
without having to take a stance on the broader ethical questions surrounding abortion. 
Mass. Choice circulated a series of Department of Welfare statistics to suggest that in the 
long run social service costs would be significantly higher if poor women lost access to 
publicly funded abortions. In 1976, the state had subsidized 3,862 procedures, which 
amounted to about 14 percent of all the abortions performed in Massachusetts and cost 
about $750,000, roughly 90 percent of which the federal government paid before the 
Hyde Amendment. During the same year, the state had spent $4.6 million on maternity 
costs and $15.4 million in AFDC payments.160 Abortion-rights proponents calculated, 
therefore, that the maternity costs of the women who had Medicaid-funded abortions 
would increase the cost of welfare by $2.2 million per year. These statistics appealed 
directly to the anxieties of suburban taxpayers. Lexington physician Harris Funkenstein 
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stated he opposed the bill on the grounds that financing abortions would “ultimately save 
the state an enormous amount of money.” 161 Fellow Lexington resident Harris Kodis 
declared, “I think the state would have a bigger burden to pay…in terms of unhappy 
people it would have to support, people with a lot of problems. Economically it doesn’t 
make sense.” Offering a counterpart to President Carter’s notion of the obligations of 
citizenship, James Morrison observed, “There are a great many things that we as 
taxpayers don’t want our money used for, but it is a democracy and if people want 
abortions they should have them.”162  
The days of debate on Doyle-Flynn that ensued inside the state legislative 
chambers further illuminated these economic, racial and spatial issues. Evoking the 
arguments of metropolitan fairness that had dominated the body’s earlier discussion of 
busing and affordable housing, Rep. David Swartz of Haverhill placed his view of the bill 
in the cognitive cartography of residential privilege. “How can we tell a wealthy woman 
from Wellesley that she can have an abortion because she doesn’t want to defer her 
European trip for a year,” he asked his colleagues,  “while we tell the poor women who 
knows she and her fetus are affected by rubella that she can’t have an abortion?”163 Rep. 
Mel King from Roxbury deemed the bill “as racist a piece of legislation as has ever been 
before us.” Rep. Peter McCarthy voiced opposition to “abortions on demand” but made 
an argument for class fairness. “There is not a person in this chamber who wouldn’t make 
sure that a mother, daughter or sister who had been raped was taken to the proper medical 
authorities, McCarthy declared, “yet we would sit here and say that poor women would 
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not have the same right.”164 Many legislators shared McCarthy’s discomfort with the fact 
that the bill did not make exceptions in cases of rape, incest or medical emergency.  
House Speaker Thomas McGee refused to allow discussion of any amendments to 
exclude these instances, though he did reject Flynn’s claim that the bill intent’s extended 
to state employees and limited its consideration only to Medicaid recipients.165 Despite 
the lack of exceptions, the House still passed the bill by a wide majority. 
 As the bill moved the Senate, Mass. Choice increased its lobbying efforts 
recognizing that the traditionally more liberal body might be less receptive to the 
restrictive legislation. This campaign targeted moderate senators who opposed abortion 
on philosophical and religious grounds but disliked the fact that Doyle-Flynn 
discriminated against the poor and contained no exceptions for drastic cases.166 The effort 
built directly upon the organizational infrastructure developed during the fight for the 
state ERA. Coalition chairman Connie Williams later stated, “With just a few calls across 
the state, we were able to get the chains of phone calls and letters coming into the 
vulnerable senator.”167 This present effort achieved the greatest success in the affluent 
suburban communities with past experience lobbying for liberal and feminist causes. The 
constituents of Wellesley Senator David Locke, one of the state’s more outspoken 
conservatives, used an onslaught of grassroots pressure to successfully persuade him to 
vote against the bill. Williams explained, “We had his constituents visiting him at home 
every night” and then “we had them report to back to us how he reacted. We knew 
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exactly when he started to waver.”168 Mass Choice representatives also persuaded Samuel 
Rotundi of Winchester to vote against the bill even though he was personally opposed to 
abortion.  Explaining his logic, he announced, “abortion is not the issue, it is economic 
discrimination” because Doyle-Flynn effectively stated, “abortions are available—but 
they are available only to those who can afford it.”169 The drawn out battle persisted and 
on September 13, 1977, Dukakis announced his anticipated veto to the Doyle-Flynn bill. 
He declared that the bill did not address the legality of abortions and instead aimed to set 
up a two-class system that gave affluent women the ability to exercise their constitutional 
rights while denying it to poor women.170 The House voted to override, but the opponents 
to the bill eventually won this scramble, the Senate sustained Dukakis veto and welfare 
recipients retained the right to a state funded abortion for the time being.171 Doyle and 
Flynn along with the Catholic Church, nevertheless, pledged to continue their quest to 
end state-funded procedures.  
In the 1978 legislative session, Doyle and Flynn presented a new version of their 
bill through a different strategy. The legislature borrowed a tactic of conservative 
politicians at the national level by attaching antiabortion riders to bills that did not 
explicitly deal with the procedure. Flynn and Doyle added codicils to several portions of 
the Medicaid and state workers insurance appropriations forbidding the use of state funds 
for abortion unless necessary to prevent the death of the mother. By excluding cases of 
rape, incest and medical necessity, the proposal proved even more stringent than either 
the earlier version or the Hyde Amendment. Flynn and Doyle also made state workers a 
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central part of the plan in order to prove they aimed to stop any public expenditure on 
abortion. The stealth strategy received far less publicity than the drawn out battle the 
previous fall, but the potential impact was even more severe.172 
Abortion rights activists renewed the campaign to defeat these restrictions. The 
organizers in this round largely focused on mobilizing previously politically uninvolved 
local residents to lobby legislators, because they recognized that since it was an election 
year, politicians would be particularly sensitive to constituent pressure.173 These 
organizations believed they could win by focusing on the majority of Medicaid recipients 
who were not women with unwanted pregnancies, and thus they tried to recruit state 
employees and the elderly to join in this campaign.174 In public statements and lobbying, 
the abortion rights community presented the potential victims of the legislation not as 
women of color trying to end pregnancies, but, rather, the poor children and elderly 
whose Medicaid payments the controversy put at risk. This strategy demonstrates the 
activists attempt to circumvent the economically and racially polarizing issues 
underpinning the legislation. Despite these lobbying efforts the bill still passed in the 
House.175 In an encore of the battle the year before, Dukakis once again issued a veto, 
which the House overrode.  
By the time of the veto, MORAL decided to shift its strategy and to turn to the 
federal courts to seek an injunction against Medicaid restrictions. Thus, they encouraged 
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even sympathetic legislators to override the veto, a decision that confounded many other 
progressive observers.176 The shift in strategy, nevertheless, indicated the coalition’s 
understanding that it could not mobilize enough constituent pressure from its largely 
white middle-class female base,  whose own right to an abortion remained secure.177 This 
constituency remained consistently less willing to spend the time to take up an issue that 
did not directly affect them. The 1979 state budget passed with the riders attached 
making Massachusetts the 36th state to cut off Medicaid funding for abortion. The 
outcome of this two-year drive sent a clear lesson to mainstream feminists about the 
limits of its ability to address issues of racial and class inequality, which would have 
long-term consequences on both the movement’s strategy and the availability of 
abortions in the Bay State.  
The defeat of Michael Dukakis by the socially conservative candidate Edward 
King in the 1978 Governor race further indicated the abortion-rights activists’ inability to 
create significant political change.178  The staunchly pro-life King had made a pledge to 
seek limits on public assistance for abortions one the central planks of his campaign. This 
promise earned him the support of the well-organized grassroots anti-abortion movement. 
The MCFL distributed a pamphlet entitled “Everything you Need to Know to Vote Pro-
Life” with a drawing of a fetus cradling a placard. The piece of literature suggested that 
voting for King and other anti-abortion candidates offered “the best protection the unborn 
have to enjoy what we already have.”179 Providing its own visual testimony of the 
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implications of the election results, MORAL circulated a cartoon with the Massachusetts 
legislature presented as a carpenter hammering away at “abortion rights” and nearby 
another figure representing Edward King holding a bomb.180  
The King administration ushered in the greatest victories for the Massachusetts 
anti-abortion movement since the Roe ruling.  In 1979, the state legislature passed an 
updated statute prohibiting publicly financed abortions that unlike earlier versions 
included public employees and made no exceptions for cases of rape or incest. At the 
crowded signing ceremony, King received applause and cheers of “Hurray for the 
governor” and “Hurray for the unborn.”181 Dr. Mildred Jefferson declared: “It’s a 
glorious day, a great, great day for the people of Massachusetts, especially the poor.”182 
Abortion rights proponents disagreed as the law meant that Massachusetts now had on its 
books the most restrictive abortion law in the nation and one that effectively cutoff the 
right of many poor women to obtain a legal procedure. The legislature added to this 
distinction the same year when it passed an informed consent law that required all women 
seeking an abortion to sign a detailed form outlining the development of a fetus, the 
procedure to be used, and the risks involved. In addition, the law stipulated that a teenage 
girl needed the approval of her parents or a superior court judge to deem her “mature” or 
the procedure in her “best interest.”  Abortion rights activists did receive some success 
circumscribing the effects of these laws through the state and federal courts.183 Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment in 1980, the 
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Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1981 eased the limits on the public financing of 
abortion instructing the state to pay for all “medically necessary” procedures even when a 
life was not in danger.184  Likewise, a federal court of appeals upheld the consent law, but 
struck down the stipulations requiring pregnant women to read the form outlining fetus 
gestation.185 While this set of rulings did offer activists some solace, it still did not 
provide unfettered access to abortions for all women.  
 
As American As Apple Pie  
In the aftermath of the Doyle-Flynn Bill and the 1978 election, the abortion rights 
movement led by MORAL made a change in focus that further reflected its suburban 
liberal underpinnings. Led by newly appointed executive director Jean Weinberg, a 
community organizer who had worked with NOW, the group acknowledged that its 
lobbying and educational campaigns had failed to produce a strong grassroots network 
despite most Massachusetts citizens support for the right to abortio. The results of an 
opinion poll released in the July before the 1978 election by Clark University exposed 
this problem. The pollsters found that 83 percent of Massachusetts residents upheld the 
basic pro-choice philosophy that the decision to have an abortion should be between a 
women and her doctor, 77 percent believed the choice should be made by an individual 
without state intervention, and 53 percent supported government funding of the procedure 
for those who could not afford to pay.186 The survey also showed that religion played a 
larger factor among state representatives than their constituents, as 80 percent of 
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Catholics polled deemed abortion a private decision.187 Despite the abortion rights 
community’s clear numerical majority in the 1978 election, anti-abortion supporters had 
outnumbered them in terms of political involvement by a margin of 10-1, which tipped 
the balance toward candidates like King. These statistics convinced the MORAL 
leadership that in order to preserve and expand reproductive rights it had to “mobilize this 
majority” not by changing views, but rather, channeling existing sentiment into “effective 
political action.”188 MORAL, therefore, decided to organize the members of the public 
already sympathetic to their cause to demonstrate there was an abortion rights 
constituency that matched the singularly focused pro-life vote.189  
The group adopted a set of grassroots-based tactics in order to achieve its goal of 
taking “members of the silent pro-choice majority and turn[ing] them into political 
activists.”190 Borrowing directly from both the pro-life movement and the state ERA 
drive, MORAL used the traditional techniques of a political campaign in order to 
galvanize moderate middle-class support.191  Like many previous liberal initiatives, this 
strategy of grassroots organizing targeted the effectiveness of suburban middle-class 
voters to work within the political channels and persuade politicians to uphold and 
expand abortion rights. MORAL implemented a plan to develop local committees in each 
of the state’s 40 senate districts by appealing directly to a suburban and middle-class 
sensibility.  Adhering to the plan, the local committees staged house parties “identical to 
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Tupperware parties’” to sell not plastic but its reproductive politics.192 Similar to a 
pyramid scheme, MORAL’s recruitment strategy encouraged the 50 to 100 people in 
attendance to invite friends and neighbors over for coffee to tell them about specific ways 
to get involved. By expanding the network, more local residents learned about the 
political process, became involved in lobbying efforts, and set up registration drives to 
increase the pro-choice vote.193 This movement to “politically activate pro-choice 
people” was most effective in traditionally liberal communities like Newton and the 
suburbs of the South Shore that had an existing base of support from the ERA campaign. 
The effort also received a significant rise in membership as residents across the state as 
residents grew frustrated with Governor King and his extremely restrictive abortion 
policies.  By 1979, MORAL had set up committees in 21 districts and by 1981 had staged 
400 meetings and reached 4,000 Massachusetts residents. In just two years, MORAL 
expanded its membership from 300 to 1,800 and budget from $3,000 to $45,000.194  
The rapid success of MORAL’s recruiting campaign inspired the national 
abortion rights movement to take similar action.195 Expanding the “Massachusetts model” 
to a national scale, NARAL changed its direction and in 1979 launched a program 
entitled “Impact ’80: Protecting the Right to Choose” with the hope of mobilizing a 
“politically astute pro-choice constituency” that would lay the foundation “for a major 
pro-choice victory in 1980.”196 Jean Weinberg described the process as “bringing inactive 
pro-choice supporters into one end of a funnel and sending campaign workers out the 
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other end.”197  NARAL, like its Bay State chapter, predicated the project on tenets of 
community organizing, particularly the idea that “people will stick with an issue in which 
they have a personal stake, if they perceive they as, individuals, can make a difference in 
the outcome.”198 Thus, MORAL representatives began traveling around the country 
providing training and materials to activists in other states about how to recruit workers 
to volunteers and get voters to the polls by promoting the issues of freedom of choice 
rather than class fairness and racial discrimination. 199  
This shift in strategy toward grassroots organization and a single-issue pro-choice 
agenda had clear-trade offs for the movement locally and nationally. In the short run, 
“Impact ‘80” failed to mobilize enough opposition to stop the victories of Ronald Reagan 
and other politically conservative politicians. 200 In the long term, this effort did succeed 
in developing an electoral constituency, but one that was overwhelmingly middle-class, 
white, and ascribed to a narrow view of the abortion debate. In particular, the campaign’s 
decision to replace the language of  “rights” with “choice” constricted its scope of vision 
and effectiveness. Examining this strategy, historian Rickie Solinger has argued that 
abortion rights activists believed it would be less threatening to promote the concept of 
“choice,” which was laden with an ideology of consumer privilege.  Elaborating on the 
motivation behind this strategy, she stated, “in a country weary of rights claims, choice 
became the way liberal and mainstream feminists could talk about abortion.”201 
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 The rhetoric of choice aligned with and built upon the longstanding suburban-
centered strategy of mainstream feminists in Massachusetts. It followed in close step with 
NOW and the ERA campaign’s efforts to couch both feminism and the amendment not as 
a demand for particular rights for women but a quest for class and race neutral ideals of 
“choice” and “opportunity.” By embracing this terminology, abortion rights activists 
further naturalized a middle-class suburban liberal perspective to stand in for the entire 
issue of reproductive politics.  MORAL’s slogan “As American as Apple Pie-A 
Women’s Right to Choose” brings the organization’s increasingly white middle-class 
ideology and agenda into the clearest focus.202 This slogan mirrored NOW’s longstanding 
effort to present feminism through a non-threatening discourse of middle-class 
respectability and traditional gender norms. However, this strategy helped codify abortion 
as a class privilege rather than a fundamental right just as the fair housing movement 
made suburban housing available to only those minorities who could it afford it. The goal 
of enhancing “choice” obscured the fact that the laws like Doyle-Flynn, the Hyde 
Amendment, and the informed consent requirements prevented a large portion of the 
majority from electing the option of abortion. 
 The embrace tactics like  Tupperware parties, phone banks, and bake sales made 
it even more difficult for mainstream feminists to create coalitions with poor and 
minority women in order to preserve abortion rights. The focus on choice and electoral 
mobilization also made the mainstream movement less able to address the variety of 
economic and social conditions that led most women to claim reproductive rights in the 
first place. In spite of the issues exposed by the fight over the Doyle-Flynn bill, MORAL, 
NOW and other mainstream groups also opted not to make welfare rights and poverty 
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central components of their campaign. Thus, these efforts failed numerically or 
ideologically to include the constituency most affected by the new limits on abortion. 
This single-issue strategy also prevented MORAL from addressing the other 
feminist issues inextricably linked to abortion such as health care, rape, domestic 
violence, and employment equality, which created tensions with other women’s and 
abortion rights activists. Organizations such as the Abortion Action Coalitio,  which had 
worked closely with MORAL on the Doyle-Flynn bill, experienced a sense of alienation 
from the focus “on abortion as a single-issue struggle. ” The members of AAC grew 
increasingly frustrated by the “liberal pro-choice perspective” of MORAL and NOW and 
“their strategic commitment to purely legislative and judicial work.” In addition, the 
AAC criticized MORAL’s “formulation of this struggle as essentially a question of 
choice” arguing that “by pushing the choice position the liberals ignore the fact that the 
availability (and for that matter the non-availability) of abortion services changes the 
meaning of all the options.”203  
On the surface, the class-blind language of choice brought abortion rights and 
feminism in closer harmony with mainstream liberalism. However, the single-issue 
strategy actually worked to set abortion from both other liberal campaigns and the 
Democratic Party.   A pro-choice position has increasingly become a prerequisite for 
candidates seeking to gain the votes of middle-class liberals, particularly those in the 
suburbs. The single-issue strategy, nevertheless, also made it easier for politicians to 
marginalize the issue as a means to avoid political controversy. Thus, the shift in strategy 
                                                
203 Leslie Cagan and Marla Erlien to Reproductive Rights National Network and Friends, January 30, 1980, 
Box 1, Folder 8, AAC. The white middle-class members of AAC experienced consistent difficulty making 
its messages often steeped in Marxist-influenced theory accessible and appealing to the welfare recipients 
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the AAC to disband in 1980. 
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enabled politicians and the Democratic Party since the late 1970s to embrace the 
symbolic ideals of the pro-choice movement without having to commit to economic or 
social policies that ensured actual equality in reproductive rights. 204 
The campaign for abortion rights ultimately exemplifies the success and limits of 
both mainstream feminism and suburban liberalism in the 1970s. The efforts demonstrate 
the continued vibrancy of activism in support of liberal causes in Massachusetts, 
particularly the Route 128 suburbs. However, by embracing the individualist ideals of 
equality of opportunity and freedom of choice, this movement disproportionately 
appealed to and benefited white suburbanites and intensified class and racial inequality in 
the Bay State. Moreover, these controversies exposed and exacerbated larger tensions in 
the political landscape that the parallel battles over taxation and welfare in the 1970s  




                                                
204 For more on the relationship between the pro-choice movement and politicians in the 1980s see William 
Saletan, “Electoral Politics and Abortion: Narrowing the Political Message” in Abortion Wars: A Half 
Century of Struggle, Rickie Solinger, ed (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), 111-123.  
 
614 
Chapter 10:   
From “Taxachusetts” to the “Massachusetts Miracle” 
 
Introduction 
  Between 1972 and 1990, Massachusetts’s identity, political ideology and 
economy remained in flux. The state gradually relinquished its hold on the claim of the 
most liberal place in America that it earned following its singular support of George 
McGovern 1972 election. Following that image-making election the state endured the 
busing crisis, a deep economic recession, and soaring unemployment and residents, 
frustrated with high tax rates disparagingly dubbed  “Taxachusetts.” In 1978, voters 
replaced Governor Michael Dukakis with the pro-business and socially conservative 
Edward King, who would proudly embrace the label “Reagan’s favorite Democrat.” 
These developments revealed the growing conservatism of the state and led to the 
invariable conclusion on the eve of the 1980 election that eight years later a candidate 
like McGovern would be “clobbered” not celebrated in Massachusetts.1 The outcome of 
the election reinforced this conviction. Voters widely approved one of the nation’s most 
severe tax limitation measures, known as Proposition 2 1/2, and made Ronald Reagan the 
first Republican presidential candidate to win Massachusetts since Dwight Eisenhower.  
The obituaries of Massachusetts liberalism proved premature. Just two years later, 
Dukakis rebounded and defeated King in the 1982 governor’s race. Dukakis’s comeback 
in 1982 demonstrates the importance of suburban liberal and moderate voters in 
transforming the base and priorities of the Democratic Party and the politics of the Bay 
                                                
1 Robert L. Turner, “Massachusetts in ’80,” Boston Globe, February 10, 1980.  
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State. During his second term, Dukakis rode the cresting wave of the high-tech industry 
to oversee the economic turnaround later coined the “Massachusetts Miracle. ” The 
resurgence of the state’s economy and his career convinced Dukakis to run for the 
presidency based on a platform of refashioned liberalism that promoted fiscal restraint, 
social moderation, and technocratic management of high-tech corporate development. 
Dukakis also aimed to reinvent many of principles that had dominated liberalism and the 
Democratic Party since the New Deal. As governor, he rejected the notions of generous 
government assistance and instead promoted a policy of personal responsibility and 
work-requirements. The vision of social welfare that Dukakis aimed to implement in the 
Bay State did not just change the political dynamics of the state, but also directly 
influenced the policies of Democratic Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton and the 
Democratic Leadership Council (DLC).  
Dukakis’s 1988 Republican opponent George H.W. Bush, nevertheless, defused 
his moderate image through a strategy that rested on latent national  resentments of 
Massachusetts and East Coast liberalism.2 The success of this tactic and the 
overwhelming defeat of Dukakis permanently crystallized an inextricable association 
between Massachusetts and the decline of the Democratic Party. The constructions of 
liberalism and Massachusetts attached to Dukakis, nevertheless, draw a direct link 
between the 1972 and 1988 presidential contests and obscure a more complicated 
narrative about the continuities, changes and challenges to the ideology and politics of 
postwar liberalism during the period those two elections bookend. These dynamics 
became most pronounced in the discussion of welfare and taxation, which defined the 
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political economy and electoral politics of the period. Tracing the state’s transformation 
from Taxachusetts into the Massachusetts Miracle, as well as the career of Michael 
Dukakis from his election as Governor in 1974 to his run for the presidency in 1988, 
challenges assumptions about political realignment, liberalism, and economic 
restructuring in both Massachusetts and the nation after 1972.  Doing so demonstrates the 
vitality of, and changes to, the Democratic Party and liberal politics before and after 
Reagan took office.  
 The debates that occurred within the realm of electoral politics in Massachusetts 
also provide new insight into the tax revolts that took place across the nation during the 
late 1970s. Recent historians of postwar politics have emphasized the important 
implications of the tax revolts of the late 1970s as symbolic of the end of New Deal 
liberalism and the beginning of the free-market conservatism that came to define the so-
called the “Age of Reagan.” 3 These accounts often treat passage of Proposition 13 in 
California in 1978 and Reagan’s victory in the presidential election two years later as 
twin examples of the nation’s rejection of liberalism.  However, the causes, 
consequences, and implications of the tax limitation measures exceed this simplified this 
California-centric explanation and overlook other places where the issue operated in a 
different political, ideological and spatial context.4 Unlike California, Massachusetts did 
not have a large budget surplus and both the campaign surrounding Proposition 2 1/2 and 
the confusion that its passage engendered ignited fierce battles about preserving basic 
                                                
3 For more on the tax revolts, see Robert Kuttner, Revolt of the Haves: Tax Revolt and Hard Times  (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1980); David O. Sears and Jack Citrin, Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in 
California (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The 
Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: The Free Press, 2001), 205-217.  
4 In his analysis of the California’s trendsetting initiative, Robert Self situates the revolt within a broader 
and more complex history of postwar metropolitan development and the process of racial and spatial 
segregation, See, Robert Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: 
University Press, 2003) especially 317-327.  
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social services that exposed differing notions about the responsibilities and entitlements 
of American citizenship and suburban residency. These debates illuminate a bipartisan 
refusal of many individual white suburban homeowners to assume responsibility for the 
costs of metropolitan fragmentation and deindustrialization.5 The passage of Proposition 
2 1/2 also reinforced the key role of both the high-tech industry and suburban taxpayers 
in shaping the political culture of Massachusetts and the national Democratic Party.  
The tax revolt and these electoral transformations did not go unchallenged by 
grassroots activists concentrated in the Route 128 suburbs. Their response to these 
developments provides important insights into both the persistence of and boundaries of 
liberalism in the 1970s and 1980s. Members of this constituency fought hard against 
Proposition 2 ½, forming a coalition that stressed the spatial, economic and racial 
inequalities such a measure would encourage. Even though they lost this battle, the 
campaign raised important questions about the definitions and obligations and privileges 
of suburban residency. Some white middle-class liberals also articulated clear 
disillusionment with the social welfare policies of Dukakis in the mid-1970s and opted to 
protest by refusing to support his re-election.  This decision directly contributed to 
Dukakis’ defeat by King in 1978. This outcome taught suburban liberal activists an 
important lesson about the dangerous consequences of breaking with the party or 
challenging the mainstream. The decision of these activists to endorse Dukakis in the 
1982 election and beyond, therefore, highlights the limits of grassroots liberals to remake 
the political landscape of Massachusetts or to force the Democratic Party to fully 
incorporate its vision of economic and social equity.  
                                                




Appalachia of the North  
 
In the early 1970s, economic restructuring, unemployment, inflation, and high 
taxes in Massachusetts set the terms of political debate for the subsequent decade. 
Existing instability in the state’s economy turned the national recession in 1973-1974 into 
a full-scale local depression.6 Mill-based textile, leather and food processing companies 
had served as the backbone of the Massachusetts economy since before the Civil War. 
These manufacturing industries had begun a steady downward spiral during the 
Depression but reached the lowest point in the late 1960s with the loss of 61,000 jobs. 
The rise of the high technology industry around the Route 128 highway after World War 
II had offset the destabilizing effects of this decline in manufacturing. Most of these new 
firms operated through federal government defense contracts. In the early 1970s, 
however, the winding down of the Vietnam War coupled with the Nixon 
Administration’s stricter wage and price controls severely shrank the number of contracts 
awarded to Massachusetts corporations by the Defense Department and NASA.7 For 
instance, Raytheon, the largest Bay State beneficiary of Defense dollars, sharply reduced 
its missile production and staff.8 In 1970, Sylvania Electronics Company shut down its 
manufacturing plants in Burlington, Woburn, and Waltham.9  
This decline in industry initiated a chain reaction creating high rates of 
unemployment. This problem became particularly pronounced within blue-collar 
                                                
6 Charles Kenney and Robert L. Turner, Dukakis: An American Odyssey (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 
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communities where most residents lacked the education, skills or opportunities to seek 
alternative forms of employment. The closing of defense-related businesses, however, 
also affected the affluent suburbs along Route 128.  By 1969, nearly 50,000 engineers 
and scientists worked in companies on Route 128, but in the following year alone 10,000 
were laid off and many others faced sharp salary reductions.10 The wife of one Lexington 
engineer candidly admitted, “We just live day to day.” Another Lexington engineer let go 
from his $23,000 per year job at ITEK became a handyman averaging about $200 a week 
for doing yard work, painting, and carpentry.11  
Many of these white collar workers eventually discovered opportunities to apply 
their expertise at new electrical machinery and computer-based companies that had begun 
to take over the office space in Route 128 industrial parks left vacant by the closing or 
relocation of research and development firms.12  These industries, however, had only 
provided 11,000 new jobs by 1974, most of which required specialized skills, and thereby 
offered little help for the thousands of blue-collar workers concentrated in sections of 
Boston and industrial cities such as Lawrence, Lowell, and Springfield.13 By 1974, the 
unemployment rate had reached 11.2 percent and one in six residents received some sort 
of government assistance, leading Massachusetts to gain the reputation as the 
“Appalachia of the North.”14 
The problems of unemployment coupled with the national inflation created a 
severe decline in state revenue and thus a corresponding increase in taxes. Like 
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unemployment, the issue of high taxes was already in motion by the time of the national 
recession. Between 1963 and 1973, state and local taxes increased from 9.6 to 14.8 
percent of personal income, earning Massachusetts the famous nickname of  
“Taxachusetts.”  The increase derived from the fact that, unlike the federal government 
and most other states, Massachusetts did not tax residents on a progressive scale. Instead, 
Massachusetts used a flat rate, which limited the amount of revenue the state government 
could generate and thereby the amount of aid and services it could provide. In the 
absence of significant state aid, municipalities relied heavily on local property taxes to 
pay for public services such as education, public works, recreation, and medical aid.   
Reformers had long advocated that introducing a more equitable system based on the 
taxpayer’s “ability to pay” would enable the state legislature to fund more local services 
and reduce the heavy reliance on property taxes.  Between 1929 and 1967, the legislature 
had considered at least sixty-seven proposals to shift to a Graduated Income Tax (GIT) in 
line with the federal system.15 However, the business community opposed the idea, 
claiming the shift would force even more industry out of the state and succeeded in 
repeatedly killing these proposals. 16 Progressive groups had not given up on this quest, 
but by 1974 Massachusetts had one the highest property tax rates in the nation.17 This 
combination of high income and property taxes sent thousands of individuals to follow 
                                                
15 The League of Women Voters also succeeded several times in placing several initiatives on the electoral 
ballot. Mass PAX,  “For Tax Reform: Vote Yes on Question 2,” 1968, Box 5 Folder V.23, CPPAX. This 
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23, 1972, Box 24, Folder GIT, FWS.  
16 League of Women Voters, The Case for a Graduated Income Tax, September 13, 1972, FWS, Box 24, 
Folder GIT; David Nyhan and Rachelle Patterson, “Businessmen spend big to kill it, ”Boston Globe, 
October 31, 1972.   
17 Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, Inc. March, 1974, “Who Assesses Property in Massachusetts,” 




the path of companies and move out of the state. For the residents who stayed in 
Massachusetts, the tax system had produced increasing economic hardship and increasing 
resentment toward local and state government.  
 
1974 Election  
This economic crisis established the backdrop for the 1974 race for governor. The 
contest signaled an important departure in Massachusetts’s politics and its brand of 
liberalism, as it became Michael Dukakis’s first serious attempt to reshape the state’s 
Democratic Party and system of government. A 40-year-old, first generation Greek-
American, Dukakis had grown up in the prosperous and traditionally liberal suburb of 
Brookline. He returned after college and law school and launched his political career as 
one of Brookline’s state representatives. During his tenure at the State House, he had 
consciously set himself apart from the powerful ethnic Democratic machine that 
dominated the legislature instead cultivated an image as a technocrat and a frugal 
reformer who refused to toe the party line. Throughout his career, he lived in a modest 
duplex house, wore bargain basement suits and rode public transportation every day to 
work.18 Dukakis combined an unusual mixture of liberal idealism and pragmatic reform, 
supporting civil rights, the anti-war movement, the anti-highway campaign, women’s 
equality, and the legalization of abortion. Yet, he experienced his greatest legislative 
accomplishments through less sensational issues such as insurance reform and changing 
the structure of government.  
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In making a bid for the governorship in 1974 Dukakis challenged the urban-based 
and socially conservative leadership of the state’s powerful Democratic Party. He aimed 
to widen the wedge first opened during the 1972 presidential primary. During that contest 
suburban liberal activists had successfully beaten Democratic insiders to become 
convention delegates and led George McGovern to win the state. Facing the party’s 
choice, Attorney General Robert Quinn, Dukakis developed a strategy that combined an 
image as a reformer and well-organized grassroots outreach. He depicted Quinn as a 
symbol of the well-entrenched patronage system that had become “a cancer” on state 
government and had to be “destroyed.”19 This emphasis earned him the endorsement of 
both Citizens for Participation in Political Action (CPPAX and the Massachusetts chapter 
of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) as well as many other suburban voters. 
Dukakis beat Quinn by a wide margin, with his greatest support coming from the Route 
128 suburbs.20  
Many observers interpreted the results as a signal of political realignment within 
the state Democratic Party.  The Boston Globe announced the “mantle of the Democratic 
Party” had shifted from the “working class three decker neighborhoods” to “the more 
affluent and single family homes of suburban Massachusetts.” The Globe deemed 
Dukakis’s victory as “one of the flagships of this change” and declared, “it is fitting that 
he is the standard-bearer on the day on which it is obvious to all that the transition of 
power in the Democratic Party is complete.”21 Fellow former Brookline state 
representative Martin Linsky later explained  the election by declaring:  “It was the first 
                                                
19 Kenney and Turner, An American Odyssey, 80.  
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time a suburban Democrat beat an urban one. It gave the Democrats a candidate who 
could win the fastest growing parts of the state, the Route 128 belt around Worcester and 
Boston.” 22  These results, therefore, would have important long-term implications both 
in shifting the orientation and emphasis of the party and establishing a permanent base of 
support for Dukakis. Although Dukakis gained the approval of suburban voters in the 
primary, he had difficulty maintaining this constituency in the general election against 
sitting Governor Francis Sargent. During his tenure, Sargent had earned a reputation as 
one of the most liberal Republican politicians in the country for his pioneering 
environmental and transportation policies, opposition to the Vietnam War, and support of 
a generous welfare state. The executive director of CPPAX Richard Couchi suggested 
that Governor Sargent had been “a more effective spokesperson for a wide variety of new 
politics issues,” and he and several other staffers refused to endorse Dukakis, whom they 
believed represented the “all-too-common centrist strategy.”23  
Dukakis’s platform during the general election confirmed Couchi’s assessment. 
Dukakis made the economy the centerpiece of his general election campaign. He saw a 
fiscally conservative agenda as a way to win the support of alienated blue-collar workers 
hardest hit by the economic downturn.  Adopting as his campaign slogan the confident 
phrase “MIKE DUKAKIS SHOULD BE GOVERNOR,” he presented himself as a 
pragmatic technocrat who could provide a better economic vision for the state.24 The 
campaign led to an unusual dynamic and reversal of assumptions about the respective 
platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties as Sargent appeared as the 
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compassionate liberal and Dukakis emerged as the economically conservative 
technocrat.25 In a speech delivered just weeks before the election, Dukakis promised to 
cut the budget by $150 million through the elimination of patronage and better 
management and gave “ a lead pipe guarantee” of no new taxes while he was in office. 
He followed up with a bold promise to close the deficit, balance the state budget, reduce 
the unemployment rate to the national average, and deliver better social services at lower 
costs.26 This confident promise helped gain him the support of the wide majority of 
residents feeling the financial pinch. Dukakis eventually defeated Sargent in the 
November election with his best showing in the cities most affected by inflation and 
unemployment.27  
Dukakis owed the victory to voters’ combined exasperation with double-digit 
inflation, the unemployment rate, Watergate and by extension the Republican Party.28 
Dukakis joined a series of successful Democratic candidates across the country that led 
the party to experience its greatest midterm triumph in decades. 29 The promises of fiscal 
moderation, nevertheless, had failed to pique the interest of many of the voters in the 
affluent and traditionally liberal Route 128 suburbs of Boston that had been crucial for 
McGovern in 1972.30 Despite the fact that these communities become overwhelmingly 
Democratic by 1970, they still supported Sargent by nearly 2-1.31 This outcome did not 
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deter the high hopes of Dukakis, who on election night promised to “give this state the 
best state government it has ever had.”32   
 
 
The Meat Cleaver  
Dukakis’s initial effort to address the state’s economic problems set the tone for 
his leadership and made the issues of welfare and taxes the focal point of his 
administration. The rise of unemployment in Massachusetts had led more people to seek 
state assistance, and the cost of welfare had grown from $500 million to $1.4 billion 
between 1971 and 1974.  Advisors warned if the current expenditure rates continued it 
would lead to a projected budget deficiency of $321 million in 1975. 33 Dukakis was 
reluctant to renege on his “lead pipe guarantee” not to raise taxes and thereby realized the 
solution lay in reducing the welfare program. When a reporter asked Dukakis before he 
took office if he would take a scalpel to human service programs, he replied, “It might be 
a meat cleaver.”34 He subsequently made the image of the “meat cleaver” the organizing 
symbol of his leadership approach, even placing one on his desk.  
This first portent of his “meat cleaving” approach came in February 1975 when he 
made a controversial announcement recommending no cost-of-living increases for 
welfare recipients. Two months later he stated that the “cost of public welfare makes 
Massachusetts a fiscal basket case” and admonished “that no other state in the nation has 
found itself so incapable of administering a welfare program that helps people genuinely 
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in need without virtually bankrupting the public treasury.” 35 He announced plans for a 
$311 million cutback in the state’s welfare budget. Dukakis aimed to accomplish those 
cuts through a combination of management controls, stricter eligibility requirements, 
eliminating employable persons under forty years old from the general relief category, 
and reducing medical aid to the elderly. These cuts focused on General Relief program, 
the part of the welfare system entirely financed by state funds. In order to be eligible for 
the program, a recipient had to have a family income that fell 20-30 percent below the 
national poverty line. Welfare rights activists immediately objected to the plan, declaring 
in exceptionalist terms,“This is Massachusetts, not Alabama, Mr. Dukakis.”36 
The proposal also stirred intense outrage from the state’s grassroots suburban 
activists, and their arguments against the proposal illuminates the ways in which 
Dukakis’s ideas challenged the bedrock principals of modern liberalism. Many liberals 
interpreted the move as a rejection of the very premise of the welfare system dating back 
to the New Deal. Critics declared these cutbacks would place undue hardship on those 
least able to handle it and thereby contradicted the premise that in moments of economic 
hardship the government had a responsibility to help the poor. Dukakis’s secretary of 
human services, Lucy Benson, announced her resignation declaring, “The most needy of 
citizens shouldn’t be required to bear a disproportionate share of the state’s burdens.”37  
Hubie Jones, a longtime activist in the black community with strong ties to the suburban 
liberal movement, publicly declared that the governor was asking the state to “replace the 
governmental philosophy which has evolved in this state and country since the Great 
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Depression with a new form of Social Darwinism.”38 Statistics put the case into even 
clearer terms. Dukakis seemed to overlook willfully the fact that the rising 
unemployment and the “structural shift” away from manufacturing-based labor had 
caused the 80 percent growth in state welfare caseloads in the previous two years.39 There 
were slim odds for welfare clients pushed off the rolls to find employment since there 
were 14,000 vacancies in the state and 320,000 unemployed people, over half of whom 
had not graduated from high school. Labor economists like Bennett Harrison predicted 
the proposal would have the greatest impact on young white working class men who 
lived in places like Worcester, Springfield, Brockton and Lawrence outside of Boston, 
where in just a year the caseload had increased from 30 percent below to 30 percent 
above that of the central city.40  
Despite grassroots suburban liberals’ frequent promotion of individualist rather 
than structurally based policies, most of them had not rejected the idea that the 
government had a responsibility to support citizens who could not support themselves. 
The suburban-centered board of CPPAX staged a meeting to discuss “what to do about 
Dukakis?” at which they decided to take the lead in defining a “left alternative” to the 
governor’s proposal.41 The CPPAX proposed a comprehensive tax reform plan, which it 
contended would raise $283 million in additional revenue.42 The Governor, nevertheless, 
ignored such suggestions. In August 1975, Dukakis signed into law his cuts that excluded 
between 15,000 to 18,000 people from General Relief and reduced medical care for 
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remaining welfare recipients. Many critics echoed the charges that “[this cut] represents a 
departure from a tradition of assisting all residents of the Commonwealth in need which 
dates back to colonial times.”43  Conservative Democrats and Republicans praised the 
cuts often using a heavily racialized imagery and assumption that the plan would prevent 
black mothers of eight from “stingier states” from moving to Massachusetts, a purported 
“Mecca” for welfare recipients.44  
When he recanted on his pledge of no tax increases in the fall of 1975, Dukakis 
also alienated this fiscally and socially moderate constituency. Throughout the year, the 
Dukakis administration had tried every possible alternative to avoid such a step. 
However, by the fall, Dukakis announced in a televised address that he could not in “in 
good conscience” make any more cuts to the welfare system and an across the board tax 
increase was necessary.45 The Massachusetts legislature reluctantly accepted Dukakis’s 
warning that “the Commonwealth quite simply has been speeding into bankruptcy and we 
had to apply the brakes before it was too late,” and after much debate passed the version 
of the state budget with the increases included.46  The 1976 state budget issued a major 
blow to human service agencies and social programs. The controversy surrounding the 
Metropolitan Council for Educational Opportunity (METCO) discussed in chapter 8 
represented just one by-product of this action and the reaction that it produced. The new 
budget affected almost every Massachusetts resident including higher taxes, lower 
welfare payments, decreased school funding and worsened medical care. This 
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combination of increased taxes and welfare cuts created disillusionment with Dukakis 
among people across the political spectrum. Critics on all sides attacked him for not 
providing clear leadership or tangible goals.47  
 
“Dump the Duke” 
The welfare cuts produced deep animosity toward Dukakis among many liberal 
activists particularly those who had long worked for welfare rights and economic justice. 
Black activist Hubie Jones along with Bill and Phyllis Ryan, who had been leaders in the 
white suburban fair housing movement, created a campaign in early 1976 to both publicly 
criticize Dukakis and test the political climate for a progressive candidate to challenge 
him in 1978.48 This group believed that Dukakis was even more offensive than a 
“straightforward conservative” like Ronald Reagan since he “proposes to cut welfare by a 
bigger percentage than Reagen [sic] ever proposed and then he wants us to call him a 
liberal.” The organization hoped to mobilize the people in the suburban-based “civil 
rights-antiwar-new politics movement” to “Dump the Duke.”49 They decided to call 
themselves the “Should Dukakis be Governor? Committee,” which was a conscious 
inversion of his blunt 1974 campaign slogan: “Dukakis Should be Governor.” The 
group’s primary activity became the dissemination of bumper stickers and literature that 
raised doubts about the governor, and they intentionally aimed to “damage his political 
future.”50 In leaflets, the Committee criticized Dukakis for his business-friendly policies 
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and called him the “’best friend business has had in the State House since Calvin 
Coolidge went to Washington.”51 In a pamphlet entitled “A Duke Should Not be 
Governor,” the Committee rapped Dukakis as the “consummate politician not the liberal 
savoir” and deemed him “heartless,” “arrogant,” “ a liar,” and “a fraud.” 52 
 These tactics underscored the campaign’s strong roots in suburban liberal 
movements that had long recognized the power of its geographically dispersed 
constituency for working within the state political system.53 The organizers sent a letter to 
state legislators defining themselves as “growing issues oriented group of citizens” who 
came from a diverse range of communities including affluent suburbs such as Concord, 
Lexington, Newton and Brookline, and blue-collar areas like Chelsea, Charlestown 
Roxbury and Lynn but who were collectively “profoundly concerned about the state 
priorities and recent regressive directions in Massachusetts public policy.”54  The 
coalition declared that the legislature, which “had a long and proud history of being one 
of most compassionate in the nation,” had become “the victim of Dukakis’ 
maladministration and misjudgment.” The group thereby urged legislators to use their 
power to stop the direction of Dukakis’s fiscal and social welfare policies and salvage the 
reputation of the state and body as “the traditional protector of the people.”55  
The bumper sticker drive constituted the most effective component of the 
campaign. The group strategically distributed stickers asking, “Should Dukakis be 
Governor?” in downtown Boston, Brookline, Cambridge and Newton in order to 
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simultaneously enrage Dukakis and to galvanize the “issue people” who would be most 
“sympathetic” to the message and its implications.56 The group made a concerted effort to 
disseminate the bumper stickers in Brookline where Dukakis lived and at the subway 
station by the State House that he used every morning to go to work.  At one point, the 
Governor reportedly saw a “Should Dukakis?” sticker on a car in front of him and pulled 
out at the first break and angrily roared past it.57 While this campaign did not lead to 
Dukakis’s resignation, it did succeed in raising doubts about the governor’s leadership. 
The effort demonstrated the vitality of grassroots liberal activism in the suburbs and the 
members’ continued ability to influence public opinion.  
 
Workfare 
Dukakis largely ignored this critique of his social service policy and instead 
advocated a program that further enraged liberal activists. Around the same time as the 
“Should Dukakis” bumper stickers appeared on cars throughout metropolitan Boston, the 
governor announced plans to pursue a workfare program as a solution to the state’s 
soaring unemployment rates and welfare rolls.  The concept of workfare had first 
emerged in the welfare discussion in the late 1960s by both Democratic and Republican 
parties. As governor of California in 1972, Ronald Reagan had instituted the nation’s 
largest and most severe version of the program that made the performance of menial tasks 
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a contingency for welfare checks.  The California state legislature later abolished the 
program in response to charges that it constituted a form of “slave labor.”58 
From the outset, Dukakis recognized workfare as a means to turn the state into a 
leader in the arena of welfare reform and to salvage his first term. When he first 
announced plans for his Work Experience Program (WEP), he declared that it provided 
an important “opportunity for Massachusetts to serve as the model for a national 
program.”59 A continuation of the earlier effort to cut off welfare payments to childless 
adults considered capable of holding jobs, WEP provided the male in a two parent 
household with work skills and counseling. The relatively small program focused on the 
2,000 unemployed fathers on the rolls for two years who lacked the skills and satisfactory 
work habits to qualify for either private job training or programs sponsored by the federal 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Under WEP, as a condition of 
welfare payment, three days a week these men would perform basic maintenance duties 
such as painting guard rails, “roadside and brush clearing,” and “litter pick up.”60  The 
other days the men received employment and personal counseling and conducted job 
hunts under the supervision of state monitors.  
 The program demonstrated Dukakis’s commitment to a political and economic 
ideology rooted in traditional gender norms, encouraging women to stay at home and 
men to provide financially for their families. It also reflected Dukakis’s firmly 
individualist outlook that hard and honest work provided a means of self-sufficiency and 
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personal betterment.61 He declared that his goal was “to get idle men working again and 
convert their welfare checks into paychecks.”62 Even members of his staff interpreted the 
program as the result of Dukakis’s “bootstrapper” worldview.63 Reflecting his pragmatic 
and business-minded mentality, Dukakis announced that “there’s something radically 
wrong with an economic system that can’t transfer these (benefits) payments into 
paychecks.”64  Dukakis’s refusal to supplement the program with a guaranteed annual 
income revealed his belief that the problem of unemployment lay not in broader 
economic restructuring but in the personal failings of those on welfare.  
WEP immediately became controversial and confirmed for many liberal critics 
that Dukakis’s technocratic tendencies led to a lack of compassion for the poor.  Sen. 
Jack Backman of Brookline became a particularly outspoken opponent. While Backman 
supported the notion that the government should be the “employer of ‘first resort,’” he 
believed that menial tasks such as roadside cleanup required by WEP would not provide 
unemployed men the skills necessary to find well-paying jobs and become financially 
self-sufficient.65 He therefore dismissed WEP as a “cruel hoax” and A “form of 
indentured servitude.” The League of Women Voters agreed that workfare would most 
likely keep people on the dole and argued Dukakis instead should concentrate his energy 
on forms of economic development that created more stable and better paying jobs.66  
Other critics accused Dukakis of using the issue to satisfy the same socially and fiscally 
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conservative constituencies that had helped him win the governorship in 1974.67 This 
critique was not entirely unwarranted as the program received praise from moderate and 
conservative Bay State residents. These proponents underscored how WEP privileged 
taxpayer rather than citizenship rights. Dorchester resident Frank S. Kawa, for example, 
relied on a racialized vocabulary of “idleness” to endorse WEP, stating it was time for 
welfare recipients  “to get off their fannies and do something to earn their bread like the 
rest of the taxpayers who support them.”68   
In spite of this debate at the state level, Dukakis successfully positioned himself 
AS a national spokesperson for work requirements. In particular, he tried to make 
workfare palatable to the Democratic Party in Washington. The campaign was part of 
Dukakis’s broader attempt to reshape the parameters of liberalism’s image and ideology. 
Throughout 1976 and 1977, he delivered speeches to the Democratic Platform 
Committee, the National Governor’s Council, and testified before several federal panels 
and congressional subcommittees about the possibilities of workfare.69 These statements 
gained the attention of Jimmy Carter, who on the campaign trail had promised to 
overhaul to the nation’s welfare system.  In announcing his own plan for reform, Carter 
acknowledged Dukakis’s leading postiion in “helping solve the welfare problem. ”70 The 
President credited the Massachusetts governor with having an a major role in shaping his 
own policy called the Program for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI), which also aimed to 
solidify support from white middle-class voters who felt alienated by the purported 
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excesses of Great Society liberalism and preferred workfare-style solutions.71 Carter 
hoped, therefore, that WEP would serve as a pilot project for his own goal of promoting  
“socially useful” jobs for welfare recipients.72 
As Dukakis made frequent trips to Washington, opposition to workfare grew in 
the Massachusetts legislature. Several legislators insisted that WEP was illegal under the 
stipulations of federal welfare regulations and the Social Security Act and aimed to 
convince their colleagues not to endorse the idea. Eventually a much more limited 
version of the proposal passed, which essentially constituted a training program for a 
small number of welfare fathers that made little impact on the state’s rates of welfare and 
unemployment. WEP and Dukakis’s advocacy of it, nevertheless, had important long-
term consequences for social welfare policy at the state and national levels. Dukakis 
implanted into the national discussion a new attitude about the best way to help the poor. 
In doing so, he made it acceptable for Democratic politicians to shift away from the 
ideals of social welfare at the heart of New Deal liberalism. This new philosophy would 
later return in the Massachusetts welfare program of the 1980s and would culminate in 
1996 when Democratic president Bill Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act based upon on a similar notion that work and 
individual self-sufficiency offered the best solution to the problem of welfare 
dependency.  
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The workfare debate in 1976 and 1977, nevertheless, exacerbated the fissures 
within the Massachusetts Democratic Party and impelled liberal activists to pursue more 
seriously plans to find a progressive candidate to challenge Dukakis in the 1978 
gubernatorial race.  Building on the “Should Dukakis?” campaign, a group of liberal 
activists led by Barney Frank, Citizens for Participation Politics (CPP) founder Alvin 
Levin, and sociologist Robert Wood searched for someone who had the “guts” to 
challenge Dukakis.73 Levin and other participants had played a central role in antiwar 
politics and Eugene McCarthy’s 1968 campaign and recognized a direct parallel between 
the earlier effort to “Dump Johnson” and their current project. This group eventually 
convinced former Cambridge Mayor Barbara Ackermann to serve as its candidate. She 
was virtually unknown beyond Cambridge, where she had led the fight for city rent 
control, against highways and served as an early opponent of the Vietnam War, supporter 
of McCarthy and longtime member of CPP. She firmly believed in increased spending on 
welfare programs.”74 Frank defined her candidacy, therefore, as a sign that there was “a 
price to be paid for hurting poor people.”75 
Ackermann and her supporters recognized that the CPPAX caucus would serve as 
the major test of her ability to gain enough liberal support to defeat Dukakis. The forum 
had previously launched the campaigns of candidates such as Robert Drinan and George 
McGovern. Dukakis, who had won the CPPAX caucus in 1974, also recognized the 
endorsement as a means to ensure his reelection. Ackermann and Dukakis, therefore, 
both appeared at the event held in a suburban church and presented their respective 
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platforms to the 200 participants. The governor sat “impassively” as Ackermann assailed 
his record and failure to provide adequate humans services or  “coherent, constructive 
and responsible management.”76 The suburban liberal delegates gave a slight edge to 
Ackermann though she failed to garner the 2/3 majority that the rules mandated to 
provide her with the organization’s official endorsement as favored Democratic 
candidate. The outcome exposed the motivation of liberal activists in the suburbs who 
were willing to challenge the governor. However, since Dukakis had received consistent 
critiques from this constituency during the previous three years, he interpreted the close 
results as a signal that he still had substantial liberal support.77   
Despite this challenge from Ackermann, Dukakis remained confident that he 
would gain a second term, which opinion polls confirmed. The dire economic and 
employment crisis had eased by 1978, and Massachusetts had entered a period of relative 
fiscal stability. Over the course of his first term, the state added over 200,000 jobs.78 
Dukakis had worked aggressively to attract more businesses to Massachusetts, bringing 
400 companies to the Bay State during his term. Although property taxes remained high, 
Dukakis’s policies of fiscal restraint had led to a $40 million budget surplus in 1978, and 
the governor had pledged to municipalities to help improve services and provide some 
tax relief. The state’s response to a large blizzard in February 1978 had also helped 
improve the governor’s image and approval ratings. A poll in March 1978 found that 56 
percent of Massachusetts resident surveyed rated his performance as good or excellent.79 
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Proposition 13  
 
 California’s passage of property-tax limitation measure Proposition 13 in June 
1978, however, directly altered the parameters of the Massachusetts gubernatorial race. 
California represented one of the only states in the nation with an average property tax 
rate that surpassed Massachusetts.80 Conservative proponents Howard Jarvis and Paul 
Gans led a populist campaign that awakened the resentments of middle-class residents 
struggling to pay their property tax bills. The measure required California municipalities 
to limit property rates to one percent of the assessed value, restrict future assessment to 2 
percent a year, and mandated a two-thirds majority by the legislature to increase state 
taxes and a similar fraction of voters to approve any new local levies. The initiative 
passed by a 2-1 margin. The law led to an immediate reduction in revenues by more than 
$7 billion, and the state went from being far above to far below the national average of 
property taxes.  
Proposition 13, nevertheless, became important less for its direct effect on the tax 
revenue in the Golden State than for signifying public resentment against the burden of 
taxes in California and across the nation.81 The law produced and reflected a new citizen 
sentiment that analysts came to identify through such shorthand phrases as the 
“proposition 13 mentality” or the “post-proposition 13 period,” which they defined as not 
just a protest against the tax burden but against the government itself.82 Like workfare, it 
marked, in the words of journalist Tom Wicker, “a massive rejection of liberal 
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government as it had developed in the post World War II era.”83 The amendment marked 
a new era of political economy and electoral politics leading to a gradual turning against 
the Keynesian economic system in favor of candidates who supported a more free-market 
vision of politics and society.   
In Massachusetts, passage of Proposition 13 enflamed resentment at the state’s 
high taxes that had first appeared during the 1974 election and had remained simmering 
ever since. Immediately following the passage of Proposition 13, Massachusetts residents 
and politicians anticipated that the state would become one of the key sites for the 
national debate surrounding taxes. Observers began to wonder if the state would be 
“swept along with the tide” of this growing national tax revolt or would it resist the 
trend.84 Although they shared a sense that Massachusetts needed to reform its tax system, 
residents and politicians divided neatly along ideological, economic, and spatial lines 
about how to achieve such changes. Proponents of tax limitation argued that if a measure 
identical to Proposition 13 passed in the Commonwealth it would look as though 
“Californians got gypped” as a 1 percent limit would slash property taxes statewide by 77 
percent. 85 This type of measure would have the greatest impact on deindustrialized cities 
where the per capita property values were lower and thereby the tax rates particularly 
high.  Journalists and policymakers predicted that wealthy suburbs like Weston and 
Wellesley would experience a tax reduction between 67 and 69 percent while in cities 
like Boston and Chelsea it would reach around 90 percent. State fiscal experts warned 
that such cuts would lead to a drastic reduction in municipal budgets that could either 
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create a loss in basic services or new burdens on the state government.86 These warnings 
set the terms of the debate over reform in the Bay State, pitting low taxes and the 
continuation of municipal services against another. Local officials looked to the fact that 
California had a large state budget surplus that could cover the loss in local revenue, 
while Massachusetts still hovered near bankruptcy.87 Further indicating the divisions over 
the issue, polls revealed that while three out of four Massachusetts voters supported a 45 
percent reduction in property taxes, the respondents differed about which basic municipal 
services to cut.88 
  The state legislature became the main site for debate over property tax limitation 
in the weeks following the passage of the California initiative. Legislators and tax reform 
group rushed to file dozens of bills resembling Proposition 13. The grassroots-based 
group Citizens for Limited Taxation (CLT), which had become increasingly powerful 
over the course of the 1970s, led this filing frenzy.89 In the summer of 1978, the group 
proposed a piece of legislation that suggested cutting property taxes in half to an average 
burden of 2.5 percent of fair market value. Proponents argued the move would stimulate 
the economy and impose restraint on the spending habits of state and local bureaucrats.  
CLT sought to present the measure, which they called “Proposition 2 ½,” as a more 
“moderate” and “less severe” version of the California initiative.90 Liberal legislators like 
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Jack Backman warned that Proposition 2 1/2 would cause “chaos,” citing Dukakis’s 1975 
welfare cuts as a sign of the dangers of such an approach.91 Even the pro-business 
Massachusetts Taxpayer Foundation, which advocated restricting state and local 
spending, warned Proposition 2 1/2 could “create economic disaster for the many 
communities in this state.”92  The legislature eventually voted down these two proposals, 
but it by no means ended the discussion of tax limitation legislation, especially 
Proposition 2 1/2.  
 
1978 Election  
The passage of Proposition 13 changed the calculus of the 1978 gubernatorial race 
by putting the issue of taxes and Edward King’s candidacy into the spotlight. An Irish-
American Roman Catholic from the blue-collar town of Winthrop, King had been a 
football star at Boston College, the Buffalo Bills, and the Baltimore Colts. Upon retiring, 
he became the executive director of the Massachusetts Port Authority.93 King had never 
before pursued elected office, and he cultivated a platform centered on establishing a 
climate for business growth that initially failed to arouse much attention from the 
electorate.  He seized the opportunity of Proposition 13 to stake out a place in the 
election, declaring his support for the implementation of a similar type of reform in 
Massachusetts. He also pledged to reduce property taxes by $500 million if elected.94 
This position provided a counterpoint to Dukakis, who said of Proposition 13, 
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“Massachusetts voters are too smart to fall for such a simplistic proposal.”95 This 
comment outraged many Bay State residents, and they agreed with King that it was the 
classic response of a “limousine liberal. ”96 
Over the course of the summer of 1978, the race increasingly narrowed to 
Dukakis and King as Barbara Ackermann’s campaign floundered. Many residents and 
grassroots activists saw the former Cambridge mayor as a politician of the 1960s unable 
to translate her commitment to the antiwar and anti-highway movements to the realities 
of the 1970s. Liberal activists privately called her a less than “ideal candidate” since she 
was “not charismatic and turtlenecked, not slick and glib” and did not have “high 
recognizability.” 97 Even one of her most ardent advocates, Barney Frank, acknowledged 
that she was “much too understated and quiet for the short encounters of the campaign 
trail.” However, Frank continued to insist that a challenge from the left was “the correct 
thing to do” because it exposed how Dukakis had betrayed liberal causes, ideals, and 
constituents during his tenure as governor.98  
King put Dukakis’s chances for reelection in more imminent danger. The former 
football star organized an extremely well-financed attack, underwritten by support in 
thebusiness and building industries. King and his advisors recognized economic 
development and tax resentment constituted too vague an agenda around which to base 
an entire campaign. In March 1978, his campaign had conducted a poll of self-described 
Dukakis supporters and found that 42 percent stated they would not support a candidate 
who opposed minimum jail sentences, 36 percent would not support one who opposed the 
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death penalty and 60 percent would not vote for a someone that favored abortion.  King 
decided to use this poll as a roadmap to define his agenda fusing “gut and pocketbook 
issues.”99 In campaign literature, he boiled his platform down to a six-point list that 
included support for tax relief, capital punishment, mandatory sentences, raising the 
drinking age to 21, and opposition to publicly funded abortion.100 Since Dukakis had 
taken the opposite stance on each of these issues, this list provided a means for King to 
position himself as the governor’s foil.  
The competing philosophies and style of all three candidates for the Democratic 
nomination came to a head during a televised debate held on August 31. The statements 
of the candidates exposed the ways in which the campaign embodied the basic tensions 
within the national Democratic Party. During the exchange, Ackermann presented herself 
as a “city liberal,” “populist,” and “bread and butter Democrat. ”101  In order to gain the 
much needed support of urban voters she pejoratively called the governor a “suburban 
liberal,” evidenced by his cutting services to the neediest while raising taxes. During his 
responses, Dukakis stressed his role in leading the state’s economic recovery and offered 
an optimistic appraisal of the state’s current fiscal climate. King used the opportunity to 
advance his socially conservative agenda, reducing his stance to support for “a 
proposition 13 for Massachusetts,” “capital punishment,”  “mandatory jail sentences for 
those who break and enter our homes in the nighttime,” and as “unalterably opposed to 
taxpayer funds” for abortion. 102 These statements demonstrated the clear contrast 
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between the governor’s technocratic efforts to elaborate on nuances of his fiscal policy 
and King’s simple and declarative style.  
Two weeks later King defeated Dukakis in one of the biggest upsets in 
Massachusetts political history. King received 51 percent of the vote, to Dukakis’s 42 
percent. Ackermann came in third with 7 percent of the vote. The results offered a lesson 
not just to Dukakis, but also for other Democratic politicians in the Bay State and the 
nation. The Boston Globe stated that the upset should send flare signs to Dukakis’s 
“spiritual cousin” and fellow “no-nonsense manager” Jimmy Carter that his chances for 
reelection were equally tenuous.103 Observers saw the primary as both a bellwether and 
reflection of the national political sentiment. Pollster Patrick Caddell observed that the 
vote showed “the level of frustration of the electorate” in the “high-tax” Northeast. In 
Caddell’s analysis, support for an anti-tax, anti-government candidates constituted “a 
safety valve” that allowed them to express frustration about a range of issues.104 Exit poll 
interviews supported this interpretation. North End nurse Theresa Flynn spoke for many 
Massachusetts residents when she said Dukakis “didn’t do enough for the little man. I can 
see why the state is called Taxachusetts.”105 One King aide proudly stated of the 
campaign’s victorious strategy:  “we put all the hate groups in one pot and let it boil.” 106 
Campaign insiders and observers also ruminated on the broader meanings of the 
results. At his concession speech, a bewildered Dukakis declared, “political scientists and 
commentators are going to be spending a lot of time” interpreting the results of the 
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race.107 Political scientist John K. White later adhered to Dukakis’s suggestion for a 
research project on the election. Using polling data, he identified education and class as 
the defining factor in the election results. White tracked a clear split between the college-
educated professionals along Route 128, who supported Dukakis’s technocratic 
management style, and less educated urban blue-collar and downscale suburban residents 
who voted for King. White also determined that Dukakis voters overwhelmingly opposed 
expansion of the highway system, the death penalty, and to a slightly lesser degree the 
adoption of large-scale tax reductions while King’s base endorsed Proposition 13 and 
strongly objected to the use of state funds for abortion.  
 Overconfidence served as another major factor in determining the outcome of the 
primary. Many critics assailed Dukakis for not devoting the proper money or energy to 
the campaign because he was sure he would win. This sense of assurance extended to his 
base as well. A number of voters had assumed Dukakis was safe and had switched their 
party affiliation in order to support popular moderate Republican Senator Edward 
Brooke, who faced a difficult battle against a conservative anti-tax, anti-busing opponent. 
An estimated 30,000 non-Republicans voted for Brooke, leading him to a comfortable 
win.108 Many of the liberals who maintained their support for the Ackermann campaign 
also operated on the assumption that Dukakis would safely win the primary. These voters 
had endorsed Ackermann less because they actually thought she could win and more to 
send a symbolic message to the governor about their frustration with his fiscally 
conservative and anti-welfare policies.  
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The primary results, therefore, offered a powerful lesson to grassroots liberals as 
well. Some voters defended their decision to go with Ackermann, saying it derived from 
Dukakis’s failure to present a progressive platform during his first term. Ken Hartnett 
explained that these voters did not support Ackermann because they wanted to see 
Dukakis lose but, rather, “just let him know he wasn’t being all a liberal governor might 
be.”109 This strategy revealed the clear imprint of the grassroots peace movement, which 
had supported long-shot third party candidates as a form of symbolic protest against the 
nation’s foreign policy agenda.  Several liberal voters, however, regretted the 
consequences of the strategy in this particular instance.  Barney Frank admitted he was a 
“little guilty” conceding, “ I guess my opposition contributed a little bit to Ed King being 
nominated. Had I known, I would have voted for him (Dukakis).110 The primary results 
also created fissures among liberals who had supported Dukakis and those who had 
broken ranks.111 Alice Piece of Lexington, for example, announced her resignation from 
CPPAX due to the fact that it had “spent the last three and one half years attacking Gov. 
Dukakis thus contributing to his defeat. ”112  Journalist Alan Lupo explained he could not 
“Dump the Duke” when he saw King as the alternative. Lupo wrote a column that 
constituted an open letter to “Jerry Grossman and my fellow liberals” admonishing them 
for their overconfidence and stating that the primary outcome offered a clear indication 
that “the state is not as liberal as you think.”113  
The general election further upset the traditional categories and assumptions of 
Massachusetts politics. King faced Francis W. Hatch, a state senator from the North 
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Shore who embodied a similar tradition of liberal Republicanism as Francis Sargent. 
Suburban liberal groups and individuals set out to prove that King’s victory had not 
signified the demise of their form of grassroots-based political activism. CPPAX led 
“Democrats for Hatch,” deploying the grassroots network it had cultivated working for a 
series of liberal candidates since the early 1960s. The CPPAX central office produced 
hundreds of fact sheets and poll cards that its members distributed when they canvassed 
their local neighborhoods in support of Hatch.114 Several other liberals and social welfare 
activists joined in this effort, focusing more on their opposition to King than their support 
for Hatch. These groups warned if King won, “Massachusetts will move in a very 
conservative direction and the results will be disastrous for working and poor people.”115  
In the general election, King’s focus on tax reform overshadowed his stance to cut 
social services and undermine other traditional liberal causes.116 The visit of Howard 
Jarvis to Massachusetts during the campaign enhanced King’s image as a leader of the 
national tax revolt and helped him solidify the votes of fiscally conservative Republicans, 
moderate middle-class homeowners, and the blue collar urban dwellers who had 
supported him in primary. The “father of Proposition 13” threw his support behind 
King’s tax plan in a television advertisement in which he declared, “If Ed King cannot do 
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it in Massachusetts, my name is not Howard Jarvis.”117 During the fall, Jarvis spoke to a 
crowd of 700 at Newton North High School where his populist rhetoric further enlivened 
the resentment of many Bay State homeowners.  “I never thought I’d find a state where 
property taxes are worse than California,”Jarvis told the crowd, “but I have and you are 
here.”118  Alluding to the state’s role in the American Revolution, Jarvis said that the 
refusal of Massachusetts officials to limit government put the state on the road “to slavery 
and tyranny and a dictatorship.”119  This endorsement of Jarvis coupled with his 
enticement of many Republican voters helped King narrowly defeat Hatch by 6 
percentage points.  
The election results sent conflicting messages about political realignment in 
Massachusetts and the nation. The election illuminated both the fact that in 
Massachusetts party affiliation did not adhere to a coherent ideology, and that the two 
categories of liberalism and conservatism had become increasingly muddled. 120  Many 
observers insisted King’s success signaled the demise of liberalism and the beginning of 
a new Democratic coalition in Massachusetts of urban blue-collar voters and the residents 
of smaller towns in the center of the state who shared a commitment to fiscal restraint and 
social conservatism.121 Leading grassroots liberal activist Jerome Grossman repeatedly 
countered this interpretation, insisting that it was not that the state or Democratic Party 
had become more conservative but that “the liberals just stayed at home.” 122 His 
comment reflected an understanding that suburban liberals often remained largely 
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apathetic without a candidate or issue to get excited about or a powerful grassroots 
campaign to mobilize them into action.  
King’s victory more accurately revealed the split between the two sides of the 
Democratic Party, which one observer reduced to “the older pork-chop, brass-collar” 
constituency and liberals who were “suburban and privileged, anti-growth pro-abortion, 
anti-highway and environmentalist.” 123 Political columnist David B. Wilson interpreted 
King’s success over Dukakis as the  “counter-revolution” of the blue-collar workforce 
against the  “technocratic ‘New Class’ of which Dukakis, on the state level, is the most 
conspicuous example.”124 Dukakis himself cautioned against reading the vote through 
this version of the backlash thesis. Around the time of his defeat, he insisted that although 
the older industrial workforce had perhaps shaped the outcome of this particular election, 
the future of the state Democratic Party would be “more of a liberal, New Frontier post-
Kennedy generation than they will be out of Ed King’s philosophical tree.”125 The 1978 
election ultimately did not mark the end of Michael Dukakis’s political career, which 
demonstrates the persistency of his brand of liberalism and this suburban-centered 
constituency of Democratic voters. However, the 1978 Democratic primary established a 
template for how to discredit and defeat Dukakis that his Republican opponent George 
H.W. Bush would borrow in the presidential election ten years later.  
 
 
A New Era 
 
The 1978 election initiated a struggle over taxes that would have far-reaching 
consequences both in the Commonwealth and the nation. Edward King’s tenure as 
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governor upheld the nightmarish predictions of liberal activists as he set out to reverse 
many of the progressive gains of the previous decade. During his four years in office, 
King implemented the socially conservative, pro-business, low-tax agenda upon which he 
campaigned. He ushered in the most restrictive abortion laws in the country and ended 
the tenure of the Dukakis-appointed members of the Governor’s Commission on the 
Status of Women, replaced them with appointees who shared his pro-life politics. He 
embraced Dukakis’s idea of workfare but suggested a far hasher and more expansive 
version that included female welfare recipients as well as men. King also defied 
transportation and environmental policy that dated back to the Sargent Administration by 
advocating for increased highway construction.126  
Reducing the property tax burden, however, emerged as the central focus of the 
King administration. In his inaugural address, he announced his intention to “take state 
government out of their lives and burdensome taxes off their backs.”127 He aimed to 
fulfill his promise of a $500 million cut with a bill that would impose a freeze on all city 
and town budgets and keep tax rates at the present levels for two years.128 This “zero 
percent tax cap” drew fierce opposition from municipal officials and unions who declared 
that it would bring a loss of local autonomy and public sector jobs. Opinion polls 
revealed that a majority of residents supported the caps in theory but not if meant a 
reduction in local government services they valued such as police and fire protection and 
quality education.129 Liberal and progressive organizations like CPPAX and their 
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political allies also strongly opposed the tax cap.130 Instead, CPPAX endorsed the 
proposal of the progressive organization Massachusetts Fair Share for a “taxbraker” that 
would cut property taxes up to 20 percent and replace the revenue with new fees on 
professional transactions such as stock transfers and accounting and legal services that 
would largely affect affluent citizens. 131 
Despite this vocal dissent, King’s tax cap proposal received significant praise and 
support from the Massachusetts High Technology Council (MHTC). A consortium of 
firms largely along Route 128, the Council formed in 1977 in order to increase the 
industry’s political clout in the state. By 1979, the MHTC included the CEOs of 89 firms 
that employed over 140,000 people worldwide. The Council argued that high property 
taxes put Bay State companies at a disadvantage when bidding with out-state-
corporations for engineers and other qualified employees. “We offer a guy a job and the 
first thing you hear is taxes,” bemoaned Herbert Roth, the president of a Waltham-based 
electronics company.132  Massachusetts had the nation’s third highest per capita income, 
but executives alleged that since state and local taxes took an average of 17.8 percent of 
personal income, it made it much less attractive to white-collar employees than Sunbelt 
states like North Carolina, which boasted a far lower percentage.133 One industry expert 
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explained,  “the electrical engineer is the linchpin of these industries and they have to go 
where the engineers want to live.”134  
While MHTC had distrusted Dukakis, it found King to be sympathetic to their 
concerns.135 The day before King announced his tax cap proposal he signed a deal with 
the MHTC called the “Social Contract” establishing that the member firms would help 
create 150,000 new jobs in Massachusetts in exchange for the Governor’s reduction of 
property and income taxes.136 This document articulated the basic notion of supply-side 
economics circulating widely during the period. Providing a local version of the “Laffer 
Curve,” the Social Contract contended, “if tax rates are reduced, jobs and hence tax 
revenues in Massachusetts will over time have greater financial resources to address its 
social problems and public responsibilities.”137  With King’s promise secured, the MHTC 
mobilized to lobby state legislators in support of King’s tax cap, welfare cuts, and in 
opposition to the taxbraker plan.138  
The members of the state legislature eventually rejected both King’s plan and Fair 
Share’s taxbraker and submitted an alternative proposal of a 4 percent ceiling on tax 
increase.139 After a drawn-out battle, King gave up an absolute freeze on local property 
tax increases and agreed to sign the 4 percent version, calling the compromise in a 
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televised address “a giant stride forward in the effort to lower property taxes.”140 
However, the plan only provided $166 million in relief, excluded school budgets, allowed 
for local overrides, and offered no guarantee that money would be used to reduce the 
property tax bills of individual homeowners. The solution angered organizations like the 
Citizens for Limited Taxation, which called the plan “a paper tiger” and announced plans 
to renew the campaign to put “Proposition 2 1/2” on the 1980 ballot. 141 
This debate over fiscal policy coupled with the results of the 1978 governor’s race 
revealed that the Massachusetts’ electorate political and ideological affiliations remained 
unsettled. Many political observers believed that in the 1980 election the state’s voting 
pattern would closely reflect “the nation as a whole,” rather than stand apart from the rest 
of the country as Massachusetts did in 1972.142 Thus, the presidential candidates from 
both parties took the race in Massachusetts seriously. While some assumed the contest 
would confirm the state’s embrace of conservative politics, many longtime Democratic 
activists remained more optimistic. Strategist John Mantilla firmly believed that 
pendulum would swing in the other direction and “liberal momentum will accelerate.” 
Likewise McGovern campaign veteran Richard Stearns confidently guaranteed, 
“Massachusetts is still essentially a liberal state.”143 
 
Proposition 2 1/2 
The debate over property tax reform embodied by the ballot initiative Proposition 
2 ½, however, overshadowed the 1980 presidential race in Massachusetts. The 
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controversial measure pitted suburban and urban communities against each other and 
revealed both continuities and changes in the state’s traditional political affiliations. 
Following the passage of the compromise tax cap, CLT, with financial support from the 
MHTC, launched an extended campaign to make Proposition 2 1/2 into Question 2 on the 
1980 electoral ballot. 144 The proposed measure shared many of Proposition 13’s features, 
but 2 1/2 was in many ways more comprehensive than its predecessor because it reached 
beyond property taxes.  In addition to a 2.5 percent limit on the assessed value of 
property, it allowed tenants to deduct 50 percent of their rent from their state income tax, 
and called for a reduction on the automobile excise tax. The complex and multipart 
measure also differed from the California version by including several provisions to 
change local budget procedures.145  
Local officials spoke out forcefully against the measure, reiterating warnings 
about the devastating effects of such a proposal on the ability to adequately manage 
municipal government.146 People on all sides agreed that these cuts would have the 
greatest impact on populous, low-income urban areas that demanded more municipal 
services. Robert Coard, executive director of a Boston anti-poverty agency, stated that the 
bill would have “a catastrophic effect on the budgets of the older, poor cities and towns.” 
He succinctly predicted, “Wealthy suburban communities will be minimally affected. 
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Urban areas will be devastated.”147 However, officials from many affluent suburbs 
provided an alternative prediction, issuing sober assessments about the layoffs of 
employees and the decline of municipal services. For instance, Newton estimated that in 
order to comply with the law it would have to let go a large number of firefighters, police 
officers, teachers, close two schools, and eliminate athletics, music, and art from the 
school curriculum.148 State officials and politicians chimed in, calling Proposition 2 1/2 
“irresponsible” and potentially “disastrous.”149  Even Governor King declared he was not 
in favor of the referendum because he worried the loss of revenue would not be 
recouped.150 
These cries and warnings from state and local bureaucrats helped proponents of 
the measure fashion a populist-laden campaign as the underdogs trying to take on the 
powerful Massachusetts government. This effort fused the money and clout of the MHTC 
with the grassroots mobilization skills and energy of the CLT. The high-tech executives 
affiliated with the MHTC recognized the measure as a means to both attract more highly-
skilled workers to the state and reduce corporate property taxes. The consortium, 
therefore, donated over $240,000 to finance the CLT’s campaign in favor of the initiative. 
The organizers recognized that it would have more success by deemphasizing the benefits 
for business and industry and instead presenting the measure strictly in terms of 
homeowner and taxpayer relief. In order to further this image and argument, the CLT 
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depicted itself as a “low-budget,” “grassroots” organization, which operated out of a 
small office run by volunteers.151  
 The public face of the campaign became CLT executive director Barbara 
Anderson, a Marblehead housewife turned anti-tax crusader. 152 While many suburban 
women became politically active after reading Betty Friedan, Ayn Rand served as the 
catalyst for Anderson’s awakening.153 She launched her political career canvassing her 
suburban neighborhood for Barry Goldwater in 1964. Over the course of the 1970s, 
Anderson became especially outraged at the proposal for a state graduated income tax, 
which she believed amounted to the “harder you work, the more they steal from you.”  In 
1978, she decided to switch her hobby from teaching swimming at a local pool to 
volunteering at CLT. She had ascended to the post as executive director in 1980 just in 
time to lead the fight for the ballot initiative and to earn the gendered reputation as the 
“Mother of Proposition 2 ½.” Anderson’s image as a suburban mom helped her and the 
anti-tax movement appear more homeowner-driven. “The way I see it, she’s a housewife 
who raised a family and woke up one morning just fed up with what’s going on,” one 
erstwhile supporter later declared.154  
Throughout this campaign, Anderson and the CLT adopted the populist 
arguments about homeowner and taxpayer rights that Howard Jarvis and his allies had 
used in California. While tax revolters across the country had appropriated the symbolism 
of the Boston Tea Party and the American Revolution, this imagery took on particularly 
                                                
151 Walter V. Robinson, “Prop 2 ½,” Boston Globe, November 5, 1980. 
152 Anderson has subsequently tried to counter accusations that she is merely a “populist front” for the 
political agenda of the high-tech industry calling her relationship with MHTC “symbiotic.” See, Renee 
Loth, “For Tax Opponent, Same War, New Front,” Boston Globe, July 23, 1989.  
153 Renee Loth, “For Tax Opponent, Same War, New Front,” Boston Globe, July 23, 1989.  
154 Nathan Cobb, “Barbara Anderson’s Time Has Come,” Boston Globe, January 14, 1990. 
 
657 
powerful meaning in the so-called “cradle of liberty.”  In one flyer, the CLT depicted an 
illustration of a Minuteman holding a musket in one-hand and in the other a placard 
declaring, “Vote for Prop 2 ½.155 In this literature, the CLT embraced a language of 
taxpayer victimization, stating that “homeowners need protection,” particularly against 
the “special interest groups that pressured local official to increase expenditures,” costly 
school budgets, and the unrealistic mandates of the state legislature. CLT representatives 
frequently asked citizens at presentations, “Are we so dumb we have to pay more than 
average states for our government?”156   In order to deflect the dire prediction of local 
officials about such a rollback of services, the CLT used the example of California where 
none of these predictions had occurred. Anderson later explained “the big argument we 
used was ‘California did it and they didn’t fall into the ocean.”157 Yet as opponents 
repeatedly pointed out, California was able to rely on a $5 billion surplus in the short 
term, while Massachusetts sat on the brink of bankruptcy.  
Through MHTC-funded media advertisements and aggressive grassroots 
organizing, the CLT managed to raise widespread support for Proposition 2 1/2 in a 
matter of months. Mirroring attitudes about the tax caps, polls showed that Bay State 
residents supported the measure primarily because they believed that taxes were “too 
high” and not because they wanted fewer services or a smaller state government.158 
Likewise, polls revealed that while the majority of Bay State voters endorsed the 
proposition they remained confused exactly as to its purpose and consequences.159 The 
CLT directly capitalized on this confusion and the general desire for tax reform. The 
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organization somewhat deceptively emphasized that Proposition 2 1/2 offered the last 
chance voters would have to alter the tax system. Sam Robbins warned Newton residents, 
“If Prop 2 ½ doesn’t pass, you are sending a message to the state legislature to tax and 
spend us into oblivion.”160 Many citizens recognized flaws in it, but believed that it 
would provide a catalyst for tax reform. Newton resident Arthur Adelman deemed the 
initiative “the lifetime chance for us taxpayers to assert ourselves.”161 These arguments 
convinced Globe columnist Ian Menzies, who suggested the measure offered a means to 
initiate much needed tax reform and coaxed, “you can vote for Proposition 2 ½ and still 
be a liberal.”162  
Many liberals did not agree with that Menzies’s characterization, and by spring 
they organized a broad-based coalition the Stop 2 1/2 Committee, to oppose the measure. 
Its leaders stressed that they supported the necessity for tax reform but not schemes that 
would reduce essential services, and increase or exacerbate the pervasive problem of 
metropolitan inequity.  The Stop 2 1/2 Committee encompassed constituencies that 
transcended spatial and social boundaries, including public sector unions, school 
superintendents, progressive groups like ACORN and Fair Share and liberal suburban-
based organizations such as the Massachusetts Council of Churches, the League of 
Women Voters, CPPAX and the ADA.  The League, which had a longstanding 
commitment to fiscal reform, became a particularly important component of this effort 
deploying its suburban-based infrastructure, knowledge about taxation, and image of 
                                                
160 Jonathan Robbins, “2 ½: A Disaster Either Way?” Newton Graphic, October 23, 1980.    
161 Arnold Adelman to the Editor, Newton Graphic, October 23, 1980.  
162 Ian Menzies, “Yes, You Can Vote for Proposition 2 ½ and Still Call Yourself a Liberal,” Boston Globe, 




respectability to oppose the ballot question. 163 The members of the League helped 
establish local Stop 2 1/2 chapters in their own communities compromised of municipal 
employees, and they educated various constituencies about the measure and urged them 
to vote against it.   
 
Proposition 2 1/2 and the Suburbs  
 The Route 128 suburbs served as a major battleground over Proposition 2 1/2. 
During the lead up to the election, bumper stickers in support of and against the initiative 
engaged in a symbolic battle throughout metropolitan Boston, illuminating many of the 
broader tensions encompassed by the issue of tax limitation.164 The League of Women 
Voters stood at the forefront of the suburban opposition to the measure, and their efforts 
highlighted the persistence of progressive ideas circulating within these communities. 
The League long suggested that the current system of property taxation directly 
contributed to the problem of exclusionary or “snob zoning” because it provided an 
incentive for municipalities to encourage policies of high-income and low density 
housing as a means to provide better services to a smaller population. The League 
believed that Proposition 2 1/2 would increase this problem by allowing suburban 
municipalities to use the measure as a justification to avoid building subsidized housing 
or the construction of a multi-family dwellings on the grounds that it would cause a 
further burden to local services.165 The League continued to emphasize that the solution 
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to these interlaced problems lay in the state government taking more responsibility for 
social services funding and ensuring the implementation of laws aimed at reducing 
economic, racial, and spatial inequality.  
In contrast to the League of Women Voters, the Lexington Tax Policy Committee 
best embodied another strand of suburban liberalism rooted in notions of consumer 
privilege. The committee aimed to engender opposition to 2 1/2 by appealing to the  
individualist sensibilities of affluent suburban residents. The members warned that 
because the state lacked the budget surplus of California, Massachusetts would have to 
levy new taxes, which would have a disproportionate impact on affluent suburbs.  Thus, 
the Committee suggested that voting against the measure provided a means to prevent 
both higher income taxes and assuming the burden for supporting declining cities.166 
Several opponents of 2 1/2 placed their stance in terms of taxpayer self-interest stating, in 
the words of one Arlington resident, “I just think if you remove taxes one place you’re 
going to get them somewhere else.” Wilmington resident Tom Hanley also believed that 
the proposal would “cost us more money in the long run.” 167 
 These opponents demonstrated the centrality of education in shaping both the 
political culture of the suburbs and individual sensibilities of its residents. The president 
of the Newton Council of Parent Teacher Associations Bonnie Armor also used 
consumerist terms to stress that opposing 2 1/2 would “preserve the educational system 
which has made Newton a desirable place to live.”168  Lexington Superintendent John 
Lawson also stirred parental anxiety by warning that 2 1/2  “would create a lower than 
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average school system for an above average student population,” which he dubbed “a 
tragedy.” 169 While these efforts clearly persuaded many residents, particularly those with 
school-aged children, it failed to convince another faction of suburban homeowners who 
believed the school system exhausted the local budget and that individual parents, not all 
taxpayers, should finance such “special” services as violin, tennis and extra reading 
instruction.170 These 2 1/2 proponents suggested that eliminating the fiscal autonomy of 
local school committees would not create a decline in the quality of local education but 
would provide local taxpayers with the ability to exercise more control over this major 
portion of most town budgets. For instance, John Powell of Lexington stated simply, “I’m 
for it taxes are too high and I want to reduce taxes.” 171  
The election results ultimately became less close than the debate in the suburbs 
indicated.  Proposition 2 1/2 won by a 59-to 41-percent margin, achieving its greatest 
success in the state’s middle-class suburban communities and urban districts where 
homeowners felt most squeezed by property taxes.172 The margin of victory was far 
narrower in affluent Route 128 communities like Concord and Sudbury. In Lexington it 
passed by a margin of fewer than 400 votes.173 The measure failed to pass by a similarly 
narrow margin in other suburban liberal strongholds such as Brookline, Lincoln and 
Newton. These narrow results came in the face of a great deal of outreach in those areas 
by the League and the Stop 2 1/2 committees and thus underscored the limits of 
                                                
169 Mary Prince, “Panel Pans Prop. 2 ½,” Lexington Minute-Man, September 25, 1980.  
170 League of Women Voters of Massachusetts,  “Questions-We’ve Been Asked—And Answers,” 
September 23, 1980, Box 9, Folder 383, Olver.  
171 Jeltsch, “How Will Lexington Vote on Proposition 2 ½.” 
172 Adams, Secrets of the Tax Revolt, 328.  
173 Robert L. Turner, “The Haves’ Were Winners,” Boston Globe, November 11, 1980; “City/Town Vote 
for President, Proposition 2 ½,” Boston Globe, November 6, 1980.  
 
662 
grassroots liberal activists to challenge the dominant moderate and fiscally conservative 
sensibility of suburban political culture.  
 The members of the CLT and MHTC interpreted the election results as the clear 
demand by the public for both property tax relief and a reduction in the scale of 
government.174 Barbara Anderson believed that the dire warnings of opponents to the 
measure had actually worked against them. “We supporters were pushing the joy of sex. 
And the opponents were trying to sell the fear of pregnancy. Once the average voter 
learned about birth control, the election was never in doubt. ”175 Though it usually 
focused more on tax rates than sex, the populist rhetoric of Anderson and her 
organization clearly had a major influence on the success of the proposition as well, 
Virginia Brings, a Marblehead mother of six, who had gone canvassing in support of the 
referedum in her suburban community, declared, “Finally we’re saying we’ve had 
enough. The little guy, the housewife…have got to feel tremendous. They’ve gotten their 
point across.”176  
Proposition 2 1/2 conflated political and economic concerns, as the corresponding 
results of the 1980 Presidential election brought into sharp relief.  A pollster observed 
“Proposition 2 1/2 was about politics as much as it was about taxes.” Barbara Anderson 
agreed. “People didn’t vote for it because of the money,” she stated. “They voted for it 
because of the attitude.”177  However, Globe political writer Robert Turner had a different 
assessment, stating,  “Massachusetts voted with its pocketbook” on both Question 2 and 
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the presidential race.  The narrow success of Ronald Reagan in the state upheld both 
variations of this argument. Reagan’s assurance of reducing federal taxes and the size of 
the government enticed voters in the same ways they welcomed the cuts in auto excise 
and property taxes promised by 2 1/2. Reagan achieved his largest victories in the 
middle-class suburbs of the North and South Shores such as Lynnfield, Medfield and 
Anderson’s hometown of Marblehead, cohering with national voting patterns.178 
Throughout the country Reagan did best among families with an income of $50,000 or 
more a year.179 Moreover, many of the urban precincts in Boston that favored Proposition 
2 1/2 did not extend their support to Reagan. Many white working-class urban voters 
responded to Carter’s effort to cultivate this constituency, and he received almost the 
same number of votes in Boston as had Proposition 2 1/2.180 
The lack of enthusiasm for Carter from liberal activists did affect the results in the 
Bay State. John Anderson, who by the fall was running as an Independent, centered his 
campaign strategy on galvanizing committed liberals to break rank with the Democratic 
Party. After Edward Kennedy had lost the Democratic nomination to Carter, Anderson 
set out to convince suburban liberal activists in groups like CPPAX and the ADA to shift 
their support to him. Anderson did end up winning 15 percent of the Massachusetts 
electorate, significantly greater than his national showing, but his support came primarily 
from independent voters in the affluent and traditionally progressive suburbs such as 
Lexington rather than from committed activists. The lack of defections away from Carter 
from this constituency stemmed largely from a dislike of Reagan. Jerome Grossman 
explained, “A vote for Anderson is a vote for Reagan. Make no mistake, the prospect of a 
                                                
178 Turner, “The Haves’ Were Winners,” Boston Globe, November 11, 1980.  
179 Turner, “The Haves’ Were Winners.” 
180 Al Larkin, “Charlestown: Choices Based on Fear, ”Boston Globe, November 5, 1980.  
 
664 
Reagan presidency is the only reason I’m in the Carter camp.”181 This statement revealed 
that Grossman and other liberal activists had clearly taken the lessons of the 1978 
governor’s race to heart and were no longer willing to use elections as means to launch 
symbolic challenges to Democratic candidates.  Grossman and other activists, 
nevertheless, had refused to actively campaign or raise money for Carter with whose 
economic and social policies they openly disagreed. Grossman articulated the sentiment 
of many liberal voters stating,  “I’m not going to dance at Jimmy Carter’s wedding, but 
I’ll be present. That’s all.”182 This lukewarm position clearly contributed to Carter’s poor 
showing in the state.   
While many observers used the election results in Massachusetts as another 
opportunity to determine a time of death for liberalism, these suburban-based activists 
aimed to find places of optimism. Though clearly disappointed and worried about the 
success of Reagan and Proposition 2 1/2 in Massachusetts, committed activists warded 
off the claims that the “New Right” had assumed control of the state. These leaders found 
hope in the election of Barney Frank to Congress in the district that encompassed 
Brookline and Newton, the victory of several liberal state legislators, and passage of 
ballot initiatives approving a moratorium on nuclear power plants and cuts to the military 
budget. Despite these hints of a progressive resurgence, the presidency of Reagan and 
implementation of Proposition 2 1/2 continued to spell uncertainty for the future of both 
liberal activists and the economic and political climate of Massachusetts. 
 
 
                                                
181 Anne Beaton, “Liberals Stay on the Sidelines,” Boston Herald American, September 6, 1980.  




The process of implementing Proposition 2 1/2 proved both difficult and 
controversial. Coinciding with the beginning of the “Reagan Revolution,” Massachusetts 
became, in the words of conservative columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak,  “a 
laboratory of supply-side economic theory.”183 The national embrace of supply-side 
economics compounded the anxiety of state and local officials who feared that the 
projected lack of financial assistance from the Reagan Administration would make the 
impact of 2 1/2 even more severe. Local officials and state legislators struggled with how 
to address significant losses of revenue and federal funds.184 The officials in several 
suburbs reiterated predictions that implementation would necessitate drastic cuts in 
municipal services, especially education.185 These warnings produced panic in cities and 
suburbs across the state. Many residents began to regret their vote, stating they had 
supported trimming administrative excess, not necessary services, and they implored the 
state legislature to compensate the loss in revenue.186 Even the MHTC suggested the state 
government should provide aid in order to offset the loss in necessary services. 187 The 
Massachusetts legislature did approve such a measure, which provided some relief to 
municipalities, but it did not permanently assuage the anxiety of residents and budget 
choices of local officials.  
The decision of many Massachusetts residents to take their children out of the 
public school system reveals the unexpected ways Proposition 2 1/2 heightened both 
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racial and economic segregation and a sense of middle-class suburban individualism. The 
passage of the law boosted private school enrollments influenced already by the busing 
crisis as well as general dissatisfaction with public schools. In the weeks immediately 
following the 1980 election, Boston area private and parochial schools received a flood of 
inquiries primarily from upper-middle class parents in places like Boston, Cambridge and 
the Route 128 suburbs. Bucolic named private schools such as Beaver Country Day 
School in Chestnut Hill, Shady Hill School in Cambridge, and Derby Academy in 
Hingham all reported a record number of new applications.188 Reflecting the attitude of 
many middle-class residents, Laurence Auros pleaded with his state legislator to pass 
additional local budget financing, declaring that if such an increase failed he would “be 
forced to send my child to a private school” which would be a “financial burden” but he 
could not deprive his daughter “a good sound education.”189  The Cambridge school 
superintendent empathized with people like Auros, insisting, “You can’t blame parents 
for considering the private sector especially when I’m forced to make massive cuts in 
aesthetic subject areas.”190  
These individual decisions had startling implications for the racial and class 
composition of schools throughout metropolitan Boston. Harvard education professor 
Stephen Bailey surmised that the process promised to “re-establish a blatant class system 
where the wealthy and the middle class buy their way out and pay just enough taxes to 
keep squalid schools going in slums” and would ensure that “the kids will no longer have 
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a sense of community.” 191 The Boston Globe called this pattern of departure the “single 
most chilling result” of Proposition 2 1/2 and warned that this trend would not only 
remove many of the brightest and most dedicated students, but also their parents who 
often played a crucial role in lobbying for quality public education. The newspaper 
suggested that this loss of bright students and motivated parents would cause the most 
harm to students who did not have the aptitude or resources to enroll in one of the area’s 
exclusive private schools.192 Public school enrollment, nevertheless, reflected just one 
small way that Proposition 2 1/2 exacerbated racial and economic inequality in 
metropolitan Boston.  
The impact of Proposition 2 1/2 magnified the hierarchical geography of 
socioeconomic privilege in Massachusetts. During its first year of implementation, 2 1/2 
led to a $311 million reduction in property taxes statewide, but the Revenue Department 
noted it “had “extremely diverse” impact on communities commensurate with existing 
patterns of wealth and privilege.193 Affluent suburbs Lexington, Carlisle, Dover, Weston 
and Wellesley, therefore, endured hardships such as fewer library hours and book 
purchases, freezes on street light acquisition, and less frequent trash collection.194 More 
solidly middle-class communities did impose some layoffs and fell behind on routine 
road repair, but also avoided serious and damaging changes. Proposition 2 1/2 had its 
greatest impact on lower middle-class, working class, and low-income urban areas. In the 
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years after the law first passed, Boston and Somerville made sharp cuts to police and fire 
service and Cambridge had to dismiss one of four teachers. The city of Quincy laidoff  
294 teachers, half of them at the high school level, reduced non-academic courses such as 
shop and gym, and completely eliminated drama.195 State assistance did not reduce but 
actually increased this pattern of inequality. For instance even though the state provided 
Cambridge $17.2 million in aid and Wayland $2.7 million, these supplements equaled 
117 percent of Wayland’s revenue loss and 12 percent that of Cambridge.196 
The override provision contained in Proposition 2 1/2 also inadvertently 
contributed to this pattern of spatial inequality. In the weeks after the 1980 election, the 
town of Brookline led the fight to allow municipalities to avoid full compliance with the 
measure. Juan Cofield the leader of this campaign stated, “Many people moved to 
Brookline for its high level of services and want to maintain that standard.” 197 This 
action led to the legislature to modify the law to enable the voters of a city or town to 
approve an override to Proposition 2 1/2 through an election.198  Since 1980, only a few 
communities other than Brookline have implemented general or permanent overrides of 
Proposition 2 1/2, but many municipalities have used temporary measures to finance the 
construction of new schools, fire stations, recreation facilities, the purchase of 
                                                
195 Jerome Rubin, “Quincy Schools Take a Big Cut” in Proposition 2 ½: Its Impact on Massachusetts, 209-
210.  
196Susskind and Horan, “Understanding How and Why the Most Drastic Cuts Were Avoided,” 268-269; 
Jerome Rothenberg and Paul Smoke, “The Pattern of Differential Impacts” in Proposition 2 ½: Its Impact 
on Massachusetts, 494. 
197 Town of Brookline, “Brookline to Debate Proposition 2 ½ at Town Meeting Wednesday,”1980, Box 3, 
Folder 102, Backman.  
198 Patricia Nealon, “Attempt to Override Prop 2 1/2 Reach New Heights,” Boston Globe, April 2, 1989. 
Anderson and the CLT supported the process because it served “as a constant reminder to people in local 
government to be very nice to their constituents because they may have to ask them for an override.” 
 
669 
conservation land or an increase in education funding. These proposals have created a 
great deal of controversy and strife in many towns.199 
 The debates often pitted residents along the same class and political lines as the 
initial proposition with town officials and affluent suburban liberals supporting the 
overrides and more solidly middle-class homeowners and the elderly opposing them. This 
override process has also proven an easier device to invoke in smaller communities and 
virtually impossible in larger municipalities with no budget surplus or few residents 
willing to spend money on items such as a new school building or conservation land. 
Thus, the provision has had the unintended consequence of enhancing the difference in 
municipal services and privileges of smaller suburbs and larger cities. Scholars have 
concluded that Proposition 2 1/2 had “neither its costs nor its benefits have been as great 
as predicted.”200 This assessment suggests the ways in which Bay State residents and 
officials have learned to adjust to the law and the forms of metropolitan inequity it 
contains. Learning to deal with Proposition 2 1/2, nevertheless, did not mean that 
Massachusetts embraced the Reagan’s Revolution’s economic ideals.201 As the 1982 race 
for Governor revealed, the state’s political culture remained very much up for grabs.  
 
Rematch  
Over the course of his first term, the public had grown increasingly dissatisfied 
with Ed King. Despite his strong anti-tax stance, King had not managed to use 
Proposition 2 1/2 to his political advantage, and many residents blamed him for the 
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uncertainty surrounding the implementation of the measure. His positions on welfare and 
the economy had earned him the reputation as Reagan’s “favorite governor” and “favorite 
Democrat.”202 King had proudly embraced that label disillusioning the state’s Democratic 
loyalists. A series of scandals and charges of corruption involving the members of his 
administration contributed to this questioning of his leadership. Likewise, the revelation 
of the hefty personal expenses he charged to the state, particularly his affection for 
lobster, contradicted his 1978 campaign promises to save taxpayer dollars and damaged 
his approval ratings further.203  
With the many negative factors against King mounting, Michael Dukakis realized 
that he had a chance for a comeback and therefore launched a campaign to retake the 
governorship. The 1982 Democratic Primary for Massachusetts governor, therefore, 
consisted of the same main candidates only with the roles of incumbent and challenger 
reversed. The campaign that Dukakis developed showed that he had taken the lessons of 
his 1978 defeat to heart. He spent the time out of office teaching at Harvard’s Kennedy 
School of Government, where he studied his own mistakes and those of King. In direct 
response to the King’s administration’s scandals and corruption charges, Dukakis made 
the suburban good-government issues of competence and integrity the overriding themes 
of his campaign.204  He focused on projecting this image without the self-righteousness 
that had plagued him throughout his first term. Dukakis and his advisors also aimed to 
avoid the mistake of too much overconfidence and complacency that had contributed to 
his defeat in 1978. He decided to develop a wide and effective network of grassroots 
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campaign volunteers with the hopes of gaining the energy and votes of the “suburban 
liberal wing of the Democratic party.” 205 
Liberal activists had also learned from the lessons of the 1978 election and the 
subsequent four years. The members of CPPAX and the ADA decided to join together to 
unite behind a single candidate rather than risk a “divided liberal vote” again in the 
Democratic primary.206 The leaders of the groups organized the Cooperative 
Endorsement Convention for Governor, modeled on the caucus its forerunners had staged 
at the outset of the 1972 presidential race.  Dukakis appeared before the 300-person 
crowd and spoke with a sense of humility absent during his previous two campaigns. 
When a member questioned him about the cuts to social services that had alienated him 
from liberal activists, he called the decision “one of the most agonizing experiences of 
my life” and admitted,  “I probably could have handled some of the problems more 
sensitively.” 207 The convention voted overwhelmingly to endorse the former governor; a 
demonstrating that he had regained the trust of the state’s liberal community.208 
The 1982 primary, like the one four years earlier, highlighted the divisions 
between the two sides of the Democratic Party, with lower and middle-income white 
ethnics concentrated in the older cities on one side and suburban liberal professionals 
employed in the service industry on the other.209 The King campaign strategy focused on 
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intensifying this cleavage in order to appeal to the blue-collar white voters that the press 
had tagged “Reagan Democrats.”210 Relying on anti-liberal stereotypes, a King aide 
called the contest the difference between the “Chablis-and-brie-crowd and Joe Six Pack,” 
a particularly bold statement given King’s own corporate backers and expensive eating 
habits.211  King revived the platform of his first campaign emphasizing the issues of 
capital punishment, mandatory sentencing, abortion, drunk driving and fear of taxes. He 
also aimed to discredit Dukakis as the prototypical ineffectual liberal.212 King spent $2 
million dollars on television, radio and print advertisements that criticized Dukakis both 
personally and politically as weak and unrepentant. In one TV ad, King invoked the 
gendered stereotype of the domineering wife, poking fun at Dukakis’s habit of going 
home every night at six for dinner with his family. In the ad, King rolled his eyes while 
stating, “and you know what happened when he did not get home on time.”213  
Dukakis increased his own advertisements and grassroots campaign, yet instead 
of focusing on urban ethnic voters as he had done during his previous two runs, he 
directed his message at white middle-class suburbanites whom he had come to recognize 
constituted both his base and the future of the Democratic Party. In an effort to gain the 
support of high-tech engineers and professionals, he promised to “spearhead a new era of 
investment” of state money in smaller and medium size-growth companies.214 Dukakis 
also revised his stance on tax limitation, suggesting that whether or not one supported 
Proposition 2 1/2 had become irrelevant and now the main issue was effectively 
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implementing the measure. He promised to do so by increasing state aid at the local level 
through “fair distribution formulas that take into account the varying impacts of 
Proposition 2 1/2 in different cities and towns.”215 His volunteer network supplemented 
these messages by telephoning 2.6 million registered Democrats, canvassing over 
200,000 voters, and holding placards at busy intersections across the state.  
Dukakis’s re-tooled image and strategy worked far better during this bout, and he 
won by a decisive margin of over 80,000 votes.216 In his victory speech, he stated that the 
win gave “him something one rarely gets in American politics—a second chance.”217  
Observers once again interpreted the Massachusetts gubernatorial primary as an 
important bellwether of national politics. Just as the 1978 defeat of Dukakis was 
interpreted as a message to Jimmy Carter, observers saw the results as a referendum on 
the Reagan administration.218 The vote revealed the limited support of Reagan’s socially 
and fiscal conservative rhetoric and policies in the industrialized Northeast. The victory 
also proved the vibrancy of suburban liberal voters. Dukakis experienced the greatest 
success within the suburbs around Boston, even winning Newton by more than a 6 to 1 
margin.219 CPPAX celebrated the primary results as a sign that “progressive politics is 
alive and well in the Bay State” and that suburban grassroots activists could overcome $2 
million of campaign ads.220 This momentum helped Dukakis easily win the general 
election, marking a resurgence of suburban-based liberalism both locally and nationally.  
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Massachusetts Miracle  
During his “second chance” as governor Dukakis refashioned a brand of growth 
liberal politics and Democratic leadership that culminated in his presidential bid in 1988. 
He made economic development his primary area of focus. Upon taking office, he 
became “a born-again business booster,” developing close ties with the state’s 
rebounding high-tech industry.221 Many experts have discounted Dukakis’s taking 
singular credit for the state’s high-tech boom in the mid-1980s, later called the  
“Massachusetts Miracle,” suggesting that it roots came more from the area’s dense 
concentration of universities and the increased popularity of computer, and the tax cap.222 
His policies, nevertheless, aimed to stimulate rather than thwart that growth using the tax 
limitation measure and existing infrastructure of high-tech companies, venture capitalist 
money, academic brainpower, and defense contracts to the state’s advantage. The 
Dukakis administration worked to broker deals between small high-tech companies and 
Boston based venture capitalist firms. These partnerships led to the creation of new 
software, data processing, and computer manufacturing corporations. The administration 
used tax incentives to direct start-ups like Wang computers to establish corporate 
headquarters and factories in older deindustrialized mill communities like Lowell, 
Springfield and Taunton and thereby simultaneously advanced the governor’s urban 
redevelopment policy. Lowell, which a decade earlier had one of the highest 
unemployment rates in the country, by 1983 had become “a model of high tech 
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revitalization.”223 Enhancing this economic success, Massachusetts companies managed 
to jockey Reagan’s pro-defense position, gaining a windfall of contracts from the 
Pentagon to make software and hardware for military weapons. Raytheon resurged 
through contracts to make the Patriot and Hawk air missiles, receiving $2.3 billion in 
government contracts in 1985 alone. Overall, the economic growth generated 50,000 new 
businesses and 160,000 jobs in two years. By 1985 Massachusetts had the highest 
percentage of workers in the service sector of anywhere in the country, the lowest 
unemployment rate of any industrial state, and the greatest average per capita income in 
the nation.224 
The reduction of the Massachusetts property tax burden through Proposition 2 1/2 
also contributed to the sense of economic optimism. In 1985, Dukakis announced the 
official retirement of the sobriquet “Taxachusetts” as the state’s tax rate had fallen below 
the national average. Dukakis accepted the concept of a ceiling, admitting, “there was no 
doubt that taxes were too high” in Massachusetts during the 1970s. 225 His fiscal policy 
managed to keep property tax rates low by replacing the revenue through increased state 
aid to cities and towns, which simultaneously enabled his administration to exert more 
regulatory control over local spending. He generated the money to administer this 
program through a crackdown on tax evasion. The Dukakis administration established the 
Revenue Enhancement and Protection Program (REAP) that combined a simplified form, 
amnesty for delinquent taxpayers, and tough enforcement of penalties. The program 
proved extremely successful and generated $900 million dollars in three years, which 
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amounted to a 27 percent increase in tax revenue. The program helped produce a state 
budget surplus that led Dukakis to administer a $64 million tax cut in 1986, the largest 
such reduction in state history in 1986. This action undoubtedly bolstered both his 
approval ratings and image as an effective reformer.226  
Dukakis also forged a new approach to social issues that built directly on this 
economic prosperity. His social service agenda earned national attention for the ways in 
which it fused the most popular ideas and policies of both liberalism and conservatism. 
Dukakis’s approach represented a new version of growth liberalism predicated on the 
idea that economic prosperity would lead to the eradication of social ills and poverty even 
embracing the slogan “Taxachusetts is dead. Caring is not.”227 Dukakis defined himself 
“as a full employment Democrat,” stating that “one of the principles goals of economic 
policy to provide good wages for every adult citizen in this country” and dubbing “full 
employment” “the most important human services program we have in this country.”228  
However, unlike New Deal era policies, Dukakis firmly believed that employment 
opportunity and stimulus should emerge from the private, not public, sector.  
Dukakis’s revised workfare program constituted the clearest fulfillment of that 
goal and signaled the ways in which he aimed to reshape liberal policy. During his time 
out of office, Dukakis had remained preoccupied with how to move poor people off 
welfare and into service economy jobs. “The issue of work and welfare has been often 
called the Middle East of domestic policy,” he later explained. “Everybody talks about it; 
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nobody wants to change it.”229  Upon returning to the State House, he sought to transform 
the highly unpopular workfare program of his first administration into a more effective 
and sustainable idea. In 1983, Dukakis launched the program Employment and Training 
(ET) to give recipients a wider choice of training and work opportunities in the private 
sector. Unlike earlier coercive and punitive workfare attempts, the program was 
voluntary, and provided transportation, day care, and full welfare payments. Through ET, 
participants received career counseling, training in areas such as electronics, retail and 
food services, basic education, and job placement services.230 
 In its first four years of operation, the program placed 38,000 former welfare 
recipients in entry-level private sector jobs, many of them concentrated in the state’s new 
high-technology companies and defense companies such as Wang Laboratories and 
Raytheon.  Every ET graduate earned at least $10,000 per year. 231 ET became popular 
among participants, and it had a long-waiting list of people wanting to enroll. The 
program contributed to a 9.4 percent decline in the state welfare rolls between 1983 and 
1985, the largest of any industrial state, and also reduced the Massachusetts welfare costs 
enabling the state to increase individual payments by 47 percent.232 Dukakis declared in 
August 1987 that of all his accomplishments as governor he was proudest of ET because 
it represented “what this state is all about, what our country is or should be all about.”233 
The program earned a great deal of national attention as an innovative and 
effective approach to the welfare issue. ABC News made ET and Dukakis the subject of a 
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“special report” on successful welfare programs.234  In 1987, Ted Kennedy proposed an 
incentive plan to get other states to adopt a version of the ET program, which the Senate 
unanimously passed.235 Liberal writer Robert Kuttner declared, “ET is Dukakis at his 
best,” observing that “more than program, ET is an attitude” since it combined the 
“liberal premise” that “most poor people want to better themselves” with the 
“conservative premise” that “most people ought to be working rather than living on the 
dole.” 236  Kuttner elaborated that the program further fused these two traditions by 
demonstrating “the good-government premise then an efficient, well-managed program is 
good for both recipients and taxpayers.”  
By the end of his first term, Dukakis and the state had settled squarely into the 
national spotlight. “The Massachusetts story has really become the national story,” 
Wisconsin Governor Anthony Earl declared. “ When people talk about low 
unemployment, they look to Massachusetts. When people talk about education and 
economic development, they look to Massachusetts. On issue after issue, we look to 
Massachusetts as a model for the other states.”237 No issue more clearly solidified this 
image than the state’s dramatic economic reversal. Time published an article in 1986 
deeming Massachusetts “the pacesetter for the nation’s transition to a high tech service 
oriented economy.”238 Time reporter Richard Stengel adopted a revised version of 
Massachusetts exceptionalism, stressing the inevitability that Massachusetts served as 
“the very model of the high-tech state.” Drawing a comparison to the industrial 
revolution of the nineteenth century, Stengel remarked that in the 1980s, the state’s 
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economy appeared once again “ahead of its time.” The very term “Massachusetts 
Miracle,” coined by members of the Dukakis administration, further fueled a naturalized 
vision of the state’s prosperity that overemphasized the governor’s singular role in the 
turnaround. Aiming to further attach himself to the state’s economic success, Dukakis 
launched a campaign called “Creating the Future” in which he brought national corporate 
labor, and academic leaders to tour innovative businesses across Massachusetts, which 
had benefited directly from state investment.239 The campaign drew further national 
attention to the state’s economic success and Dukakis, who in 1986 the National 
Governor’s Association named the “most effective governor in America.” This honor 
impelled Dukakis to run for president the following year.240  
 
The 1988 Presidential Race  
Dukakis made his successful turnaround of the state’s economy and political 
structure the centerpiece of his presidential campaign.241 During the first year of his 
campaign, he primarily promoted his record as governor, emphasizing the state’s 
innovative programs such as ET and REAP and how he hoped to apply a similar style of 
leadership to the presidency.  Time noted that he often appeared to be running for 
“Governor of the United States.”242 Dukakis’s vision for creating “for good jobs at good 
wages” piqued the interest of blue-collar voters in the Midwest. At the same time, his 
commitment to stimulating high-tech growth earned him a following among white-collar 
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professionals in the metropolitan areas of the Sunbelt. In order to soften his image as a 
technocrat, Dukakis also emphasized his Greek ethnicity and first-generation immigrant 
narrative of upward mobility.243 This strategy and message help earn him frontrunner 
status and the eventual nomination of the Democratic Party by the summer of 1988.  
Suburban liberal activists in Massachusetts remained supportive but not ebullient 
about Dukakis.  When deciding whether to run, Dukakis had sought the counsel of 
Jerome Grossman. While Grossman offered advice to Dukakis, he and his constituency 
did not show the same level of enthusiasm or activism as they had offered to candidates 
like Drinan and McGovern. Some members of the state’s liberal base expressed more 
excitement about Jesse Jackson and the Rainbow Coalition. During the Massachusetts 
Democratic Primary, an alliance of union members, gay voters and disillusioned 
suburban liberals and African-Americans actively campaigned for Jackson.244 The civil 
rights leader failed to defeat Dukakis on his home turf, but he came in second with 19 
percent of vote. Jackson’s success in the suburbs, particularly in the affluent South Shore 
communities of Cohasset, Duxbury, and Hingham that had virtually no African-American 
residents, created particular surprise. Experts interpreted these results as an implicit 
message to Dukakis not to veer too far to the center or right.245  Many liberals, 
nevertheless, did not join Jackson’s campaign, afraid of repeating the consequences of the 
1978 governor’s race.  CPPAX endorsed Dukakis’s candidacy but did not provide him 
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the enthusiastic grassroots organizing and energy that had been crucial for earlier state 
and national candidates.246 
 The tense relationship between Dukakis and the liberal community in the state 
and the nation nevertheless became conflated and subsumed by the strategy of 
Republican candidate Vice President George H.W. Bush. The Bush campaign recognized 
that Dukakis’s technocratic message of competence and integrity would make him a 
formidable candidate, a sentiment reinforced by the fact that he led the vice-president in 
the polls in the spring of 1988.247 Bush and his campaign manager Lee Atwater, 
therefore, used a template established by previous conservative politicians to discredit 
Democratic candidates. The campaign transformed Dukakis’s reputation as a technocrat 
into a sign of his elitism and depicted him as the quintessential “Massachusetts liberal” 
who was “out of step with the mainstream America on most social issues.” The Bush 
campaign aimed to revive the rhetoric first formulated by Richard Nixon during the 1972 
race even defining Dukakis as a “Massachusetts, McGovern-like liberal.”248 Atwater even 
called McGovern and Dukakis “two peas in a pod” and “political soul mates.”249 The 
Bush campaign relied on negative associations of Democratic social and economic 
policies in order to prove that Dukakis was “tax-and-spend,” “an old-styled liberal,” “Ted 
Kennedy liberal,” who had never seen a “tax increase he didn’t like.”250 It mattered little 
that these Bush’s accusations did not mesh with Dukakis’s fiscally conservative record. 
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The effectiveness of these messages showed the continuing power of the labels 
“Massachusetts” and “liberalism.” 251  
 Conflating elitism with Massachusetts and liberalism also protected the well-
heeled and Bay State-born Bush from attacks about his own pedigree. Bush used a series 
of keywords including  “Massachusetts,” “Harvard, ”“George McGovern,” “Ted 
Kennedy, ” “Taxachusetts,” eventually simply the abbreviation the  “L-word” to evoke 
the negative associations and resentment about both the Bay State and left-leaning 
politics and attach them to Dukakis.252 Like Edward King’s strategy in the 1978 primary, 
Bush turned to social issues of school prayer, gun control, and the death penalty to turn 
out voters. Bush, hardly a Bible belt fundamentalist himself, declared there was a “wide 
chasm” on the “questions of values between me and the liberal governor whom I’m 
running against.”253  
Bush’s attack culminated in two infamous campaign advertisements that 
intermingled the categories of race, gender and sexuality with the power of the 
Massachusetts liberal image. The first ad provided the visual counterpart to Bush’s 
accusation that Dukakis would not serve as an effective commander-in-chief. It showed 
the slightly-built Dukakis in a large military tank wearing an ill-fitting helmet. Similar to 
King’s slick advertisements, it called into doubt Dukakis’s masculinity and thereby 
evoked the stereotypes of liberal elites as weak and effeminate.254  The second and far 
more damaging TV advertisement used gender and sexuality along with race to prove 
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that Dukakis was incompetent and “soft” on crime. The spot told the story of Willie 
Horton, an African-American convicted murderer from Massachusetts who raped a white 
women during a prison furlough, and concluded by stating “Weekend Prison Passes: 
Dukakis on Crime.” The ad drew immediate outrage from civil rights and Democratic 
activists who accused Bush of trying to use racial fears and anxieties of white voters to its 
advantage. 255 These advertisements showed that despite the state of Massachusetts’ tax 
revolt, busing crisis, and support of Ronald Reagan in two elections, it could not 
overcome an assumption that it was a bastion of elite liberalism that remained out of 
touch with the rest of the nation.  
  These advertisements served as key turning points in the 1988 presidential race. 
During the fall, the Dukakis campaign proved unable to muster a meaningful response, 
and Bush came from behind to lead in nearly every poll.256 Two weeks before the 
election, opinion polls revealed that 41 percent of voters believed Dukakis would weaken 
national security and more than half believed Bush would strengthen it. Sixty-two percent 
of voters believed Bush was tough on crime, whereas only 37 thought the same of 
Dukakis.257  In the weeks before the general election, it looked as though Dukakis might 
even lose Massachusetts due to both the caricatures of the Bush campaign and news that 
the state’s fiscal climate had steadily worsened. That prediction did not come true, 
however; Dukakis did end up winning his home state by only 8 percentage points.  Bush 
won a by 6-5 vote margin overall and swept the Southern states.258  
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Dukakis’s sound defeat sent a particular disheartening message to Massachusetts 
residents, particularly liberals, since Bush’s success largely lay in mobilizing the nation’s 
resentments specifically against them. William Schneider, a political analyst, declared the 
election “proved most of the country does not want to be Massachusetts.”259 Unlike the 
1972 election when similar interpretations evoked a sense of pride and exceptionalism, in 
1988 the results became a point of embarrassment. The election appeared a referendum 
on the way of life and reputation of the Bay State that relied heavily on stereotypes and 
obscured a more complex reality. Globe Reporter Mark Muro observed, “The Bush style 
worked powerfully to pique hazy prejudices, to orchestrate old suspicions that 
Massachusetts and its institutions really are weightless, un-American.”260 The results 
showed the dangers of Massachusetts politicians trying to succeed at the national level 
even when they cultivated an image and platform of moderation. In the immediate 
aftermath of the election, Kevin Phillips warned, “It’s an awfully big albatross to come 
from Massachusetts and expect to be president.” 261 
Some progressive observers interpreted the results differently. For instance, 
economist Jeff Faux argued that Dukakis lost because he was not liberal enough to 
mobilize an enthusiastic grassroots based of support.  The tepid response to Dukakis from 
the suburban liberal activists in groups like CPPAX upholds this observation. Faux 
argued that the future of the Democratic Party depended on galvanizing a populist cross-
class, cross-race and cross-space coalition. 262 Few members of the Democratic Party, 
however, paid heed to this suggestion and listened to the advice of Kevin Phillips instead. 
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Following the 1988 election a group of politicians from the Democratic Leadership 
Council (DLC), calling themselves “New Democrats” aimed to shift the party’s symbolic 
center of gravity away from the Northeast and liberal values and move toward the South 
and the ideological center. This strategy culminated in the success campaign of Sunbelt 
populist Bill Clinton in 1992. The name “New Democrat” itself embodied their effort to 
distance the party from its liberal past.263 
The DLC’s centrist promoters have provided a distorted reinterpretation of 
Dukakis’s campaign platform that reified Bush’s attacks on its purported liberalism. The 
DLC’s efforts to remakethe  image of the Party have also obscured the clear line between 
the technocratic policies that Dukakis successfully promoted, the presidency of Jimmy 
Carter and the agenda of Bill Clinton.264 As Governor of Arkansas, Clinton had praised 
Dukakis whose approach to governance had a clear influence on his ideas about effective 
management and establishing public-private partnerships.265 During his presidency, 
Clinton advocated the shift to a high-tech service-based economy and a similar workfare 
solution to the welfare crisis that Dukakis had tested in the Bay State a decade earlier. 
These examples reveal the enduring imprint both Dukakis and Massachusetts have left on 
the national Democratic Party.  
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The 2004 Democratic National Convention in Boston symbolized the city’s effort 
to overcome its reputation for racism, the state of Massachusetts’s effort to confront its 
image as out of touch with the rest of the country, and the national Democratic Party’s 
efforts to surmount the rumors of its decline. Explaining the motivations for Boston’s 
aggressive campaign to host the event, Mayor Thomas Menino asserted, “For too many 
people around the country, when they think of Boston the image they remember is of Ted 
Landsmark getting hit with American flag. I wanted the opportunity to show people we 
are a much different city now, a city where diversity is welcome.”1 Michael Dukakis 
called on the convention organizers and Democratic presidential candidate and Bay State 
Senator John Kerry to fight back against the attacks associated with the label of 
“Massachusetts Liberal.” “There’s a lot about this state and this region that people can 
admire,” Dukakis declared, “but you have to put it out there.”2 The Democratic National 
Committee heeded this advice. “We’re going to use Boston to provide context and 
backdrop for the convention,” a spokesperson explained, “Boston stands for so many 
things that are important in this election—patriotism, health care, education.”3 
A dizzying array of events, tours, and speeches surrounding the Convention, 
therefore, worked to the dispel the reputation of Boston and Massachusetts as a 
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contradictory cauldron of racial tension, exceptional liberalism, northern elitism and high 
taxes, created by the Boston busing crisis, the results of the 1972 presidential election and 
George H.W. Bush’s attack on Dukakis in 1988. Instead, the Democratic National 
Committee showcased Boston’s booming high-tech economy, role in cutting-edge 
medical research, American Revolution landmarks and seeming racial harmony.4  Inside 
the convention hall, Kerry sought to overcome the image of Dukakis’s doomed tank ride 
by stressing his military service, support of middle-class tax cuts, and somewhat evasive 
stance on abortion and gay rights. 5 His opponent George W. Bush once again effectively 
adopted the image of Massachusetts residents as “out of touch” with “mainstream” 
values, which not even the balloons, Vietnam veterans, and centrist promises of the 
Convention could overcome.6  Kerry’s defeat in the 2004 presidential election offered the 
Democratic Leadership Council yet another Massachusetts-based cautionary tale and 
further solidified the sense that the state stood apart from the rest of the nation.   
Just as Kerry and the Bay State had difficulty shedding the label of 
“Massachusetts Liberal,” so, too, has the city of Boston experienced problems 
transcending its racially-fraught past.  Mayor Menino was correct, however, in suggesting 
that Boston has become a more racially diverse city since the 1970s. Between 1970 and 
1990 the minority of population of Boston doubled from 7 to 14.5 percent.7 During the 
1990s, Boston continued to lose its white residents and by the end of the decade had 
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transformed from “majority white” to a “majority minority” city.8 In this period, Boston 
gained many Asian, and Hispanic, and Black residents largely the result of an increase 
37,000-person increase in its foreign-born population during the decade.9 
At the beginning of the 21st century, Boston boasts one of most diverse immigrant 
communities of any major U.S. city.10 While Boston had a small Chinese population 
since the late nineteenth century concentrated in Chinatown, the end of the Vietnam War 
and crisis in Cambodia coupled with the steady growth of the knowledge-based economy, 
has pushed the city’s Asian population beyond the boundaries of Chinatown to other 
parts of the city. The city’s Asian population grew from 8,442 in 1970 to 30,452 in 1990, 
and these newcomers represented a range of countries and income levels though refugees 
from Cambodia and Vietnam have compromised a large component of this growth.11 
During the same period, Boston’s Latino population expanded from 17,940 to 59,558. 
These migrants have come primarily from Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala, and Brazil.12 Although Blacks still 
comprise the largest demographic group in Boston, immigration has also significantly 
changed its contours.  A significant percentage of the city’s black community was born in 
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Caribbean Basin, especially Haiti and the British Indies.13  In fact, roughly 80 percent of 
the city’s current black population did not reside in Boston at the time of the busing 
crisis.14  
The Metropolitan Council of Educational Opportunity (METCO) provides an 
important microcosm of the changes in Boston’s racial composition. During the 1980s 
and early 1990s the program began to face criticism that it did not serve the minority 
population of Boston equally and favored African-Americans. In the early 1990s, 32 
percent of the Boston school population was Asian, Latino or another non-black minority, 
but only 5 percent of the METCO students fell into that category. These statistics led 
Chinese-American activist and Boston School Committee member Robert Guen to accuse 
the program of not sufficiently recruiting Asian and Latino students.15 This discrepancy 
derived in part from the program’s dual roots in both the Racial Imbalance Act, which 
defined “non-white” explicitly as African-American, and the black freedom struggle of 
the 1960s. In  1994 the state heeded the criticisms of Gruen and others and began to issue 
specific guidelines for METCO recruitment. The stipulations required the program to 
reflect more accurately the changing demographics of Boston. By the 2007-2008 school 
year, the 3,274-pupil program included 2,462 African-Americans (75 percent), 552 
Latinos (17 percent), and 112 Asians (3 percent). 16 
METCO remains extremely popular among minority parents in Boston. There is 
currently a 12,000-name waitlist of Boston students seeking acceptance into the program, 
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which compromises one-fourth of all Boston residents eligible.17  Many parents sign their 
children up before their first birthday. These names reveal the continued success of  
METCO’s mission in providing quality education for students of color, which remains 
the primary reason that most parents aim to enroll their children in the program.18 In a 
clear testament to the educational opportunities the program offers, between 2002 and 
2004, 87 percent of METCO graduates went to college, more than the state's 77 percent 
rate for all students, and Boston's 54 percent rate.19 Although they discuss the hardship 
that participation entailed, the vast majority of METCO alumni have stated they would 
participate again or put their children in program if they had the chance.20 These 
respondents have consistently stated that the most important thing they gained from 
METCO was how to operate in a white world. This sentiment brings into sharp relief the 
ways in which the individualist contours of the program have failed to challenge the 
structures of metropolitan inequality.  
METCO remains fully funded by the Massachusetts government and constitutes 
one of the few programs of its kind in the nation. METCO has served as an essential 
component of the state’s effort to restore its image of liberalism and sense of tolerance in 
the aftermath of the Boston busing crisis. The state government takes pride in the 
program’s national acclaim and frequently touts its funding of METCO as a sign of its 
commitment to racial integration. METCO remains, nevertheless, the only state-funded 
racial integration program that Massachusetts offers. And, despite their consistent 
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celebrations of METCO, state politicians never suggest that the program should be  
expanded or that suburban municipalities should pay a fraction of its $20 million yearly 
budget.21 The program, therefore, has roughly remained the size it was at the time of the 
busing crisis, even as the waitlist of Boston students hoping to get involved continues to 
grow. Massachusetts remains a heavily suburbanized state and the unwillingness to 
expand the program or alter its funding structure illustrates an important way in which 
state politicians are responsive to the political priorities of white middle class 
suburbanites, whom they largely represent. 
The Supreme Court’s decision to strike down the voluntary busing plans of 
Louisville and Seattle in 2007 has made the legal future of the 44-year-old program 
uncertain.  While no case has yet arisen, many fear the ruling will either bring the end of 
the program or will force METCO to transport students on the basis of economic class. 
METCO officials have opposed using income as a substitute for race on the grounds that 
it would only reinforce stereotypes that the program has worked hard to challenge. “I’m 
not going to send a bus of poor kids to the suburbs,” longtime director Jean McGuire said 
in the aftermath of the Supreme Court decision, “That’s cruel. There are enough people 
who think that all black kids are poor as it is.”22 McGuire and other METCO officials 
have also opposed such a move since they worry it will lead suburban communities to 
withdraw participation. Suburban school officials have confirmed fears by suggesting 
that using class rather than race as the main admission criteria would reduce the 
multicultural benefits of the program for their predominately white student populations. 
Capturing the sentiment of many suburban officials, the METCO coordinator in Lincoln 
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succinctly declared: “We don’t need more white children.”23 These reactions illuminate 
the persistence of class discrimination in shaping both the mission of METCO and the 
ideology of suburban liberalism.  
The depictions of the program in these black and white terms, nevertheless, ignore 
important changes to the racial demographics within the Boston suburbs since the 1980s.  
The resurgence of technology companies kindled by the Massachusetts Miracle coupled 
with the changes in federal immigration policy has led to a surge in the Asian population 
in the Route 128 suburbs over the last thirty years. In Lexington, the Asian population 
grew from 3 to 7 percent, Newton from 2 to 4.6 percent and Brookline from 4.8 to 8.4 
percent over the course of the 1990s. 24  Unlike the largely low-income refugee 
populations concentrated in Boston, Chelsea and Lowell, newcomers in Lexington, 
Newton and Concord consist primarily of either the upwardly mobile children of earlier 
generations of immigrant families or middle-class immigrants who came to the Boston 
area to achieve a “high-tech version of the American dream.”25 “Most are like me,” 
Lexington resident Sophia Ho observed, “Immigrants who, I don’t want to use the word 
‘made it’ but who’ve been successful. They want to raise their children in a town where 
education is very important.”26 Describing why their two-year long search led them to the 
affluent suburb of Weston, Upendra Mishra, a newspaper owner and his wife a software 
engineer explained, “When we saw that every kid who graduated Weston High School 
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went on to college, without exception, we said, this is perfect. This is where we want to 
live.”27  These explanations echo the motivating factors that led many young white 
families to move to Lexington and its surrounding areas in the 1950s and 1960s and 
shows the ways in which the high-tech industry continues to remake the social dynamics 
of the historic communities along Route 128.  
The schools have become the most visible indication of the influence of this new 
population on the Route 128 suburbs. In the 1990s, for instance, about one in four new 
students in the Newton schools were Asian. The town of Acton drew a particularly 
highconcentration of international residents to work as engineers and computer scientists 
in nearby high-tech firms. 28 Between 1990 and 2000, the number of residents over age 
five who spoke Chinese at home rose more than 700 percent from 102 to 773. At one 
Acton elementary school alone, 93 of the 500 students speak a language other than 
English at home.29 Most longtime residents of the Route 128 suburbs have celebrated this 
rise in new ethnic groups in their communities. Extending the logic that led many 
residents to support METCO, these white suburbanites interpret foreign-born students as 
a means to expose their children to cultural diversity.30 In Acton, for instance, the schools 
have introduce Asian languages and history into the current curriculum on the grounds 
that it will benefit white children as well. 
White suburban residents’ selective celebrations of multiculturalism, nevertheless,  
helped to further inscribe class discrimination as a natural feature of the suburban 
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landscape. Like the fair housing movement and the METCO program, this ideology 
rooted in suburban liberalism celebrates the meritocratic achievements of middle-class 
people of color, while perpetuating the discrimination against less privileged minorities. 
For instance, the Lexington Public School system added 1,800 Asian children but 
included only 32 more African-American and 37 Latino students in the 1990s.31 In 
Needham, the growth of Asian students during the 1990s was nearly triple that of 
African-Americans and Latinos combined.32 Thus, while these demographic 
developments have helped lessen the pronounced black-white binary in the Route 128 
suburbs, they have intensified patterns of class and race inequality throughout 
metropolitan Boston.  
 While the overall suburban minority population increased during the 1990s, but so 
too did the segregation of blacks and Latinos from whites and Asians. The 2000 census 
showed that 43 percent of the state’s black population lives in Boston, almost entirely in 
the Dorchester, Mattapan and Roxbury neighborhoods, which have high levels of 
poverty, crime and struggling schools. Research has yielded that blacks have the lowest 
percentage of homeownership and the highest percentage of public housing residency of 
any racial group in Boston.33 These patterns have stretched into the neighboring suburbs. 
African-Americans represent 10 percent of the population of the affluent inner-ring 
suburb of Milton, which gives it the sixth largest percentage of black residents in the 
state. Yet nearly all of these black residents are concentrated in a less than 2-square-mile 
part of the community. Blacks compromise less than 5 percent of Milton’s population 
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outside of that area.34 Similarly the Latino population in Massachusetts has increasingly 
become concentrated in the struggling cities of Lawrence and Chelsea where they 
compromise 60 and 48 percent of the population respectively and faced similar hurdles.35  
The ineffectiveness to challenge the exclusionary zoning practices of suburban 
municipalities has directly contributed to these patterns of racial, economic and spatial 
inequality. Surveying the 2000 census, the Executive Director of the Fair Housing Center 
of Greater Boston remarked, “there is a correlation between the strength of a 
community’s resistance to 40B and the lack of diversity in those communities.”36 The 
Route 128 suburbs embody this trend, falling drastically short of the 10 percent guideline 
outlined in the 1969 Anti Snob Zoning Act (officially known as 40B).37 In Route 128 
communities like Concord and Wellesley, residents have continued to use a combination 
of 40B delay mechanisms and environmental laws to blunt the mandate of the Anti-Snob 
Zoning Act and prevented the building of even small scattered site projects.38 Many of 
the towns that have fought tooth-and-nail against affordable housing construction 
continue to participate actively in the METCO program.  In fact, residents and officials 
often deflect charges deflect charges of racial and economic exclusivity by citing their 
involvement in METCO as a justification for not building affordable housing. These 
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blockades underscore the very limited sense of responsibility of most suburban residents 
for the larger patterns of segregation and poverty in Boston. 
 During the 1980s and 1990s, changes in the patterns of suburbanization 
compounded these problems of racial and economic inequality in metropolitan Boston. In 
the 1980s many high-tech firms began shifting construction of their headquarters and 
plants to I-495, a semi-circular highway 30 miles from downtown Boston, where land 
was cheaper and more abundant than the famed Route 128 highway.39 Population 
migration quickly followed suit as large shopping centers and subdivisions joined the 
industrial parks, rapidly transforming the former farming communities along this 
corridor.40 I-495 has joined places like Loudon County in Northern Virginia as a national 
symbol of exurban sprawl.41 During the 1990s, the resurging economy brought 
Massachusetts its biggest population boom since the decade after World War II.  The area 
between I-495 and Route 128 gained 124,700 residents accounting for nearly 40 percent 
of the state’s growth. 42  This boom in the I-495 high-tech corridor, nevertheless, 
exacerbated the population declines in several Route 128 suburbs including Burlington, 
Belmont, Waltham and Wellesley.43 Few residents of color have joined in the I-495 
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migration and thus the area remains about 93 percent white, paralleling national patterns 
of suburban growth. 44  
These demographic shifts toward I-495 had important political reverberations, 
making suburban voters ever more central in shaping state and national elections. After 
Dukakis retired in 1988, the state elected Republican William Weld as its new governor. 
Weld promoted a form of “Volvo Republicanism,” a term that revealed its popularity 
among upper-middle-class white moderate suburbanites. 45  This governing philosophy, 
which another observer deemed “libertarian liberalism,” had much in common with 
Dukakis’s platform.  It combined fiscal restraint and social moderation, advocating that 
government should limit its bureaucratic reach and stay out of personal decisions like 
divorce and gay rights. 46 Weld sought to explicitly distance himself from the increased 
social conservatism of Republicans nationally and revive the party’s libertarian tradition. 
He ushered in four consecutive Republican Massachusetts governors including Mitt 
Romney in 2002, who continued Weld’s commitment to fiscal restraint and business 
development.  
The success of these Republicans in the traditionally Democratic state has 
demonstrated the growing strain of political independents in Massachusetts, especially in 
high-tech suburbs. “Neither Republicans nor Democrats define the state’s political 
psyche today,” longtime political reporter Robert L. Turner observed in 1998. 
“Independent voters—those who refuse to link themselves with any party have 
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determined most of Massachusetts’ critical elections in the last 20 years.”47 In 1990, the 
number of self-defined Independents surpassed the number of registered Democrats, 
which stagnated during the 1990s, even as Bill Clinton received his largest percentage 
vote in Massachusetts in 1996.48 These results show the increasing convergence between 
the politically moderate messages of Republican governors in Massachusetts and the 
Democratic candidates running for president.  
The results of these gubernatorial races highlight the importance of suburban 
residents in shaping Bay State politics.  As one reporter summarized, “Governors are 
made in the suburbs, where the voters are socially liberal, cautious on economics and 
wary of concentrations of power.”49 Romney’s promise not to raise taxes led him to win 
both the affluent Route 128 suburbs such as Wellesley and Marblehead and virtually 
every community along I-495. Analysts in fact recognized that the  “suburban commuter 
voter,” which they defined as affluent and politically independent professionals, made the 
difference in Romney’s decisive victory over his Democratic opponent.50 Under 
Romney’s tenure, the state continued to embody a political agenda of social liberalism 
and fiscal moderation, passing two pieces of legislation that came to set the terms of 
political and social debate across the nation.  In 2003, Massachusetts became the first 
state to legalize gay marriage, which Romney unsuccessfully tried to veto. Two years 
later, in 2005, it adopted the first state-mandated health care system. At the time, Romney 
advocated the health-care reform presenting the program in a language of individualism 
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and free-market ideology, which appealed directly to the individualist sensibility of white 
middle-class suburbanites. 51  
Romney’s success proved the power of suburban voters in Massachusetts politics 
to the state Democratic Party. Chairman of the state party Phil Johnston observed that to 
be successful politicians in Massachusetts must “fashion a message for the suburbs.” 52 
Fellow leader Glen Godis similarly declared, “If we intend to be competitive, we have to 
focus on a more moderate agenda.”53 Thus, the state Democratic Party began to search 
for ways to appeal to the so-called “SUV-driving suburbanites” who seemed to abandon 
them for Romney. 54 In 2006, Democrat gubernatorial candidate Deval Patrick 
understood well the power of social liberalism and fiscal moderation among Bay State 
suburbanites. Patrick, an African-American, had grown up poor on the South Side of 
Chicago, the product of a METCO-style program that led him to a boarding school in 
Massachusetts and then Harvard and Harvard Law School. He was the top civil rights 
official in the Justice Department in the Clinton Administration before leaving to work as 
lawyer for Texaco and Coca-Cola. His personal narrative potentially offered another 
marker that Massachusetts had resolved its racial tension. Patrick, nevertheless, explicitly 
aimed to de-center his race during the campaign and instead, like Romney, presented 
himself as an outsider and business executive with a strong commitment to fiscal 
management and transcending partisan division. He promised to bring “accountability” 
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and “leadership” and to make the state “stop dwelling on the differences between the 
right and the left and start focusing on the differences between right and wrong.”55 
This moderate message helped Patrick became the first African-American 
governor of Massachusetts and the first Democrat to hold the seat in sixteen years. He 
achieved a landslide victory across the state, bolstering his largest base of support within 
the affluent suburbs outside of Boston. In Newton, 70 percent of voters supported Patrick, 
his largest margin of victory. While his personal narrative and image compelled suburban 
residents in the Route 128 and 495 communities, it was Patrick’s promises to help local 
communities resolve their budget deficits and help keep property taxes under control that 
truly tipped the levers in his favor.56 A similar political agenda and set of biographical 
details led Barack Obama to overwhelmingly carry these highway-bound suburbs and the 
state of Massachusetts as a whole two years later.  
In January 2010 Massachusetts catapulted into the national political spotlight 
when Republican State Senator Scott Brown won the special election to fill the seat 
vacated by “liberal lion” Edward Kennedy. The first election of a Republican senator 
since 1972 did not just end the one party rule of the Massachusetts congressional 
delegation, but more notably, the Democratic Party’s super majority in the Senate. The 
seemingly improbable victory of Brown sent both the party and the nation reeling. The 
election result provided further confirmation that the despite the Democratic Leadership 
Council’s  effort to reorient the party’s image away from the Bay State, the fates of 
Massachusetts, the Democrats, and liberalism remain intimately intertwined.  
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 The widespread shock that Scott Brown victory’s occurred in “the bluest of the 
blue states” illuminates how that reputation has obscured the fiscally moderate and 
complex political realities of Massachusetts.57 The largest support for Brown emerged 
from the suburbs between the Route 128 and Route 495 rings.  These communities are 
disproptionately populated by employees of the state’s high-tech corporations who were 
also central to the success of Weld, Romney, and Patrick in each of their bids for the 
governorship.58 Democratic candidate Martha Coakley did win Lexington and Newton 
and by a smaller margin Concord, but it was not enough to offset the large turnout for 
Brown in these booming areas. Brown represented a predominately suburban and 
exurban state senate district and therefore knew how to appeal to this constituency 
presenting himself as a reformer and promising effective fiscal management and 
change.59 He, therefore, updated a bipartisan and bifurcated tradition of fiscal moderation 
and social liberalism that directly contributed to the political success of Michael Dukakis 
in 1974, Edward King in 1978, William Weld in 1990, Mitt Romney in 2002, Deval 
Patrick in 2006 and even Barack Obama in 2008.  
On the surface, Brown’s victory served as a litmus test of the public’s attitude 
toward President Obama.60 Many of the progressives who voted for Obama have joined 
in these clamors of dissatisfaction.61 The sense of disillusionment, however, demonstrates 
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a basic misunderstanding of the transformations that have occurred within liberalism and 
the Democratic Party over the course of the last fifty years. Obama’s campaign and 
policies directly embody the suburbanization and corporatization of liberalism and the 
Democratic Party. Obama has pursued a set of policies that do not aim to remake the 
structures of capitalism but, rather, to work largely within them by promoting privatized 
solutions. The president’s treatment of unequal wages of CEOs, managers and other 
highly-skilled workers as the byproduct of meritocracy rather than government subsidies 
complements the tenets of market-based individualism and middle-class entitlements at 
the heart of suburban liberalism. 62 This vision of the knowledge-based “New Economy” 
directly benefits the white-collar suburbanites in the Route 128 and Route 495 high-tech 
corridors, who have come to serve as the base of the Democratic Party over the last thirty 
years. This fiscally moderate and socially liberal agenda played a pivotal part in Obama 
winning 50 percent of suburban voters across the nation in the 2008 election, including 
many of the people in Massachusetts who led Brown to the chambers of the U.S. Senate. 
Obama’s and Brown’s victories together highlight the importance of the suburbs in 
shaping the political agenda and priorities of both of the state and the country as a whole. 
Ultimately, these results reveal that Massachusetts, and its suburban residents, embody 
the archetype for, not the exception to, understanding the changes in Democratic Party 
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